Africa@War Series

Battle for Cassinga is written as a firsthand account by an ordinary South African paratrooper who was at the 1978 assault on the Angolan headquarters of PLAN, the armed wing of SWAPO. The book relates why the South African government took the political risk in attacking the fortress in an external operation and examines the SWAPO claims that Cassinga was a refugee camp guarded by a few PLAN soldiers. It also explains why Sam Nujoma the SWAPO leader had no option but to perpetuate this falsehood. The battle, although a resounding success, suffered some setbacks which could have been disastrous to the South African paratroopers had they not maintained the initiative. The improvisations made by the commander Col Jan Breytenbach ensured that a flawed jump and poor intelligence did not adversely affect the outcome. The unforeseen Soviet-made anti-aircraft guns used against both aircraft and ground troops threatened to derail the attack. An appearance of a large column of armor manned by Cubans from the nearby town of Techamutete, when half the South African force had already left the battleground, placed the remaining lightly armed paratroopers in mortal danger. The landmines laid by the South Africans, together with the brave actions of the South African Air Force pilots saved the day, allowing the remaining forces to withdraw safely. Battle for Cassinga looks at all the players in a critical light. SWAPO and PLAN, the SADF and the commanders from both sides, Dimo Amaambo of PLAN and Jan Breytenbach of the SADF as well as the brave soldiers from both sides who fought for their political ideologies but perhaps, more importantly, for their own band of brothers.

Fireforce 'Writ Large' - Airborne Assault in Mozambique. Startling in its innovation and daringly suicidal, Operation Dingo was not only the Fireforce concept writ large but the prototype for all the major Rhodesian airborne attacks on the external bases of Rhodesian African nationalist insurgents in the neighboring territories of Mozambique and Zambia until such operations ceased in late 1979. Fireforce as a military concept is a 'vertical envelopment' of the enemy (first practiced by SAS paratroopers in Mozambique in 1973), with the 20mm cannon being the principle weapon of attack, mounted in an Alouette III K-Car ('Killer car'), flown by the air force commander, with the army commander on board directing his ground troops deployed from G-Cars (Alouette III troop-carrying gun ships and latterly Bell 'Hueys' in 1979) and parachuted from DC-3 Dakotas. In support would be propeller-driven ground-attack aircraft and on call would be Canberra bombers, Hawker Hunter and Vampire jets. On 23 November 1977, the Rhodesian Air Force and 184 SAS and RLI paratroopers attacked 10,000 ZANLA cadres based at 'New Farm', Chimoio, 90 kilometers inside Mozambique. Two days later, the same force attacked 4,000 guerrillas at Tembué, another ZANLA base, over 200 kilometers inside Mozambique, north of Tete on the Zambezi River. Estimates of ZANLA losses vary wildly; however, a figure exceeding 6,000 casualties is realistic. The Rhodesians suffered two dead, eight wounded and lost one aircraft. It would produce the biggest SAS-led external battle of the Rhodesian bush war.

South African Mirages and Cuban MiG-21s dogfighting over Cuito Cuanavale, the largest tank battle on African soil since El Alamein; Puma troopships shot out of the skies by Strela missiles and RPG-7 rockets; Alouette III gunships hovering menacingly above Koevoet tracker-combat teams as they close in for the kill; Hercules and Transall transports disgorging their loads of Parabats over Cassinga; suicidal helicopter hot extractions of Recce operators deep in enemy territory; and a lone Alouette pilot who disobeyed orders and under intense ground fire evacuated a critically wounded soldier … such is the story of the South African Air Force, the SAAF, over the 23-year period 1966-1989, the period of conflict that became known as the 'Border War'. Set against the backdrop of the Cold War, the SAAF was effectively South Africa's first line of defense against Soviet expansionism in southern Africa. That the Soviets, through their surrogates-the Cuban military, Angola's FAPLA and Namibia's SWAPO-sought a communist regime in South Africa is indisputable, as too was the SAAF's skill, quality, determination and capability to defeat the best Soviet air defenses of the time. This account covers all the major operations that the SAAF was involved in, from Operation Blouwildebees, the opening salvo of the conflict at Omgulumbashe, South West Africa in 1966 to the final curtain, Operation Merlyn, the so-called April Fool's Day 'war' of 1989 when the SAAF and Koevoet, almost alone, frustrated SWAPO's last throw of the dice with its illegal invasion of South West Africa. In this account, highlighting such operations as Reindeer, Bootlace/Uric, Sceptic, Protea, Daisy, Askari, Moduler, Hooper and Packer, among many, as well as the ongoing methodological operations like Lunar, Maanskyn, Donkermaan and Butterfly, Baxter examines and brings to life the squadrons and aviators that fought in both counterinsurgency and conventional warfare roles. Besides an extensive selection of rare photographs, the book features a comprehensive section on camouflage and markings and 6 pages of color aircraft profiles and insignia by noted SAAF authority William Marshall, making this title especially useful for modelers. Peter Baxter is an author, amateur historian and African field, mountain and heritage travel guide. Born in Kenya and educated in Zimbabwe, he has lived and travelled over much of southern and central Africa. He has guided in all the major mountain ranges south of the equator, helping develop the concept of sustainable travel, and the touring of battlefield and heritage sites in East Africa. Peter lives in Oregon, USA, working on the marketing of African heritage travel as well as a variety of book projects. His interests include British Imperial history in Africa and the East Africa campaign of the First World War in particular. His first book was Rhodesia: Last Outpost of the British Empire; he has written several books in the Africa@War series, including France in Centrafrique, Selous Scouts, Mau Mau and SAAF's Border War.

