Bloody Verrieres, Volume 1: The I. SS-Panzerkorps Defence of the Verrieres-Bourguebus Ridges—Operations Goodwood and Atlantic, 18–22 July 1944

By Arthur W. Gullachsen and Russell Hart

“An excellent work that adds to the history of the Normandy Campaign. It also gives the armchair historian points to ponder.” —A Wargamers Needful Things
 
South of the Norman city of Caen, the twin features of the Verrières and Bourguebus ridges were key stepping stones for the British Second Army in late July 1944—taking them was crucial if it was to be successful in its attempt to break out of the Normandy bridgehead. To capture this vital ground, Allied forces would have to defeat arguably the strongest German armored formation in Normandy: the I. SS-Panzerkorps “Leibstandarte.”
 
The resulting battles of late July and early August 1944 saw powerful German defensive counterattacks south of Caen inflict tremendous casualties, regain lost ground, and at times defeat Anglo-Canadian operations in detail. Viewed by the German leadership as militarily critical, the majority of its armored assets were deployed to dominate this excellent tank country east of the Orne river. These defeats and the experience of meeting an enemy with near-equal resources exposed a flawed Anglo-Canadian offensive tactical doctrine that was overly dependent on the supremacy of its artillery forces. Furthermore, weaknesses in Allied tank technology inhibited their armored forces from fighting a decisive armored battle, forcing Anglo-Canadian infantry and artillery forces to further rely on First World War “Bite and Hold” tactics, massively supported by artillery.
 
Confronted with the full force of the Panzerwaffe, Anglo-Canadian doctrine at times floundered. In response, the Royal Artillery and Royal Canadian Artillery units pummeled the German tankers and grenadiers, but despite their best efforts, ground could not be captured by concentrated artillery fire alone. This is a detailed account of the success of I. SS-Panzerkorps’ defensive operations, aimed at holding the Vèrrieres-Bourgebus ridges in late July 1944.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Casemate Publishers
• Release date: Dec 31, 2021
• ISBN: 9781636240039

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Copyright 2021 © Arthur W. Gullachsen

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Contents

Foreword by Russell Hart

Acknowledgements

Guide to the battle map unit abbreviations

Introduction: The fighting east of the Orne, 18 July–3 August 1944

1The German way of war in Normandy, July 1944

2The I. SS-Panzerkorps on the eve of Goodwood , 17 July 1944

3The formations of the I. SS-Panzerkorps in the line, 17 July 1944

4Operation Goodwood : the attack of the 8th British Corps, 18 July 1944

5The first counter-attacks of I. SS-Panzerkorps , 18 July 1944

6The assault of the 5th Guards Armoured Brigade, 18 July 1944

718 July: the British and Germans regroup and launch more attacks

8Operation Atlantic , 18 July: the 272. Infanterie-Division is pushed back

9The Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend hold the line: Operation Goodwood , 19–20 July 1944

10 Atlantic , 19 July 1944: the Canadian infantry divisions advance

11 Atlantic , 20 July 1944: the Leibstandarte and 2. Panzer-Division counter-attack

12 Atlantic , 21 July 1944: the defeat of the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade

13 A further attack on St Andre-sur-Orne, 22 July 1944

Conclusion

Appendices

Endnotes

Bibliography

Foreword

In Bloody Verrières, the first volume of a two-volume study of the critical period 18 July–3 August 1944, Arthur Gullachsen presents a definitive account of the 1st SS Panzer Corps ferocious defence of the high ground south and south-east of Caen between 18 and 22 July 1944. He offers the most detailed, accurate, and balanced analysis of the German defence yet written. Effectively utilising the limited surviving German wartime archival records, supplemented with Anglo-Canadian archival documents, memoirs, and secondary studies, Gullachsen recreates the organisation, leadership, composition, and operations of the I SS Panzer Corps to a hitherto unprecedented degree. In doing so he demolishes four historical orthodoxies.

