The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A Re-examination

By Boris Sokolov

This book investigates several controversial issues regarding the role of the Soviet Union and the performance of the Soviet government and Red Army, to which the author provides some provocative answers. The primary question explored by the author, however, regards the effectiveness of both the Red Army and of the Soviet military economy.

Dr. Sokolov argues that the chief defect of the Soviet military economy was the disproportionate emphasis on the production of tanks and aircraft at the expense of transportation means and the means of command and control. This leads the author to look at the role of Lend-Lease during the war. Through the delivery of radio sets, trucks, jeeps, locomotives, fuel, explosives and so on, the author concludes that Lend-Lease was critical to the Red Army, and that the Soviet Union would not have been able to wage a long war against Germany without the Lend-Lease supplies - a conclusion that defies decades of Soviet claims to the contrary.

Finally, the author looks at the still very controversial and hot topic of Red Army losses in the war, which was taboo for decades, arguing that this is an effective measure of the Red Army's military performance. He and other scholars have estimated that the Red Army's losses were on the scale of 27 million, three times larger than the official estimates, and approximately 10 times greater than the German losses on the Eastern Front. He argues that such horrendous casualties and such an unfavorable ratio for the Red Army were the result of the relatively low value placed on human life in both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and the much more destructive nature of the Soviet totalitarian regime as compared with the Third Reich, which cowed the Soviet generals and officers into total subservience. Due to the elimination of all political opposition and the total control over people's lives, soldiers and civilians could not protest against the crude tactics that resulted in such a very high rate of losses.

Dr. Boris Sokolov is a prolific author and a member of the Russian branch of PEN International, which celebrates literature and promotes freedom of expression. In 2008, Dr. Sokolov was forced to resign as Professor of Social Anthropology from his post at the Russian State Social University in Moscow at the demand of President Medvedev's administration after publishing an article about the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. The author of 69 books (as of 2012), his work has focused on the history of the Second World War and has also written biographies of such prominent military and political leaders as Bulgakov, Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Tukhachevsky, Rokossovsky and Zhukov. In addition, he has written numerous articles on history, philology, political science and economics. A prominent specialist in the problems of military losses, military economy and strategy, he has given lectures in Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Denmark, and his books and articles have been translated into numerous languages. He currently resides in Moscow and is working on a biography of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky.

Stuart Britton is a freelance translator and editor residing in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. He has been responsible for making a growing number of Russian titles available to readers of the English language, consisting primarily of memoirs by Red Army veterans and recent historical research concerning the Eastern Front of the Second World War and Soviet air operations in the Korean War. Notable recent titles include Valeriy Zamulin's award-winning 'Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative ' (Helion, 2011), Boris Gorbachevsky's 'Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier's War on the Eastern Front 1942-45' (University Press of Kansas, 2008) and Yuri Sutiagin's and Igor Seidov's 'MiG Menace Over Korea: The Story of Soviet Fighter Ace Nikolai Sutiagin' (Pen & Sword Aviation, 2009). Future books will include Sve

• Language: English
• Publisher: Helion and Company
• Release date: Apr 24, 2013
• ISBN: 9781909384712

Boris Sokolov

Dr. Boris Sokolov is a prolific author and a member of PEN International, which celebrates literature and promotes freedom of expression. In 2008, he was forced to resign from his post at the Russian State Social University after publishing an article about the Russian-Georgian War. His work has focused on WW2 and biographies of prominent military and political leaders.

Book preview

Introduction

This book is a compilation of several articles, published at different times, which are devoted mainly to the position and role of the Soviet Union in World War II. The main subject of exploration is the effectiveness of both the Red Army and the Soviet military economy. The book examines several different aspects of this subject.

One important indicator of military effectiveness is the level of losses sustained by the armed forces. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not a good indicator of the effectiveness of a military economy under war conditions. Rather, good measures of the effectiveness of a wartime economy are connected not only with level of production of main types of weapons and equipment, such as tanks and aircraft, but also with the output of communications equipment to facilitate command and control and with building vehicles to convey troops and supplies. The chief defect of the Soviet military economy was the large disproportion between the production of tanks and combat aircraft on the one hand, and the output of both the means of command and control and transportation means on the other. This disproportion was to some extent alleviated by Lend-Lease. Yet Soviet historiography traditionally denied the decisive role of Lend-Lease by stressing the fact that the Lend-Lease supplies received were insignificant compared to the Soviet output of tanks and aircraft. However, the tremendous growth in the Soviet production of armaments and equipment was to a large extent due to the Lend-Lease supplies of aluminum and alloys. The Soviet Union also decisively depended on American and British supplies of radio sets, anti-aircraft artillery, trucks, wagons, locomotives, some industrial equipment, fuel, explosives and so on. The Soviet Union really could not have waged a protracted war with Germany without the Lend-Lease supplies. The Soviet economy was not autonomous, despite the claims of the Soviet leaders and did not surpass either the American or German economies.