The end of the Cold War introduced an altered global dynamic. The old bond of East/West patronage in Africa was broken, weakening the first crop of independent revolutionary leadership on the continent who no longer had the support of one or other of the superpowers. With collapse of the Soviet Union, all this changed. The question of global/strategic security devolved into regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, characterized primarily by the Balkans War, but also many other minor regional squabbles across the developing world that erupted as old regimes fell and nations sought to build unity out of the ashes. In Africa, the situation was exacerbated by an inherent tribalism and factionalism that had tended to be artificially suppressed by powerful, often military, dictatorships, generally unconcerned with the needs and requirements of an oppressed population. No more striking example of this can be found than Somalia. One of the only effective armed resistance movements mounted against European colonization in Africa took place in Somalia, which was suppressed only after enormous military expenditure. The crisis in Somalia that began to take shape with the ouster of military leader Mohammed Siad Barre during the early years of the 1990s forced both the United States and the United Nations to adapt their collective military policy toward the challenges of peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, in a human environment only dimly understood, extremely austere in terms of local infrastructure and with a warring clan leadership. This book tells the story of the international intervention that took place in Somalia, the successes, failures and lessons learned. Many broad assumptions were made based on an unclear understanding of the dynamics of a regional conflict, coupled with the necessity for the first time in modern military history to balance political necessities with military. The crisis in Somalia set the tone for military intervention in a post-Cold War world, and although the same mistakes have been depressingly often repeated, the complexion of global military organization changed dramatically as a consequence of this episode.

Between 1973 and 1989, various Western powers and Libya were entangled in a seemingly never-ending exchange of blows. Supposedly launched in retaliation for one action or the other, this confrontation resulted in a number of high-profile, even though low-scale, clashes between the Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF), the US Navy and even the French. Meanwhile, almost as a sideshow, the LAAF - quantitatively one of the most potent air forces in North Africa and the Middle East - also saw intensive deployment in Chad. Initially, with sporadic fighting between different parties for the control of N'Djamena, the Chadian capital, this conflict eventually turned into a major war when Libya invaded the country outright. The LAAF deployed not only French-made Mirage but also Soviet-made fighter-bombers of MiG and Sukhoi design, Mil-designed helicopters and even bombers of Tupolev design, to establish her dominance over the extensive battlefield of the Sahara Desert. Because of the Cold War but also due to confrontation with Libya over a number of other issues, France - a one-time major arms supplier to Libya - and the USA gradually got dragged into the war. Deployments of their troops and intelligence services in Chad, Egypt and the Sudan never resulted in a full-scale war against Libya, but time and again culminated in small-scale aerial operations that proved crucial to developments on the ground, several of which are still a matter of extensive debate. Detailing not only the aerial operations but the ground war and the geopolitical background of these conflicts, and illustrated with over 100 contemporary photographs, maps and all-new color profiles, this volume provides a unique insight into an otherwise completely forgotten conflict that raged from the skies over the southern Mediterranean to southern Chad and northern Sudan, yet one that not only represented a formative period of the LAAF, but which also prompted a number of crucial modifications and developments in France and the USA.

Nigeria was a unique concept in the formation of modern Africa. It began life as a highly lucrative if climatically challenging holding of the Royal Niger Company, a British Chartered Company under the control of Victorian capitalist Sir George Taubman Goldie. It was handed over to indigenous rule in 1960 with the best of intentions and a profound hope on the part of the British Crown that it would become the poster child of successful political transition in Africa. It did not. One of the signature failures of imperial strategists at the turn of the 19th century was to take little if any account of the traditional demographics of the territories and societies that were subdivided, and often joined together, into spheres of foreign influence, later evolving into colonies, and finally into nation states. Many of the signature crises in postcolonial Africa have owed their origins to this very phenomenon: incompatible and mutually antagonistic tribal and ethnic groupings forced to cohabit within the indivisible precincts of political geography. Congo, Rwanda/Burundi, Sudan and many others have suffered ongoing attrition within their borders as historic enmities surge and boil in restless and ongoing violence. Such was the case with Nigeria in the post-independence period. The traditions and practices of the Islamic north and the Christian/Animist south, and even within the multiplicity of ethnic division in the south itself, proved to be impossible to reconcile. The result was an immediate centrifuge away from the center, complicated by the vast infusion of oil revenues and the inevitable explosion of corruption that followed. All of this created the alchemy of civil war and genocide, which erupted into violence in 1967 as the eastern region of Nigeria attempted to secede. The war that followed shocked the conscience of the world, and revealed for the first time the true depth of incompatibility of the four partners in the Nigerian federation. This book traces the early history of Nigeria from inception to civil war, and the complex events that defined the conflict in Biafra, revealing how and why this awful event played out, and the scars that it has since left on the psyche of the disunited federation that has continued to exist in the aftermath.

