Helion Studies in Military History Series

Learning from Foreign Wars examines how the Russian army interpreted, and what lessons it learned from the wars in Europe between 1859 and 1871, and the American Civil War. This was a time marked by rapid change - political, social, economic and technological. By raising the question of learning from foreign wars the author attempts to fill a gap in the historiography of the Russian army. The army was one of the pillars on which the Russian regime built its power, and it was crucial for the survival of the regime both in domestic and foreign affairs. The reactions and thinking of the military at a time of rapid social, political, economic, and technological change, therefore, tell a lot about the regime's ability to adjust, develop, and ultimately survive. Furthermore, the influence of foreign wars on Russian strategic war planning is analyzed with the use of the first Russian war plan of 1873 and the proceedings from the strategic conference, chaired by Alexander II, in 1873. The influence of foreign wars on the General Staff officer education is also investigated. This book is largely based on extensive research in Russian archives. Special attention is given to the military attachés and, thus, the author fills a gap in the historiography of the Russian army. It uncovers the development of the military attaché institution with the use of new archival material. The Russian military attaché reports from the European Great Powers 1859-71 and the observer reports from the different theaters of war are also examined. In addition, extensive use has been made of the military press and contemporary military literature with regard to the wars.

In 'Abolishing the Taboo', Brian Madison Jones takes a new look at the integral role played by Dwight D. Eisenhower in the creation of a new nuclear creed for the United States during the Cold War. The author centers the narrative on Eisenhower, the man, the general, and the president, with specific focus on his intellectual and political understanding of nuclear technology in general and nuclear weapons in particular. Abolishing the Taboo presents an analysis of Eisenhower's thinking about nuclear weapons since 1945 as well as a survey of nuclear developments from 1953-1961. With heavy reliance upon archival research at the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas as well as published works by Eisenhower and his confidants, Abolishing the Taboo evidences how Dwight D. Eisenhower came to believe that nuclear weapons and nuclear technology were permissible and desirable assets to help protect U.S. national security against the threat of international communism. Through an analysis of Eisenhower's words and actions, Jones shows how and why Eisenhower sought to make nuclear weapons as available, useful, and ordinary for purposes of national security as other revolutionary military technology from the past, such as the tank. Jones describes Eisenhower's assessment of the role and value of nuclear technology as profound, sincere, and pragmatic, but also simplistic, uneven, and perilous and explains that Eisenhower consistently advanced his view that strength through nuclear technology was possible, necessary, and sustainable. Abolishing the Taboo shows how Eisenhower sought to reverse the perception that nuclear weapons were inherently dangerous by advocating steadily and consistently for the proper and acceptable use of nuclear technology to contribute to the safety of the republic. The president conceived policies such as the New Look, massive retaliation, Project Plowshare, and Atoms for Peace in part to convince the American public and the international community of the U.S.'s genuine desire for peace as Eisenhower simultaneously entrenched atomic and thermonuclear weapons into the American national conscience, according to the author. Jones concludes that Eisenhower, more than any other single figure, expanded the role played by nuclear technology in American life and became the primary architect of the new American nuclear creed that made nuclear weapons and nuclear technology ordinary, abundant, and indispensable to U.S. national security in the postwar period.

Portugal was the first colonial power to arrive in Africa and the last to leave. As other European states were granting independence to their African possessions, Portugal chose to stay and fight despite the small odds of success. That it did so successfully for thirteen years across the three fronts of Angola, Guiné and Mozambique remains a remarkable achievement, particularly for a nation of such modest means. The Portugese approach to the conflict was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged national strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading the burden to the colonies, with the solution on the battlefield. Even today Portugal's systematic and logical approach to its insurgency challenge holds valuable lessons for any nation forced to wage a small war on the cheap. John P. Cann's study is both wide-ranging and comprehensive, providing a description and analysis of Portugese counterinsurgency, including aspects such as intelligence and mobility, besides discussing social and logistical operations. Whilst discussing operations that took place during the 1960s and 1970s this study remains very relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.

