Poland and the Second World War, 1938–1948

By Evan McGilvray

A detailed chronicle of Poland’s efforts during World War II from beginning to end, by the author of Narvik and the Allies.
 
The invasion of Poland by German forces (quickly joined by their then-allies the Soviets) ignited the Second World War. Despite determined resistance, Poland was quickly conquered but Poles continued the struggle to the very last day of the war against Germany, resisting the occupier within their homeland and fighting in exile with the Allied forces.
 
Evan McGilvray, drawing on intensive research in Polish sources, gives a comprehensive account of Poland’s war. He reveals the complexities of Poland’s relationship with the Allies (forced to accept their Soviet enemies as allies after 1941, then betrayed to Soviet occupation in the post-war settlement), as well as the divisions between Polish factions that led to civil war even before the defeat of Germany.
 
The author narrates all the fighting involving Polish forces, including such famous actions as the Battle of Britain, Tobruk, Normandy, Arnhem, and the Warsaw Rising, but also lesser known aspects such as Kopinski’s Carpathian Brigade in Italy, Polish troops under Soviet command, and the capture of Wilhelmshaven on the last day of the war.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Apr 30, 2019
• ISBN: 9781473889729

Evan McGilvray

Evan McGilvray has written several books on Polish military history for Helion and is writing a book about Poland, NATO and the failure of democracy in Poland since joining the European Union.

Book preview

Chapter One

A Breakdown of Diplomacy, 1938-39

The story of Poland and the Second World War is a bleak one and illustrates a problem with history: dating something as significant as the Second World War. In many ways this work was conceived as an act of irrational anger with a particularly ignorant doctor who as a Pole would only relate to her own country despite trying to settle in the United Kingdom. This lady’s attitude was that the British teach that the Second World War began on 3 September 1939 rather than 1 September 1939 when Poland was invaded by Germany – well we do but I thought well when did the Second World War begin? Did it begin on 1 September 1939 or 3 September 1939?

Perhaps if one asked a Czech the reply might well be during October 1938 when Germany, Poland and Hungary invaded and dismembered Czechoslovakia. Then take the question outside Europe and ask somebody from China and you might receive an even earlier date such as when Japan invaded China. And of course, a Russian might say that the war began in June 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, but this would mean overlooking the fact that the Soviet Union was an ally of Germany from late August 1939 and helped in the invasion and occupation of Poland on 17 September 1939, and an invasion of Finland during November 1939 with fighting lasting until March 1940 when Finland sued for peace. In the spring of 1940 the Soviet Union also annexed the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as well as snatching Bessarabia (modern Moldova) from Romania. One could also look at Italy and wonder when did the war start for Italy? Was it when Italy invaded Ethiopia? And of course, the Americans observe that for them the Second World War began on 7 December 1941 when Japan attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.

Quite simply the Second World War was a serious of wars, conflicts, resentments and quarrels which eventually added up to an overwhelming conflict by two of the largest democracies, USA and UK, and one of the most tyrannical states, the Soviet Union against the genocidal regime of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany and the other Axis powers, including democratic Finland. The Second World War cannot be compartmentalised; its span, horror and advances are clearly breathtaking. This work will investigate just one of the states involved but will link up with much else in the Second World War. This state of course is Poland.

Poland returned to the world map on 11 November 1918; not as a result of a war of independence as is often touted in Polish historiography but as a consequence of the First World War. Poland during 1795 had been annexed by the three mainland European empires of Austria, Russia and Prussia and, after 1870, Germany. Periodically the Poles had revolted but each revolt was defeated by a particular source of schism in traditional Polish society, that of land. The Polish revolts during the nineteenth century were mainly headed by landowners wanting their lands back but doing so in the guise of Polish independence. Each time they were undone as their peasant support drained away, when each imperial power granted Polish peasants freedom, or in basically the end of serfdom in their part of Poland. The last revolt in Poland was in 1863 and ended when the Russian Tsar granted emancipation throughout the Russian empire. The reality for peasants was that most subjects of the Tsar remained poor and oppressed, but it did mean that Polish revolutionary leaders could be led off to be executed or deported to Siberia. The peasants did nothing to help them after 1863 as Polish nationalism meant little to them. However, the Polish nobles were at least not slaughtered by Polish peasants as had been the case in the Austrian partition of Poland in 1846 once emancipation was announced in the Austrian Empire. After 1863 there was not another revolt in Poland (barring the 1905 revolution in the Russian Empire which was not about Poland but politics throughout the empire). Independence in Poland therefore came to Poland as a political vacuum occurred into which stepped Józef Piłsudski, a nationalist leader and a Lithuanian aristocrat who had recently been released from German captivity and had a revolutionary paramilitary force behind him; they arrived in Warsaw on 11 November 1918 and assumed power. It was without doubt the best thing that could have happened in Poland at that time as Piłsudski possessed the necessary charisma to lead Poland while his paramilitaries were the nucleus of the new Polish army which had to be hastily resurrected to defend Poland’s newly found independence as well as stake out national frontiers. The Polish army between late 1918 to the summer of 1920 transformed itself from being a more-or-less amateur force to a professional army, especially because Polish officers who had served in the former imperial armies, notably Austria, now began service with the new Polish army. The climax of this success was the Polish victory against the Red Army at the Battle of Warsaw on 15 August 1920 (despite some questionable Polish leadership). The consequence was twofold: Soviet expansion was contained and Polish frontiers remained fixed for a generation. Peace reigned in Poland despite a military coup led by Piłsudski in May 1926 which overthrew democracy in Poland that had been in existence since 1921. After Piłsudski’s death in 1935, the military regime became more aggressive and Fascist in its outlook while Polish foreign policy became dangerously similar to that of Germany. This précis is to illustrate how Poland by 1938 found itself in a precarious position as two aggressive totalitarian states had emerged on the Polish eastern and western frontiers.