It has been over three decades since the Union Jack was lowered on the colony of Rhodesia, but the bitter and divisive civil war that preceded it has continued to endure as a textbook counterinsurgency campaign fought between a mobile, motivated and highly trained Rhodesian security establishment and two constituted liberations movements motivated, resourced and inspired by the ideals of communist revolution in the third world. A complicated historical process of occupation and colonization set the tone as early as the late 1890s for what would at some point be an inevitable struggle for domination of this small, landlocked nation set in the southern tropics of Africa. The story of the Rhodesian War, or the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle, is not only an epic of superb military achievement, and revolutionary zeal and fervor, but is the tale of the incompatibility of the races in southern Africa, a clash of politics and ideals and, perhaps more importantly, the ongoing ramifications of the past upon the present, and the social and political scars that a war of such emotional underpinnings as the Rhodesian conflict has had on the modern psyche of Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian War was fought with finely tuned intelligence-gathering and -analysis techniques combined with a fluid and mobile armed response. The practitioners of both have justifiably been celebrated in countless histories, memoirs and campaign analyses, but what has never been attempted has been a concise, balanced and explanatory overview of the war, the military mechanisms and the social and political foundations that defined the crisis. This book does all of that. The Rhodesian War is explained in digestible detail and in a manner that will allow enthusiasts of the elements of that struggle - the iconic exploits of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, the SAS, the Selous Scouts, the Rhodesian African Rifles, the Rhodesia Regiment, among other well-known fighting units - to embrace the wider picture in order to place the various episodes in context

In 1961, Portugal found itself fighting a war to retain its colonial possessions and preserve the remnants of its empire. It was almost completely unprepared to do so, and this was particularly evident in its ability to project power and to control the vast colonial spaces in Africa. Following the uprisings of March of 1961 in the north of Angola, Portugal poured troops into the colony as fast as its creaking logistic system would allow; however, these new arrivals were not competent and did not possess the skills needed to fight a counterinsurgency. While counterinsurgency by its nature requires substantial numbers of light infantry, the force must be trained in the craft of fighting a ‘small war’ to be effective. The majority of the arriving troops had no such indoctrination and had been readied at an accelerated pace. Even their uniforms were hastily crafted and not ideally suited to fighting in the bush. In reoccupying the north and addressing the enemy threat, Portugal quickly realized that its most effective forces were those with special qualifications and advanced training. Unfortunately, there were only very small numbers of such elite forces. The maturing experiences of Portuguese and their consequent adjustments to fight a counterinsurgency led to development of specialized, tailored units to close the gaps in skills and knowledge between the insurgents and their forces. The most remarkable such force was the flechas, indigenous Bushmen who lived in eastern Angola with the capacity to live and fight in its difficult terrain aptly named ‘Lands at the End of the Earth’. Founded in 1966, they were active until the end of the war in 1974, and were so successful in their methods that the flecha template was copied in the other theaters of Guiné and Mozambique and later in the South African Border War. The flechas were a force unique to the conflicts of southern Africa. A flecha could smell the enemy and his weapons and read the bush in ways that no others could do. He would sleep with one ear to the ground and the other to the atmosphere and would be awakened by an enemy walking a mile away. He could conceal himself in a minimum of cover and find food and water in impossible places. In short, he was vastly superior to the enemy in the environment of eastern Angola, and at the height of the campaign there (1966–1974) this small force accounted for 60 per cent of all enemy kills. This book is the story of how they came to be formed and organized, their initial teething difficulties, and their unqualified successes.

