Africa@War Series

Across Africa in the post-1956 era, the aspirations of African nationalists to secure power were boosted and quickly realized by the British, French and Belgian hasty retreat from empire. The Portuguese, Southern Rhodesian and South African governments, however, stood firm and would be challenged by their African nationalists. Influenced by the Communist bloc, these nationalists adopted the 'Armed Struggle'. In the case of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, took this step in 1962 after their effort to foment rebellion in Rhodesia's urban areas in 1961-62 had been frustrated by police action and stiffened security legislation. Rhodesia's small, undermanned security forces, however, remained wary as Zambia and Tanganyika had given sanctuary to communist-supplied ZAPU and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) guerrillas. The Rhodesians had foreseen that the northeastern frontier with Mozambique would be the most vulnerable to incursions because the African population living along it offered an immediate target for succor and subversion. The Portuguese were not seen as a bulwark as they were clearly making little progress in their counter-insurgency effort against their FRELIMO nationalist opponents. The Rhodesians were fortunate, however, that ZAPU and ZANU chose to probe across the Zambezi River from Zambia into the harsh, sparsely populated bush of the Zambezi Valley. The consequence was that the Rhodesian security forces conducted a number of successful operations in the period 1966-1972 which dented insurgent ambitions. This book describes and examines the first phase of the 'bush war' during which the Rhodesian forces honed their individual and joint skills, emerging as a formidable albeit lean fighting force.

South African Mirages and Cuban MiG-21s dogfighting over Cuito Cuanavale, the largest tank battle on African soil since El Alamein; Puma troopships shot out of the skies by Strela missiles and RPG-7 rockets; Alouette III gunships hovering menacingly above Koevoet tracker-combat teams as they close in for the kill; Hercules and Transall transports disgorging their loads of Parabats over Cassinga; suicidal helicopter hot extractions of Recce operators deep in enemy territory; and a lone Alouette pilot who disobeyed orders and under intense ground fire evacuated a critically wounded soldier … such is the story of the South African Air Force, the SAAF, over the 23-year period 1966-1989, the period of conflict that became known as the 'Border War'. Set against the backdrop of the Cold War, the SAAF was effectively South Africa's first line of defense against Soviet expansionism in southern Africa. That the Soviets, through their surrogates-the Cuban military, Angola's FAPLA and Namibia's SWAPO-sought a communist regime in South Africa is indisputable, as too was the SAAF's skill, quality, determination and capability to defeat the best Soviet air defenses of the time. This account covers all the major operations that the SAAF was involved in, from Operation Blouwildebees, the opening salvo of the conflict at Omgulumbashe, South West Africa in 1966 to the final curtain, Operation Merlyn, the so-called April Fool's Day 'war' of 1989 when the SAAF and Koevoet, almost alone, frustrated SWAPO's last throw of the dice with its illegal invasion of South West Africa. In this account, highlighting such operations as Reindeer, Bootlace/Uric, Sceptic, Protea, Daisy, Askari, Moduler, Hooper and Packer, among many, as well as the ongoing methodological operations like Lunar, Maanskyn, Donkermaan and Butterfly, Baxter examines and brings to life the squadrons and aviators that fought in both counterinsurgency and conventional warfare roles. Besides an extensive selection of rare photographs, the book features a comprehensive section on camouflage and markings and 6 pages of color aircraft profiles and insignia by noted SAAF authority William Marshall, making this title especially useful for modelers. Peter Baxter is an author, amateur historian and African field, mountain and heritage travel guide. Born in Kenya and educated in Zimbabwe, he has lived and travelled over much of southern and central Africa. He has guided in all the major mountain ranges south of the equator, helping develop the concept of sustainable travel, and the touring of battlefield and heritage sites in East Africa. Peter lives in Oregon, USA, working on the marketing of African heritage travel as well as a variety of book projects. His interests include British Imperial history in Africa and the East Africa campaign of the First World War in particular. His first book was Rhodesia: Last Outpost of the British Empire; he has written several books in the Africa@War series, including France in Centrafrique, Selous Scouts, Mau Mau and SAAF's Border War.

The end of the Cold War introduced an altered global dynamic. The old bond of East/West patronage in Africa was broken, weakening the first crop of independent revolutionary leadership on the continent who no longer had the support of one or other of the superpowers. With collapse of the Soviet Union, all this changed. The question of global/strategic security devolved into regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, characterized primarily by the Balkans War, but also many other minor regional squabbles across the developing world that erupted as old regimes fell and nations sought to build unity out of the ashes. In Africa, the situation was exacerbated by an inherent tribalism and factionalism that had tended to be artificially suppressed by powerful, often military, dictatorships, generally unconcerned with the needs and requirements of an oppressed population. No more striking example of this can be found than Somalia. One of the only effective armed resistance movements mounted against European colonization in Africa took place in Somalia, which was suppressed only after enormous military expenditure. The crisis in Somalia that began to take shape with the ouster of military leader Mohammed Siad Barre during the early years of the 1990s forced both the United States and the United Nations to adapt their collective military policy toward the challenges of peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, in a human environment only dimly understood, extremely austere in terms of local infrastructure and with a warring clan leadership. This book tells the story of the international intervention that took place in Somalia, the successes, failures and lessons learned. Many broad assumptions were made based on an unclear understanding of the dynamics of a regional conflict, coupled with the necessity for the first time in modern military history to balance political necessities with military. The crisis in Somalia set the tone for military intervention in a post-Cold War world, and although the same mistakes have been depressingly often repeated, the complexion of global military organization changed dramatically as a consequence of this episode.

