First Polish Armoured Division 1938–47: A History

By Evan McGilvray and Janusz Jarzembowski

“If the Polish armed forces are of interest to you this title covering their distinguished service during World War II should appeal to many.” —Armorama
 
The First Polish Armored Division was formed in Scotland in February 1942 from Polish exiles who had escaped first Poland and then France. Its commander, Stanislaw Maczek, and many of its men had previously served in Polish 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade (10 BKS), which had taken part in the Polish invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and given a good account of itself in the defense of Poland against German and Soviet invasion of 1939. Under Maczek’s leadership the division was trained and equipped along British lines in preparation for the invasion of France.
 
Attached to 1st Canadian Army, the division was sent to Normandy in late July 1944. It suffered heavily during Operation Totalize but went on to play a crucial role in preventing an orderly German withdrawal from the Falaise Pocket by its stand at Hill 262. They then played their part in the advance across Western Europe and into Germany.
 
This detailed history, supported by dozens of archive photos, concludes by looking at the often-poor treatment of Maczek and his men after the war.
 
“A Polish armoured division comprising volunteers from Polish refugees—it reads like a story from the Boys Own Paper . . . Astonishing!” —Books Monthly

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jul 20, 2022
• ISBN: 9781526724168

Evan McGilvray

Evan McGilvray has written several books on Polish military history for Helion and is writing a book about Poland, NATO and the failure of democracy in Poland since joining the European Union.

Book preview

Preface

This work is a further examination of the history of the First Polish Armoured Division during the traumatic years of 1938–1947. A period that convulsed Europe into hatred, naked warfare and finally a peace of sorts. Given the Russian invasion of Ukraine this year, 2022, it is obvious that some consider that the 1930s and 1940s are not over yet in east-central Europe. The very reason why many members of the division including its commander, General Stanisław Maczek, could not return to their homelands owing to annexation and occupation by the Soviet Union.

The text of this book is well illustrated with contemporary black and white images as well as modern colour photographs of uniforms and equipment worn and used by the First Polish Armoured Division; brought to life by modern enactors. As the author of the text, I would like to thank my co-author and friend Janusz Jarzembowski for his great skill and knowledge in providing not only most of the photographs of the division and the accompanying captions but also for his organization of the modern day shoots. Without Janusz’s contacts this book would have never seen the light of day and without his friends’ generosity in donating images it would have been a lot poorer. Finally let us take a moment to reflect that the challenges faced by Europe in 1939 are ours today. Like Maczek and his men, we all need to stand united in order to face down tyranny in all of its forms; today and tomorrow.

Evan McGilvray

Chapter One

1938–1940

The First Polish Armoured Division (FPAD) was one of those units that sprang up during the Second World War and then more or less disappeared as swiftly as they had appeared. However, in the short period that the FPAD was operational it revealed the talents of well-ordered Polish soldiers under the command of an extremely talented commander, General Stanisław Maczek. Later, as we shall see, Maczek’s obvious and demonstrated talents were ignored and he was allowed to retreat into obscurity as were his men.

The origins of the FPAD lay with the 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade (10 MBK) which was only formed in 1937. It was the only entirely motorized unit of the pre-war Polish army, an army that largely relied on horsed cavalry, but this was not as outdated as it might seem to the reader of the early twenty-first century. The British and French armies were only wholly motorized during the 1930s, while the German army which seemed to sweep all before it between 1939 and 1941 was hugely reliant on horses to pull its artillery, for example, which seems at odds with the images of blitzkrieg using the iconic Stuka dive-bomber as a form of flying artillery and of course the use of massed armour. The truth is somewhere in the middle.