Great Lakes Conflagration' is the second in two volumes covering military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the turn from the 21st century. This volume explores developments in the DRC that led to the outbreak of violence in August 1998, and systematically details the continued build-up and status of the Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan armies, as well as the forces of Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and other African countries that were sucked into the conflict. Recounted is the Rwandan attempt to topple the government of Laurent Kabila through an operation that saw a redeployment of some of best Rwandan units from Kigali and Goma to the western DRC, resulting in a series of fierce air-land clashes with Zimbabwean and Angolan forces and culminating in the Battle of Kinshasa. Also described is the fighting along what became the 'Eastern Front' in the DRC, as Zimbabwean and allied troops attempted to stop Rwandan, Ugandan and rebel advances out of Kivu Province in the direction of the Congo River through 1998 and 1999. These early phases of the war, or 'The First African War' as it has come to be known, were characterized by surprising outflanking and infiltration maneuvers; foreign mercenaries; Zimbabwean Hawk and Lynx light strikers flying intensive combat operations from N'Djili airport, half of which was occupied by Rwandans, Ugandans and Congolese rebels; interdiction strikes guided by special forces deployed deep behind enemy lines; operations of helicopter gunships and transport aircraft under intense ground attack in support of troops cut off by advancing opponents; use of transport aircraft as makeshift bombers in bad weather and by night and clashes of armored forces and many other elements of 'high-technology' warfare. All the protagonists deployed their best military units, their best equipment and some of their best military commanders, yet despite their best efforts, and hampered by in-fighting, the conflict ultimately resulted in a stalemate which dragged on for a further three years while negotiations bogged down. This book is illustrated with an extensive selection of exclusive photography, color profiles and markings, making it of special interest to enthusiasts and professionals alike.

Across Africa in the post-1956 era, the aspirations of African nationalists to secure power were boosted and quickly realized by the British, French and Belgian hasty retreat from empire. The Portuguese, Southern Rhodesian and South African governments, however, stood firm and would be challenged by their African nationalists. Influenced by the Communist bloc, these nationalists adopted the 'Armed Struggle'. In the case of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, took this step in 1962 after their effort to foment rebellion in Rhodesia's urban areas in 1961-62 had been frustrated by police action and stiffened security legislation. Rhodesia's small, undermanned security forces, however, remained wary as Zambia and Tanganyika had given sanctuary to communist-supplied ZAPU and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) guerrillas. The Rhodesians had foreseen that the northeastern frontier with Mozambique would be the most vulnerable to incursions because the African population living along it offered an immediate target for succor and subversion. The Portuguese were not seen as a bulwark as they were clearly making little progress in their counter-insurgency effort against their FRELIMO nationalist opponents. The Rhodesians were fortunate, however, that ZAPU and ZANU chose to probe across the Zambezi River from Zambia into the harsh, sparsely populated bush of the Zambezi Valley. The consequence was that the Rhodesian security forces conducted a number of successful operations in the period 1966-1972 which dented insurgent ambitions. This book describes and examines the first phase of the 'bush war' during which the Rhodesian forces honed their individual and joint skills, emerging as a formidable albeit lean fighting force.

Great Lakes Holocaust' is the first in two volumes covering military operations in Zaire - as the Congo was named from 1971 until 1997 - and the Democratic Republic of Congo at the turn of the 21st century. This volume explores the events of the 1980s and 1990s in Rwanda and Uganda, which eventually spilled over the borders into Zaire, resulting in one of the worst tragedies ever to befall an African region. The narrative traces the ascent of crucial Rwandan, Congolese and Ugandan military and political figures, and their connections within influential business and political circles in and outside Africa. It examines the build-up of the Zairian military under the government of Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in the 1960s and 1970s, and provides an in-depth study into reasons for its near-collapse in the early 1990s. The military build-up of Rwanda and Uganda is discussed in detail as is their planning for operations inside Zaire, and the global logistic tail that provided the Rwandan military, particularly, but also most of its opponents, with a capability of not only waging war beyond their borders, but - in the case of Rwanda - of invading and practically conquering a country the size of Western Europe or the USA east of the Mississippi. The book further traces the covert Rwandan military actions inside Zaire, initially run under the guise of an insurgency by one of Zaire's ethnic minorities; how ever-deepening Rwandan operations inside Zaire were practically dictated by concentrations of Hutu refugees; and how the insurgency - led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila who was installed by key Rwandan and Ugandan military and political figures - developed into an organization that sought autonomy from the military and political dictates of Rwanda, in turn delivering a direct reason for the Second Congo War which was fought from 1998-2003.

While the first volume in this mini-series spanned the first decade of confrontations between Libya and several of its neighbors, but foremost the USA and France, between 1973 and 1985, the second is to cover the period of less than a year – between mid-1985 and March 1986, when this confrontation reached its first climax. Through mid and late 1985, relations between France and Libya became tense over the situation in Chad. By early 1986, the French felt forced to deploy their air force for an airstrike on the crucial Libyan air base at Wadi Doum, in the north of that country. Tripoli reacted with a high-profile aerial attack on N’Djamena IAP and by bolstering support for its proxies. This eventually provoked Paris to launch its third military intervention in that country, Operation Épervier. Meanwhile, a series of terror attacks on US citizens and interests in Europe and the Mediterranean area took place. While most of these saw the involvement of Iran and Syria too, Libya was recognized as major supporter of the activities in question. In the aftermath of several traumatic experiences, the US administration began planning for direct action against the government in Tripoli and various terrorist organizations supported by it. As the Pentagon planners prepared a contingency list of targets in Libya, and the US Air Force began planning its involvement, ships and aircraft of the US Navy launched intensive operations off the Libyan coast with the aim of provoking an incident that could be used as a reason for major military attack on Libya. Eventually, these operations culminated in Operation Prairie Fire – a series of short but sharp clashes between the US Navy and Libyan air defenses and the Navy, in March 1986. Part 2 of this mini-series provides an unprecedentedly detailed and richly illustrated description of the involved air forces, their equipment and markings, and related military aerial operations, many of which have remained unknown until today, while others have been forgotten outright.