Fireforce 'Writ Large' - Airborne Assault in Mozambique. Startling in its innovation and daringly suicidal, Operation Dingo was not only the Fireforce concept writ large but the prototype for all the major Rhodesian airborne attacks on the external bases of Rhodesian African nationalist insurgents in the neighboring territories of Mozambique and Zambia until such operations ceased in late 1979. Fireforce as a military concept is a 'vertical envelopment' of the enemy (first practiced by SAS paratroopers in Mozambique in 1973), with the 20mm cannon being the principle weapon of attack, mounted in an Alouette III K-Car ('Killer car'), flown by the air force commander, with the army commander on board directing his ground troops deployed from G-Cars (Alouette III troop-carrying gun ships and latterly Bell 'Hueys' in 1979) and parachuted from DC-3 Dakotas. In support would be propeller-driven ground-attack aircraft and on call would be Canberra bombers, Hawker Hunter and Vampire jets. On 23 November 1977, the Rhodesian Air Force and 184 SAS and RLI paratroopers attacked 10,000 ZANLA cadres based at 'New Farm', Chimoio, 90 kilometers inside Mozambique. Two days later, the same force attacked 4,000 guerrillas at Tembué, another ZANLA base, over 200 kilometers inside Mozambique, north of Tete on the Zambezi River. Estimates of ZANLA losses vary wildly; however, a figure exceeding 6,000 casualties is realistic. The Rhodesians suffered two dead, eight wounded and lost one aircraft. It would produce the biggest SAS-led external battle of the Rhodesian bush war.

Battle for Cassinga is written as a firsthand account by an ordinary South African paratrooper who was at the 1978 assault on the Angolan headquarters of PLAN, the armed wing of SWAPO. The book relates why the South African government took the political risk in attacking the fortress in an external operation and examines the SWAPO claims that Cassinga was a refugee camp guarded by a few PLAN soldiers. It also explains why Sam Nujoma the SWAPO leader had no option but to perpetuate this falsehood. The battle, although a resounding success, suffered some setbacks which could have been disastrous to the South African paratroopers had they not maintained the initiative. The improvisations made by the commander Col Jan Breytenbach ensured that a flawed jump and poor intelligence did not adversely affect the outcome. The unforeseen Soviet-made anti-aircraft guns used against both aircraft and ground troops threatened to derail the attack. An appearance of a large column of armor manned by Cubans from the nearby town of Techamutete, when half the South African force had already left the battleground, placed the remaining lightly armed paratroopers in mortal danger. The landmines laid by the South Africans, together with the brave actions of the South African Air Force pilots saved the day, allowing the remaining forces to withdraw safely. Battle for Cassinga looks at all the players in a critical light. SWAPO and PLAN, the SADF and the commanders from both sides, Dimo Amaambo of PLAN and Jan Breytenbach of the SADF as well as the brave soldiers from both sides who fought for their political ideologies but perhaps, more importantly, for their own band of brothers.

On 11 November 1965, Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith unilaterally declared his country independent of Britain. International sanctions were immediately instituted against the minority white regime as Robert Mugabe's ZANLA and Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA armies commenced their armed struggle, the Chimurenga, the war of liberation. As Communist-trained guerrillas flooded the country, the beleaguered Rhodesians, hard-pressed for manpower and military resources, were forced to devise new and innovative methods to combat the insurgency. Fire Force was their answer. Fire Force as a military concept dates from 1974 when the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) acquired the French MG151 20mm cannon from the Portuguese. Visionary RhAF and Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) officers expanded on the idea of a 'vertical envelopment' of the enemy, with the 20mm cannon being the principal weapon of attack, mounted in an Alouette III K-Car ('Killer car'), supported by ground troops deployed from G-Cars (Alouette III troop-carrying gunships and latterly Bell 'Hueys') and parachuted from DC-3 Dakotas. In support would be a propeller-driven ground-attack aircraft armed with front guns, pods of napalm, white phosphorus rockets and a variety of Rhodesian-designed bombs; on call would be Canberra bombers, Hawker Hunter and Vampire jets. In spite of the overwhelming number of enemy pitted against them, Rhodesian Fire Forces accounted for thousands of enemy guerrillas, with a kill ratio exceeding 80:1. At the end of the war, ZANLA generals admitted their army could not have survived another year in the field-in no small part due to the ruthless efficiency of the Fire Forces, described by Charles D. Melson, the Chief Historian of the U.S. Marine Corps, as the ultimate "killing machine".

Nigeria was a unique concept in the formation of modern Africa. It began life as a highly lucrative if climatically challenging holding of the Royal Niger Company, a British Chartered Company under the control of Victorian capitalist Sir George Taubman Goldie. It was handed over to indigenous rule in 1960 with the best of intentions and a profound hope on the part of the British Crown that it would become the poster child of successful political transition in Africa. It did not. One of the signature failures of imperial strategists at the turn of the 19th century was to take little if any account of the traditional demographics of the territories and societies that were subdivided, and often joined together, into spheres of foreign influence, later evolving into colonies, and finally into nation states. Many of the signature crises in postcolonial Africa have owed their origins to this very phenomenon: incompatible and mutually antagonistic tribal and ethnic groupings forced to cohabit within the indivisible precincts of political geography. Congo, Rwanda/Burundi, Sudan and many others have suffered ongoing attrition within their borders as historic enmities surge and boil in restless and ongoing violence. Such was the case with Nigeria in the post-independence period. The traditions and practices of the Islamic north and the Christian/Animist south, and even within the multiplicity of ethnic division in the south itself, proved to be impossible to reconcile. The result was an immediate centrifuge away from the center, complicated by the vast infusion of oil revenues and the inevitable explosion of corruption that followed. All of this created the alchemy of civil war and genocide, which erupted into violence in 1967 as the eastern region of Nigeria attempted to secede. The war that followed shocked the conscience of the world, and revealed for the first time the true depth of incompatibility of the four partners in the Nigerian federation. This book traces the early history of Nigeria from inception to civil war, and the complex events that defined the conflict in Biafra, revealing how and why this awful event played out, and the scars that it has since left on the psyche of the disunited federation that has continued to exist in the aftermath.