The Korean War (1950-1953) was the first - and only - full-scale air war in the jet age. It was in the skies of North Korea where Soviet and American pilots came together in fierce aerial clashes. The best pilots of the opposing systems, the most powerful air forces, and the most up-to-date aircraft in the world in this period of history came together in pitched air battles. The analysis of the air war showed that the powerful United States Air Force and its allies were unable to achieve complete superiority in the air and were unable to fulfill all the tasks they'd been given. Soviet pilots and Soviet jet fighters, which were in no way inferior to their opponents and in certain respects were even superior to them, was the reason for this. The combat experience and new tactical aerial combat tactics, which were tested for the first time in the skies of Korea, have been eagerly studied and applied by modern air forces around the world today. This book fully discusses the Soviet participation in the Korean War and presents a view of this war from the opposite side, which is still not well known in the West from the multitude of publications by Western historians. The reason for this, of course, is the fact that Soviet records pertaining to the Korean War were for a long time highly classified, since Soviet air units were fighting in the skies of North Korea "incognito", so to speak or even more so to write about this was strictly forbidden in the Soviet Union right up to its ultimate collapse. The given work is in essence the first major work in the post-Soviet era. First published in a small edition in Russian in 1998, it was republished in Russia in 2007. For the first time, the Western reader can become acquainted with the most detailed and informative work existing on the course of the air war from the Soviet side, now in English language. The work rests primarily on the recollections of veterans of this war on the so-called 'Red' side - Soviet fighter pilots, who took direct part in this war on the side of North Korea. Their stories have been supplemented with an enormous amount of archival documents, as well as the work of Western historians. The author presents a literal day-by-day chronicle of the aerial combats and combat work of Soviet fighter regiments in the period between 1950 and 1953, and dedicates this work to all the men on both sides who fought and died in the Korean air war.

This book investigates several controversial issues regarding the role of the Soviet Union and the performance of the Soviet government and Red Army, to which the author provides some provocative answers. The primary question explored by the author, however, regards the effectiveness of both the Red Army and of the Soviet military economy. Dr. Sokolov argues that the chief defect of the Soviet military economy was the disproportionate emphasis on the production of tanks and aircraft at the expense of transportation means and the means of command and control. This leads the author to look at the role of Lend-Lease during the war. Through the delivery of radio sets, trucks, jeeps, locomotives, fuel, explosives and so on, the author concludes that Lend-Lease was critical to the Red Army, and that the Soviet Union would not have been able to wage a long war against Germany without the Lend-Lease supplies - a conclusion that defies decades of Soviet claims to the contrary. Finally, the author looks at the still very controversial and hot topic of Red Army losses in the war, which was taboo for decades, arguing that this is an effective measure of the Red Army's military performance. He and other scholars have estimated that the Red Army's losses were on the scale of 27 million, three times larger than the official estimates, and approximately 10 times greater than the German losses on the Eastern Front. He argues that such horrendous casualties and such an unfavorable ratio for the Red Army were the result of the relatively low value placed on human life in both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and the much more destructive nature of the Soviet totalitarian regime as compared with the Third Reich, which cowed the Soviet generals and officers into total subservience. Due to the elimination of all political opposition and the total control over people's lives, soldiers and civilians could not protest against the crude tactics that resulted in such a very high rate of losses. Dr. Boris Sokolov is a prolific author and a member of the Russian branch of PEN International, which celebrates literature and promotes freedom of expression. In 2008, Dr. Sokolov was forced to resign as Professor of Social Anthropology from his post at the Russian State Social University in Moscow at the demand of President Medvedev's administration after publishing an article about the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. The author of 69 books (as of 2012), his work has focused on the history of the Second World War and has also written biographies of such prominent military and political leaders as Bulgakov, Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Tukhachevsky, Rokossovsky and Zhukov. In addition, he has written numerous articles on history, philology, political science and economics. A prominent specialist in the problems of military losses, military economy and strategy, he has given lectures in Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Denmark, and his books and articles have been translated into numerous languages. He currently resides in Moscow and is working on a biography of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. Stuart Britton is a freelance translator and editor residing in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. He has been responsible for making a growing number of Russian titles available to readers of the English language, consisting primarily of memoirs by Red Army veterans and recent historical research concerning the Eastern Front of the Second World War and Soviet air operations in the Korean War. Notable recent titles include Valeriy Zamulin's award-winning 'Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative ' (Helion, 2011), Boris Gorbachevsky's 'Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier's War on the Eastern Front 1942-45' (University Press of Kansas, 2008) and Yuri Sutiagin's and Igor Seidov's 'MiG Menace Over Korea: The Story of Soviet Fighter Ace Nikolai Sutiagin' (Pen & Sword Aviation, 2009). Future books will include Sve