Also the real losses of the Red Army were much larger than has been officially recognized. As is argued in this book, the official figure for the irrevocable losses of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War of 8,668,400 understates the actual losses by around a factor of three. For example, the official publication of the Russian Defense Ministry, which presents the cited figure of 8,668,400, also gives the irrevocable losses of the Soviet troops during the Berlin operation in April-May 1945. These losses, including the losses of the two Polish armies that participated in the operation, are given as 81,116 men, of which the Polish armies lost 2,825.¹ In contrast, the official publication of the Polish Defense Ministry gives the real figures of irrevocable losses of the two Polish armies during the Berlin operation: 7,200 killed and 3,800 missing; these figures are 3.9 times larger than the official Soviet (Russian) figures.² If we assume that the same underestimation relates to the figure for the total Soviet irrevocable losses during the Berlin operation, these losses may be estimated as 316,352 killed and missing. Also during the East Pomeranian operation the irrevocable losses of the First Polish Army were estimated by the official Russian source as 2,575 killed and missing.³ However, the Polish official data estimate the irrevocable losses to be 5,400 killed and 2,800 missing, e.g. 3.2 times larger.⁴ So the Soviet irrevocable losses during the East Pomeranian operation may be estimated as 177,000 killed and missing.

As another example, the same Russian official source states that during the defense of Odessa (August-October 1941), Soviet losses were 16,578 killed and missing.⁵ However, it is known that the Romanian Army took approximately 16,000 prisoners during the fighting for Odessa, which would mean according to the Soviet statistic that the defenders of Odessa lost only about 600 killed – a number that is simply not credible.⁶ These cases, as well as the tremendous underestimation of the irrevocable losses of the Central Front during Kursk, which will be discussed later, are decisive proof that the official irrevocable losses of the Red Army are drastically understated by at least a factor of three. The actual irrevocable losses of the Red Army relative to the irrevocable losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front are likely a ratio of 10 to 1. If we include the irrevocable losses of Germany’s allies in the East and the irrevocable losses of the Soviet Union’s allies, the ratio of irrevocable losses on the Soviet-German front falls only to around 9.3:1. If we take the losses of only the German units and those Red Army units that directly faced them while excluding those Soviet prisoners that died in German captivity, the ratio is 8:1 in favor of the German side.

It is interesting to note that the ratio of German and Russian irrevocable losses during the First World War, in the second half of 1916, was also around 7:1.⁷

The disproportionate and tragic losses of the Red Army were caused by two primary factors. The first factor was the common cultural backwardness of Russia as compared with Germany. This factor operated during both World Wars. This backwardness resulted in the very low value assigned to human life both in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union. The second factor was the much more destructive character of Soviet totalitarianism as compared with Hitler’s Nazi regime in Germany. Lenin and Stalin crushed the market economy, liquidated private property and terrorized the entire people with brutal wide scale repressions. Under such conditions the Soviet generals and officers were afraid to take independent action. Due to both the elimination of all political opposition and the total control over the people’s lives, neither the soldiers nor the civilians could protest the very high level of human losses. They could not refuse to make hopeless attacks while ordered.

There are the similar examples of clear facts, connected with the actual issue of Stalin’s possible intention to attack Hitler. Yet in March 1941 deputy chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Nikolai F. Vatutin, made a very telling inscription on the text of the plan of strategic deployment of the Red Army in the West: Offensive to begin on 12 June.⁸ It is also stressed in the book that on 4 June 1941, the Politburo decided to form a Polish division in the Red Army before 1 July. These examples strongly suggest that Stalin really did plan to attack Germany in the summer of 1941. These facts may be explained only by such supposition, whereas the other facts may be explained both as preparation for repulsing of possible German attack and as preparation for future Soviet attack to Germany.