In 1961, Portugal found itself fighting a war to retain its colonial possessions and preserve the remnants of its empire. It was almost completely unprepared to do so, and this was particularly evident in its ability to project power and to control the vast colonial spaces in Africa. Following the uprisings of March of 1961 in the north of Angola, Portugal poured troops into the colony as fast as its creaking logistic system would allow; however, these new arrivals were not competent and did not possess the skills needed to fight a counterinsurgency. While counterinsurgency by its nature requires substantial numbers of light infantry, the force must be trained in the craft of fighting a ‘small war’ to be effective. The majority of the arriving troops had no such indoctrination and had been readied at an accelerated pace. Even their uniforms were hastily crafted and not ideally suited to fighting in the bush. In reoccupying the north and addressing the enemy threat, Portugal quickly realized that its most effective forces were those with special qualifications and advanced training. Unfortunately, there were only very small numbers of such elite forces. The maturing experiences of Portuguese and their consequent adjustments to fight a counterinsurgency led to development of specialized, tailored units to close the gaps in skills and knowledge between the insurgents and their forces. The most remarkable such force was the flechas, indigenous Bushmen who lived in eastern Angola with the capacity to live and fight in its difficult terrain aptly named ‘Lands at the End of the Earth’. Founded in 1966, they were active until the end of the war in 1974, and were so successful in their methods that the flecha template was copied in the other theaters of Guiné and Mozambique and later in the South African Border War. The flechas were a force unique to the conflicts of southern Africa. A flecha could smell the enemy and his weapons and read the bush in ways that no others could do. He would sleep with one ear to the ground and the other to the atmosphere and would be awakened by an enemy walking a mile away. He could conceal himself in a minimum of cover and find food and water in impossible places. In short, he was vastly superior to the enemy in the environment of eastern Angola, and at the height of the campaign there (1966–1974) this small force accounted for 60 per cent of all enemy kills. This book is the story of how they came to be formed and organized, their initial teething difficulties, and their unqualified successes.

With Ethiopia in disarray following a period of severe internal unrest and the spread of insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray, Ethiopia and its armed forces should have offered little opposition to well-equipped Somali armed forces which were unleashed to capture Ogaden, in July 1977. However, excellently trained pilots of the Ethiopian Air Force took full advantage of their US-made equipment, primarily their few brand-new Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighter-bombers, to take the fight to their opponents, win air superiority over the battlefield, and thus have their hands free to interdict the Somali supply links to stop the invasion cold. This air victory practically sealed the fate of the Somali juggernaut in Ogaden, especially so once Ethiopia convinced Cuba and the Soviet Bloc to support her instead of Somalia. In a fit of pique, Somalia forced all Soviet advisers to leave the country. Already bitter over similar experiences in Egypt in 1972, Moscow's revenge was designed as a clear message: nobody was to treat her in such fashion again. The USSR subsequently launched an air bridge to Ethiopia, unique and unprecedented in its extension and importance, delivering huge quantities of armament and equipment necessary for the Ethiopians to reconquer Ogaden, and beyond. In turn Somalia asked the USA for help and thus occurred an unprecedented switch of Cold War alliances. This volume details the history and training of both Ethiopian and Somali air forces, their equipment and training, tactics used and kills claimed, against the backdrop of the flow of the Ogaden war. It explains in detail, supported by over 100 contemporary and exclusive photographs, maps and color profiles, how the Ethiopian Air Force won the decisive victory in the air by expertly deploying the F-5Es - unequaled in maneuverability, small size and powerful armament - to practically destroy the Somali Air Force and its MiG-17s and MiG-21s.

Great Lakes Conflagration' is the second in two volumes covering military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the turn from the 21st century. This volume explores developments in the DRC that led to the outbreak of violence in August 1998, and systematically details the continued build-up and status of the Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan armies, as well as the forces of Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and other African countries that were sucked into the conflict. Recounted is the Rwandan attempt to topple the government of Laurent Kabila through an operation that saw a redeployment of some of best Rwandan units from Kigali and Goma to the western DRC, resulting in a series of fierce air-land clashes with Zimbabwean and Angolan forces and culminating in the Battle of Kinshasa. Also described is the fighting along what became the 'Eastern Front' in the DRC, as Zimbabwean and allied troops attempted to stop Rwandan, Ugandan and rebel advances out of Kivu Province in the direction of the Congo River through 1998 and 1999. These early phases of the war, or 'The First African War' as it has come to be known, were characterized by surprising outflanking and infiltration maneuvers; foreign mercenaries; Zimbabwean Hawk and Lynx light strikers flying intensive combat operations from N'Djili airport, half of which was occupied by Rwandans, Ugandans and Congolese rebels; interdiction strikes guided by special forces deployed deep behind enemy lines; operations of helicopter gunships and transport aircraft under intense ground attack in support of troops cut off by advancing opponents; use of transport aircraft as makeshift bombers in bad weather and by night and clashes of armored forces and many other elements of 'high-technology' warfare. All the protagonists deployed their best military units, their best equipment and some of their best military commanders, yet despite their best efforts, and hampered by in-fighting, the conflict ultimately resulted in a stalemate which dragged on for a further three years while negotiations bogged down. This book is illustrated with an extensive selection of exclusive photography, color profiles and markings, making it of special interest to enthusiasts and professionals alike.

