Punic Wars, 264 Bc

By André Geraque Kiffer

The three wars fought between Rome and Carthage (from the Phoenician Kart hadasht, new city) from the 3rd century BC are called the Punic Wars (from the Latin poeni, Phoenicians). Domination of the Mediterranean was at stake. From the “Hundred Years’ War” fought between Carthage and Rome, we will analyze how the Carthaginians could have better faced the Roman “Total War” policy, guided by the concepts of Karl von Clausewitz in his work “Vom Kriege” (On War). We will also analyze, guided by the concepts of Sun Tzu in his work “The Art of War” and Julian Stafford Corbett in his “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy”, how the Carthaginians could, since 264 BC, have privileged the use of a strategy of indirect approach, making use, mainly, of its initial maritime superiority. Let s consider, to make the next simulation possible, that the political power of Carthage would have understood the risk of living in the shadow of Rome. They would understand that, despite the vocation of their people (of Phoenician origin) being essentially mercantilist, they would not be able to continue to practice it peacefully, in case the Roman Senate decided to expand their territory beyond the Italian peninsula.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Clube de Autores
• Release date: Jan 31, 2024

Book preview

ANDRÉ  GERAQUE  KIFFER

Punic  Wars,  264  BC.

A  Carthaginian  Historical

Simulation

Author’s  Edition

Resende

2019

---  Kiffer,  André  Geraque.

Punic  Wars,  264  BC.  A  Carthaginian  Historical  Simulation. André  Geraque  Kiffer.

Author’s  Edition,  Resende,  2019.

Bibliography:  209  p.  35  im.  21  cm..

1.  History.  2.  Art  of  War.  3.  War  Science.  4.  Wargames.  I. Author.  II.  Title.

ISBN  978-85-65853-17-0

2

3

My  story  will  be  less  certain  than  history;  but  whoever  wants to  relive  the  past  to  study  the  similarities  and  analogies between  human  conflicts  in  the  present  is  enough  for  me  to find  it  useful.  This  War  History  of  mine  is  a  definite achievement  and  not  an  ostentatious  work  for  a  current audience.

(André  Geraque  Kiffer)

4 PROLOGUE

I  was  inspired  to  build  this  work  by  reading  Arnold Toynbee's  book,  A  Study  of  History,  and  Trevor  N. Dupuy's  Future  Wars.  Between  2005  and  2007  I acquired  a  collection  of  board  wargames  in  New York,  and  reading  the  book  Wargame  Design published  by  Strategy  &  Tactics  Magazine consolidated  a  Matrix  for  A  Study  of  Military History.  Thus,  from  2008,  I  was  able  to  begin  an analysis  of  the  wars,  campaigns,  and  battles  of history  of  a  particular  time  and  /  or  civilization described  in  the  Smithsonian  Institute's  Atlas  of Military  History.  So  far  I  have  published  the  following series:  I.  Historical  Simulation  of  the  First  Empire Wars  in  2010;  VIII.  World  War  I  Historical Simulation  in  2011;  II.  Historical  Simulation  of  the Wars  in  Classical  Greece  in  2012;  III.  Historical Simulation  of  the  Roman  Wars  in  2016;  and  IV. Historical  Simulation  of  Wars  in  the  Medieval  Era  in 2018.  In  2014,  to  continue  my  work"  A  Study  of

Military  History  ,  I  read  the  book  Japanese  and

5 Chinese  Chess  -  The  Science  and  Art  of  War  and added  a  new  book  The  Study  of  Wars  and  Chess Games  to  my  planned  study,  associating  the foundations  of  chess  games  with  the  principles  of Art  and  Science  of  War.  In  each  book  of  the  work  a selected  war,  campaign,  or  battle  is  studied  at  any of  the  applicable  decision  levels,  namely  the Political,  Strategic,  Operational,  Tactical,  and Technical.  Based  on  a  summary  of  the  historical  fact I  seek  to  highlight  the  decisive  fact  (s)  causing  the negative  result  (s)  before  playing  the  simulation through  a  board  wargame  -  the  actions  on  the  other side  of  the  hill  (from  the  enemy)  are  studied through  a  parallel  electronic  war  game.  In  the simulation  all  the  possibilities  of  the  purpose  of  the study  are  completed  when  the  past  of  history  is analyzed  on  the  basis  of  present  theory  and projected  into  the  future  or  revived  as  a  what  if schematic  case.  When  we  play  we  will  follow  the maxim  WIN  ALWAYS  BUT  WITH  THE  LOWEST

POSSIBLE  COST".