The two states were of course Germany under the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union headed by Joseph Stalin. Both were extremely dangerous to Poland. When Poland regained its independence both Germany and Russia were distracted by their own internal affairs and weakened. Germany had been defeated militarily in 1918 as well as suffering from internal conflict verging on civil war. It was not until 1933 when Hitler took power that Germany seemed to enjoy stability, which of course it was not really. Russia, later the Soviet Union, underwent a revolution and a civil war of which the war with Poland was part of the conflict as the Poles, taking advantage of the chaos in Russia, advanced east until they reached the Ukrainian capital, Kiev. The Communists, more commonly known as the Bolsheviks, by now the new power in Russia, saw the Polish incursion as a threat to the Communist revolution and so counter-attacked until they pushed the Poles back to Warsaw. The Polish victory at Warsaw denied the Bolsheviks their ‘World Revolution’. The Bolshevik future ideologically lay in the west but the defeat in Poland led to Stalin’s policy of socialism within one state. However, none of the Bolsheviks truly believed in this and yearned for the time when the International Revolution could be kick started once and for all. Poland was not forgiven for defeating the Red Army and became the object of Bolshevik ambitions and intrigues. Hitler’s Nazis were ideologically committed to annexing the Slavic lands to the German east but post 1935 Polish leaders seemed to ignore this until it was too late. However, for the time being, during the 1920s both Germany and Russia were weak and therefore Poland had breathing space to adapt to the conditions of independence.

The American President, Woodrow Wilson, had demanded Polish independence as part of European peace but it should be realised that if either Germany or Russia had been in a position to quash Polish independence it was unlikely that any western leader would have done anything about it as few actually believed in Polish independence. The two major European powers, the UK and France, both had overseas empires and any breath of former colonies or territories from wherever receiving independence was to be treated with caution. The British, for example, at the time were dealing with Irish revolutionaries who were fighting British forces. Ireland got a measure of independence in 1921. Poland in its turn was seen as a basket case because not only was it bankrupt before it started but by inheriting the legacy of three imperial overlords very little was unified, the railway gauge for example. Therefore, it should be seen that even though Poland had its problems in the 1920s it was allowed to grow in its own way, but the decade of the 1930s were extremely dangerous as its two powerful neighbours had regained their former powers and once more turned towards the destruction of Poland.

As already suggested, few outside Poland really believed in the idea of the revived Polish state. Once interwar Poland, the Polish Second Republic, was destroyed by the end of October 1939, Stalin’s Foreign Minister, Molotov, gave his view of Poland to the Supreme Council of the USSR: ‘However one swift blow to Poland, first by the German army and then by the Red Army and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles treaty.’¹ Molotov makes a clear reference to the demands of the Versailles Peace Treaty regarding Germany and her empire and how Polish independence was an issue for the Allies, especially the Americans, given that there was a considerable Polish minority in the USA which might from time to time be able to swing a presidential election. Therefore, it hurt nobody in the USA to demand Polish independence, but its consequences were to allow Hitler to make unsubstantiated claims of Polish brutality on the behalf of the German minorities living in Poland after 1933. Hitler’s lies helped to bring about the invasion of Poland and eventually world war.