Confrontations between Libya, and the USA and France reached their highest point in the period between April 1986 and early 1989. In response to a Libyan-instigated and supported series of terror attacks against US citizens and interests in Europe, in April 1986 the USA launched Operation El Dorado Canoyon – a series of raids against carefully selected targets in Libya. Simultaneously, the USA and France bolstered the military of the Chadian government, enabling it to subsequently launch an all-out advance against Libyan troops and proxy forces in the north of Libya. This culminated in the series of spectacular campaigns better known as ‘Toyota Wars’, characterized by high speed of operations and surprise. The Chadian Army defeated its opponents in 1987 and nearly launched an invasion of Libya in 1988, successfully concluding this conflict. This title closes the Libyan Air Wars mini-series with a detailed insight into the final US–Libyan confrontation, which took place in early 1989, and culminated in another high-profile air combat between the most modern jet fighters of the Libyan Arab Air Force, and the US Navy. As usual, the volume is richly illustrated by well over 150 contemporary and exclusive photographs, color profiles, and maps, detailing the history, training, equipment, markings and tactics of the involved air forces.

Between 1973 and 1989, various Western powers and Libya were entangled in a seemingly never-ending exchange of blows. Supposedly launched in retaliation for one action or the other, this confrontation resulted in a number of high-profile, even though low-scale, clashes between the Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF), the US Navy and even the French. Meanwhile, almost as a sideshow, the LAAF - quantitatively one of the most potent air forces in North Africa and the Middle East - also saw intensive deployment in Chad. Initially, with sporadic fighting between different parties for the control of N'Djamena, the Chadian capital, this conflict eventually turned into a major war when Libya invaded the country outright. The LAAF deployed not only French-made Mirage but also Soviet-made fighter-bombers of MiG and Sukhoi design, Mil-designed helicopters and even bombers of Tupolev design, to establish her dominance over the extensive battlefield of the Sahara Desert. Because of the Cold War but also due to confrontation with Libya over a number of other issues, France - a one-time major arms supplier to Libya - and the USA gradually got dragged into the war. Deployments of their troops and intelligence services in Chad, Egypt and the Sudan never resulted in a full-scale war against Libya, but time and again culminated in small-scale aerial operations that proved crucial to developments on the ground, several of which are still a matter of extensive debate. Detailing not only the aerial operations but the ground war and the geopolitical background of these conflicts, and illustrated with over 100 contemporary photographs, maps and all-new color profiles, this volume provides a unique insight into an otherwise completely forgotten conflict that raged from the skies over the southern Mediterranean to southern Chad and northern Sudan, yet one that not only represented a formative period of the LAAF, but which also prompted a number of crucial modifications and developments in France and the USA.

Great Lakes Holocaust' is the first in two volumes covering military operations in Zaire - as the Congo was named from 1971 until 1997 - and the Democratic Republic of Congo at the turn of the 21st century. This volume explores the events of the 1980s and 1990s in Rwanda and Uganda, which eventually spilled over the borders into Zaire, resulting in one of the worst tragedies ever to befall an African region. The narrative traces the ascent of crucial Rwandan, Congolese and Ugandan military and political figures, and their connections within influential business and political circles in and outside Africa. It examines the build-up of the Zairian military under the government of Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in the 1960s and 1970s, and provides an in-depth study into reasons for its near-collapse in the early 1990s. The military build-up of Rwanda and Uganda is discussed in detail as is their planning for operations inside Zaire, and the global logistic tail that provided the Rwandan military, particularly, but also most of its opponents, with a capability of not only waging war beyond their borders, but - in the case of Rwanda - of invading and practically conquering a country the size of Western Europe or the USA east of the Mississippi. The book further traces the covert Rwandan military actions inside Zaire, initially run under the guise of an insurgency by one of Zaire's ethnic minorities; how ever-deepening Rwandan operations inside Zaire were practically dictated by concentrations of Hutu refugees; and how the insurgency - led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila who was installed by key Rwandan and Ugandan military and political figures - developed into an organization that sought autonomy from the military and political dictates of Rwanda, in turn delivering a direct reason for the Second Congo War which was fought from 1998-2003.

In 1961, Portugal found itself fighting a war to retain its colonial possessions and preserve the remnants of its Empire. It was almost completely unprepared to do so, and this was particularly evident in its ability to project power and to control the vast colonial spaces of Africa. Following the uprisings of March 1961 in the north of Angola, Portugal poured troops into the colony as fast as its creaking logistic system would allow; however, these new arrivals were not competent and did not possess the skills needed to fight a counterinsurgency. While counterinsurgency by its nature requires substantial numbers of light infantry, the force must be trained in the craft of fighting a ‘small war’ to be effective. The majority of the arriving troops had no such indoctrination and had been readied at an accelerated pace. Even their uniforms were hastily crafted and not ideally suited to fighting in the bush. In reoccupying the north and addressing the enemy threat, Portugal quickly realized that its most effective forces were those with special qualifications and advanced training. Unfortunately there were only very small numbers of such elite forces. The maturing experiences of the Portuguese and their consequent adjustments to fight a counterinsurgency led to the development of specialized, tailored units to close the gaps in skills and knowledge between the insurgents and their forces. This book is about the Fuzileiros or Portuguese marines, a naval force that operated in the riverine littorals of Africa and that was both feared by the enemy and loved by those loyal to Portugal. The Fuzileiros underwent one of the longest and most physically demanding specialist infantry training regimes in the world, lasting some forty-two weeks. Perhaps only 15 to 35 percent of the inductees eventually passed the course and were awarded the traditional and highly coveted navy blue beret. When deployed to Africa, they underwent further acclimation for weeks until they were able to move through the slime and mud of a riverbank with ease, as their lives depended on it. They became experts at riverine warfare and regularly ranged inland on extended patrols, many of which are recounted here. They were comfort able with the uncomfortable fighting environment, and this ability translated into an unpredictability that the enemy feared. This book is the story of how they came to be formed and organized, the initial teething difficulties, and their unqualified successes.