6 Keywords:  History.  Art  of  War.  War  Science.

Wargames.

7 SUMMARY

CHAPTER  1  –  PUNIC  WARS..................………….8 CHAPTER  2  –  CARTHAGINIAN  STRATEGIC ANALYSIS……......................................................28 CHAPTER  3  –  CARTHAGINIAN  STRATEGIC SIMULATION.................................................…….55

REFERENCES....................................................202

8 CHAPTER  1

PUNIC  WARS

For  the  reader  who  wants  an  introduction  to  the history  of  the  Wargames  and  the  historical  period  of the  Roman  Art  and  Science  of  War,  we  recommend purchasing  the  first  issue  of  this  Series.

Im  1:  The  Punic  Wars  theater.

The  Punic  Wars  (from  Latin  Poeni, Phoenicians)  are  called  the  three  wars  between

Rome  and  Carthage  (from  the  Phoenician  Kart

9 Hadasht,  New  City)  from  the  3rd  century  BC.  The Mediterranean  domain  was  at  stake.  Rome  had completed  the  unification  of  the  peninsula,  and Carthage  already  occupied  Corsica,  Sardinia,  and part  of  Sicily.  Conflict  between  the  two  imperial powers  was  inevitable.

When  considering  more  than  2,000  years  ago, it  is  understood  that  much  evidence  may  have  been misrepresented,  particularly  by  the  victors.  But  two factors  stand  out  as  the  most  likely  causes  for  the Punic  Wars:  the  Romans  saw  a  political  opportunity, in  Messina's  appeal  against  Syracuse,  to  gain advantage;  and  that  the  Carthaginians,  unlike  them, had  not  fought  for  most  of  their  domains,  and  were thus  less  prepared  militarily.  In  human  terms  nothing has  changed  to  this  day!

There  was  mutual  respect  to  the  extent  that  the opposing  military  powers  did  not  meet,  one terrestrial  Roman,  another  maritime  Carthaginian.  A third  and  final  treaty  of  alliance,  in  279  BC,  served

their  interests  well  against  the  attacks  of  the  Greek

10 Pyrrho  of  Epirus,  in  favor  of  the  colonies  of  Magna Greece  on  the  Italian  peninsula  and  Sicily.  But about  15  years  later  the  two  allies  would  enter  a  war of  over  100  years  for  mutual  extinction.

Im  2:  Sicily.

Sicily  was  a  geographical  area  strategically arranged  midway  the  two  great  powers,  and  a  great divide  of  the  Mediterranean  sea.  An  eastern  under the  Hellenistic  aegis,  a  western  under  the Carthaginian  aegis.  Until  then,  Carthage  for  lack  of military  interest,  being  sufficient  to  him  the commercial  monopoly  of  Sicily,  since  its  greater economic  interest  continued  in  Hispania;  and  Rome for  lack  of  a  navy,  the  two  had  not  disputed  the possession  of  the  island.  As  long  as  Rome  relied  on

its  roads  for  land  trade,  and  accepted  dependence

11 on  Hellenics  or  Carthaginians  for  maritime  trade, peace  would  be  maintained  ...

First  Punic  War  (264  -  241  BC)

Attacked  by  Syracuse,  Carthage's  ally,  Messina then  in  the  hands  of  Campanian  mercenaries  -  the Mamertini  -  sought  help  from  Carthage  and  Rome. The  Carthaginians  arrived  first,  occupied  Messina, and  reconciled  it  to  the  king  of  Syracuse,  Hieron.

Rome  also  decided  to  intervene.  He  named Appius  Claudius  commander  of  the  expedition.  The former,  initially  more  than  300  km  from  Sicily, dispatched  a  vanguard  that  quickly  marched, crossed  the  strait  of  Messina  and  kidnapped  the Carthaginian  admiral  Hanno,  forcing  him  to  retire.