With two dangerous hostile states on its frontiers, Polish governments had to try to work with both and anger neither as far as possible, however it was felt that Germany was easier to work with as perhaps it was on the surface not as radical as the Soviet Union and perhaps there was a measure of commonality between the two states. Of the two, probably Germany was hated less by Poles than was Russia. This was largely to do with traditionally Catholic Poland being aghast at the anti-religious activities of the Soviet regime. Indeed, many Poles saw the Bolsheviks as ‘godless heathens’ and considered them to be a scourge not seen since Attila the Hun. Even so Richard Overy notes that though Poles saw the Soviet Union as the greatest threat, the Polish government refused to become a ‘tame satellite’ as the German government had expected. German leaders had hoped that by the spring of 1939 Poland would have joined Germany and the Anti-Comintern Pact against the Soviet Union. That they did not was a blow to Germany’s plans and on 3 April 1939 Hitler gave orders to the German armed forces to prepare Fall Weiss, the German invasion of Poland.² So how did the Poles arrive at such an unfortunate situation which was to dog them for decades to come?

Quite simply, it was their neighbours which decided the fate of Poland. Two very aggressive enemies on one’s frontiers must always spell disaster if one is a weak and poor country with few friends and none of any real influence or will. France may have been a military ally of Poland but the French as a nation after the shock and horror of the First World War was not willing to go to help. This left Poland pretty much high and dry and so Polish foreign policy had to be tailored to maintaining correct relations with the German and Soviet governments with a hint of favouritism towards Germany. Actually, it should be considered that for much of the 1930s Germany actually courted Poland especially after Piłsudski’s death in 1935.

British Foreign Office papers document well the countdown to the German invasion of Poland beginning in January 1939. The Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax in a telegram to Mr Mallet in Washington DC observed that the Munich Agreement of autumn 1938 had made Hitler resentful. Hitler, according to Halifax, felt that he had been robbed of a local war in Czechoslovakia, which had caused him to feel humiliated and for which he blamed the British government. In Halifax’s opinion almost as soon as the Munich Agreement had been signed, Hitler was already planning further aggression in Europe. By December 1938 the prospect of establishing an independent Ukraine under German vassalage was being discussed openly in Germany.

Further reports from Germany indicated that Hitler, encouraged by Ribbentrop, Himmler and others, was considering an attack on the western powers as a preliminary to action in the east. It was thought that a German attack against Holland to bring the Dutch coast under German control would enable Germany to dictate terms to the British and paralyse France. There were no real indications that Hitler had made up his mind, but reports suggested that Italy was being pushed to enforce its claims against France. It was also suggested that perhaps Poland could be bribed into joining Germany and perhaps other possible allies with the prospect of ‘colonial loot’. It was expected that Japan would be allocated the Dutch East Indies in the event of a Dutch defeat.³ This was more or less what eventually happened after September 1939. The possibility of Poland receiving colonies for supporting German aggression is interesting, and Japan did annexe the Dutch East Indies after 1941.

The following day, 25 January, Halifax informed Sir Howard Kennard, the British ambassador to Poland, referring to a conversation which Colonel Józef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, had had with Hitler, that Beck had received assurance from the German dictator that Germany had no intention of confronting Poland with any fait accompli. This gave the impression that Germany was not planning any further expansion anywhere.⁴ However by now astute diplomats were well aware of Hitler’s duplicity and could only wait and see how future events unfolded. Hitler’s actions were more truthful than his words. Even so, Ogilvie-Forbes, the British ambassador to Germany, told Halifax that a recent conciliatory attitude towards Poland had made an active German intervention in Ukraine unlikely in the near future.⁵ The German attitude towards Ukraine vis-à-vis Poland and the Poles will be explored further in this work as it is of significance and illustrates how the Nazis knew how to play one people off against another even though ideologically they held both the Poles and Ukrainians in utter contempt as Slav sub-humans.

The British, for once, were not being fooled by the German authorities, as Colonel Mason-MacFarlane, the British military attaché to Berlin, told Ogilvie-Forbes that in his opinion there was something afoot in Germany. It was not clear what was going on but both Mason-MacFarlane and the Polish military attaché considered that at that time Poland was not on the agenda. The German army was clamouring ‘under its breath’ for a breathing space but were not getting it.⁶ What was being noticed but not understood by the British authorities was that Germany was about to annexe the remainder of Czechoslovakia and therefore rip up the Munich Treaty signed only a few months earlier.

