North Sea Campaign, 1916

By André Geraque Kiffer

British Admiral Jellicoe wanted to take the opportunity, thanks to his superior numbers, to destroy the essentials of the German fleet without major losses. He would thus leave his units free to devote themselves to other strategic objectives, including larger actions in the Mediterranean, an eventual attack in the Baltic to support Russian land forces and protection of the merchant navy in all seas. German Admiral Scheer, for his part, hoped to inflict some serious damage on the British fleet and quickly return to the protected German bay. In the scenario of the war game that will be used, in general terms, the plan of the German naval campaign for the year 1916 would have as its main objective to attract and destroy fractions of the Great British Fleet, for this purpose combining the maximum available means in concentrated actions - that were historically attempted but not coordinated throughout 1916 -, relying on the most reliable weather forecasts possible, against dispersed enemy formations and historically with problems of communication between themselves and between them and the Admiralty.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Clube de Autores
• Release date: Feb 2, 2024

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ANDRÉ  GERAQUE  KIFFER

North  Sea  Campaign,  1916.

A  German  Historical  Simulation

Author’s  Edition

Resende

2019

---  Kiffer,  André  Geraque.

North  Sea  Campaign,  1916.  A  German  Historical Simulation.  André  Geraque  Kiffer.

Author’s  Edition,  Resende,  2019.

Bibliography:  235  p.  51  im.  21  cm..

1.  History.  2.  Art  of  War.  3.  War  Science.  4.  Wargames.  I. Author.  II.  Title.

ISBN  978-85-9136-878-5

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My  story  will  be  less  certain  than  history;  but  whoever  wants to  relive  the  past  to  study  the  similarities  and  analogies between  human  conflicts  in  the  present  is  enough  for  me  to find  it  useful.  This  War  History  of  mine  is  a  definite achievement  and  not  an  ostentatious  work  for  a  current audience.

(André  Geraque  Kiffer)

4 PROLOGUE

I  was  inspired  to  build  this  work  by  reading  Arnold Toynbee's  book,  A  Study  of  History,  and  Trevor  N. Dupuy's  Future  Wars.  Between  2005  and  2007  I acquired  a  collection  of  board  wargames  in  New York,  and  reading  the  book  Wargame  Design published  by  Strategy  &  Tactics  Magazine consolidated  a  Matrix  for  A  Study  of  Military History.  Thus,  from  2008,  I  was  able  to  begin  an analysis  of  the  wars,  campaigns,  and  battles  of history  of  a  particular  time  and  /  or  civilization described  in  the  Smithsonian  Institute's  Atlas  of Military  History.  So  far  I  have  published  the  following series:  I.  Historical  Simulation  of  the  First  Empire Wars  in  2010;  VIII.  World  War  I  Historical Simulation  in  2011;  II.  Historical  Simulation  of  the Wars  in  Classical  Greece  in  2012;  III.  Historical Simulation  of  the  Roman  Wars  in  2016;  and  IV. Historical  Simulation  of  Wars  in  the  Medieval  Era  in 2018.  In  2014,  to  continue  my  work"  A  Study  of

Military  History  ,  I  read  the  book  Japanese  and

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Chinese  Chess  -  The  Science  and  Art  of  War  and added  a  new  book  The  Study  of  Wars  and  Chess Games  to  my  planned  study,  associating  the foundations  of  chess  games  with  the  principles  of Art  and  Science  of  War.  In  each  book  of  the  work  a selected  war,  campaign,  or  battle  is  studied  at  any of  the  applicable  decision  levels,  namely  the Political,  Strategic,  Operational,  Tactical,  and Technical.  Based  on  a  summary  of  the  historical  fact I  seek  to  highlight  the  decisive  fact  (s)  causing  the negative  result  (s)  before  playing  the  simulation through  a  board  wargame  -  the  actions  on  the  other side  of  the  hill  (from  the  enemy)  are  studied through  a  parallel  electronic  war  game.  In  the simulation  all  the  possibilities  of  the  purpose  of  the study  are  completed  when  the  past  of  history  is analyzed  on  the  basis  of  present  theory  and projected  into  the  future  or  revived  as  a  what  if schematic  case.  When  we  play  we  will  follow  the maxim  WIN  ALWAYS  BUT  WITH  THE  LOWEST

POSSIBLE  COST".

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Keywords:  History.  Art  of  War.  War  science.  War

games.