1. Czech-Polish border, November 1938. The 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade on field exercises is greeted by civilians. Note the black leather coats which earned them the nickname of ‘The Black Brigade’. Seen here addressing a civilian is Colonel Kazimierz Dworak, commanding officer of the 24th Uhlans (Lancers) Regiment, who would later act as the assistant divisional commander in the First Polish Armoured Division, Normandy, France, 1944. (Lukasz Stozek)

2. Zaolzie, Czechoslovakia, annexed by Poland in September/October 1938. General Bortnowski, seen here wearing a greatcoat with senior officers of the 10th Cavalry Brigade, poses in front of a Polish 7TP twin-turreted tank. Standing sixth from left is Colonel Antoni Trzaska-Durski, commander of the brigade (replaced by Colonel Stanislaw Maczek in October 1938), then General Władysław Bortnowski, who commanded the group ‘Slask’, which included the brigade, during the annexation. To his left is Chief of Staff Captain Franciszek Skibiński, who went on to hold a number of commands in the First Polish Armoured Division. (Lukasz Stozek)

The Polish army between the two world wars had been allowed to fester, not only because Poland was a poor country and could not afford to modernize its army while there was also a reluctance to do so even though Poland was ruled by a military clique after 1926, but there was also a naïve assumption that after the horrors of the First World War there should be no more war and that war should indeed be outlawed; a lovely sentiment but it wasn’t going to happen anytime soon. Furthermore, the rise of fascism and other extreme political regimes across Europe ensured that this wasn’t going to happen and by the 1930s, countries like the UK and France reluctantly began to re-arm but their re-arming was a virtual modernization as it no longer included the use of horses for continental warfare at least. There were some far-flung parts of their empires that still required horses and mules, but this need not detain us here. By 1939 both the British and French armies were fully mechanized, but initially the British lacked the manpower as until that year the British relied on volunteers for their armed services while their real power lay with their navy. The French, on the other hand, may have had the men as they still used conscription, but the country lacked the political will to fight another war having suffered so terribly between 1914 and 1918. Poland did make some attempts to modernize its army, but struggled to do so given its poor financial situation; however, it did invest well in 37mm Bofors anti-tank guns which did sterling work during the 1939 September campaign when the Polish army valiantly did its best to defend its country against German invasion. However, the Polish army was totally undone once the Soviet Union invaded from the east and left Poland with a two-front war about which she could do little and so the Polish army withdrew abroad.

The future commanding officer of the future FPAD, General Stanisław Maczek, as Colonel Maczek at the end of October 1938 was made commander of 10 MBK. Maczek was very surprised at this sudden promotion as he saw it. For the previous eighteen years he had served in various regiments as he slowly climbed the promotional ladder of the Polish peacetime army. For the previous four years he had been second-in-command of the 7th Infantry Division based in Częstochowa in southern Poland. By 1938 war in Europe was very much in the air and Poland had already invaded and occupied Czech territory in Teschen at the beginning of October 1938. Maczek with 10 MBK was sent to Teschen to participate in the occupation. Without doubt, Maczek would have been uncomfortable with the situation, but as a professional soldier he said nothing. Instead he studied the latest military literature as well as the international situation regarding Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union; it made grim reading. All Maczek could do was make the best of a bad situation and prepare his troops for war.¹

3. Poland, late 1930s. A TKS tankette and a 7TP twin-turreted tank can be seen here on manoeuvres, minus their armaments. The 7TP tank version was adapted from a British Vickers design and licence-built in Poland, of which forty were fitted with two turrets mounting machine guns. The TKS was also based on a British design and was used in a variety of roles including reconnaissance. (Lukasz Stozek)

Maczek led a very successful campaign against the Germans between 1 and 17 September 1939 when he and his men were obliged to leave Poland and head for Hungary. On the afternoon of 19 September 1939, 1,500 men out of the original 3,000 men of 10 MBK who had engaged the Germans on 1 September 1939 crossed from Poland into Hungary. They entered the country as if they were on parade, carrying all their arms including heavy weapons and banners. The Hungarians were not allies but historically the Poles and Hungarians were close and Maczek considered them to be brothers but then he had been part of the Imperial Austrian Army until 1918 that had encompassed Hungary which was a kingdom within the former Austrian empire. He was also of Croat heritage; again Croatia was part of the Austrian empire. Part of the closeness of the Hungarians and the Poles was a common antipathy towards the Russians. Maczek wondered how the Hungarians were going to treat their Polish intruders; he was soon to find out.