It has been over three decades since the Union Jack was lowered on the colony of Rhodesia, but the bitter and divisive civil war that preceded it has continued to endure as a textbook counterinsurgency campaign fought between a mobile, motivated and highly trained Rhodesian security establishment and two constituted liberations movements motivated, resourced and inspired by the ideals of communist revolution in the third world. A complicated historical process of occupation and colonization set the tone as early as the late 1890s for what would at some point be an inevitable struggle for domination of this small, landlocked nation set in the southern tropics of Africa. The story of the Rhodesian War, or the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle, is not only an epic of superb military achievement, and revolutionary zeal and fervor, but is the tale of the incompatibility of the races in southern Africa, a clash of politics and ideals and, perhaps more importantly, the ongoing ramifications of the past upon the present, and the social and political scars that a war of such emotional underpinnings as the Rhodesian conflict has had on the modern psyche of Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian War was fought with finely tuned intelligence-gathering and -analysis techniques combined with a fluid and mobile armed response. The practitioners of both have justifiably been celebrated in countless histories, memoirs and campaign analyses, but what has never been attempted has been a concise, balanced and explanatory overview of the war, the military mechanisms and the social and political foundations that defined the crisis. This book does all of that. The Rhodesian War is explained in digestible detail and in a manner that will allow enthusiasts of the elements of that struggle - the iconic exploits of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, the SAS, the Selous Scouts, the Rhodesian African Rifles, the Rhodesia Regiment, among other well-known fighting units - to embrace the wider picture in order to place the various episodes in context

While the first volume in this mini-series spanned the first decade of confrontations between Libya and several of its neighbors, but foremost the USA and France, between 1973 and 1985, the second is to cover the period of less than a year – between mid-1985 and March 1986, when this confrontation reached its first climax. Through mid and late 1985, relations between France and Libya became tense over the situation in Chad. By early 1986, the French felt forced to deploy their air force for an airstrike on the crucial Libyan air base at Wadi Doum, in the north of that country. Tripoli reacted with a high-profile aerial attack on N’Djamena IAP and by bolstering support for its proxies. This eventually provoked Paris to launch its third military intervention in that country, Operation Épervier. Meanwhile, a series of terror attacks on US citizens and interests in Europe and the Mediterranean area took place. While most of these saw the involvement of Iran and Syria too, Libya was recognized as major supporter of the activities in question. In the aftermath of several traumatic experiences, the US administration began planning for direct action against the government in Tripoli and various terrorist organizations supported by it. As the Pentagon planners prepared a contingency list of targets in Libya, and the US Air Force began planning its involvement, ships and aircraft of the US Navy launched intensive operations off the Libyan coast with the aim of provoking an incident that could be used as a reason for major military attack on Libya. Eventually, these operations culminated in Operation Prairie Fire – a series of short but sharp clashes between the US Navy and Libyan air defenses and the Navy, in March 1986. Part 2 of this mini-series provides an unprecedentedly detailed and richly illustrated description of the involved air forces, their equipment and markings, and related military aerial operations, many of which have remained unknown until today, while others have been forgotten outright.

On 1 October 1990, hundreds of Banyarawanda militants that served with the Ugandan Army deserted their posts to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and invade Rwanda. Thus began the Rwandan Civil War, which was to culminate in the famous genocide of nearly one million of Tutsi and moderate Hutus, in 1994. Starting with in-depth descriptions of the history of Rwandan political, military and security development, this volume traces the history of the RPA from its emergence as a small-scale insurgent group formed from the ranks of Rwandan refugee diaspora in Uganda; its military operations and related experiences during nearly four years of war against the Rwandan government; and its establishment of control over Kigali, in July 1994. As such, the narrative presented here provides a fascinating and unique insight into the military story behind the emergence of modern-day Rwanda and its military; considered by many to be the ‘Israel of Africa’. Providing minute details about RPF’s tactics and doctrine – that strongly influenced developments in a number of other modern-day African wars – this volume is foremost an offering that provides highly interesting backgrounds for and a prequel to, nearly all of the subsequent wars in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. Illustrated with over 150 photographs, color profiles, and maps describing the equipment, colors, and markings, and tactics of the RPF and its opponents, this is a unique study about the emergence of one of the most important US allies on the African continent.

