Air Campaign In England, 1940

By André Geraque Kiffer

The Battle of Britain, also known as the Air Battle for England (German: die Luftschlacht um England) was the first major military campaign fought entirely by air forces. Historians have cited Germany s failure to destroy Britain s air defenses to force an armistice (or even a full surrender) as the first major German defeat of World War II and a crucial turning point in the conflict. In this and other historical simulations of the Second World War I do not decide my hypotheses based on the morals of one ideological faction or another. As a citizen I am a Democrat. I do seek to study the strategy, operational and/or tactical variants for the narrated, analyzed and simulated story. Therefore, in this book, I will dedicate myself to simulating how this first exclusive campaign and air battle in history would have developed if the Luftwaffe command had corrected the main operational flaws listed in my historical analysis. As a military scientific foundation, I will use the lessons learned in Operation Focus (in Hebrew: מבצע מוקד, Mivtza Moked), which was Israel s air attack at the beginning of the Six-Day War in 1967.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Clube de Autores
• Release date: Feb 2, 2024

Book preview

ANDRÉ  GERAQUE  KIFFER

Air  campaign  in  England,  1940.

A  historical  simulation

Author’s  Edition Rio  de  Janeiro

2023

---  Kiffer,  André  Geraque.

Air  campaign  in  England,  1940.  A  historical  simulation. André  Geraque  Kiffer.

Author’s  Edition,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  2023. Bibliography:  209  p.  101  im.  21  cm..

1.  History.  2.  Art  of  War.  3.  Science  of  War.  4.  War Games.  I.  Author.  II.  Title.

ISBN  978-65-00-82860-3

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3 PROLOGUE

As  a  Military  Historian  I  rely  on  a  summary  of  the historical  fact,  I  analyze  and  highlight  the  decisive factors,  before  simulating  hypotheses  what  if… hypotheses  through  a  board  game.  In  the simulation,  all  possibilities  of  the  purpose  of  the study  are  completed,  when  the  past  of  history  is analyzed  based  on  the  theory  of  the  present  and projected  for  similar  situations  in  the  future.  Since 2010  I  have  published  the  following  series  of simulations:  I.  Historical  Simulation  of  the  Wars  of the  First  Empires;  II.  Historical  Simulation  of  the Wars  in  Classical  Greece;  III.  Historical  Simulation of  the  Roman  Wars;  IV.  Historical  Simulation  of Wars  in  the  Medieval  Era;  V.  Historical  Simulation of  Wars  in  the  Modern  Era  (1453  to  1774);  VI. Historical  Simulation  of  Wars  in  the  Age  of Revolutions  (1775  to  1860);  VII.  Historical Simulation  of  Wars  in  the  Industrial  Age  (1861  to 1913);  "VIII.  Historical  Simulation  of  the  First  World

War;  IX.  Historical  Simulation  of  World  War  II;  X.

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Historical  Simulation  of  the  Cold  War  (1917  to 1991);  and  XI.  Historical  Simulation  of Contemporary  Wars  (1991  to  ...)".  I  conclude, cautioning,  that  due  to  the  broad  temporal  (more than  three  and  a  half  thousand  years)  and  spatial (the  entire  planet)  spectrum  to  which  I  have  been dedicating  my  studies,  I  am  not  attached  to  any current  and/or  past  doctrinal  systems  and,  rather,  I seek  to  present  simulations  through  concepts  that are  the  most  understandable  for  all  readers, regardless  of  their  professional  area.  Especially because,  regarding  War,  I  understand  that  the military  does  not  and  should  not  have  exclusivity. Keywords:  History.  Art  of  War.  Science  of  War.  War

Games.

5 SUMMARY

HISTORICAL  FACT…...…………….……….…....…6 HISTORICALANALYSIS………………..………….17 HISTORICAL  SIMULATION………………….…….37 ANNEXES........…………………………………….198

REFERENCES....………………………………….208

6 HISTORICAL  FACT

Development  of  aerial  strategies

Strategic  bombing  during  the  First  World  War introduced  air  raids  designed  to  panic  civilian targets  and  led  in  1918  to  the  merger  of  the  British army  and  navy  air  services  into  the  Royal  Air  Force (RAF).

Im  1:  Bombing  of  Warsaw  in  1914.

His  first  chief  of  staff,  Hugh  Trenchard,  was among  the  military  strategists  of  the  1920s,  such  as the  Italian  Giulio  Douhet,  who  saw  aerial  warfare  as a  new  way  of  overcoming  the  bloody  stalemate  of trench  warfare.

Germany  was  prohibited  from  having  a  military

air  force  by  the  1919  Treaty  of  Versailles,  and  so  its

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air  crews  trained  through  civil  and  sport  flying. Following  a  1923  memorandum,  the  airline Deutsche  Luft  Hansa  developed  designs  for  aircraft such  as  the  Junkers  Ju  52,  which  could  carry passengers  and  cargo  but  also  be  easily  adapted into  a  bomber.  In  1926,  the  Lipetsk  fighter  pilot school  began  secretly  training  German  airmen  in the  Soviet  Union.

Im  2:  The  formulators,  Douhet,  Trenchard  and  Wever.

Erhard  Milch  organized  rapid  expansion,  and after  the  Nazi  seizure  of  power  in  1933,  his subordinate  Robert  Knauss  formulated  a  theory  of deterrence  incorporating  the  ideas  of  Douhet  and Tirpitz's  Risk  Theory.  This  included  a  fleet  of  heavy

bombers  to  prevent  a  pre-emptive  strike  from

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France  and  Poland  before  Germany  could  fully rearm.  A  war  game  developed  in  1933–34  indicated the  need  for  fighters  and  antiaircraft  protection,  as well  as  bombers.