In addition, Soviet irrevocable losses in equipment were much higher than the Germans during the war. As Russian historian Andrei Smirnov proves in his brilliant work, the Soviet losses in combat aircraft were 2-3 times higher than the Germans. At the same time, the German bombers, dive-bombers and ground attack aircrafts operated much more effectively than did those of the Red Army. It was the result of poorly trained Soviet pilots, the low level of Soviet air command capabilities, and the weaknesses in Soviet aircraft design and production. The latter aspect resulted in the superiority of German aircraft in some important characteristics.⁹ (9) The same situation concerned the armored forces. For example, during the tank battle near Prokhorovka Station the Soviet irrevocable losses were, at a minimum, 192 tank and self-propelled guns against German irrevocable losses of 2 tanks and 1 self-propelled gun. The ratio of losses was 48:1.¹⁰ Such a poor result for the Red Army was caused by the weak training that Soviet tankers and Soviet armor commander alike received, and by the very low level of organization of the battlefield evacuation and repair services. Soviet tanks, like the aircraft, were inferior to their German counterparts in some important details, such as in radio communications and the quality of the gun sight optics, for example. The gap between the Russians and Germans was greatest in the more complex arms and services, especially in Air Force, Navy and the armored troops. In artillery the gap was smaller, as German generals testify.

Only in 1944-1945, when a considerable portion of the German troops was transferred to the Western Front in order to repulse the Allied landing in Normandy, did the German losses on the Eastern Front, especially in prisoners, increase considerably due to the growing Soviet superiority both in personnel and equipment. For example, before the beginning of the Soviet offensive in Belorussia in June 1944, Army Group Center numbered only 442,100 officers and men, including only 258,600 in combat detachments, while the Soviet fronts opposing it numbered 2,411,600 officers and men.¹¹ The ratio is 5.5:1 in favor of the Red Army. Typically, the Soviet superiority in numerical strength was even greater on the selected axes of the main attacks, where the fronts would concentrate their forces. But until the end of the war the Soviet irrevocable losses remained much larger than the German ones.

I also demonstrate in this book through a comparison of output and losses that the official figures for the Soviet production of tanks and combat aircraft during the war are seriously overstated because of the double counting of defective pieces of equipment and those returned for overhaul. It is possible that some equipment was produced only on paper, in official reports, because non-fulfillment of the wartime plan norms could provoke serious repressions.

This falsification of military production numbers inspired in me the concept of ‘imaginary value’ as a very important means of distribution and re-distribution of goods in the Soviet planned economy. I later applied this concept to the study of Soviet GDP and Soviet military expenditures in the 1980s, and to two articles about the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, which rather dramatically influenced my career. After the publication of the first article about the Russian-Georgian War, I was forced to resign my position as professor of social anthropology at Moscow State University at the demand of Russian President Dmitrii A. Medvedev’s administration.

I want to thank heartily my old friend Colonel David M Glantz, chief editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, both for accepting my articles for publication in his journal, and for his permission to include their translations in this book. I also want to express my sincere thanks to my beloved wife Liudmila M. Sokolova, who kindly agreed to type this book.

Notes

1

Did Stalin intend to attack Hitler?

¹

[Note by David M. Glantz that introduced this article when it appeared in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Russian historiography today resounds with a heated debate over who intended to attack whom to initiate the Soviet-German war. In a series of books, Victor Suvorov advances the theory that Stalin planned to attack Hitler, but that Barbarossa preempted Stalin’s plan. In this article Sokolov argues in support of Suvorov’s case, claiming that Stalin actually planned an attack as early as spring 1940 to exploit expected German difficulties in their war in the West. Despite subsequent events in the West, Sokolov claims that, ultimately, Stalin planned to launch his offensive on 6 July 1941. While the German 22 June attack rendered Stalin’s supposed plan superfluous and many (including the editors of this journal) question Suvorov’s and Sokolov’s conclusions, the notoriety of this view requires that it be advanced, discussed, and accepted or rejected on its own merits.]

The question of whether the Soviet Union was preparing a preventive or offensive war against Germany on the eve of 22 June 1941 has once again become current, following the publication of V. Suvorov’s books, Ledokol’ [ Icebreaker ] and Den’-M [ Day-M ], in which he asserts that a Soviet attack against Germany was planned for 6 July 1941, an attack which had no connection with the German plan, Barbarossa. ² In our opinion, both the facts cited by Suvorov and, especially, those which have come into the field of view of researchers after the publication of the above books make it possible to not only agree with Suvorov’s conclusion, but also to justifiably suggest that Stalin had at first intended to attack Hitler in Summer 1940, but that this plan was thwarted by the rapid collapse of France, just as in Summer 1941 a similar plan was thwarted by the German invasion.