Shortly a brigadier from the Hungarian General Staff arrived from Budapest and began to negotiate with the Poles; he was careful how he did so. Very quickly it became obvious what he was after: he wanted the Polish anti-tank guns as the Hungarian army did not have any decent anti-tank artillery. At first it seemed as if the Hungarians were making a request for the guns, but after two days orders arrived from Budapest: the Poles were to hand over the guns to the Hungarian army. Meanwhile the Poles were getting very frustrated by their inability to leave Hungary; the confiscation of their weapons made them all the more determined to leave. All the Poles wanted to do was to go to France for a second chance to fight the Germans and, after 17 September, the Soviet Union.

There was a series of long conferences between the Hungarians and the Poles as they attempted to try to decide how to proceed; the Hungarians were quite nervous of offending the Germans in how they dealt with the Poles. The result was that the entire brigade was to be interned. However, the Hungarians seemed to have taken a lax view in how they guarded their Polish internees and as a consequence, the Poles started to escape in small groups. It might have been the case that the Hungarians were possibly acting out of sympathy for the Poles or more practically just happy to get shot of this large number of well-disciplined and motivated men who were very determined to get to France, one way or another, in order to continue their war. Or, put more simply, once the Poles were out of Hungary, it was no longer a Hungarian problem.

4. Nowa Dęba, Poland 1938, 10th Cavalry Brigade. A photo of one of the two prototypes of TKS-D tankettes equipped with the Bofors wz.36 anti-tank gun. (Lukasz Stozek)

The Poles had another piece of good luck as the Polish Consulate was still operational in Budapest. From there false documentation was provided for escaping Polish servicemen. There was further help as materials necessary for escape were sent to Maczek’s internment camp disguised as a gift from a Hungarian aristocrat for the ‘poor internees’. Maczek was able to escape from Hungary with his wife and two small children dressed in civilian clothes, posing as part of a Polish diplomatic party. They travelled via Yugoslavia and Italy, which was still neutral, and then on to France, arriving on the evening of 21 October 1939. The ability to escape from internment was common among Poles in 1939 and some did it in style, receiving hospitality while on the run, notably from Yugoslavs and Polish diplomatic staff along the way. However, what is incredible is that Maczek was able to travel with his wife and children to France. Maczek may have been a resourceful man but his wife was even more so as she not only managed to escape from Poland with the children but was also able to locate her husband’s brigade and reunite them with him. During the night of 21/22 October 1939, Maczek with his family travelled to Paris and at 10 o’clock in the morning he reported to the Polish military commander, General Władysław Sikorski, at the Regina Hotel in Paris. Maczek was warmly greeted by Sikorski; they had known one another since the 1920s. Sikorski was also aware of the bravery of 10 MBK during the September campaign and the invaluable leadership during the fighting. Maczek was promoted to brigadier general and was made responsible for the training of Polish troops in France as the Poles tried to re-establish their army while in exile.²

5. Nowy Wiśnicz, Poland, 6 September 1939. An abandoned TKS tankette, minus its machine gun, from the 10th Cavalry Brigade. (Lukasz Stozek)

In France, the Poles went unnoticed as on the whole the French ignored them. At this point of the war there was little happening on the Western Front. It was the time of the ‘Phony War’. Sikorski was rebuilding the Polish army, but the French were reluctant to provide equipment until the Germans finally did invade Western Europe during May 1940. Some of the Polish troops – the infantry – were used in Norway in the Narvik campaign between April and June 1940. Maczek was commander at the Polish garrison at Coëtquidan from October 1939 until February 1940. After this he was commander of the (Polish) Light Armoured Brigade at Sainte-Cécile, near Avignion, where he remained in post until the fall of France during June 1940. Arriving at Coëtquidan must have been a depressing experience for Maczek as his men lacked everything including uniforms. Maczek recalled that Poles were converging on the base, not only those Poles already resident in France but also those, like Maczek, coming from Hungary, Romania and other parts of the world.³