With Ethiopia in disarray following a period of severe internal unrest and the spread of insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray, Ethiopia and its armed forces should have offered little opposition to well-equipped Somali armed forces which were unleashed to capture Ogaden, in July 1977. However, excellently trained pilots of the Ethiopian Air Force took full advantage of their US-made equipment, primarily their few brand-new Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighter-bombers, to take the fight to their opponents, win air superiority over the battlefield, and thus have their hands free to interdict the Somali supply links to stop the invasion cold. This air victory practically sealed the fate of the Somali juggernaut in Ogaden, especially so once Ethiopia convinced Cuba and the Soviet Bloc to support her instead of Somalia. In a fit of pique, Somalia forced all Soviet advisers to leave the country. Already bitter over similar experiences in Egypt in 1972, Moscow's revenge was designed as a clear message: nobody was to treat her in such fashion again. The USSR subsequently launched an air bridge to Ethiopia, unique and unprecedented in its extension and importance, delivering huge quantities of armament and equipment necessary for the Ethiopians to reconquer Ogaden, and beyond. In turn Somalia asked the USA for help and thus occurred an unprecedented switch of Cold War alliances. This volume details the history and training of both Ethiopian and Somali air forces, their equipment and training, tactics used and kills claimed, against the backdrop of the flow of the Ogaden war. It explains in detail, supported by over 100 contemporary and exclusive photographs, maps and color profiles, how the Ethiopian Air Force won the decisive victory in the air by expertly deploying the F-5Es - unequaled in maneuverability, small size and powerful armament - to practically destroy the Somali Air Force and its MiG-17s and MiG-21s.

On 11 November 1965, Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith unilaterally declared his country independent of Britain. International sanctions were immediately instituted against the minority white regime as Robert Mugabe's ZANLA and Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA armies commenced their armed struggle, the Chimurenga, the war of liberation. As Communist-trained guerrillas flooded the country, the beleaguered Rhodesians, hard-pressed for manpower and military resources, were forced to devise new and innovative methods to combat the insurgency. Fire Force was their answer. Fire Force as a military concept dates from 1974 when the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) acquired the French MG151 20mm cannon from the Portuguese. Visionary RhAF and Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) officers expanded on the idea of a 'vertical envelopment' of the enemy, with the 20mm cannon being the principal weapon of attack, mounted in an Alouette III K-Car ('Killer car'), supported by ground troops deployed from G-Cars (Alouette III troop-carrying gunships and latterly Bell 'Hueys') and parachuted from DC-3 Dakotas. In support would be a propeller-driven ground-attack aircraft armed with front guns, pods of napalm, white phosphorus rockets and a variety of Rhodesian-designed bombs; on call would be Canberra bombers, Hawker Hunter and Vampire jets. In spite of the overwhelming number of enemy pitted against them, Rhodesian Fire Forces accounted for thousands of enemy guerrillas, with a kill ratio exceeding 80:1. At the end of the war, ZANLA generals admitted their army could not have survived another year in the field-in no small part due to the ruthless efficiency of the Fire Forces, described by Charles D. Melson, the Chief Historian of the U.S. Marine Corps, as the ultimate "killing machine".

Portuguese paratroopers or “paras” began as a stepchild of the army and found a home in the Portuguese Air Force in 1955. Initially, the post-World War Two Portuguese Army seemed to have had mixed emotions about the need for elite, special-purpose forces that operated in small units with the attendant flexibility and elevated lethality. Shock troops have been traditionally controversial, and even the vaunted military theorist Baron Karl von Clausewitz saw little point in them. The history of the paras in the Portuguese Army is illustrative of this ambivalent view. Nevertheless, in a “war of the weak” in which insurgents avoid government strengths and exploit its vulnerabilities using agility, deception, and imagination, such small, crack government units are particularly well suited to counterinsurgency operations. This appreciation emerged with the threat of a new kind of war in Portuguese Africa, an insurgency, and the new and visionary Air Force well understood the potential of paras when combined with the mobility of the helicopter. The Air Force saw an urgent need for troops who could fight an unconventional war, who could not only defeat an enemy but separate him from the population in which he sought concealment and support and on which he depended for funding, recruits, and intelligence. These were specialised warfighters who in one minute were physically destroying an insidious enemy and in the next administering aid and support and protecting a vulnerable population. These were just the troops that Portugal would require for military success in its approaching battle fought between 1961 and 1974 to retain its African possessions, and this vision would be realized on the African battlefield with devastating consequences. This book tells the paras’ story as researched from Portuguese sources. It details how they were formed and trained and how they developed their imaginative, effective, and feared tactics and applied them in operations to protect the population from insurgent predations and destroy a vicious enemy.

