Summary of General Leslie R. Groves's Now It Can Be Told

By IRB Media

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.

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#1 I was offered an extremely attractive assignment overseas in mid-September, 1942. I was to be placed in charge of the Army’s part of the atomic effort. I was skeptical, but it took me several weeks to realize how overoptimistic an outlook Styer had presented.

#2 I was brought into the picture when research on the uses of atomic energy was already underway. The American-born scientists, in the main, did not have as much awareness of the danger of the situation as did their foreign-born colleagues.

#3 The American and British attempt to achieve international censorship of information relating to atomic energy was largely successful, though they were hindered by the refusal of Joliot-Curie to participate.

#4 In November 1941, Bush decided that the uranium project was growing to be of such importance that it should be outside of NDRC control. It was placed directly under the Office of Scientific Research and Development, of which NDRC was a part.

• Language: English
• Publisher: IRB Media
• Release date: Mar 29, 2022
• ISBN: 9781669376453

IRB Media

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Insights on General Leslie R. Groves's Now It Can Be Told

Contents

Insights from Chapter 1

Insights from Chapter 2

Insights from Chapter 3

Insights from Chapter 1

#1

I was offered an extremely attractive assignment overseas in mid-September, 1942. I was to be placed in charge of the Army’s part of the atomic effort. I was skeptical, but it took me several weeks to realize how overoptimistic an outlook Styer had presented.

#2

I was brought into the picture when research on the uses of atomic energy was already underway. The American-born scientists, in the main, did not have as much awareness of the danger of the situation as did their foreign-born colleagues.

#3

The American and British attempt to achieve international censorship of information relating to atomic energy was largely successful, though they were hindered by the refusal of Joliot-Curie to participate.

#4

In November 1941, Bush decided that the uranium project was growing to be of such importance that it should be outside of NDRC control. It was placed directly under the Office of Scientific Research and Development, of which NDRC was a part.

#5

The desirability of investigating the military possibilities of plutonium was emphasized by Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, of the University of California, and the Uranium Committee of the OSRD approved his proposal in December 1941.

#6

The American military requirements for the project were to end the war and to do so before their enemies could use it against them. They had to move ahead with the utmost speed.

#7

On June 25, Marshall, Nichols, and Styer met with the Uranium Committee of the OSRD. They explained that the new facility was to be called the Laboratory for the Development of Substitute Materials or DSM. I demurred on the grounds of security, but they decided to hire Stone and Webster as the over-all architect-engineer-managers.

#8

On June 29, officials of Stone and Webster met with Robins, Marshall, and me to discuss the project. They were hired on the spot. The best location was decided to be near Knoxville, Tennessee.

#9

The site chosen for the pilot reactor was the Argonne Forest, under the control of the Forest Preserve of Cook County. The Forest Commission was very co-operative, and great pains were taken to ensure that the plant would not interfere with any of the Commission’s plans for the future.

#10

In August 1942, Marshall began to recruit the non-scientific personnel needed for the Manhattan Project. He brought in a number of reserve officers who had been civilian employees of the Corps of Engineers for years, and they formed a trained and competent nucleus.

#11

I was eager to support Marshall’s project, and on September 16, I agreed to an AAA rating for the copper needed at Trail. The metal would have to be taken from the Corps of Engineers’ quota, but I didn’t realize that this would upset other projects of the Corps.

#12

I was assigned to the MED on September 17, and immediately began asking questions about the project and its prospects for success. I was horrified by the lack of theory and proven knowledge behind the project, and felt that the whole endeavor was based on possibilities rather than probabilities.

#13

I visited General Styer, and told him that I felt the best move was to get the military commission first, and then the man to carry out their policies second. I thought that the man was blunt, but his other qualities would overbalance.

#14

I had to recommend to the President that the project be abandoned because the War Production Board was unwilling to co-operate with his wishes. I did not see how we could possibly get the job done with nothing better than an AA-3 priority.

#15

On September 23, I became a brigadier general and officially took charge of the project. I outlined the general way in which I expected the MED to operate, emphasizing that we intended to avoid empire-building by utilizing to the utmost existing facilities of other government agencies.

#16