In a ferocious defence, the I SS Panzer Corps savaged the armored spearheads of Second British Army and effectively annihilated the 29th (British) Armoured Brigade. Yet, his most compelling conclusion is that while the Germans achieved a spectacular defensive success their victory was Pyrrhic – it was achieved only at the cost of denuding other sectors of the front of resupply and reinforcement and thereby directly contributed to the collapse of the German defence of Normandy in late July 1944. Moreover, he argues that, despite this remarkable defensive victory, the Germans were nonetheless doomed to inevitable defeat by the inept, myopic strategic micromanagement of their Führer Adolf Hitler as the Germans found themselves locked in an attritional battle that they could not possibly win. Nonetheless, superior tactics, better weaponry, greater combat experience, and the aggressive spirit of the elite Waffen-SS inflicted multiple battlefield defeats on Anglo-Canadian forces, exploiting the latter’s overreliance on artillery dominance and their inferior quality armour.

Secondly, Gullachsen demonstrates that the I SS Panzer Corps commander, SS General Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, was not, as often portrayed, a military incompetent who owed his command to being one of the closest Nazi ‘Old Fighters’ of Adolf Hitler. Instead, Gullachsen illustrates that Dietrich was actually the most experienced German commander in Normandy and that he used his expertise and that of his staff to orchestrate a masterful defensive counter-strike. Dietrich re-deployed the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler from reserve, moved it forward under sustained, repeated Allied air attack, and then launched, without infantry or artillery support, two devastatingly effective armoured counter-attacks utilising superior tactics, technology, experience, and aggression that smashed multiple Allied armoured spearheads.

Thirdly, Gullachsen concludes that the 1st SS Panzer Division played the decisive role in stalling Montgomery’s Operation Goodwood offensive, a reality that has not been sufficiently recognized hitherto. Finally, he argues that SS Lieutenant Colonel Joachim Peiper, the commander of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, played a pivotal role in Dietrich’s defensive success. A controversial figure most infamously known for his involvement in the Malmedy Massacre during the Battle of the Bulge, Gullachsen argues that Peiper achieved his most impressive military accomplishment of his career during these crucial five days.

The work begins with a detailed background that explains the German ‘Way of War’ in Normandy during summer 1944. Gullachsen demonstrates that the Second British Army faced an opponent of variable quality and capabilities that nonetheless was a military effective force still capable of inflicting grievous losses. He documents the many strengths and weaknesses of the defending German forces, concluding that they had few options but to be ‘as extremely militarily efficient and effective as possible in matters they could control’ and try to attrit the Allies to the negotiating table. Subsequent chapters provide detailed overviews of the I SS Panzer Corps’ organisation, structure, deployment, command personalities, and operational procedures on the eve of Operation Goodwood. Contrary to German doctrine, overwhelming Allied superiority compelled Dietrich to forward deploy much of his armour to backstop his frontline infantry that were incapable of resisting superior Allied firepower without armoured support. The bulk of the book then presents the most detailed examination of the corps’ defence against Operations Goodwood and Atlantic between 18 and 22 July ever written.

The result is a definitive tactical-operational study of the 1st SS Panzer Corps’ determined defence of the high ground south of Caen during those crucial late July days. Bloody Verrieres is, therefore, a must read for anyone interested in the Normandy Campaign, the German Army, the Waffen-SS, the German Way of War, and World War II.

Russell A. Hart, Ph.D.,

Professor of History, Hawai’i Pacific University

Acknowledgements

The completion of this first volume in a two-volume set in a reasonable amount of time is attributable to my wife, Michele, who provides me space to complete my various projects and supports me reaching my objectives. She is my voice of reason and guides me to the right path. Mrs Ruth Sheppard, my editor at Casemate Publishers, gave me a chance, and a contract, which of course spurred me on to the completion of the rough draft of the first volume by early July 2021. The organisation of what primary documents I had on the Canadian side were a terribly rough jumble of electronic files, and without the assistance and advice of my colleague Dr Asa McKercher, I would have been lost. He was also a huge help with the indexing. Mr. Mike Bechthold drew superb maps and was very patient with all my adjustments. These are a very important part of the book, because as far I am concerned, they are the first accurate and detailed battle maps of the events 18–22 July 1944.