Tadeusz Walewicz, a veteran of the September campaign, made certain observations of the French at that time. Walewicz had arrived in France via Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy and was sent to Coëtquidan before being sent to rejoin his former unit, 10 MBK, at Sainte-Cécile. He claimed that the French provided the Poles with a few very old tanks for training, but when Germany attacked the Low Countries on 10 May 1940 the situation changed dramatically. The French suddenly wanted 10 MBK to join the French forces that were already fighting. The brigade was not up to strength, but it was taken to a huge military depot near Paris where all the materials necessary for fighting a war including tanks, artillery pieces and ammunition were suddenly made available. The Poles were given a brief period to study the equipment and then they were entrained for the front, despite not being familiar with the new French equipment.⁴

With the German advance under way, the Polish Armoured Brigade was mobilized and all eyes were on Maczek to take the lead and deploy it against the German invasion.⁵ The Poles were to cover the French withdrawal that was fighting along the route from Avise to Moloy near Divan. The Poles made their final stand at Montbard, but were hopelessly equipped and undermanned for the task. On 17 June 1940, the brigade, lacking fuel and surrounded by the enemy, was ordered to destroy their remaining equipment and try to escape in small groups into unoccupied France known as Vichy.⁶ Maczek echoes Walewicz’s words as he too, also recalled that once France was endangered in May 1940 suddenly they wanted the Poles to defend the country having spent seven months ignoring them and being niggardly with them regarding training and equipment.⁷ On 6 June 1940 Maczek had estimated that his 10th Armoured Brigade would be ready in the next seven to ten days. The Germans attacked on 9 June 1940 and the Poles went into battle, ready or not.⁸

As could be expected, France was in chaos as civilians flocked to the roads in the hope of avoiding the invading Germans but of course this choked the roads and made it difficult for military movements. A minute from a meeting of the Cabinet of the Polish government-in-exile, still in France, reveals that the Poles had a plan to unify Polish armour and anti-tank units around the Paris area. However, not only were civilians fleeing the German advance, the enemy was also panicking them which caused further clogging of routes that the military might have been able to use.⁹ A further problem was the attitude of the French towards the Poles. The Polish army had been under French command since the defeat of Poland but surely it was a step too far when the French military tried to surrender Polish units to the Germans. Sikorski, like a great many Poles, had set great store by trusting the French army and their commanders, and so was furious when the French tried to surrender his men and refused to go along with the French plan. In a bitter row with French commanders, he decried the ‘paralyzed defeatism at the top of France’s military and political commands’.¹⁰ It was a great shock for Sikorski to discover that the French, who he had thought were friends, considered the Poles to be nothing but minor allies who the French, possibly to save their own skins, were willing to use as a bargaining chip.

The Poles were not unsympathetic towards the French and understood that they wanted to use every possible unit against the Germans in order to try to stem the enemy invasion of France, but Polish commanders were dismayed by the manner in which French commanders deployed Polish forces. Maczek and other commanders were very concerned that the French did not use Polish resources in a large formation but instead put them into the line in ‘penny packets’. Maczek sought Sikorski’s help to prevent this from happening as it was becoming quite obvious that the French were quite willing to sacrifice the Poles after months of under-equipping them and not allowing them to train properly. However, Sikorski had little influence with the French and even though he beseeched the French authorities to postpone the deployment of Polish troops for several weeks, the French commander, Marshal Pétain, insisted that the Poles enter the battle in an attempt to fight off the German invasion. Finally it became apparent to both the French and the Poles that the Germans were dictating the pace of the offensive and there was little that could be done to beat off this offensive.

6. Zhabinka, Poland, 14 September 1939. German soldiers examine an abandoned Polish FT-17 light tank. Originally a French Renault design, these tanks were obsolete by 1939 and some were used on Polish armoured trains. This particular tank was from the armoured train ‘Bartosz Glowack’ (named after a peasant hero of the 1794 Kosciuszko Uprising against the Russians) which had a complement of two Renaults and four TKS tankettes and saw action during the 1939 campaign. (Janusz Jarzembowski, Armoured Hussars Archive (hereafter AHA))