The British remained focussed on events that might affect Poland. Ogilvie-Forbes in another of his regular dispatches to Halifax told of his impression that every effort was being made to square Poland and that something was big in the wind.⁷ It would seem that the German government was trying to play down anything which might antagonise the Polish government at the time. Sir Reginald Hoare, the British ambassador to Romania, reported from Bucharest that the Polish ambassador in the Romanian capital had told him that Hitler had given the Polish Foreign Minister an ‘official assurance’ that Ukraine was not a live issue and would only become so if the Soviet Union showed any signs of disintegrating.⁸

The question of German ambitions in Ukraine continued to dominate conversations in European diplomatic missions and chancelleries. Count Csáky, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, gave Sir G. Knox, the British ambassador to Budapest, his impressions of a recent visit to Berlin (16-18 January 1939). Csáky was convinced that Germany wanted nothing but peace at the time. Of the Ukraine Hitler had assured the Hungarian that there were to be no ‘adventures’ in that direction as he had recognised that these could not happen without arousing the hostility of the Poles. Incredibly Hitler made the claim that being in agreement with the Poles had been the foundation of ‘Germany’s present greatness’⁹ – an interesting interpretation of the rise of Nazi Germany.

Colonel Beck had this version of events after a meeting with Hitler in January 1939: Beck considered that his diplomacy had convinced Hitler not to pursue his plans for Ukraine. Beck reckoned that by telling Hitler that a move towards Ukraine would cause the Soviets to march against Germany. Beck may also have encouraged Hitler to revise the very low estimates which Germany held of the extent of Soviet armed forces.¹⁰ British diplomats were beginning to get a flavour of how the Poles were starting to cool their relationship with the German government. William Strang met the Polish ambassador to the UK, Count Edward Raczyński, who told Strang that it was the German government rather than the Poles who were pressing for detailed negotiations. Beck was being quite difficult to the Germans and gave nothing away. If the Germans wanted something, they had to give Poland something meaningful in return; Beck rather doubted whether anything as worthwhile as a German-Polish agreement was likely in the near future.¹¹ What was clear was the German clarion call for the return of Danzig to Germany. Despite his pledge that the Sudetenland was his last territorial demand, Hitler could see no contradiction between this and his demands for Danzig. He and most Nazis saw it as part of a natural process, as was Germany’s demand for the port of Memel from Lithuania. It was all part of returning Germans to the Reich and the restoration of German pride after 1918, no matter what the cost.¹²

From his vantage point in Warsaw, Kennard was able to report the political atmosphere and popular mood in Poland. He noted that there had been several ‘manifestations’ of the normal Polish dislike for Germany, which was escalating. This was quite noticeable at a party given for Ribbentrop visiting Poland where the atmosphere between Polish and German officials was ‘glacial’. The Danziger Vorposten was banned from Poland. The general feeling was that Beck was once more retreating to a position of neutrality in his German policy after a few years of being perhaps too friendly towards Germany. Polish public opinion seems to have been relieved that he felt that it was the safe and advisable thing to do.¹³

Sir Neville Henderson in Berlin was able to comment on the situation in Germany. In his opinion the German government was still trying to be conciliatory towards the Poles on contentious issues such as Danzig and the Polish Corridor. The German pursuit of Poland was an attempt to secure a friendly Poland on the German eastern frontier. In Henderson’s opinion this was likely to be a consequence of Germany’s internal economic situation and the possibility of international emergencies elsewhere. Germany was staking a lot on a successful Polish policy, but even so the German government was quite touchy as the Polish Ambassador to Germany had a ‘disagreeable interview’ with Ribbentrop in connection with anti-German student demonstrations in Poland and Danzig. It was noted that Polish-German relations were far from cordial, but Henderson’s belief was that the German government was not seeking trouble with Poland.¹⁴

Colonel Mason-MacFarlane wrote a minute to Henderson which was received in the FO on 10 March 1939. This minute considered the anti-German demonstration staged in Kraków during the visit to Poland of Count Ciano the Italian Foreign Minister. The intention was to convey a message: even though Poland appreciated Italy’s friendship, there was to be no question of Poland being drawn into the orbit of the pro-German alliance, commonly known as the Axis Powers. Mason-MacFarlane observed that the Japanese Embassy in Warsaw had been continuously trying to sound out the Poles as to when they proposed to take joint action with Germany against the Soviet Union. At the same time the Japanese diplomats strove to prevent a breakdown in the relationship between Poland and Germany. Colonel Szymanski, the Polish Military Attaché in Berlin, asserted that during this generation there was no possibility of Poland combining aggressively with Germany against the Soviet Union or vice versa. Szymanski made it clear that Poland had no intention whatsoever of knuckling under to Germany in any way. He was more or less convinced that Hitler’s aim was complete dominance of Europe and most likely world hegemony and stressed that relations between Warsaw and Moscow were excellent. According to Szymanski the Polish authorities had very little, if any, evidence of any reduction in the speed or scope of the German armament programme. It seemed that the Polish government wished for an Anglo-Franco-Italian rapprochement. Mason-MacFarlane ended his missive with personal testimony concerning Szymanski. He noted that Szymanski had been in Berlin for seven years and had fought in the German army throughout the First World War and therefore knew Germany well. Furthermore it was considered that Szymanski never ‘opens up’ unless he was apprehensive on Poland’s behalf and that the information he had imparted to Mason-MacFarlane was given in good faith.¹⁵