7 SUMMARY

CHAPTER  1  –  NORTH  SEA  CAMPAIGN,  1916......8 CHAPTER  2  –  GERMAN  NAVAL  STRATEGIC ANALYSIS..............................................................60 CHAPTER  3  –  NAVAL  STRATEGIC SIMULATION.........................................................77

REFERENCES.…................................................231

8 CHAPTER  1

NORTH  SEA  CAMPAIGN,  1916

At  the  beginning  of  1916,  admiral  Von  Pohl  had to  be  replaced  by  vice  admiral  Reinhardt  Scheer who  received  permission  from  the  emperor  to  take greater  risks.  As  early  as  May  1916,  Scheer organized  a  large-scale  attack  on  the  British  ports  of Lowestoff  and  Yarmouth.  It  was  a  total  fiasco, battlecruiser  Seydlitz  crashes  into  a  mine  without sinking,  but  had  to  return  promptly  to  the  base, while  the  rest  of  the  German  fleet,  knowing  that  the English  were  warned  in  time  and  already  at  sea, made  turnback  to  return  humiliated  to  their  bases.

The  lack  of  combat  action  associated  with continued  alertness  on  their  ships  was  beginning  to

erode  the  spirit  of  the  German  crews,  increasingly

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influenced  by  the  Social  Democratic  Workers  Party, which  has  always  opposed  the  naval  weapons  race, warning  that  this  would  lead  Germany  to  a  war against  many  nations  from  which  it  could  never  win.

Millions  of  Germans  were  bogged  down  in  the trenches,  uselessly  sacrificing  their  lives.  The English,  at  least,  felt  that  the  seas  of  the  planet belonged  to  them,  even  standing  in  the  cold  regions of  Scotland  and  the  Orcades.  They  dominated  the maritime  space  because  they  were  allies  of  the remaining  four  maritime  powers:  the  still  neutral  US, Japan,  France  and  Italy,  already  allies  of  Great Britain.

Even  so,  the  bulk  of  his  navy  was  tied  to  well- sheltered  ports,  haunted  by  the  ghost  of  the German  navy.  Shortly  after  the  failed  German attack,  the  English  assemble  the  first  two  air  attacks in  history  from  seaplane  transports,  but  to  no  avail.

Admiral  Scheer  then  decided  to  change  naval strategy  and  try  to  get  the  British  fleet  to  fight  near the  German  bases,  seeking  action  at  any  price,  so

that  from  April  24,  1916,  the  Germans  restricted  the

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submarine  war  due  to  the  threat  of  the  United States  enter  the  war.  He  decided  to  attack  the  port of  Sunderland  to  make  the  British  fall  into  an ambush  of  submarines.

Scheer  understood  that  submarines  could successfully  complement  the  activity  of  surface squadrons.  Eighteen  units  were  sent  to  the  English shores  to  ambush  Jellicoe's  Pentland  Firth  fleet  and Beatty's  Firth  of  Forth  fleet.  Three  submarines  were supposed  to  lay  mines  near  Scapa  Flow.

Thus  supported,  Scheer  planned  a  major combat  action  for  May  29  with  several  Zeppelin airships  to  detect  in  time  the  appearance  of  the Grand  Fleet.  The  originally  scheduled  date  was  May 17,  a  few  days  after  the  submarines  left,  but  a  delay in  Seydlitz  repairs  delayed  the  event  to  29,  an excessively  windy  day  for  the  airships  to  fly.

So  Scheer  abandoned  the  idea  of  attacking Sunderland,  preferring  to  rig  his  squadron  near southern  Norway,  hoping  to  lure  only  a  few  British ships  and  destroy  them  with  ease.  To  this  end,  he

advanced  four  light  cruisers  ahead  accompanied  by

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three  destroyer  flotillas  and  followed  by  his  five battle  cruisers.

In  the  cruiser  Lützow  was  raised  the  admiral Hipper  pavilion.  Fifty  miles  back  sailed  the  bulk  of Scheer's  battleship  squadron  through  the  dredged channel  between  the  minefields  at  Horns  Reef.  The submarines  had  to  withdraw  on  June  1,  so  Scheer changed  his  battle  plan  and  left  without  even  aerial observation,  first  sailing  along  the  Danish  coast, near  the  Jutland  peninsula  or  Skagerrak,  as  it  is called  in  German.  The  idea  was  to  get  Beatty's battlecruiser  and  part  of  Jellicoe's  three  battleship squadrons  to  bump  into  German  submarines  that were  supposed  to  sink  as  many  units  as  possible.