In 1971, Idi Amin Dada, a former officer of the King’s African Rifles and commander of the Ugandan Army, seized power in a military coup in Uganda. Characterized by human rights abuses, political repression, ethnic persecution, extra judicial killings, nepotism, corruption and gross economic mismanagement, Amin’s rule drove thousands into exile. Amin shifted the country’s orientation in international relations from alliances with the West and Israel, to cooperation with the Soviet Union. With Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere offering sanctuary to Uganda’s ousted president, Milton Obote, Ugandan relations with Tanzania soon became strained too. Already in 1972, a group of Tanzania-based exiles attempted, unsuccessfully, to invade Uganda and remove Amin. By late 1978, following another attempted coup against him, Amin deployed his troops against the mutineers, some of whom fled across the Tanzanian border. The rebellion against him thus spilled over into Tanzania, against whom Uganda then declared a state of war. Opening with an overview of the ascent of crucial military and political figures, and the buildup of the Tanzanian and Ugandan militaries during the 1960s and 1970s, this volume provides an in-depth study of the related political and military events, but foremost of military operations during the Kagera War – also known as ‘A Just War’ – fought between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978–1979. It further traces the almost continuous armed conflict in Uganda of 1981–1994, which became renowned for emergence of several insurgent movements notorious for incredible violence against civilian population, some of which remain active in central Africa to this day. This book is illustrated with an extensive selection of photographs, color profiles, and maps, describing the equipment, markings, and tactics of the involved military forces.

Ethiopia, a country of ancient origins in eastern Africa, remains a military powerhouse of that continent until our days. Nowadays involved in the war in neighboring Somalia, Ethiopia was also involved in half a dozen of other armed conflicts over the last 60 years. Crucial between these was the Eritrean War of Independence. Fought 1961-1991, this was one of biggest armed conflicts on the African continent, especially if measured by numbers of involved combatants. It included a wide spectrum of operations, from ‘classic’ counterinsurgency (COIN) to conventional warfare in mountains – with the latter being one of the most complex and most demanding undertakings possible to conduct by a military force. Campaigns run during the Eritrean War of Independence often included large formations of relatively well-equipped forces, led by well-trained commanders, along well-thought-out plans, based on homegrown doctrine. The air power played a crucial – although not necessarily decisive – role in many of battles. Nevertheless, most of details about this conflict remain unknown in the wider public. Similarly, relatively few Western observers are aware of relations between the Eritrean liberation movements, and various dissident and insurgent movements inside Ethiopia – although the synergy of these eventually led the downfall of the so-called Derg government, in 1991. While the first volume in this mini-series spanned the history of wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1961 and 1988, the second covers the period since. Correspondingly, it is providing coverage of military operations that led to the fall of the Derg government in Ethiopia of 1991, the period of Eritrean military buildup and a complete reorganization of the Ethiopian military in the 1990s, and concludes with the first detailed account of the so-called Badme War, fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea in period 1998-2001. It is illustrated by many contemporary photographs, maps and color profiles.

Ethiopia, a country of ancient origins in eastern Africa, has remained a military powerhouse of that continent until the present day. Currently involved in the war in neighboring Somalia, Ethiopia was also involved in half a dozen of other armed conflicts during the last 60 years. One of the most significant was the Eritrean War of Independence. Fought 1961-1991, this was one of the biggest armed conflicts on the African continent, especially if measured by numbers of combatants involved. It included a wide spectrum of operations, from ‘classic’ counter-insurgency (COIN) to conventional warfare in mountains – with the latter being one of the most complex and demanding undertakings possible to conduct by a military force. Campaigns run during the Eritrean War of Independence often included large formations of relatively well-equipped forces, led by well-trained commanders, utilizing complex plans based on homegrown doctrine. Airpower played a crucial – although not necessarily decisive – role in many of battles. Nevertheless, most of details about this conflict remain unknown to the wider public. Similarly, relatively few Western observers are aware of relations between the Eritrean liberation movements, and various dissident and insurgent movements inside Ethiopia – although the synergy of these eventually led the downfall of the so-called Derg government, in 1991. Reaching back to extensive studies of Ethiopian and Eritrean military history, this volume provides a detailed account of the first 25 years of this conflict: from the outbreak of armed insurgency in 1961 until the crucial battle of Afabet, in 1988. It is illustrated by over 100 contemporary photographs, maps and color profiles.

Between 1961 and 1974 Portugal fought a war to retain its African colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Collectively known as the Campaigns for Africa, the origin of the conflict stems from the post-World War II atmosphere of nationalism and anti-colonial fervor. The Angolan insurgency began in 1961, followed by unrest in Guinea-Bissau in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964. Portugal’s initial actions in Angola were based on foot-slogging by infantry, considered the best method of addressing an insurgency, not only to hunt the enemy but also to keep contact with the population. But in the vast areas of Angola – the majority of which was unsuited to wheeled vehicles – this tactical approach was too painful, and for Portugal the number of troops available was limited. The helicopter was a possible solution, but it was beyond Portugal’s finance resources and it had a tendency to fly over those areas where it was vital to communicate with the population and secure its loyalty. When in 1966 the enemy guerrillas sought a new front in eastern Angola, Portugal needed a force that could combine mobility over rough terrain with the ability to engage insurgents, while maintaining strong links with the population. One of the adaptive solutions to this challenge was found in the past: create horse cavalry units in the form of dragoons that were equally trained for cavalry or infantry service, just as their historical predecessors fought. In this particular case, adaptive tactics involved adjusting existing military methods and means from the traditional and available inventory to craft a solution that would deny eastern Angola to insurgents and support the population there. This story is about imaginative thinking that, instead of a ‘forced abandonment of the old’, led to a ‘resurrection of the old.'