On 1 October 1990, hundreds of Banyarawanda militants that served with the Ugandan Army deserted their posts to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and invade Rwanda. Thus began the Rwandan Civil War, which was to culminate in the famous genocide of nearly one million of Tutsi and moderate Hutus, in 1994. Starting with in-depth descriptions of the history of Rwandan political, military and security development, this volume traces the history of the RPA from its emergence as a small-scale insurgent group formed from the ranks of Rwandan refugee diaspora in Uganda; its military operations and related experiences during nearly four years of war against the Rwandan government; and its establishment of control over Kigali, in July 1994. As such, the narrative presented here provides a fascinating and unique insight into the military story behind the emergence of modern-day Rwanda and its military; considered by many to be the ‘Israel of Africa’. Providing minute details about RPF’s tactics and doctrine – that strongly influenced developments in a number of other modern-day African wars – this volume is foremost an offering that provides highly interesting backgrounds for and a prequel to, nearly all of the subsequent wars in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. Illustrated with over 150 photographs, color profiles, and maps describing the equipment, colors, and markings, and tactics of the RPF and its opponents, this is a unique study about the emergence of one of the most important US allies on the African continent.

In 1971, Idi Amin Dada, a former officer of the King’s African Rifles and commander of the Ugandan Army, seized power in a military coup in Uganda. Characterized by human rights abuses, political repression, ethnic persecution, extra judicial killings, nepotism, corruption and gross economic mismanagement, Amin’s rule drove thousands into exile. Amin shifted the country’s orientation in international relations from alliances with the West and Israel, to cooperation with the Soviet Union. With Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere offering sanctuary to Uganda’s ousted president, Milton Obote, Ugandan relations with Tanzania soon became strained too. Already in 1972, a group of Tanzania-based exiles attempted, unsuccessfully, to invade Uganda and remove Amin. By late 1978, following another attempted coup against him, Amin deployed his troops against the mutineers, some of whom fled across the Tanzanian border. The rebellion against him thus spilled over into Tanzania, against whom Uganda then declared a state of war. Opening with an overview of the ascent of crucial military and political figures, and the buildup of the Tanzanian and Ugandan militaries during the 1960s and 1970s, this volume provides an in-depth study of the related political and military events, but foremost of military operations during the Kagera War – also known as ‘A Just War’ – fought between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978–1979. It further traces the almost continuous armed conflict in Uganda of 1981–1994, which became renowned for emergence of several insurgent movements notorious for incredible violence against civilian population, some of which remain active in central Africa to this day. This book is illustrated with an extensive selection of photographs, color profiles, and maps, describing the equipment, markings, and tactics of the involved military forces.

From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and its nationalist enemies fought an increasingly intense war for the independence of "Portuguese" Guinea, then a colony but now the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of the conflict, Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy, and increasingly based its strategy on this advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a crucial role in the Guinean war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, the FAP – despite the many challenges it faced – proved to be the most effective and responsive military argument against the PAIGC, which was fighting for Guinea's independence. The air war for Guinea is unique for historians and analysts for several reasons. It was the first conflict in which a non-state irregular force deployed defensive missiles against an organized air force. Moreover, the degree to which Portugal relied on its air power was such that its effective neutralization doomed Lisbon's military strategy in the province. The FAP's unexpected combat losses initiated a cascade of effects that degraded in turn its own operational freedom and the effectiveness of the increasingly air-dependent surface forces, which felt that the war against the PAIGC was lost. The air war for Guinea thus represents a compelling illustration of the value – and vulnerabilities – of air power in a counter-insurgency context, as well as the negative impacts of over reliance on air supremacy. Volume 1 of Sanctuary Lost is extensively illustrated with photographs and specially commissioned color artworks.

Ethiopia, a country of ancient origins in eastern Africa, has remained a military powerhouse of that continent until the present day. Currently involved in the war in neighboring Somalia, Ethiopia was also involved in half a dozen of other armed conflicts during the last 60 years. One of the most significant was the Eritrean War of Independence. Fought 1961-1991, this was one of the biggest armed conflicts on the African continent, especially if measured by numbers of combatants involved. It included a wide spectrum of operations, from ‘classic’ counter-insurgency (COIN) to conventional warfare in mountains – with the latter being one of the most complex and demanding undertakings possible to conduct by a military force. Campaigns run during the Eritrean War of Independence often included large formations of relatively well-equipped forces, led by well-trained commanders, utilizing complex plans based on homegrown doctrine. Airpower played a crucial – although not necessarily decisive – role in many of battles. Nevertheless, most of details about this conflict remain unknown to the wider public. Similarly, relatively few Western observers are aware of relations between the Eritrean liberation movements, and various dissident and insurgent movements inside Ethiopia – although the synergy of these eventually led the downfall of the so-called Derg government, in 1991. Reaching back to extensive studies of Ethiopian and Eritrean military history, this volume provides a detailed account of the first 25 years of this conflict: from the outbreak of armed insurgency in 1961 until the crucial battle of Afabet, in 1988. It is illustrated by over 100 contemporary photographs, maps and color profiles.