This  aggression  involved  Rome  at  war  with Carthage  and  Syracuse.  Its  political  objective,  not very  clear  at  the  time,  was  to  conquer  the  whole island.  The  more  specific  strategic  objectives  were to  occupy  Messina,  subdue  Syracuse  and  reduce

Agrigento.

12 A  combined  Allied  attack  on  Messina  was

repulsed,  where  and  when  one  of  the  Carthaginian quinqueremes  rushed  and  ran  aground,  serving  as a  model  for  the  construction  of  a  Roman  fleet.  In 263  the  Romans  invaded  the  territories  of  Hieron, which  was  forced  to  sign  a  separate  peace  and  an alliance  pact.  In  262,  they  surrounded  and  captured the  Carthaginian  base  of  Agrigento;  but  the fortresses  of  the  western  coast  of  Sicily  were  not disturbed

Im  3:  Hamilcar  and  Hannibal.

This  is  because  the  new  Carthaginian commander  Hamilcar  Barca  -  Hannibal's  father, Carthaginian  commander  in  the  Second  Punic  War  - used  the  outside  lines  provided  by  his  naval  force  to supply  Lilybaeum,  the  main  Carthaginian  city  on  the island,  while  threatening  the  rearguard  of  Roman

land  movements.

13 Therefore  Rome  confirmed  that,  to  win  in  Sicily,

her  legions  were  not  enough,  she  would  need  a navy  to  challenge  Carthaginian  superiority.  To compensate  for  the  little  Roman  tradition  in seamanship  in  the  face  of  the  new  Phoenicians,  the Romans  appealed  to  adapt  siege  artifacts  to  ships, such  as  the  Corvus  ,  a  tugboat  that  allowed  the assault  of  embarked  troops.

Im  4:  The  Corvus.

In  260,  the  Carthaginians  suffered  a  severe naval  defeat  at  Mylae,  in  northern  Sicily,  when  the Romans,  besides  presenting  145  vessels  against 130,  were  still  surprising  by  their  approach  devices that  turned  naval  battles  into  land  battles.

After  this  tactical  naval  victory  two  strategic options  were  opened  to  the  Romans:  first  -  taking

advantage  of  the  temporary  rule  of  the  Tyrrhenian

14 sea  to  continue  the  campaigns  in  Sicily,  taking advantage  of  local  naval  superiorities  to  overpower the  Carthaginian  cities  of  the  western  coast;  or subduing  Sardinia  and  Corsica,  inhibiting  the plundering  raids  of  the  western  coast  of  the  Italic peninsula.  Second  -  maintain  a  strategic  defensive in  Sicily  and  attack  the  Carthaginian  territory  in Africa,  threatening  its  center  of  political  power.

The  Romans  decided  on  the  first  option,  mainly because  they  did  not  yet  have  a  naval  supremacy and  an  expedition  to  Africa  more  or  less  required this.  But  they  nevertheless  forgot  this  lack  of  means in  conducting  the  first  strategic  option,  while  trying both  divergent  strategic  actions,  namely  Sardinia- Corsica  and  Sicily.  Despite  their  success  in  Corsica in  259,  in  the  main  strategic  area,  Sicily,  the Carthaginians,  with  guerrilla  tactics  under  Hamilcar, have  stalled.

In  this  way  Rome  decided  to  invest  in shipbuilding  and  return  to  the  strategic  goal  of

attacking  in  Africa.  In  the  summer  of  256  he  set  off  a

15 fleet  of  330  vessels,  of  which  250  quinqueremes, from  the  Messina  strait  to  the  mouth  of  the  Himera river,  some  30  km  east  of  the  town  of  Agrigento, where  at  the  foot  of  mount  Ecnomus  two  legions were  waiting  to  be  shipped  on  the  African expedition.  A  Carthaginian  fleet,  also  strong  on  330 warships,  set  sail  from  Lilybaeum  and  intercepted the  Roman.

Im  5:  Cape  Ecnomus  naval  battle.

In  the  ensuing  battle  the  Carthaginian