I am also deeply indebted to Dr Simon Trew of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, who pushed in the right direction when I was a bit lost at times. I was also aided by the assistance, research materials and kind words of Casemate author and established Second World War military historian Douglas E. Nash, whose book From the Realm of a Dying Sun: Volume I: IV.SS-Panzerkorps and the Battle for Warsaw, July–November 1944 influenced how this book was structured, though this work is my own. I also wish to extend my sincere gratitude to the Royal Military College of Canada, whose Office of the Vice-President, Research, awarded me funding at critical points to facilitate the research effort to make this book a reality and pay for items such as maps and photograph rights.

I must also state here that this work is not intended to be a glorification, apology, misrepresentation or political endorsement in any way, shape or form for the Waffen-SS, the military arm of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP or Nazi party), or Das Heer, the wartime German regular army. Many of the historical figures described in the following pages were very much war criminals, committed atrocities and were prosecuted for those crimes at the conflict’s conclusion. While this book is an examination of military events, it must never be forgotten that the Waffen-SS officers involved were the military elite of a genocidal regime, and whose personal political stances were very much in line with those of the NSDAP party in 1944.

That said, neither is this book intended to be a verification of the strategic genius of General Bernard Montgomery or a portrayal of Anglo-Canadian forces of the late war period as tactically superior. Both sides had their strengths and weaknesses. The purpose of these two volumes is to present a critical analysis of the German defensive effort against the British Second Army in late July and early August 1944 during the Normandy Campaign. Nothing more, nothing less. Any mistakes in translation or research are my own.

So, without further ado, I hope you enjoy this first volume of a two-volume set on the twin battles of Bourguébus and Verrières ridges in July 1944, detailing the actions of those from ‘the other side of the hill.’ Many of the personalities in this account were very prominently omitted from the ‘Goodwood Narrative’ established by the British Army Camberley Staff College battlefield tours for Operation Goodwood. This is a strenuous attempt to correct that, and present a more inclusive assessment of events.

Arthur Gullachsen

Kingston, Ontario, Canada, September 2021

Battle map unit abbreviations

German

Canadian/British

INTRODUCTION

The Fighting East of the Orne, 18 July–3 August 1944

It can be argued that Allied armies in Normandy very rarely met the Germans on equal terms on the battlefield. Allied air and artillery superiority, and the rate at which new combat units and resources were delivered into the bridgehead, made this scenario virtually impossible. Operating within a disintegrating logistical and transport network and facing ongoing resistance from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, High Command of the German Armed Forces) supreme command on utilisation of available reserves, German generals faced a challenging command environment in July 1944. Multiple factors made moving resources to and around the front increasing difficult, and the ability to quickly match the Allies in sheer combat power in time to save a crisis situation was limited. Commanders in France were forced to make critical decisions on where and how to concentrate their most powerful forces, and to attempt the best they could with these ever-shrinking resources to defeat Allied attacks.

Due to the rapidly increasing combat power of the Allies, the obvious danger to the German front in Normandy by midsummer was deploying its major resources in the wrong spot. If this occurred, forces could not be rapidly shifted from one section of the front to another. An even greater danger was the very real possibility that multiple major Allied efforts could be made simultaneously. By mid-July, there were not enough German forces or resources to successfully meet two major onslaughts, and the ability to move them quickly to a threatened area of the front was limited.¹ This second scenario was exactly what occurred in late July 1944, and thus decided the military campaign in Normandy.

By late July 1944, the cumulative effects of gradual attrition during June and early July led to a complete collapse of the western Normandy defences, allowing the U.S. VII Corps to achieve a decisive breakthrough on 27 July. This breakthrough, part of the larger U.S. Operation Cobra, marked the beginning of the end for German forces in France. The conditions on the German 7. Armee front in the west facing the U.S. Army stood in stark contrast to those present south of Caen in July 1944. There, a very large number of elite Panzer-Divisionen (armoured divisions) had been concentrated to conduct a competent defence in depth against what was seen by the Germans to be the preeminent threat: an Anglo-Canadian armoured breakthrough south of Caen.