In 1961, Portugal found itself fighting a war to retain its colonial possessions and preserve the remnants of its Empire. It was almost completely unprepared to do so, and this was particularly evident in its ability to project power and to control the vast colonial spaces of Africa. Following the uprisings of March 1961 in the north of Angola, Portugal poured troops into the colony as fast as its creaking logistic system would allow; however, these new arrivals were not competent and did not possess the skills needed to fight a counterinsurgency. While counterinsurgency by its nature requires substantial numbers of light infantry, the force must be trained in the craft of fighting a ‘small war’ to be effective. The majority of the arriving troops had no such indoctrination and had been readied at an accelerated pace. Even their uniforms were hastily crafted and not ideally suited to fighting in the bush. In reoccupying the north and addressing the enemy threat, Portugal quickly realized that its most effective forces were those with special qualifications and advanced training. Unfortunately there were only very small numbers of such elite forces. The maturing experiences of the Portuguese and their consequent adjustments to fight a counterinsurgency led to the development of specialized, tailored units to close the gaps in skills and knowledge between the insurgents and their forces. This book is about the Fuzileiros or Portuguese marines, a naval force that operated in the riverine littorals of Africa and that was both feared by the enemy and loved by those loyal to Portugal. The Fuzileiros underwent one of the longest and most physically demanding specialist infantry training regimes in the world, lasting some forty-two weeks. Perhaps only 15 to 35 percent of the inductees eventually passed the course and were awarded the traditional and highly coveted navy blue beret. When deployed to Africa, they underwent further acclimation for weeks until they were able to move through the slime and mud of a riverbank with ease, as their lives depended on it. They became experts at riverine warfare and regularly ranged inland on extended patrols, many of which are recounted here. They were comfort able with the uncomfortable fighting environment, and this ability translated into an unpredictability that the enemy feared. This book is the story of how they came to be formed and organized, the initial teething difficulties, and their unqualified successes.

In the broad history of the Cold War, the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was the climax of a far-off, but nonetheless important African war. It was waged between the apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF) and the armed forces of the communist MPLA government in Angola and the People’s Republic of Cuba. Led by Soviet generals, the MPLA embarked on a grand offensive in order to knock out the pro-Western rebel movement UNITA in southeastern Angola. As UNITA’s survival was crucial to South Africa’s military strategy in fighting its own counterinsurgency war against the South West African rebel movement SWAPO, the SADF stepped in with a single mechanized brigade and broke the back of the overwhelming MPLA offensive. The MPLA forces were subsequently driven back over a hundred kilometers, before the SADF advance was finally stopped just short of the town of Cuito Cuanavale. Since then, a hot war of words have been waged about who actually won. In this book, a South African military historian and retired journalist examines the campaign, the adversaries, and their achievements on the basis of his research in SADF archives. His scrupulous attempt at objectivity results in interesting conclusions. While the MPLA lost hands down, he posits a draw between the Cubans and the SADF. Although having been a South African reservist officer himself, he has critical words for the SADF leadership. Many misunderstandings, some of which were purposefully created by Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, are put to rest. While not sharing Castro’s political beliefs, he acknowledges Castro’s military acumen and political savvy in extricating his country from an unwinnable war while smelling of roses. The analysis contains many lessons about mechanized warfare in the African context from which both laymen and military professionals alike may learn.

Ethiopia, a country of ancient origins in eastern Africa, remains a military powerhouse of that continent until our days. Nowadays involved in the war in neighboring Somalia, Ethiopia was also involved in half a dozen of other armed conflicts over the last 60 years. Crucial between these was the Eritrean War of Independence. Fought 1961-1991, this was one of biggest armed conflicts on the African continent, especially if measured by numbers of involved combatants. It included a wide spectrum of operations, from ‘classic’ counterinsurgency (COIN) to conventional warfare in mountains – with the latter being one of the most complex and most demanding undertakings possible to conduct by a military force. Campaigns run during the Eritrean War of Independence often included large formations of relatively well-equipped forces, led by well-trained commanders, along well-thought-out plans, based on homegrown doctrine. The air power played a crucial – although not necessarily decisive – role in many of battles. Nevertheless, most of details about this conflict remain unknown in the wider public. Similarly, relatively few Western observers are aware of relations between the Eritrean liberation movements, and various dissident and insurgent movements inside Ethiopia – although the synergy of these eventually led the downfall of the so-called Derg government, in 1991. While the first volume in this mini-series spanned the history of wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1961 and 1988, the second covers the period since. Correspondingly, it is providing coverage of military operations that led to the fall of the Derg government in Ethiopia of 1991, the period of Eritrean military buildup and a complete reorganization of the Ethiopian military in the 1990s, and concludes with the first detailed account of the so-called Badme War, fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea in period 1998-2001. It is illustrated by many contemporary photographs, maps and color profiles.