There were the beginnings of an assessment of the strengths of the Red Army which had become important following the Stalinist purges of the Soviet officer corps. An enclosure contained in a dispatch from Sir W. (William) Seeds to Halifax revealed such an assessment from the British military attaché in Moscow, Colonel Firebrace. At the time it was considered that in an offensive war the Red Army had less value but could probably make an initial advance into Poland. It was also noted that the Red Army thought that war was inevitable and was without doubt preparing for it.¹⁶ At the time of writing the British government was considering whether the Red Army could be brought into an alliance against Germany in the event of a German invasion of Poland. As we shall see the Poles were less than happy with such a proposed arrangement.

During the early spring of 1939 Poland was being courted by Germany, Italy and Romania. Jockeying for position and alliances began as it became increasingly likely that a European war would break out in the near future. Kennard noted in a letter to Sir Alexander Cadogan at the FO that there had been three visits by foreign ministers to Warsaw in a six-week period. Ribbentrop’s visit had been the most senior, followed by that of Ciano and a lesser visit by the Romanian Foreign Minister, Grigore Gafencu. The Romanian received sympathy from the Polish general public as Romania was in the same position as Poland: seeking a neutral way between Germany and the Soviet Union. Ciano was received with contempt even though many Poles sympathised with Italy; it was Ciano’s personal bad manners, vanity and mediocrity which raised the collective Polish ire. However the worst Polish popular contempt was saved for Ribbentrop who the Poles clearly disliked intensely.¹⁷

However, events in east-central Europe were beginning to take off at an alarming rate and this caused the Soviet authorities concern. Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to the UK, was convinced that the British Empire, even with the French, would be unable to stand up to German aggression without the collaboration and help of the Soviet Union.¹⁸ Like most European states during the first half of 1939 even the Soviet Union was looking for partners and trying to second guess what the future held. From mid-March 1939 the drums of war beat harder and faster. Kennard reported that the Polish government had recognised Slovakian independence and had already appointed a chargé d’affaires in the Slovak capital, Bratislava. Arciszewski, the Deputy Polish Foreign Minister, admitted that the Polish government was surprised at the rapidity of events following the German occupation of the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia.¹⁹ Even if the Polish government was trying to placate the German government in recognising Slovak independence (basically Slovakia became a German colony), the Polish public did not and demonstrated against Germany. The British diplomatic representative in the Free City of Danzig reported to Lord Halifax that Hitler was ‘incensed’ with anti-German protests in Poland and intended to ‘teach Poland a lesson’.²⁰

With the dismembering of Czechoslovakia by Germany in March 1939, European states began to assess what should be done regarding their own security issues as the map of Europe was redrawn and an ever-expanding Germany was beginning to dominate the centre. Charles Corbin, the French ambassador to London, suggested that if Czechoslovakia was to be finally broken up then it might be to Hungary’s advantage if it incorporated Ruthenia into Hungarian territory. This would then give Hungary a frontier with Poland which would constitute a barrier of sorts against German expansion east.²¹

A few days earlier Halifax said that he was anxious to discuss the international situation with Beck. Halifax wanted to find common interest between Poland and the UK. He wanted to hear Beck’s views on emigration and of raw materials – to both of these the Polish government attached great importance. Amazingly the Polish government also considered that Poland deserved colonies, but Halifax was wise enough not to discuss this overzealous Polish ambition saying that it was inappropriate at the time and liable to mislead and disturb British public opinion.²² As for Beck he was sounding increasingly bellicose, as Kennard reported twice to Halifax on 17 March 1939. The problem was that Beck did not take the German threat seriously enough and dismissed British concerns about German military movements. Beck failed to attach any importance to German troop movements in East Prussia and saw no threat from that direction. He told Kennard that if Germany should occupy Danzig, then Poland would fight. The British Military Attaché had been told pretty much the same by the Polish general staff.²³ In a second telegram on 17 March, Kennard told Halifax of Beck’s attitude concerning relations with Poland’s minor neighbours. Beck considered that Hungary was more likely to fight than Czechoslovakia had been in the face of German aggression. Beck also observed that the military conventions of the 1931 Polish-Romanian Treaty had only envisaged the Soviet Union as an aggressor.²⁴ And this was the problem by 1939: most of the alliances which had been concluded on mainland Europe, especially in east-central Europe, were anti-Soviet in nature. Germany was not seen as an international threat until it was more or less too late, and even then many tried to live in a state of denial concerning German imperialist ambitions, either through sympathy for Germany or fear of another war like that of 1914-18.