Believing the First U.S. Army could be contained in the wooded, hedgerow-encased squares of bocage country to the west and seeing this terrain as unsuitable for large-scale armoured operations, the German focus swung to the eastern part of the bridgehead in late June. Following their partial containment of the 8th British Corps (US Army corps utilise Roman numerals, while Commonwealth corps use Arabic numbers) armoured offensive, 18–20 July’s Operation Goodwood, German analysis more than ever came to the conclusion that the focus of their defensive effort must lay south of the city of Caen.² Subsequent German efforts saw the deployment of scarce powerful resources to defend two key topographical features over a roughly 13-kilometre stretch of front. From these two vantage points, perfect observation to the north, east and west could be utilised to gain excellent tactical advantages with regard to direct and indirect fire. To hold the front south of Caen and dominate the excellent tank country in the area, German commanders at all levels saw these two high features as of the highest strategic importance. Their loss would make the German Hauptkampflinie (HKL, main defensive line) untenable and unhinge their eastern defences.

The first of these terrain features was Hill (or Point) 112, and its nearby Hill 113 – these points being the height in metres above sea-level – near the village of Esquay south of the Odon River. The British attacks in June and July to capture and hold this piece of vital ground and advance south and east have been the subject of extensive study by military historians. In two epic battles between the 8th British Corps and defending elements of the I. and II. SS-Panzerkorps (SS-Pz.Korps; Waffen-SS armoured corps containing two or more divisions) during Operations Epsom and Jupiter, the attackers twice captured Hill 112 only to see it partially regained by German counter-attacks.³

The second major area of vital terrain, and the battles to control it and its villages, as illustrated in Map 1, is the subject of this two-volume set. This second elevated feature south Caen is much larger and is actually two distinct pieces of ground. The first is the smaller kidney bean-shaped Verrières Ridge, with the nearby villages of May-sur-Orne, Verrières and Fontenay-le-Marmion. The second, larger feature is Bourguébus Ridge, which encompasses the villages of Rocquancourt, Tilly-la-Campagne and Garcelles-Secqueville. The smaller Verrières feature is dominated by the height of Hill 88 and is independent in that it does not ‘connect’ with the Bourguébus feature. To aid the reader, and fly in the face of the Canadian accounts of the Verrières Ridge fighting, all points (heights in meters above sea level) as they were marked on the original British Army maps, will be referred to as hills. As an example, Point 67 is now Hill 67 to provide continuity with Hill 112 and Hill 113 across the Orne and similar references to hills in German accounts.

Topography map of Bourguébus and Verrières Ridges sectors July 1944.

The ground dips near the village of Verrières, then rises again, marking the beginning of Bourguébus Ridge. While Bourguébus Ridge ends near the village of La Hogue in the east, its height extends far to the south and is overseen by the dominating Hill 122 near the village of Cramesnil, also referred to as the Cramesnil Spur. Bisecting the western portion of Bourguébus Ridge in 1944 was the paved two-lane Route Nationale 158 (RN 158), which ran north–south at a slight north-west angle, connecting the southern industrial sections of Caen with the city of Falaise to the south.

As a result of the undulating nature of these twin features, only a small portion of their total area is observable from any one vantage point on them today. However, from virtually any point on these features in 1944, large portions of ground to Caen’s immediate south were visible, making them very useful for the observation of movement and adjustment of artillery fire. The control of both ridges was absolutely critical for the German defensive effort against what occurred in the period 18 July–3 August 1944. Multiple determined Anglo-Canadian efforts to gain the Verrières–Bourguébus Ridges and exploit south, utilising firepower to do so, were launched in late July.⁴