As of mid-1976, the civil war in Angola was seemingly decided: supported by a large contingent of Cuban forces, the MPLA established itself in power in Luanda. Its native competitors, the US-French-Zaire-supported FNLA, and UNITA, supported by China and South Africa, were in tatters. The French and Zaire-supported FLEC – an armed movement for the independence of the oil-rich Cabinda enclave – was in disarray. The last few of their surviving units were either driven out of the country, or forced into hiding in isolated corners of northern and southeastern Angola. Nevertheless, the war went on. The MPLA’s government failed to decisively defeat UNITA, in southern Angola, and then found itself facing a coup attempt from within in May 1977. Crushed in blood, this resulted in thousands being jailed and tortured: many more escaped abroad, where they reinforced the ranks of the battered opposition. The coup prompted the Soviets to attempt increasing their influence with the aim of establishing permanent military bases in the country. While all such overtures were turned down, Angolan operations along the border to what was then the South-West Africa (subsequently Namibia) in October 1980, combined with the increased activity of SWAPO – an insurgency against the South African control of that territory - subsequently Namibia – prompted South Africa to launch another military intervention and resume supporting UNITA. In turn, this prompted not only the Cubans to further increase their military presence, but also the Soviet Union into delivering massive amounts of military aid to the government in Luanda. Angola not only assumed the role of one of the major hot battlefields in the Cold War: its ‘civil war’ saw a number of major showdowns between diverse belligerents, culminating in the Battle of Cangamba in 1983. Based on extensive research, with help of Angolan and Cuban sources, War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 2 traces the military build-up of the Cuban and Soviet-supported Angolan military, the FAPLA and its combat operations, and those of the Cuban military in Angola, in the period 1976-1983, their capabilities and intentions, and their battlefield performances. The volume is illustrated with over 100 rare photographs, half a dozen maps and 18 color profiles.

In the broad history of the Cold War, the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was the climax of a far-off, but nonetheless important African war. It was waged between the apartheid South African Defence Force (SADF) and the armed forces of the communist MPLA government in Angola and the People’s Republic of Cuba. Led by Soviet generals, the MPLA embarked on a grand offensive in order to knock out the pro-Western rebel movement UNITA in southeastern Angola. As UNITA’s survival was crucial to South Africa’s military strategy in fighting its own counterinsurgency war against the South West African rebel movement SWAPO, the SADF stepped in with a single mechanized brigade and broke the back of the overwhelming MPLA offensive. The MPLA forces were subsequently driven back over a hundred kilometers, before the SADF advance was finally stopped just short of the town of Cuito Cuanavale. Since then, a hot war of words have been waged about who actually won. In this book, a South African military historian and retired journalist examines the campaign, the adversaries, and their achievements on the basis of his research in SADF archives. His scrupulous attempt at objectivity results in interesting conclusions. While the MPLA lost hands down, he posits a draw between the Cubans and the SADF. Although having been a South African reservist officer himself, he has critical words for the SADF leadership. Many misunderstandings, some of which were purposefully created by Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, are put to rest. While not sharing Castro’s political beliefs, he acknowledges Castro’s military acumen and political savvy in extricating his country from an unwinnable war while smelling of roses. The analysis contains many lessons about mechanized warfare in the African context from which both laymen and military professionals alike may learn.

This book provides a history of the roots of FNLC (Front for the National Liberation of the Congo: ex-Katanga Gendarmerie) in Angola and Zaire, political situation under Mobutu regime, FNLC incursions into Zaire border since 1977 (“Shaba Wars I and II”) and subsequent hostage taking in mining town of Kolwezi. The author describes the subsequent French Foreign Legion and Belgian Para Commando airborne operation and freeing of the hostages, together with practical destruction of the FNLC as fighting force.

Portuguese paratroopers or “paras” began as a stepchild of the army and found a home in the Portuguese Air Force in 1955. Initially, the post-World War Two Portuguese Army seemed to have had mixed emotions about the need for elite, special-purpose forces that operated in small units with the attendant flexibility and elevated lethality. Shock troops have been traditionally controversial, and even the vaunted military theorist Baron Karl von Clausewitz saw little point in them. The history of the paras in the Portuguese Army is illustrative of this ambivalent view. Nevertheless, in a “war of the weak” in which insurgents avoid government strengths and exploit its vulnerabilities using agility, deception, and imagination, such small, crack government units are particularly well suited to counterinsurgency operations. This appreciation emerged with the threat of a new kind of war in Portuguese Africa, an insurgency, and the new and visionary Air Force well understood the potential of paras when combined with the mobility of the helicopter. The Air Force saw an urgent need for troops who could fight an unconventional war, who could not only defeat an enemy but separate him from the population in which he sought concealment and support and on which he depended for funding, recruits, and intelligence. These were specialised warfighters who in one minute were physically destroying an insidious enemy and in the next administering aid and support and protecting a vulnerable population. These were just the troops that Portugal would require for military success in its approaching battle fought between 1961 and 1974 to retain its African possessions, and this vision would be realized on the African battlefield with devastating consequences. This book tells the paras’ story as researched from Portuguese sources. It details how they were formed and trained and how they developed their imaginative, effective, and feared tactics and applied them in operations to protect the population from insurgent predations and destroy a vicious enemy.