Nevertheless, Maczek reported to General Huntziger, commander of the Fourth Army Group and to General Réquin, commander of the French Fourth Army, fighting near Reims. Maczek received his first orders of the campaign. His task was one that was more suited to a large motorized-armoured group and the Polish task was to cover the flanks of the French Fourth Army and those of the defences on the route towards Paris. This meant paying attention to the huge gaps between the two formations; an incredible task. The Poles found themselves between the left flank of one of General Réquin’s divisions, the 20th Infantry Division and somewhere out yonder, beyond the Poles, was the 59th Infantry Division. On the right flank, somewhere, it was believed that there was another French army, but the reality was that most of the French units by then only existed in the heads of the French staff as the Poles realized after twice making contact with the staff of the 59th Infantry Division. More or less every time the Poles tried to make contact with the division at given positions, they encountered the enemy. This meant that the Poles were unable to execute their orders which were to connect the two separated flanks of the two armies and plug the gaps between them. Owing to the deep German penetration from the west of French positions it was very clear that the Poles had little room to move, but finally decided that the best way they might be able to make some difference in the battle for France was to guard the flanks and rear of the French 20th Infantry Division, which they did.

The Poles certainly made a difference to the fighting as when the 20th Infantry Division withdrew from the marshlands of St. Gond, Polish armour was able to prevent the French division being cut off by German units striking towards Champaubert-Montigivroux. The fighting between German and Polish armour, with two squadrons of tanks under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Zgorzelski acting as a guard from the north, was short. The biggest shock to Polish armoured units came from the air as Stuka dive-bombers twice bombed the length of two Polish tank battalions, the Polish AAA platoon and Polish staff travelling in two cars. The Polish AAA platoon shot down one of the Stukas and continued to stubbornly defend against further aerial attacks.

Maczek had been caught unawares by the first Stuka attack as Polish staff cars and armour as well as its anti-tank (A/T) battery and its AAA battery were gathered in an area with little if any protection from aerial observation or indeed from aerial attacks. Therefore they moved from the lightly wooded area where they had been positioned and relocated in French infantry lines which were already overcrowded. Of course, the Polish arrival made the situation worse as positions became confused with equipment becoming blocked in and passage for vehicles heading towards the new position growing increasingly difficult.

7. Zhabinka, Poland, 14 September 1939. Two knocked-out TKS tankettes are examined by a German soldier near Zhabinka railway station and are from the Polish Armoured Train ‘Bartosz Glowack’. (AHA)

As a group, the Polish tanks could intimidate the enemy and even though the crews were safe from shrapnel bursts once within their vehicles, they still needed to find a safe harbour from serious attacks such as Stukas in their tank-busting role. One of the German aerial attacks had landed a direct hit on an ammunition truck which supplied the A/T guns. The truck went up like a torch, while its ammunition exploded with a great roar. The Stukas attacked for about an hour before finally ceasing. These attacks were stupefying. The effects of an attack that seemed as accurate and precise as the aircraft in their nose-dives, dropping vertically with their fitted screaming sirens, seemed to make the attacks almost personal. Polish troops reported that it felt as if they came towards them individually and to no one else.

The short battle, as the Poles covered the 20th Infantry Division, slowed down nearby German armour. This was discovered by reconnaissance units from the division who had, over a twenty-four-hour period, carried out the dangerous work of searching the area to the south from the marshes around St. Gond. It was also thanks to the reconnaissance work of the French division that the Poles were able to later find themselves in the unoccupied sector of France and away from the Germans. This enabled large numbers of the Poles from the division in France to leave and make their way to the UK and resume their fight against the Germans.

The situation in France continued to deteriorate and it was becoming clear to the Poles that they would have to get out of the country and to the UK; meanwhile, they still had to continue with some fighting until they were able to leave. They were still charged with the operational task of protecting the rear of the French Fourth Army but were also considering how they were going to leave France. It was difficult to decide what to do, but a large advance of enemy motorized-armoured units in the area made it quite obvious that the present offensive was coming to an end, if it wasn’t already over. There was an obvious enemy presence in the area as the 20th Division was coming into regular contact with German reconnaissance patrols, especially in the south as the enemy pressed its invasion deeper and deeper into France. Evacuation routes were becoming more and more compromised, not only due to the presence of German patrols but also by military equipment trying to move around the battlefields as well as civilian refugees fleeing the advance of the Germans and an impending occupation. Maczek was determined to ensure that he and his men were able to get away from France and not accept their fate in the resigned way that seemed to characterize those in flight from the enemy.