Because of the importance of these twin high features, Anglo-Canadian offensive operations in late July aimed at the Verrières–Bourguébus positions were met with a ferocious defence well supported by scarce powerful resources. What is not acknowledged in many works of German military history is that the Heer (German Army) and Waffen-SS (military wing of the Nazi Party) were at the height of their combat powers in the summer of 1944. Never before or again were more German armoured and infantry divisions and independent corps-level units at higher strength or better equipped, especially in Normandy.⁵ That they suffered cataclysmic defeats in this period was due primarily to the inept strategic leadership of the OKW supreme headquarters, dominated by the person of German Chancellor and Führer (leader) Adolf Hitler. Also interfering in military matters right down to the tactical level, Hitler’s micro-management of in-theatre commanders further impaired a German Westheer (Army of the West) that simply did not have the resources to match the Allies. Suffering terrible losses due to Allied air superiority and artillery supremacy, German forces were trapped in an attritional battle they did not have the resource base to win.

This is not to state that the Germans were completely helpless in July 1944. Powerful German counterattacks to the south of Caen inflicted tremendous casualties, regained lost ground and at times defeated 8th British and 2nd Canadian Corps operations in detail. These defeats and the result of meeting an enemy with near-equal resources in certain sectors exposed a flawed Anglo-Canadian offensive doctrine that was overly dependent on the battlefield supremacy of the Royal Artillery (RA) and Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA). Furthermore, weaknesses in Allied armour technology inhibited the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) and Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC) from fighting and winning a decisive armoured engagement, forcing even more reliance on Anglo-Canadian artillery and anti-tank forces that supported First World War-style ‘bite and hold’ infantry-first tactics.⁶ When faced with an enemy with superior technology in the way of armour massed to fight a decisive defensive battle, Anglo-Canadian attacks floundered and saw their infantry forces savaged by the Panzerwaffe, the German tank arm.⁷ The RA and RCA in return pummelled the German tankers and Panzergrenadiere (armoured infantry), but despite their best efforts it was found that ground could not be captured by concentrated artillery fire alone.

This massive German defensive effort saw a large number of Panzer divisions manoeuvre in a small operating area in Normandy, totally disrupting Anglo-Canadian offensive operations. This two-volume work will chronicle in detail the defensive battle fought by the I. SS-Panzerkorps (I. SS-Pz.Korps), one of the most powerful Panzerkorps in Normandy, between 18 July and 3 August 1944. It will argue that the Germans gained a defensive success, achieving their strategic aims in that sector of the front. During this time, the Korps deployed the majority of the most powerful formations available in France and came the closest of any German Korps to matching Allied combat power in its sector.⁸ However, this temporary defensive victory and the cost of stripping other sections of the front would lead to eventual disaster for the Germans when the western sector of their front collapsed.

While the massive British 18–20 July armoured assault, Operation Goodwood, has been studied intensively by European military historians and was the subject of countless British Army Staff College battlefield tours seeking to learn lessons on how to defeat Soviet tank armies in the Cold War period, no specialised study of German defensive efforts during the latter part of the month exists. Canadian military historians have produced narratives primarily using first-hand accounts of 2nd Canadian Corps operations in July and early August 1944, but little detail is provided on ‘the other side of the hill.’ Apart from German accounts and the writings of late Canadian military historian Roman Jaromowycz, descriptions of the powerful German counterattacks that came in late July are almost unknown in the western historiography of the campaign.⁹ The fighting from 18 July into the beginning of August resulted in very high Canadian and British casualties in both men and equipment, in return for minimal gains. Despite the best efforts of Anglo-Canadian forces to control and fight past the formidable Verrières and Bourguébus ridges, the Panzerwaffe struck back in a series of counterattacks that saw almost all of the vital ground remain in German hands, with heavy casualties on both sides.

While numerous works have been published on the Waffen-SS in Normandy, much of it is in French; the works in English often lack detail, presenting only an overview of events and brief sketches of personalities and formations.¹⁰ German post-war accounts written by those involved are largely based on memories rather than primary documents. To properly tell the story of the I. SS-Pz.Korps, a clear picture needed to be painted of the corps’ headquarters organisation, its commanders and its conduct of operations, with a detailed account of the defensive battles of the divisions under its command. While numerous publications exist on the Panzerwaffe and their battles in Normandy, no detailed study of a Panzerkorps in this theatre and how it actually functioned existed up until now.