The chronologically first in a series of facts being examined is the report of the former Commander of the Baltic Fleet, V.F. Tributs, that in February 1940, Navy Commissar N.G. Kuznetsov issued a special directive in which he indicated the possibility that a coalition headed by Germany and including Italy, Hungary and Finland might come out against the USSR. The actual training of the Baltic Fleet in 1940-41 proceeded within the framework of these instructions.³ This report is completely trustworthy. On the one hand, Kuznetsov did not refute it in his memoirs or in posthumously published manuscripts.⁴ On the other hand, although the prewar operational plans for fleets and flotillas were destroyed after the war, they were summarized in detail in the report of the Main Naval Staff on the results of the Great Patriotic War, compiled in 1946. We believe it is necessary to cite this in full:

In accordance with the 1941 operational plans, in case an aggressor unleashes war against the USSR, the following missions are placed before the Soviet fleets and flotillas:

We will return to these plans. For the time being, let us note that, on the whole, they correspond to the 1940 plans in Tributs’ summary with respect to probable enemies. Here the composition of the enemy coalition has been broadened to include Romania, Bulgaria, Sweden, Turkey, and Iran. It is possible that in 1940, before the occupation of Bessarabia, these countries were not viewed as potential enemies or that Tributs simply omitted them in his listing, inasmuch as all of them, with the exception of Romania, maintained neutrality in relations with the USSR. The fact that as of February 1940 the Baltic Fleet had been preparing for war specifically against the German coalition proves that Germany and her allies were named the only possible enemies, rather than one of the probable enemies, in Kuznetsov’s directive. Such an orientation for February 1940, undoubtedly approved by the higher political leadership, is striking. After all, at the same time Britain and France were seriously examining the possibility of landing an expeditionary corps to aid Finland.⁶ This was no secret for the Soviet leadership, and it is traditionally seen as one of the main reasons which forced Stalin to conclude the Moscow Peace that