War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 3 covers the air warfare during the II Angolan War – fought 1975-1992 – through narrating the emergence and operational history of the Angolan Air Force and Air Defence Force (FAPA/DAA) as told by Angolan and Cuban sources. Most accounts of this conflict – better known in the West as the ‘Border War’ or the ‘Bush War’, as named by its South African participants – tend to find the operations by the FAPA/DAA barely worth mentioning. A handful of published histories mention two of its MiG-21s claimed as shot down by Dassault Mirage F.1 interceptors of the South African Air Force (SAAF) in 1981 and 1982, and at least something about the activities of its MiG-23 interceptors during the battles of the 1987-1988 period. On the contrary, the story told by Angolan and Cuban sources not only reveals an entirely different image of the air war over Angola of the 1980s: indeed, it reveals to what degree this conflict was dictated by the availability – or the lack of – air power and shows that precisely this issue dictated the way that the commanders of the Cuban contingents deployed to the country – whether as advisors or as combat troops – planned and conducted their operations. It is thus little surprising that the first contingent of Cuban troops deployed to Angola during Operation Carlota, in late 1975, included a sizeable group of pilots and ground personnel who subsequently helped build-up the FAPA/DAA from virtually nothing. They continued that work over the following 14 years - sometimes in cooperation of Soviet advisors and others from East European countries – eventually establishing an air force that by 1988 maintained what South African military intelligence and the media subsequently described as the ‘most advanced air defense system in Africa’. Not only the air defense system in question, but also the aircraft serving as its extended arms, ultimately managed a unique feat in contemporary military history: they enabled an air force equipped with Soviet-made aircraft and trained along the Soviet doctrine to establish at least a semblance of aerial superiority over an air force equipped with Western-made aircraft and operating under a Western doctrine. Based on extensive research with help of Angolan and Cuban sources, the War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 3 traces the military build-up of the FAPA/DAA in the period 1975-1992, its capabilities and its intentions. Moreover, it provides a unique, blow-by-blow account of its combat operations and experiences. The volume is illustrated with 100 rare photographs, half a dozen maps and 15 color profiles, thus providing a unique source of reference on this topic.

War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4 continues the coverage of the operational history of the Angolan Air Force and Air Defense Force (FAPA/DAA) as told by Angolan and Cuban sources, in the period 1985-1988. Many accounts of this conflict – better known in the West as the ‘Border War’ or the ‘Bush War’, as named by its South African participants – consider the operations of the FAPA/DAA barely worth commentary. At most, they mention a few air combats involving Mirage F.1 interceptors of the South African Air Force (SAAF) in 1987 and 1988, and perhaps a little about the activity of the FAPA/DAA’s MiG-23s. However, a closer study of Angolan and Cuban sources reveals an entirely different image of the air war over Angola in the 1980s: indeed, it reveals the extent to which the flow of the entire war was dictated by the availability – or the lack – of air power. These issues strongly influenced the planning and conduct of operations by the commanders of the Angolan and Cuban forces. Based on extensive research with the help of Angolan and Cuban sources, War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4 traces the Angolan and Cuban application of air power between 1985-1988 – during which it came of age – and the capabilities, intentions, and the combat operations of the air forces. The volume is illustrated with 100 rarely seen photographs, half a dozen maps and 15 color profiles, and provides a unique source of reference on this subject.

From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and its nationalist enemies fought an increasingly intense war for the independence of "Portuguese" Guinea, then a colony but now the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of the conflict, Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy, and increasingly based its strategy on this advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a crucial role in the Guinean war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, the FAP – despite the many challenges it faced – proved to be the most effective and responsive military argument against the PAIGC, which was fighting for Guinea's independence. The air war for Guinea is unique for historians and analysts for several reasons. It was the first conflict in which a non-state irregular force deployed defensive missiles against an organized air force. Moreover, the degree to which Portugal relied on its air power was such that its effective neutralization doomed Lisbon's military strategy in the province. The FAP's unexpected combat losses initiated a cascade of effects that degraded in turn its own operational freedom and the effectiveness of the increasingly air-dependent surface forces, which felt that the war against the PAIGC was lost. The air war for Guinea thus represents a compelling illustration of the value – and vulnerabilities – of air power in a counter-insurgency context, as well as the negative impacts of over reliance on air supremacy. Volume 1 of Sanctuary Lost is extensively illustrated with photographs and specially commissioned color artworks.

Through late 1987 and early 1988, the battlefields of southern Angola moved ever further away from the border with South West Africa/Namibia, until the showdown between the Soviet and Cuban-supported government in Luanda and South African-supported insurgency of UNITA culminated in the controversial and still much disputed Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. During this period, Angolan and Cuban airpower slowly grew to a point where it outmatched the SAAF, in turn limiting the freedom of movement of the SADF and UNITA ground forces, and reducing their operations to attritional battles, with little chance of achieving major victories on terms acceptable to the government in Pretoria. As the changing political climate between East and West, and in Africa began to bring about and end to the South African intervention in Angola and the occupation of South West Africa/Namibia, the government of Angola was able to switch its attentions to dealing with UNITA. Volume 5 of War of Intervention in Angola examines in detail this final period of Cuban involvement in the long and tragic civil war that ruined Angola between 1975 and 1992. While the emphasis is upon the operations of the Angolan and Cuban air forces, it also details how these impacted upon the ground operations of all parties. This volume is richly illustrated with original photographs of the forces involved, specially commissioned maps of the ground operations, and a range of full color artworks.​

In the early hours of 22 November 1970, six Portuguese warships surrounded Conakry, the capital of the Republic of Guinea, on the West African coast. Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, a military force landed on the northern and southern coasts of the sleeping city. At the head of these men was a young Portuguese marine officer, Commander Alpoim Calvão, who had been appointed to command this secret operation, codenamed Green Sea - Mar Verde in Portuguese. The main objective of the invasion was to promote a coup d'état in the former French colony and overthrow the regime of President Sékou Touré, who supported the guerrillas of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), who were fighting for the independence of Portuguese Guinea. The invaders also sought to destroy the naval resources that the guerrillas and the Guinean navy had in the port of Conakry, capture the leader of the party, Amilcar Cabral, and rescue a group of Portuguese soldiers held in a PAIGC prison. The incursion would not have the expected success concerning the coup d'état, and Portugal would be condemned by international organizations for the invasion of a sovereign state, but this operation would remain in the memory of many as the most daring carried out during the colonial war in Africa, although the Portuguese regime never recognized its involvement.