Sir Eric Phipps raised his doubts to Lord Halifax regarding Beck and Poland vis-à-vis Romania as Beck was seeking a triple alliance with France and the UK against German aggression but was willing to ditch Romania.²⁵ However, French diplomats said that France and Britain were at the ‘turning of the road’ and that it was essential to know the attitude of Poland and that of the Soviet Union.²⁶ The potential allies needed to know what they were going to get into if any such alliance was to be formed. The UK government to date had had very little to do with the Slavic world, as was demonstrated in autumn 1938 when Chamberlain refused to stand up to Hitler over Czechoslovakia, a country of which the British knew little.

Beck was certainly unwilling to commit Poland in the case of Romania being attacked by either Germany or Hungary. Furthermore the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister was still reluctant to accept that Poland might be attacked by Germany in the near future, but instead continued to insist that Germany was likely to either attack the Soviet Union or at least become involved in some ‘adventure’ in Ukraine which was part of the Soviet Union.²⁷ The concern that Hungary might attack Romania was realistic as Germany was not the only European state to have felt hard done by after the First World War, as Hungary (the Austro-Hungarian Empire) as a member of the defeated Central Powers lost territory and people including native Hungarians to Romania as a result of peace settlements after that war. This loss was a source of irritation between the two countries and there was a genuine fear that as Hungary had seized territory from Czechoslovakia in 1938, it may well attack Romania if a suitable opportunity arose.

The British government tried to convince the Polish government of the necessity of some form of alliance with the Soviet Union, but history was realistically against any meaningful agreement between the two countries. Quite simply, the Poles did not trust the Soviets at all. Even so Kennard pressed the point that it was important to Poland that they should have good relations with the Soviet Union as a possible source for military materials and other raw materials. Arciszewski, the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, admitted that there was something in what Kennard said as well as adding that Polish popular opinion was less hostile to the Soviet Union than it had been previously.²⁸

The problem was that as the British government sought an answer to the problems that the east-central European countries faced regarding German aggression in the region, the British continuously considered that Soviet support was essential and the probable answer. In theory this may have been so but was to ignore Soviet ambitions concerning the same region and the possibility of reviving the former Russian empire. Lord Perth, the British ambassador to Rome, reported to Halifax that the Hungarian Ambassador to Italy considered that if the UK linked the Soviet Union to European security it would be a huge mistake. In the Hungarian’s opinion such an action would automatically alienate a number of countries as they were violently anti-Soviet, including Poland. Perth considered that the Hungarian ambassador may well have been expressing a personal prejudice but all the same there was some strength in the argument.²⁹ The British and French governments had been aware for at least two days that an alliance system in east-central Europe was going to be difficult. In response to British questions, Beck had already pointed out that Polish foreign policy was a balancing act and was concerned what might happen if Romania was attacked. In Beck’s view, Romania would request aid and therefore Poland wanted greater reassurance concerning Romanian security and to this end requested British and French support.³⁰

As the Poles debated the consequences of a possible alliance with the Soviet Union in the face of German aggression, Ogilvie-Forbes reported from Berlin that the British Military Attaché had seen his Polish counterpart the previous night. It was learnt from this meeting that the Polish government had flatly turned down recent proposals made by the German government that Poland should join the anti-Comintern Pact. The Polish Military Attaché said that there was an obvious necessity for the Polish government to observe the greatest caution vis-à-vis Germany especially in the case of Danzig.³¹ On the same day, 25 March, Kennard reported that Germans living in Danzig had been using menacing language against Poles, possibly with the aim of intimidating the Polish government as they considered the British proposal for consultations concerning a possible alliance between the UK and Poland.³²

On 29 March Ogilvie-Forbes telephoned Halifax with the information that allegations had been made in the publication Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondence (28 March) of anti-German incidents in Poland. It was also reported that the agreement of 26 January 1934 between Hitler and Piłsudski was now being rejected by certain quarters in Poland.³³ Clearly this was only a pretext by the German government to try to convince the world of Polish bad will. Up to a point the British government was still falling for German lies as Halifax telegraphed Kennard with the message that on the part of the British there was a lack of confidence in Beck and that perhaps it might be more desirable to speak to the president or Marshal Śmigły-Rydz, but Halifax was happy to leave it to Kennard’s discretion on how to proceed in future talks.³⁴ Three observations should be made here: the President of Poland had no power (as we shall see later in this work); Śmigły-Rydz was in effect the military dictator of Poland but of very little ability beyond bullying; and clearly Kennard knew this – as we shall see, he continued to deal with Beck.