Reviews for The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War

[kunikov_1 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

Many have written on the history of the Second World War in Russia in the past twenty to thirty years. Gorbachev’s ‘glasnost’ opened the way for new questions, ideas, theories, and accounts from the Stalinist period, including the Eastern Front. Unfortunately, with all the new information that became available many took it upon themselves to begin writing sensationalist books that flooded the market and continue to do so today. Thus, the current Second World War book market in Russia is a mixture of historical monographs, journalistic and amateur accounts, and sensationalist conspiracy theories. ‘The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A Re-Examination’ falls somewhere in between all three. The author, Boris Sokolov, was forced to resign from his position as professor of Social Anthropology, which automatically raises questions about his historical background. What Sokolov and many authors like him do well is raise questions that have yet to be answered in a satisfactory manner. Unfortunately, often the questions they raise are pushed beyond their boundaries and become the basis of ill-defined generalizations and fallacious comparisons. Thus, throughout this slim volume of articles that were previously published in Russian newspapers or western academic journals, there is some interesting information offered but it is missing valuable context and is warped by numerous theories that already exist in Russia, which Sokolov latches onto with his own version of events and evidence.The initial chapter discusses the oft-repeated idea by conspiracy theorists that Stalin was preparing to attack Hitler in the summer of 1941. This is usually most associated with the likes of Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), even though the initial creator of this myth was Hitler himself who declared the invasion of the Soviet Union a pre-emptive strike against gathering Red Army forces who were poised to strike against Germany. While Suvorov grasps at every straw that’s available to him, be it real or imaginary, Sokolov utilizes the simplistic idea that because an order was issued to create a Polish division by 1 July 1941, an invasion was imminent. He points to the corresponding creation of a Finnish Corps on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Finland, but curiously enough fails to point out the entire lead-up to the invasion of Finland and juxtapose it with the diplomatic situation on the ground in the spring and summer of 1941. The rest of the chapter offers little of substance or new information to those already familiar with the eve of the war on the Eastern Front.The more interesting chapters are those on the Battle of Kursk and Lend Lease. In the case of the former, Sokolov makes an interesting point in his discussion of whether it was ideal to wait for the Germans to attack or whether an earlier offensive by the Red Army against a Wehrmacht lacking Tigers, Panthers, and Ferdinands would have garnered greater success and fewer losses. Unfortunately, he doesn’t offer enough information about the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in April or May of 1943, nor does he analyze the weather conditions or logistical constraints that either side might have been under. It’s easy to pass judgment by simply mentioning a few figures, harder still to analyze the entire contextual situation that existed on a month-by-month basis. The more interesting aspect of this chapter is his discussion of the losses the Red Army sustained. Unfortunately, his example is limited to the Central Front and a figure of some 50-60,000. There is no adequate explanation for why the Central Front is listed as containing 738,000 men on July 5, yet numbered 645,300 on July 12 when it supposedly only suffered 33,897 casualties. The only Order of Battle change was the departure of two rifle brigades and the arrival of a tank brigade, at best a change of strength of some 5-7,000 men, according to Sokolov. Yet no explanation is offered of why such a drastic change in figures exists. The author believes this represents an undercounting of losses, which is the simplest explanation and there’s no doubt that undercounting existed in every army (who doesn’t want extra rations?). While this is the only real evidence Sokolov presents about the undercounting of casualties, he readily begins to apply this formula (undercounting by around 1/3) to other operations, creating a generalization out of one example. When discussing Red Army losses in general compared to the Wehrmacht, Sokolov comments that the ‘unfavorable ratio of losses may be explained by the superiority of the new German tanks and also the superiority of German command and control in armor combat.’ While this analysis is undoubtedly accurate in some scenarios, Valery Zamulin has shown quite well that the losses the Red Army sustained were a result of a combination of factors, few of which can be analyzed without understanding the greater context of specific engagements, forces utilized, etc.The chapter on Lend Lease seems to be a limited analysis of random equipment and materials and again lacks context. Yes, it is important to stress that value of Lend Lease supplies and the fact that the Soviet Union played down the aid it received while some in the west believed it represented a lifeline in the fullest sense of the term. Unfortunately, Sokolov doesn’t do a great job in getting his point(s) across. He discusses aviation fuel but fails to offer a breakdown of deliveries by year. There is also no breakdown of motor vehicle deliveries by year nor does Sokolov discuss the fact that Soviet domestic production of motor vehicles could have been increased if the need arose at the expense of light tank production, which was being curbed as is by the latter years of the war due to the dominance of the T-34. The reason Soviet domestic truck production was so low was because they knew that Lend Lease trucks were supposed to be delivered, but this is left out of Sokolov’s discussion(s). Thus, similar to previous chapters, the author discusses important subjects and brings up relevant examples only to then exaggerate their value and importance without adequate context and analysis. The last two chapters deal with losses and to some extent overlap each other. The more interesting look at the Soviet Union’s losses once more shows that serious research is still needed to give a more credible account and understanding of the devastation the Soviet Union experienced and how well or poorly the Red Army performed throughout the war. Sokolov again points to interesting information but fails to accurately analyze it. For instance, he lists the number of prisoners of war the Soviet Union sustained from 1943-1945 as 604,000 by Soviet estimates while German data gives a figure of 746,000. Yet there is no mention made of the fact that the Germans counted anyone of military draft age as a prisoner of war, no matter if they were part of the Red Army or were civilians (and there are accounts of civilians in German POW camps). This is also why the figures of the prisoners taken from the Kiev encirclement in 1941 differ when Soviet numbers are compared to German ones. Sokolov is also quick to dismiss Germany’s allies when calculating losses, his reasoning being the Red Army suffered fewer losses and Germany’s allies didn’t actively participate during the entire war. Not what I’d call an objective analysis.There’s much more one can say but the above is a good representation of what this thin volume offers. For those interested in understanding how much of Russia’s literature on the war is written this is a good starting point that features a middle ground between historical analysis and journalistic tendencies that create the ability to exaggerate and sensationalize without adequate understanding. Due to the limited archival access that was available to historians interested in writing on the Eastern Front within the Soviet Union, the end result was a plethora of literature that said little but never failed to exaggerate socialist heroism and economic abilities. Today’s Russian historians, journalists, and amateurs have access to much more information but lack a foundation or grounding in how to properly analyze and present the raw data at their disposal. The end result is that all too often the right questions are asked but adequate answers are not always forthcoming.