8. Nowy Wiśnicz, Poland, September 1939. An abandoned TKS minus its machine gun is inspected by German motorcyclists from the 4th Light Division, part of Army Group South. It was converted to the 9th Panzer Division in January 1940 and saw extensive action throughout the war. (Lukasz Stozek)

Maczek, with his staff, searched for contact with French commanders for orders and co-operation. They received orders to concentrate their forces on the River Seine. Throughout the next twenty-four hours the Poles received communications from the commander of XXIII Corps. After this things began to settle down and the Polish brigade worked with the 2nd (French) Infantry Division along a passage via the Seine heading westwards. At Bar-sur-Seine, a bridge was discovered intact. The Germans had tried to destroy it by aerial bombardment but had failed. On 15 June 1940, the Poles crossed over it and headed towards a forest area in the hope that the trees would mask their movements. Maczek discovered some French commanders who were still willing to defend their homeland and remained defiant against what seemed to be an unstoppable German advance across France. The commander of the French 42nd Infantry Division wanted to punch a way to the River Loire and make a stand there. Maczek dismissed the plan as somewhat cloud-cuckoo, but all the same he was impressed that there was still some French resistance against a background of the defeatism that had been widespread across France during May and June 1940. The prospect of a large-scale French counterattack being in the offing was good news to the ears of Maczek, but then news came of the fall of Paris. The war was more or less over in France.

The situation in France was one that Maczek refused to accept: the country had not been totally occupied and so there was a chance to escape the Germans if one travelled westwards towards the Pyrenees and neutral Spain. France still had overseas territories from where it was widely thought the French would continue to fight the war. The commander of the French 42nd Infantry Division set out on further operations and was content that the Poles were there to aid him. There was a hope that at least locally they might be able to turn the tables on the Germans as they received detailed orders, instructions and directions. The Poles moved into the Chaource forest with a single aim: to keep their tanks and vehicles fuelled, but they had no supply column from which to receive fuel. The Poles and the French only infrequently received fuel from the nearest depot, while German tanks ran on petrol and simply helped themselves from French petrol stations. The German advance destroyed the Allied supply system, which meant that by this point the Poles were almost out of fuel. Maczek noted that by the second half of June 1940 every source of supply was either in German hands, had been bombed by the Germans or destroyed by the French as they retreated. Maczek sent out vehicles to obtain fuel, but they either returned empty-handed or, more often than not, did not return. There was the same result when Maczek sent out officers or NCOs.

9. Poland, September 1939. An abandoned Polish 7TP light tank, possibly belonging to either the 1st or 2nd Light Tank Battalion. Based on a British design, it had a diesel engine and was fitted with a Bofors 37mm gun as well as a 7.9mm Ckm wz.30 machine gun mounted coaxially and was superior to the majority of German tanks encountered during the 1939 campaign. (AHA)

The Polish brigade received orders from Corps that they were to operate as an advance guard and move to Montbard on the Burgundy Canal from where they would be assured passage to the west. However, the Poles took a chance to reflect on the situation that lay before them. It was estimated that there were more than 60 kilometres of marching before them which would not be easy as they knew that there would be fighting as well as the march itself. To add to their problems they only had a small amount of fuel available in reserve. Amazingly, the situation had been reviewed and the mood became more optimistic as it was realized that they would be able to take a number of trucks and tanks with them. Colonel Duchon argued against this, but fuel was taken from surplus vehicles and tanks and the column was set up once all materials and vehicles not required were destroyed. In this way every drop of fuel was either used or destroyed; nothing was to fall into the hands of the enemy.

The Poles set out. They were not really a brigade any more but just a strong reinforced company with two motorized cavalry squadrons, combat engineers with anti-tank and anti-aircraft units attached, and they moved westwards. The Polish column thrust its way to the left and forced its way towards the Burgundy Canal. After two motorcycle patrols were sent out and not seen again, there were no further attempts at reconnaissance. It was just too absurd, not to say foolhardy, to send out further patrols if large numbers of Germans were out foraging for fuel and supplies. It had already been observed at a distance from Montbard that French vehicles, military and civilian, were turning repeatedly away in panic from the direction of advancing German motorized units that were already in Montbard complete with artillery.