Overview of British Second Army operations near Caen 18–21 July 1944.

What spurred the author to undertake this project? The subject matter of this work was influenced by the work of the aforementioned late Colonel (Canadian Army Ret’d) Roman Jaromowycz, whose 1997 McGill History PhD Dissertation, ‘The Quest for Operational Manoeuvre in the Normandy Campaign: Simonds and Montgomery Attempt the Armoured Breakout,’ provided the first details on the significant German armoured operations in July.¹¹ Another key inspiration was the writing of Colonel (U.S. Army Ret’d) Douglas E. Nash, whose ground-breaking work From the Realm of a Dying Sun: Volume I: IV. SS-Panzerkorps and the Battles for Warsaw, July–November 1944 was the first study to accurately detail how a Panzerkorps headquarters actually functioned operationally on the Eastern Front. A third influence was the late author of several histories of the Waffen-SS, Major General (British Army Ret’d) Michael Reynolds. His 1997 work Steel Inferno: I. SS Panzer Corps in Normandy was the first Anglophone work to provide a comprehensive overview of Waffen-SS operations in this theatre.¹² While not a trained historian, Reynolds’s passion for the subject allowed him to present an accurate picture of the divisions under corps command of the I. SS-Pz.Korps. Reynolds followed up this publication with a second work entitled Sons of the Reich: II SS Panzer Corps in Normandy, Arnhem, Ardennes, Eastern Front.¹³ This later book chronicled the divisional operations of the II. SS-Pz.Korps in Normandy, some formations of which were placed temporarily under I. SS-Pz.Korps command during the July fighting. This study will attempt to build upon the accomplishments of Reynolds and delve further into the inner workings of the headquarters of I. SS-Pz.Korps during its defensive battle from 18 July–3 August 1944.

Finally, this book will analyse the strategic impact of Anglo-Canadian operations in late July on the overall Germany defensive strategy in Normandy. The effect of this fighting in weakening the remaining front has not been fully integrated into the western historical explanation of why German defences in Normandy collapsed. The conclusion presented in Volume II will illustrate that the successful tying down of powerful German forces near Caen critically depleted other sections of the Normandy front. This German deployment thus allowed other Allied operations, most notably 25 July’s Operation Cobra involving U.S. forces, to succeed, sealing the fate of the German land forces in Normandy.

Western works on Normandy mention Anglo-Canadian operations in the 8th and 12th British Corps and 2nd Canadian Corps sectors, but do not acknowledge the scale of the German concentration opposing them. Nor do prominent histories of the campaign specifically highlight just how weak this concentration rendered the neighbouring German 7. Armee to the west.¹⁴ This diversion of resources deprived the 7. Armee of mobile armoured formations and the fuel and ammunition to employ them effectively to deal with a major U.S. offensive.¹⁵ And if the role of the British Second Army was pivotal in creating this situation, should the impact of Anglo-Canadian operations be acknowledged as a crucial tipping-point within the Normandy Campaign? By committing the most powerful units within the 8th British and 2nd Canadian Corps during late July to engage the mass of the available German Panzerwaffe for nearly two weeks, key strategic goals were accomplished, albeit at a terrible cost.¹⁶

The author also sought to gain a greater understanding of the commander of I. SS-Pz.Korps during the July fighting, SS-Obergruppenführer und Panzergeneral der Waffen-SS (Ogruf.) Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich. Portrayed by western military historians as a national socialist promoted well past his abilities within the Waffen-SS, a conclusive appreciation of Dietrich’s command abilities was needed. While many authors have focused on Dietrich’s reaction to the 20 July 1944 Bomb Plot and attempted assassination of Hitler in this period, the author decided more work could be done in examining his role as battlefield commander.¹⁷