During World War II, Portugal played its cards uncommonly well as a neutral and subsequently became a member of NATO. This membership resulted in a modernizing of its navy and its integration into the Atlantic Alliance. By 1960, when other colonial powers were abandoning their empires, Portugal made the decision to cling to its possessions, as they had been Portuguese for over 400 years. Without them Portugal saw itself as only a small European country, whereas with them, it would be a great nation. Portugal ultimately would fight a 13-year debilitating war against various nationalist movements in Africa to retain its possessions. By the mid-1950s, it became apparent to the Portuguese Navy that it would fight in Africa, and it began to make preparations. Ultimately, it would perform a near wholesale conversion from the blue water or oceanic navy that supported NATO to a brown water or riverine one to fight in Africa. This is the story of that conversion and the great "battle of the rivers" in Africa. This naval reorientation was a remarkable achievement, in that Portugal not only learned to fight a new kind of war, it built a navy to accomplish this and did so while shouldering its NATO commitments. The Portuguese Navy in developing a specialized naval force clearly foresaw the paramount economic, military, and psychological importance of controlling the interior waterways of Africa, for the infrastructure there was universally primitive. While there was generally a road network radiating from the colonial capital, the primary routes used clandestinely by insurgents were chiefly the waterways. The job of the navy was to foreclose enemy use of these lines of communication, and this it did with great success. The lessons from this experience tend to be forgotten, as this war was overshadowed by the U.S. conflict in Vietnam. Today, however, riverine operations are experiencing a renaissance in reaction to the "war of the weak." While modern boats are more technologically advanced, and their crews use newer and better equipment and weapons, the problems and their solutions remain largely the same. The operating environment remains the rivers, bayous, salt pans, canals, lakes, and deltas extending inland from the coast. The population remains a vulnerable target, and the need to establish a permissive environment continues as the primary goal. Clearly, the legacy of the Portuguese brown water navy remains relevant today.

Interest in the First World War, or Great War, continues unabated. New angles are sought, fresh interpretations penned. Equally, much previously published material resides long forgotten in the pages of now-rarely-consulted journals and periodicals. Landrecies to Cambrai reprints an extensive series of articles that ran, on an irregular basis, in the Army Quarterly from January 1924 until April 1939. Each article presents a detailed account of a specific German military operation on the Western Front - usually with detail down to battalion level. The author utilized an extensive array of original German sources, including regimental histories and operational-level narratives, ensuring a remarkable amount of color and detail are present in the text. Operations covered include: The night attack at Landrecies, 25 August 1914; Neuve Chapelle, 10-12 March 1915; Aubers Ridge, 9 May 1915; The fight for Hill 70, 25-26 September 1915; The German attack at Vimy Ridge, May 1916; The German defence during the Battle of the Somme July 1916; The German defence of Bernafay and Trônes Woods, 2-14 July 1916; Mametz Wood and Contalmaison, 9-10 July 1916; Delville Wood, 14-19 July 1916; The Somme, 15 September 1916; The capture of Thiepval, 26 September 1916; In front of Beaumont-Hamel, 13 November 1916; Battle of Arras, 9 April 1917; The Battle of Vimy Ridge, 9 April 1917; The fight for Inverness Copse, 22-24 August 1917; The fight for Zonnebeke, 26 September 1917; Cambrai - the action of the German 107th Division. All original maps are also included. Landrecies to Cambrai offers a unique perspective and much hitherto-overlooked material relating to a wide variety of German operations on the Western Front 1914-17.