10. Wola Pękoszowska, Poland, September 1939. A damaged 7TP tank from the 2nd Light Tank Battalion abandoned by the road and being examined by German soldiers. In the background is a Polish Fiat 621L truck. (Lukasz Stozek)

The Poles were aided by a French artillery officer, Captain Jean Borotra, the famous French tennis ace, who was leading his men out of Montbard. Borotra gave Maczek information that allowed him to form a plan to seize Montbard. By now the Polish column had been reduced to a small band of brave men who were facing a numerically superior enemy. The Poles also lacked field artillery, while the conventional thinking was that tanks should not attack at night or operate in forests or urban areas. Maczek knew all this and ignored it; for one thing he had nothing to lose, nor did his comrades-in-arms, and after the German invasion of their homeland they were out to punish the enemy. Maczek decided to attack Montbard at night using great violence and impetus and hoped to overawe the Germans and drive them out of the town. Maczek linked his motorized squadrons and, using the only thing that he really held – surprise – he set out with his force to retake Montbard. This is an example of Maczek at his best, doing the unexpected using unorthodox tactics; something he had done during the Polish-Ukrainian War two decades earlier. More importantly, Maczek was able to convince his men to follow him as he continued to inspire them and convince them that all was not lost and there was always hope. Years later, Maczek recalled that he could not remember where his words had come from, but he thanked God on the road before Montbard that they did and with the last of the fuel and the last chance of battle, the Poles prepared for battle and moved out westwards towards Montbard.

As Maczek had thought, the Polish armoured assault on Montbard caught the Germans totally unaware. The Polish armour swiftly rushed the road with no casualties and moved to the outskirts of the town and began to link up with other Polish units commanded by Majors Zgorzelski and Eysymont. The Poles traversed the twisting route and passed German 88mm artillery which was by then ablaze. The fighting was fierce with tanks, artillery and hand grenades all adding to the din of battle. Maczek wrote decades later of a ‘parasol of bullets and shells’. The ferocious Polish attack had its desired effect and soon the Germans were disorientated and pushed back. The tactic of ‘shock and awe’ was a trademark of Maczek and one that would become a characteristic of the First Polish Armoured Division. The Poles advanced further into the town, taking prisoners as well as engaging the Germans in some heavy fighting; the latter were beginning to find out the hard way that Polish troops were not quite the pushover they might have expected. It was learned that there was still an intact bridge over the Burgundy Canal, even though the canal was still in German hands. However, this piece of good news was soon marred as it was discovered that the nearby French division was not going to come to the Polish position but was heading instead to the south, towards Dijon.

This news was followed by the sound of an explosion: the Germans had destroyed the bridge over the Burgundy Canal to prevent the Poles from capturing it. Maczek took it as a compliment to his men that the Germans feared this despite their numerical advantage: they were concerned that the Poles may well have captured the bridge as their attacks were so fierce, they fooled the Germans into thinking that their force was in larger numbers than it actually was. It soon became obvious that the Germans had failed to destroy the bridge and so fighting broke out once more. The fighting over the bridge and its surrounding area distracted the Poles and was beginning to reduce the chances of them escaping to the west via the Burgundy Canal, especially as the Germans did outnumber the Poles which would become evident if the fighting continued. Maczek once more began to work out just how he might cross the canal with his force and felt that there was a chance of a feint by moving south and hoping to outstrip the Germans, crossing the canal and then heading westwards.

11. Lviv, Poland, September 1939. An abandoned 7TP twin-turreted tank from the Armoured Weapons Reserve Unit No. 2. The armament consisted of two wz.30 7.92mm machine guns mounted in each turret. (Lukasz Stozek)

The June nights were short which was a blessing, and there was a thick fog in the mornings which veiled the Polish withdrawal from Montbard to the forest. This included evacuation of the wounded, led by Major Eysymont. Once in the forest, the Poles reorganized themselves as they prepared a small vanguard for future operations. The overall situation in the region was rapidly changing