Conducting the research needed for this work was a daunting task, considering the lack of primary source material. At the conclusion of the war, many documents, included the invaluable Kriegstagebucher (war diaries) maintained by the Korps and Armee Generalstabsoffiziers (General Staff Officers) of grades 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d were destroyed or, in the case of the Waffen-SS, deliberately burned in their storage archives at a castle near the village of Sasmuk in the German protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in May 1945.¹⁸

However, some primary documents did survive, and a major effort was made to obtain copies of them. The key remaining primary source relevant to the subject matter of this work is the Panzergruppe West (Pz.Gr.West) Ia Kriegstagebuch and supplementary documents for the period June–August 1944.¹⁹ As the Army-level headquarters that commanded the I. SS-Pz.Korps, one of several corps under its command as an army-level formation over the course of the campaign, documents of this organisation and the higher H.Gr. B (Army Group B) to which it was subordinate did survive. These war diaries were invaluable, as while the I. SS-Pz. Korps’ Ia Kriegstagebuch did not survive the war, its daily reports were forwarded to, and recorded in other forms by, headquarters Pz.Gr.West. These reports, reviewed before their transmission by the I. SS-Pz.Korps’ Chef des Stabes (Chief of Staff), SS-Oberführer (Obf.) Fritz Kraemer, tell the story of the daily operations of the corps and its formations. Another key surviving primary source is the July and August 1944 reports to the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen (Inspectorate of Armoured Troops), which survived the war.²⁰ These reports contained the daily status of operational armoured fighting vehicles and other strengths within the formations of the corps, and often more accurately relayed the result of operations than German war diary entries.

When confronted with a total lack of information, the liberal use of Canadian and British primary documents and secondary sources fills the gaps where no surviving German accounts of specific operations exist. Often these documents, including intelligence summaries, after-action reports and war diaries, provide a wealth of information that if pieced together supply a high level of detail. Though there are often incorrect statements, these inaccuracies can be readily exposed by comparing multiple accounts of the same event.

Every attempt has been made to present the historically accurate titles for military units and military ranks for each nation involved as they appear in primary documents in the language they were written. German ranks, units, formations, units, terms and equipment will use their German designations, and will be placed in italics. For the Waffen-SS and Heer, this means using SS-Hauptsturmführer (Hstuf.) and Aufklärungabteiling and so on. Also, a detailed chart is presented within the appendices, with Second World War British and U.S. Army rank equivalents, as well as a glossary of German terms used. For the sake of brevity, abbreviated versions of the German ranks will be used, such as Ostubaf. for SS-Obersturmbannführer (SS-Lieutenant Colonel). Divisions, corps and armies have their proper titles as they appear on archival primary documents and were typed by staff officers in each army during 1944. While German Armeen had Arabic numbers, the Allied armies’ titles were spelt out, e.g. First U.S. Army. In another example, the 8th British Corps used an Arabic numeral in wartime documents rather than the roman numerals used for the U.S. Army’s VII Corps and the Waffen-SS I. SS-Pz.Korps.

In conclusion, this two-volume work has utilised the vast majority of all relevant resources created or archived in the past 76 years to facilitate the publication of an accurate historical narrative of military operations and present new conclusions. The result is a detailed critical account of three weeks of intense German defensive warfare within a vital sector of the Normandy bridgehead front. These battles would result in temporary tactical victories for the Germans and a bloody nose for Anglo-Canadian forces, but the inability to swiftly shift the panzer divisions involved to the west, as well as the inability to cope with the attrition and movement restrictions inflicted by the Anglo-Canadian artillery and air forces, would contribute to eventual strategic defeat in France.

CHAPTER 1

The German way of war in Normandy, July 1944

Before beginning a description in the next chapter on what the I. SS-Pz.Korps was and how it functioned in late July and early August, a brief discussion of the German approach to war in Normandy in the summer of 1944 is required. By addressing a number of key topics with examples from the late June 1944 fighting in the bridgehead, the reader can better comprehend the military situation in which the Germans found themselves within their defences by mid-July.