By the end of March 1939 German hypocrisy was breathtaking but not unexpected. The Polish Deputy Foreign Minister told Kennard that the German government, via the Romanian Ambassador to Poland, would regard any Polish movement into the Free City of Danzig as a casus belli. Equally the Polish government considered that a declaration by the Danzig senate of unity with Germany would be a cause for war.³⁵ Ogilvie-Forbes reporting from Berlin made an important observation based on his experience at his post in the German capital: in his opinion all German foreign policy decisions were being made by Hitler on the instigation of von Ribbentrop, supported and encouraged by a coterie of (Nazi) party extremists. These extremists, Ogilvie-Forbes considered, were connected to von Ribbentrop’s office (the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the foreign political department of the Nazi party. The British Ambassador noted further that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs was never consulted save for the purpose of ‘technical details’. The problem with German foreign affairs according to Ogilvie-Forbes was that the star of von Ribbentrop was rising and that he was briefing Hitler that the UK was somehow deficient and a spent force. Von Ribbentrop’s poor advice to Hitler was dangerous in the view of Ogilvie-Forbes. There was no confirmation that von Ribbentrop was pressing for war with Poland, but it would be in his nature to do so especially as Beck was now defying him.³⁶ The day before, 30 March, Kennard warned Halifax that German techniques of provocation were so varied and ‘insidious’ that in certain conditions Poland might be driven in self-defence to commit a technical act of provocation. Therefore Kennard said that it should be impressed on Beck that the Polish government should take care to avoid uncompromising attitudes or any provocative actions in their dealings with the German government. Also the Poles were urged to keep in touch with their British counterparts.³⁷ There were further considerations, as Halifax in correspondence with Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugesson, the British ambassador to Turkey, was of the opinion that there was a likelihood of a ‘German-Soviet combination’ designed to crush both Poland and Romania and then turn their aggression to the rest of Europe.³⁸ At the same time Kennard reported that Beck would fall in line with the wishes of the British government and be careful in dealings with the German government. However, Beck did confirm that Danzig could well be a casus belli as discussed earlier but had ordered the Polish press to act with caution.³⁹

On 31 March 1939 the British government made the unprecedented step of guaranteeing Polish independence against German aggression. It was not a good agreement if the Polish government had looked at it properly. The most obvious thing was that the UK did not have a large army but instead a vast navy. This was of little use in the defence of Poland; the other ally, France, had a large army but seemed to want to avoid any confrontation with Germany unless it was forced to. Somehow the British to this day get the blame for the catastrophe of 1939. It is true that there was an element of wishful thinking, with Adolf Hitler heading the list as he was certain that neither the UK nor France would ultimately go to war with Germany over Poland. A grave miscalculation for Germany.

Beck agreed with Neville Chamberlain that until 1938 German policies, even though difficult to accept, were defendable. However, once Germany moved into Czechoslovakia a line had been crossed and that he (Beck) welcomed the British intention to defend Polish independence against German aggression.⁴⁰

Dealing with Poland was not easy, as Anthony Eden noted. In a letter to Halifax, Eden complained that some Polish attitudes were far from satisfactory. Eden understood Polish reservations to all things Russian, but he felt uncomfortable with the Polish attitude towards Romania. Much of the problem lay with the fact that Beck, if not the Polish government, considered Poland to be a great power and clearly it was not; Poland wanted seniority in agreements with the UK, and certainly did not want parity with Romania. Eden was quick to absolve Beck and the Polish government of being short sighted in the matter of Polish security, and they were aware that if Germany attacked Romania, Poland would probably be drawn into any fighting. What concerned Eden was that if he read Beck and the Polish government correctly, in the case of war in eastern Europe, Poland would rather be the ‘first victim’ rather than Romania.⁴¹ To many this is a curious statement but actually is perfectly in keeping with Poland often seeing itself as a victim nation, and almost blasphemous as many Poles also consider Poland to be the crucified nation.