The  British  learned  of  the  German  exit  and  also raised  their  anchors,  unaware  that  the  Germans were  also  in  force.  Each  thought  it  was  going  to  fight only  part  of  the  enemy  force.  It  was  an  exemplary case  of  the  failure  of  game  theory,  in  this  case  war. Both  naval  formations  cost  more  than  the  gross domestic  product  of  the  two  great  powers,  though

then  hardly  any  talk  of  econometric  measures.

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The  Grand  Fleet  (British)  totaled  a  little  over one  million  tons  with  60,000  men,  while  the Hochseeflotte  (German  High  Seas  Fleet)  grouped 600,000  tons  of  ships  and  45,000  men.  Never  in  the history  of  mankind  have  so  many  men  and  ships clashed.

Im  1:  The  North  Sea  Theater  of  Operations.

The  study  will  begin  by  characterizing  the  key aspects  of  the  maritime  theater  involved  in  the campaign.

The  North  Sea  is  an  important  part  of  the Atlantic  Ocean,  situated  between  the  British  Isles and  Northern  Europe,  where  it  occupies  an  area  of

570,000  km².

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Set  on  a  vast  continental  shelf,  its  average depths  are  around  200  m,  deepening  off  the Norwegian  coast  (731  m).  It  has  sand  banks  and,  in its  central  area,  a  submerged  plateau  -  Dogger Bank,  on  which  the  depth  is  only  20  m.  Always  free of  ice,  it  is  one  of  the  richest  fishing  areas  in  the world  and  the  center  of  active  navigation.  Rain  and fog  occur  at  all  seasons  of  the  year.

Atmospheric  conditions  had  a  great  influence on  events;  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that,  had  it  been clear  sky,  the  tactics  employed  by  both  parties would  have  been  very  different.  Clear  weather would  have  disfavoured  the  German  squadron  that sought  to  avoid  combat.

Visibility  was  relatively  good  at  the  beginning  of the  action  of  the  battlecruisers;  but  by  1615  hours this  visibility  had  diminished  considerably  to  the east,  to  the  Germans'  advantage.  By  1700  hours the  conditions  were  getting  worse  and  worse,  and as  admiral  Beatty  said:  the  silhouette  of  the  British ships  was  silhouetted  on  the  west  side  over  a  clear

horizon,  while  the  enemy  ships  were  mostly

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obscured  by  fog  and  only  showed  clearly  at intervals.

Im  2:  North  Sea  topography.

By  the  time  the  Grand  Fleet  began  fighting  the conditions  were  even  worse;  the  sky  was completely  covered,  the  sea  calm,  the  light  wind and  the  smoke  from  the  ships  joining  the  mist  made the  visibility  poor.  Extracts  from  the  reports  of  the general  officers  and  the  commanders  that  have been  published  show  that  from  1800  hours  onwards it  was  impossible  to  accurately  assess  the  distance

of  visibility.

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Im  3:  Ocean  currents.

This  varied  according  to  positions  and directions.  It  seems  that  after  1800  hours  the average  visibility  was  never  more  than  11,000 meters,  and  in  most  cases  less  than  this  figure.  In exceptional  cases  and  in  certain  directions  it  was possible  to  see  objects  for  a  very  short  time  up  to  a distance  of  14,500  meters,  but  in  other  directions nothing  beyond  1,800  or  2,700  meters  was distinguished.  After  6  pm,  any  of  the  British battleships  could  not  see  more  than  three  or  four enemy  ships  at  a  time.

Throughout  the  battle,  admiral  Jellicoe  ignored

the  strength  and  composition  of  the  German  fleet,

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and  it  was  only  possible  for  him  to  form  an  idea, thanks  to  the  swift  sights  obtained  by  rare  ships through  fog  and  smoke.  On  the  morning  of  June  1, Jellicoe  asked  for  signs  where  the  Indefatigable  ship and  others  were,  thus  showing  that  he  was  not  yet aware  of  the  losses  suffered  the  day  before  by  the British  fleet.

Im  4:  Waves  in  meters.

If,  by  examining  a  diagram  of  the  battle,  a  circle is  drawn  with  the  Iron  Duke  flagship  center  at 11,000  meters  radius,  one  can  get  a  rough  idea  of

how  Jellicoe  saw  the  situation  at  that  moment.  It  is

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still  necessary  to  remember  that  large  sections  of the  inner  surface  of  this  circle  were  hidden  by  the smoke  of  neighboring  ships.

Im  5:  Rain  and  fog.

It  would  not  be  fair,  however,  to