During the Normandy fighting, Anglo-Canadian formations in the eastern portion of the bridgehead faced well-equipped, semi-mechanised units that had an adequate amount of armour and medium-quality infantry. German units at times performed well enough that there were occasions where Anglo-Canadian units suffered reverses and were driven out of their positions.¹ Luftwaffe (German air force) ground attack assets in July were active by day and night, seeking to actively bomb and strafe enemy positions.² Enemy artillery units occasionally attempted counter-battery fire and sustained bombardments of targets of importance.³ Groups of German Panzer (armoured fighting vehicles), often with infantry support, launched coordinated counterattacks that inflicted significant casualties on Anglo-Canadian units. As shown in chart 2.1, the Germans had the resources to inflict significant losses on attacking Allied units in very short periods of time. The British Second Army during this period was facing a militarily effective enemy that sought to destroy or at the very least contain the eastern section of the Normandy bridgehead established in June 1944.

Examining the three traditional combat arms of the German land forces in 1944 – these being artillery, armour and infantry – what were the strengths and weaknesses of each in Normandy? Some German combat arms units, such as the Panzergrenadiere manning the 7.5cm Pak 40 anti-tank guns of the I. Bataillon, SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 25 (I.Btl. /SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 25), provided an effective anti-tank defence against the attacking B Squadron of the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Examining this figure, it shows the anti-tank gunners inflicted significant tank casualties during the Canadian assault of 8 July before eventually being overwhelmed by multiple attacking infantry regiments and elements of armoured and anti-tank regiments.

B Squadron, 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment tank losses during Operation Charnwood. Squadron war establishment strength: 19 tanks.⁴

It was due to the performance of these units and others that the German front in Normandy did not disintegrate in June 1944 and managed to hold until early August. Other units in combat were overwhelmed by the Allies very quickly, often despite their best efforts and due to no fault of their equipment. For a multitude of reasons, these forces would only survive contact with the Anglo-Canadian enemy as cohesive fighting forces for a few hours, maybe less.⁵

The fighting in Normandy was first and foremost a campaign fought by artillery forces. Significant Allied resources were devoted to endlessly bombarding the Germans with indirect fire and providing anti-tank direct fire support to their infantry and armoured units during their operations. Faced with the challenge of providing at least an equal level of indirect and direct fire support and effective counter-battery fire to the armoured and infantry forces on the front lines, der Deutschen Artillerie forces in Normandy were overwhelmed.

The German Artillerie arm in 1944 consisted of no less than a dozen different types of units and formations within the Heer, some of which were duplicated within the Waffen-SS, from Sturmartillerie with Sturmgeschütz armoured vehicles to Festungartilleirie Batterien (batteries) operating within concrete casemates along the Atlantikwall and other fortifications.⁶ The dedicated artillery forces at the divisional level fighting within the I. SS-Pz.Korps south of Caen were the Panzer-Artillerie and Artillerie-Regimenter (regiments), each with a mixture of captured, self-propelled and towed artillery; the Panzerjäger (anti-tank) Abteilungen (detachments) that could provide direct fire support with towed Panzerabwehrkanone (Pak) anti-tank guns and Jagdpanzer turretless armoured vehicles; and the anti-aircraft Flak (Flugabwehrkanone) Abteilungen (detachments), with a mixture of light and heavy anti-aircraft guns, both towed and self-propelled. At the corps level, a mixture of schwere (heavy) Artillerie, Werfer (Rocket) and Beobachtende Artillerie (observation) Abteilung were present, often organised into Brigaden (brigades). Topping all this off were the organic mortars, Pak and Flak guns held within the infantry Grenadier, Panzergrenadier and Panzer regiments and within the divisional Pionier (engineer) Bataillon and other independent regimental and divisional companies. Independent of I. SS-Pz.Korps’ control but often involved in ground combat were the Flakabteilung of the Luftwaffe, of which in France there were a sizeable amount, often organised into Flak Korps, which often contained hundreds of light and heavy anti-aircraft guns.

Of these elements the ones with