On  March  1,  1935,  the  Luftwaffe  (Air  Force) was  formally  announced,  with  Walther  Wever  as chief  of  staff.  The  1935  Luftwaffe  Doctrine  for  the Conduct  of  Air  War  (Luftkriegführung)  established air  power  within  the  overall  military  strategy,  with critical  tasks  of  achieving  air  superiority  (local  and temporary)  and  providing  battlefield  support  for  the Army  and  Navy.

Strategic  bombing  of  industries  and  transport could  be  a  decisive  long-term  option,  depending  on the  opportunity  or  preparations  of  other  armed forces.  It  could  be  used  to  overcome  a  stalemate  or when  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  economy  was sufficient  and  conclusive.

The  list  excluded  bombing  civilian  targets  to destroy  homes  or  undermine  morale,  as  this  was considered  a  waste  of  strategic  effort,  but  the

doctrine  permitted  revenge  attacks  if  German

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civilian  targets  were  bombed.  A  revised  edition  was published  in  1940,  and  the  central  tenet  of  Luftwaffe doctrine  was  that  the  destruction  of  enemy  armed forces  was  of  primary  importance.

The  RAF  responded  to  Luftwaffe  developments with  its  1934  Expansion  Plan,  a  rearmament scheme,  and  in  1936  it  was  restructured  into Bomber  Command,  Coastal  Command,  Training Command  and  Fighter  Command.

The  latter  was  commanded  by  Hugh  Dowding, who  opposed  the  doctrine  that  bombers  could  not be  stopped:  the  invention  of  radar  at  that  time  could allow  early  detection  and  prototype  monoplane fighters  were  significantly  faster.

Priorities  were  contested,  but  in  December 1937,  the  Minister  in  charge  of  Defense Coordination,  Thomas  Inskip,  sided  with  Dowding, stating  that  The  role  of  our  air  force  is  not  to  deliver an  early  knockout  blow,  but  rather    prevent  the Germans  from  inflicting  a  similar  knockdown  on  us, and  therefore  fighter  squadrons  were  as  necessary

as  bomber  squadrons.

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Im  3:  Guernica  1

1  .

The  Spanish  Civil  War  (1936–1939)  gave  the Condor  Legion  of  the  Luftwaffe  the  opportunity  to test  aerial  combat  tactics  with  its  new  planes.

First  phases  of  the  Second  World  War

The  early  stages  of  the  Second  World  War  saw successful  German  invasions  of  the  continent,  aided decisively  by  the  air  power  of  the  Luftwaffe,  which was  able  to  establish  tactical  superiority  with  great effectiveness.

The  Battle  of  France  saw  an  aggressive invasion  of  French  territory.  RAF  Fighter  Command was  desperately  short  of  trained  pilots  and  aircraft.

1

1  Extract  from  the  canvas  Guernica,  painted  in  1937,  by  the

Spaniard  Pablo  Picasso  (1881-1973),  on  display  at  the Reina  Sofia  Museum  in  Madrid.  The  painter  wanted  to

expose  the  terror  of  the  aerial  bombing  in  Spain  (1936-39).

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Im  4:  Battle  of  France  2

2  .

However,  mainly  for  political  reasons,  the  new Prime  Minister,  Churchill,  sent  fighter  squadrons  to support  operations  in  France,  where  they  suffered heavy  losses.  This  occurred  despite  Hugh Dowding's  objections  that  diverting  his  forces  would leave  the  home  defenses  crippled.

After  the  evacuation  of  British  and  French soldiers  from  Dunkirk  and  the  surrender  of  France on  June  22,  1940,  Hitler  focused  his  energies primarily  on  the  possibility  of  invading  the  Soviet

2

2  West  Point  Military  Academy  (United  States),  Department

of  Military  History,  Atlas.

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Union.  He  believed  that  the  British,  defeated  on  the continent  and  without  European  allies,  would  quickly reach  an  agreement.

German  objectives  and  guidelines

By  the  end  of  June  1940  Germany  had defeated  Britain's  allies  on  the  continent,  and  on  30 June  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  Oberkommando  der Wehrmacht  (OKW,  High  Command  of  the  Armed Forces),  Alfred  Jodl,  issued  his  review  of  options  to increase  pressure  on  Britain  to  agree  to  a negotiated  peace.

The  first  priority  was  to  eliminate  the  RAF  and gain  air  supremacy.  Intensified  air  attacks  against shipping  and  the  economy  could  affect  food supplies  and  civilian  morale  in  the  long  term. Reprisal  attacks  on  terrorist  bombings  had  the potential  to  cause  quicker  capitulation,  but  the  effect on  morale  was  uncertain.

On  the  same  day,  Luftwaffe  Commander-in- Chief  Hermann  Göring  issued  his  operational

directive:  destroy  the  RAF,  thus  protecting  German

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industry;  and  also  block  overseas  supplies  to Britain.

Im  5:  Sea  Lion,  scheduled  for  August  25th.

In  Directive  No.  16  -  on  preparations  for  a landing  operation  against  England  -  on  July  16, Hitler  demanded  readiness  by  mid-August  for  the possibility  of  an  invasion  which  he  called  Operation Sea  Lion,  unless  the  British  agreed  to  the negotiations.  The  Luftwaffe  reported  that  it  would  be ready  to  launch  its  major  attack  in  early  August

1940.

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The  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Kriegsmarine (Navy),  Grand  Admiral  Erich  Raeder,  continued  to highlight  the  impracticality  of  these