Summary of Antony Beevor's The Fall of Berlin 1945

By IRB Media

Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.

#1 The mood in Germany had changed two years before, when rumors began to circulate that General Paulus’s Sixth Army had been encircled on the Volga by the Red Army. The Nazi regime found it difficult to admit that the largest formation in the Wehrmacht was doomed to annihilation in the ruins of Stalingrad.

#2 The air-raid shelters in Berlin were overcrowded, and the foreign workers who worked there were not allowed to enter them. The German population had a deep-seated fear of the Slavic invader from the east.

#3 The bombing of Berlin polarized opinion between the hardliners and the war-weary. The majority of Germans were ready to march behind Hitler, weapons in hand, in December 1944.

#4 The German Army’s high command did not share Hitler’s enthusiasm for the offensive in the west. They feared that the plan was over-ambitious and would never reach its objective of Antwerp, the Western Allies’ main supply base.

• Language: English
• Publisher: IRB Media
• Release date: Apr 12, 2022
• ISBN: 9781669384564

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Insights on Antony Beevor's The Fall of Berlin 1945

Contents

Insights from Chapter 1

Insights from Chapter 2

Insights from Chapter 3

Insights from Chapter 4

Insights from Chapter 5

Insights from Chapter 6

Insights from Chapter 7

Insights from Chapter 8

Insights from Chapter 9

Insights from Chapter 10

Insights from Chapter 11

Insights from Chapter 12

Insights from Chapter 13

Insights from Chapter 14

Insights from Chapter 15

Insights from Chapter 16

Insights from Chapter 17

Insights from Chapter 18

Insights from Chapter 19

Insights from Chapter 20

Insights from Chapter 21

Insights from Chapter 22

Insights from Chapter 23

Insights from Chapter 24

Insights from Chapter 25

Insights from Chapter 26

Insights from Chapter 27

Insights from Chapter 28

Insights from Chapter 29

Insights from Chapter 1

#1

The mood in Germany had changed two years before, when rumors began to circulate that General Paulus’s Sixth Army had been encircled on the Volga by the Red Army. The Nazi regime found it difficult to admit that the largest formation in the Wehrmacht was doomed to annihilation in the ruins of Stalingrad.

#2

The air-raid shelters in Berlin were overcrowded, and the foreign workers who worked there were not allowed to enter them. The German population had a deep-seated fear of the Slavic invader from the east.

#3

The bombing of Berlin polarized opinion between the hardliners and the war-weary. The majority of Germans were ready to march behind Hitler, weapons in hand, in December 1944.

#4

The German Army’s high command did not share Hitler’s enthusiasm for the offensive in the west. They feared that the plan was over-ambitious and would never reach its objective of Antwerp, the Western Allies’ main supply base.

#5

Guderian was a witness to the meeting where Hitler and his military staff discussed the Soviet army’s build-up for a huge offensive in the east. He warned that the attack would take place within three weeks, but Hitler insisted that such estimates of enemy strength were preposterous.

#6

The Battle of the Bulge was a disaster for the German military. It cost them 80,000 casualties, and they used up all their fuel reserves. Hitler refused to accept that the battle was his equivalent of the Kaiserschlacht, the last great German attack of the First World War.

#7

The German holiday ended on 3 January, and people went back to work immediately. The only industry that seemed to be thriving was armaments production, directed by Hitler’s personal architect, Albert Speer.

Insights from Chapter 2

#1

The estimates of Soviet strength were not exaggerated. The Red Army had 6. 7 million men along a front that stretched from the Baltic to the Adriatic. The Eastern Front had come to believe that it would all end in death.

#2

The German attack across the Vistula was imminent. The Red Army had improved in so many ways, but some weaknesses remained. The worst was the chaotic lack of discipline, which was a result of the terrible attrition among young officers.

#3

The Red Army was a hard school for junior officers. They were treated as dehumanized by their own authorities, and many died during their first battle. But the soldiers had a strong belief that they were close to defeating the Nazis.

#4

The basic concept of the campaign had been decided by the end of October 1944. The Stavka, the Soviet supreme headquarters, was headed by Marshal Stalin. Stalin allowed commanders a latitude of action which their German counterparts envied.

#5

The Vistula offensive began on 12 January 1944, when Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front attacked out of the Sandomierz bridgehead. The snow was quite heavy and visibility almost nil.

#6

On the morning of January 14, the assault on East Prussia began with General Chernyakhovsky’s 3rd Belorussian Front. The 1st Belorussian Front, led by Zhukov, attacked from the Vistula River bridgeheads at Magnuszew and Pulawy. The 8th Guards Army and the 5th Shock Army, with heavy artillery support, broke open the third line.

#7

Stalin was in excellent spirits when he met with Eisenhower’s chief of staff, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, on 12 January. He was happy to show how well he had prepared for the Vistula River offensive. Churchill was becoming