Lacking funding to purchase and operate own aircraft, the Rhodesian police established the British South Africa Police Reserve Air Wing (PRAW). Equipped with private aircraft, mostly flown by owner pilots, this extended policing across a country that had few roads, reaching remote villages and farms, separated by long distances. Established in 1967, the PRAW assisted in the capture of criminals, transported police officers, and flew in support of police operations. During the 1960s, it was expanded into three flights with more than 20 aircraft. By 1974, the PRAW included five flights, by 1979, nine, with two of its pilots being awarded the M.B.E. for outstanding services. As the conflict in Rhodesia escalated, it began actively cooperating with the Rhodesian armed forces: its miscellany of Beechs, Cessnas, Pipers, and Taylorcraft – all apparently ‘sports and utility’ aircraft - were armed: sometimes with light machine guns installed in underwing pods, but often with heavy machine guns that fired through the side doors, de-facto converting them into mini-gunships. Based on extensive use of official documentation, participant recollections, and richly illustrated, Copper Wings: British South Africa Police Reserve Force Air Wing Volume 2 continues an account of this service.

Lacking funding to purchase and operate own aircraft, the Rhodesian police established the British South Africa Police Reserve Air Wing (PRAW). Equipped with private aircraft, mostly flown by owner pilots, this extended policing across a country that had few roads, reaching remote villages and farms, separated by long distances. Established in 1967, the PRAW assisted in the capture of criminals, transported police officers, and flew in support of police operations. During the 1960s, it was expanded into three flights with more than 20 aircraft: all of these saw gradually intensifying operations as the war in Rhodesia escalated. Based on extensive use of official documentation and participant recollections alike, and richly illustrated, Copper Wings: British South Africa Police Reserve Force Air Wing Volume 1 is the first operational history of the service from its establishment in 1967, until 1974. 

From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and its nationalist enemies fought an increasingly intense war for the independence of "Portuguese" Guinea, then a colony but now the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of the conflict Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy, and increasingly based its military strategy and political pacification program on this singular advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a crucial role in the Guinean war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, the FAP – despite the many challenges it faced – proved to be the most effective and responsive military argument against the PAIGC rebels, which was fighting for the colony’s independence from European rule. The air war for Guinea stands as a remarkable episode in air power history for several reasons. It was, for example, the first conflict in which a non-state irregular force deployed defensive missiles against an organized air force. Moreover, the degree to which Portugal relied on its air power was such that its effective neutralization doomed Lisbon's military strategy in the province. Ultimately, the FAP's unexpected combat losses initiated a cascade of effects that degraded, in turn, its own operational initiative; the battlefield effectiveness of increasingly air-dependent ground forces; Portuguese military morale and national resilience; and ultimately, Lisbon’s tenability as an imperial power. The air war for Portuguese Guinea thus represents a compelling illustration of the value – and vulnerabilities – of air power in a counter-insurgency context, as well as the negative impacts of overreliance on air supremacy. This, the second of three volumes in the Sanctuary Lost mini-series, examines the evolution of Portuguese air power and guerrilla air defenses during the conflict’s most active years, as both sides sought the means and methods required to counter the other’s efforts to control Guinea’s airspace. It is richly illustrated throughout with original photographs and includes specially commissioned color artworks.

As of 1975, the decades long insurgency in Angola appeared to be short of its conclusion. However, with no less than three major insurgent movements fighting for supremacy, the war went on and then South Africa, USA, the Soviet Union, Zaire and Cuba became involved. Affairs like the CIA’s efforts to destabilize Angola for little else but to recoup its prestige after the catastrophic defeat in South Vietnam, or the South African military intervention in Angola – Operation Savannah – have attracted lots of public attention and are relatively well covered in related publications. On the contrary, the final stages of the Portuguese withdrawal, the military buildup of three native insurgent forces, and then the onset of the Cuban military intervention in Angola – Operation Carlotta run in 1975 and 1976 – remain largely unknown. Based on extensive research with help of Angolan and Cuban sources, the War of Intervention in Angola is providing a unique insight precisely into the latter topic. It traces the failures of the US-supported FNLA, the growth and reorganization of the MPLA into a conventional army; deployment of Cuban military contingents, their capabilities and intentions; and the performance and experiences of the MPLA and Cuban forces at war with South Africans and the third Angolan insurgent group – UNITA. The volume is illustrated with over 100 rare photographs, a dozen of maps and 15 color profiles.