Beck was often foolish and made quite ridiculous statements as he tried to punch above his and Poland’s weight. As he said to Eden: Poland was a ‘nation of soldiers’ and was convinced that thirty-five million could not be easily wiped out.⁴² Here Beck is stating the total population of Poland in 1939 but fails to discuss the minorities in Poland; the German and Ukrainian minorities were hostile towards Poland, and ethnic Poles only measured sixty-nine per cent of the population – Poles were nearly a minority in their own land. Furthermore, the Jewish minority numbered about three million, largely poor and having little reason to like the local Poles since 1935 when Śmigły-Rydz took on the mantle of Piłsudski but unlike his predecessor actively discriminated against them. However, Beck was quite right to say to the German Ambassador to Poland, who complained that Poland had a large armed force in the Danzig area, that it was Germany which had created this position and that both sides were now negotiating ‘under the menace of bayonets’ owing to German methods of conducting foreign policy.⁴³

Overall Beck told Eden that he considered that his visit to London and the agreement reached between London and Warsaw would deter any further German aggression against Poland. However, the biggest problem was that Beck (and other eminent Poles) refused to believe that the German army was anything like as strong as many correctly feared.⁴⁴ Kennard requested his Military and Air Attachés to furnish him with accurate assessments of just how strong the Polish armed forces really were, and it did not make for comfortable reading given that the UK was willing to fight for Poland. It was discovered that the reality was that Poland in the first three weeks of war with Germany could field about 54 divisions and had an air force of about 600 aircraft of which three quarters were obsolete compared with those of the German air force. The British assessment was that the Poles would be unable to defend the Polish Corridor or their western frontier and would be compelled to fall back behind the River Vistula. The Polish navy, which was minuscule, in Kennard’s opinion would either have to intern itself in ‘some Baltic port’ or be destroyed by enemy action. There was an assumption by the British that Poland would be cut off from much of the world during such an invasion and therefore a friendly Soviet Union (Russia) was of ‘paramount importance’. Overall, even though Kennard did not doubt the doughty spirit of the Polish people, the Polish army lacked modern equipment and could only offer limited resistance to a large-scale German offensive.⁴⁵ The chickens of military neglect in Poland since 1926 were beginning to come home to roost; even if there had been some limited attempts to modernise the Polish army after October 1938, it was all rather too late.⁴⁶

Lieutenant Colonel Sword in his report pointed to the weaknesses of the Polish armed forces which were dominated by personalities rather than professional and technical expertise. Sword noted that there had been no progress since December 1938 in how Poland might defend itself if invaded by Germany. He also highlighted that the Polish army was poorly administered with little coordination between the Ministry of War, the General Inspectorate and the General Staff. As Sword pointed out: the General Inspectorate and General Staff were responsible for the planning of defence

Reviews for Poland and the Second World War, 1938–1948

[atticusfinch1048 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Poland and the Second World War 1938 – 48On the 1st September 2019, I was remembering what my Grandfather was doing that day, fighting with the 4th Engineers to defend his country from invasion from their troublesome neighbour. He would be fighting for seventeen days before capture, his internment as a POW, a month before he and a number of others escaped and made their way to France, to re-join the Polish Army in exile.This excellent book by Evan McGilvray adds to the new canon on Polish history and what the Poles did during the war to the Western world. The Poles are almost the forgotten allies, like the embarrassing uncle at the family party, who drinks too much. Even though the Poles took part in the Victory in Europe, the Polish soldiers who served under British command were not invited to the victory parade. British military history has not been kind to the Polish, especially when you remember the British glorious failures during the war.McGilvray, quite rightly begins in 1938 with the failure of diplomacy and goes some way to try and explain what it was like for the Poles to be stuck between to sharks who wished to devour them. People often think the Poles should have looked at Russian in 1938, but the Poles who had been occupied by them from 1791 to 1918 would hardly want to go back to their imperial slave masters. While at the same time the Germans, who also occupied Poland at that time, would mean more of the same. Has to be remembered East Prussia was carved out of Poland and other eastern European nations. This also shows how the Nazi allies such as the Russians not only facilitated the war but took advantage of the war by invading them in 1939, to aid their allies. Whereas McGilvray calls the death of Poland 1948, to the western world it was, to a Pole it died in 1939 and was reborn in 1989. In 1948, Stalin subjugated Poland into their bloc, and killed off the ability to stand up for the Polish memory of war.McGilvray’s book goes along way to explain what Poland did before the war, shining a light on the time, when Britain and France were writing cheques, they knew they could never deliver. How even at the end of the war, Churchill amongst a cast of many politicians appeased Stalin and sold the Polish down river. So much for defending Britain with the most kills in the Battle of Britain, serving the British army with honour on all battle theatres, the Poles were stabbed in the back, again.This really is an excellent book, and not written by a bias historian of Polish descent such as me, but by an excellent military historian. McGilvray is an excellent researcher and writer who masters the subject he writes about. This is the beginning of putting further knowledge of the Polish response to war out to the general reader. An excellent book/