At the beginning of the Second World War the Nazi hierarchy at an early stage, had fully recognized the importance of controlling the depiction of military conflict in order to ensure the continued morale of their combat troops by providing a bridge between the soldiers and their families. Promoting the use of photographic record also allowed the Nazis to exercise control over negative depictions of the war. In contrast, the British military and political decision makers were reluctance to embrace any potential propaganda benefits of film and photographic material in the build up to and the early months of the Second World War. Military commanders in the field were conscious that their tactical blunders could be recorded on film and still photographs and made available to the British public. Visions such as the First World War use of troops as fodder for machine guns and the ensuing mud-coated corpses of British troops were not the sort of record of the conflict that British generals in the field were willing to contemplate. British politicians and their generals feared that a realistic presentation of the horror of war could have an adverse effect on recruiting. However, pressure was to come from across the Atlantic where the refusal to allow reporting of the war was harming Britain's cause in the United States and British diplomats overseas reported that the Germans were winning the propaganda war throughout the unoccupied countries of Europe. This belated acceptance of the need for open reporting of the conflict meant that when it was finally accepted as useful the P.R.2 Section (Public Relations) at the War Office and the British Military found itself in a 'catch up' situation. Despite the disadvantages of such a slow start, the British combat cameramen grew in strength throughout the conflict, producing films such as Desert Victory, Tunisian Victory, Burma Victory, The True Glory and a huge stock of both cine and still material lodged as 'Crown Property' in the Imperial War Museum, London. The British Army Film and Photographic Unit's material represents some of the most frequently used records of historical events and key figures of the period. It is utilized by film producers and television program makers without the camera men who shot the footage being listed in program credits. This book does not seek to denigrate the work of others such as Accredited War Correspondents but it does seek to accord to the combat camera men of the A.F.P.U. the recognition they are entitled to, but have never received, for their enormous and unique contribution to the historical record of the Second World War. Based on memoirs, personal letters and interviews with the AFPU camera men, this book reveals the development of the unit and tells the human story of men who used cameras as weapons of war.

This work examines the nature of the relationship between the British Government and the Polish Government-in-Exile, 1939-1945. The relationship was extremely difficult owing to the extremity of the time and the situations of the two governments. Before 1939 there had been little contact between Poland and Britain. Between 1939 and 1945, however, the two countries were joined in a common desire for the military defeat of Germany: this was virtually the only common goal that the two governments shared; Polish ambitions to see Poland restored to its pre-war frontiers were not shared with the major allies (Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union) after 1941. The question of differing objectives caused friction between the Western allies, the Soviet Union and the Polish Government-in-Exile. As hosts the British Government was able to control the Polish Government-in-Exile but frequently found that the demands of the Soviet Government on the latter difficult to justify, although the British did so in order to maintain the unity of the alliance against Germany. However, the Polish Government-in-Exile failed to recognize its true position in the alliance: it was very much a junior partner - just another minor European power and irritant. Another problem in the relationship between the British Government and the Polish Government-in-Exile was, what kind of government was it? Between 1926 and 1939, a military clique had ruled Poland and the signs were that in exile very little had changed in the mindset of many Poles, especially those military officers who arrived in exile after 1939. This situation vexed the British Government, which sought to work with democratically minded Poles, but found this pool to be limited owing to the continuing political influence of the Polish military in exile. This attitude worsened as the war progressed until eventually the Polish Government-in-Exile lost any relevance in the war against Germany. Making full use of unpublished material and Polish sources, this is a detailed and lucid contribution to modern Polish and European history, including much information concerning the creation of the Polish Army following the end of the First World War, and the politics of the Army during the 1920s and 1930s, besides detailed coverage of its political role during the Second World War.