Implementing a Culture of Safety: A Roadmap for Performance Based Compliance

By Dutch Holland and Scott Shemwell

Implementing a Culture of Safety
Deepwater production of oil and gas takes place in one of the worlds most hazardous and dangerous environments a place where operating in a pervasive Culture of Safety is not an option but an absolute requirement. Why?
A deepwater disaster could be as horrific as a release of a multi-megaton nuclear weapon!
A single deepwater player, making a poor decision, could cause an accident the size of a multi-megaton disaster!
The number of vitally-interested stakeholders has mushroomed, and they are mad!
The number of participants in the development of a billion dollar asset has skyrocketed!
Energy executives now have everything at stake when responsible for a god-like, megaton disaster!

To stay safe and productive, energy companies must step up their game with new and improved ways of operating:
High Reliability Organizations
Strong-Bond Governance
Asset Integrity Management
Integrated Operations
Authorization, e.g., Two-Key Requirements
Surrounded by a true Culture of Safety.

The heart of the matter is to design a valid Culture of Safety and then implement it on target, on time and on budget!

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Feb 13, 2014
• ISBN: 9781493151530

Dutch Holland

Dutch Holland, PhD & Jim Crompton, MS ENG are highly regarded as “thought leaders” and as consultants who will tell it like it is. The authors’ collaboration combines management consulting experience in upstream with oil & gas domain expertise into important insights about creation of business value from digital technology. Jim and Dutch are both convinced that the Digital Engineer concept must be made a reality or the Big Crew Change will likely result in both “outdated roles” and replacements that may “fit the roles but not the digital future of the upstream business.”

Book preview

Copyright © 2014 by DUTCH HOLLAND, PHD & SCOTT M SHEMWELL, DBA.

Library of Congress Control Number:   2013922326

ISBN:      Hardcover      978-1-4931-5152-3

                Softcover       978-1-4931-5151-6

                eBook            978-1-4931-5153-0

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

Rev. date: 02/10/2014

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Contents

Preface Protecting Lives And Business Value With A Culture Of Safety

A Culture Of Safety Hits The Headlines: The Shuttle Columbia

A Culture Of Safety In The Headlines Again: Macondo

A Culture Of Safety Defined

Our Goals For This Book

The Organization Of This Book

So Why Might You Want To Read This Book?

The New Risk Environment… And Failure Is Not An Option

Chapter One Failure Is Not An Option… So How Do We Operate?

Boiling It All Down

The Way We Do Business! Mission Accomplished! Successful Splashdown!

Part One: The Culture Of Safety

Chapter Two The Elements Of Organizational Culture

So, What Exactly Is Culture?

Culture According To Social Scientists

The Way We Will Look At Culture In This Book

Culture As A Slate Of Behaviors

The Formation Of Natural Culture

Designing And Implementing A Culture Of Safety

A Culture Of Safety Will Dramatically Change The Way We Manage

Chapter Three The Requirement For A Culture Of Safety

The Current Upstream Safety Situation

The Work Ahead

Part Two The Implementation Of A Culture Of Safety

Chapter Four A General Model For Implementing A Culture Of Safety:

Overview Of The Three Phases Of Implementation Of A Culture Of Safety

Difficulty Of The Three Phases

Chapter Five Success Factors For Implementation Of A Culture Of Safety

The Needed Leadership Model: Leaders Must Simultaneously Run-The-Business And Change-The-Business

The Needed Perspective: Implementing A Culture Of Safety Requires An Organizational Change

Understanding Organizations As A Collection Of Moving Parts

Understanding Organizational Change As A Series Of Change Projects

Identifying The Change Projects That Will Drive The Organizational Change To The Culture Of Safety

Identifying The Change Projects Within The Change Projects

A Universal Metaphor For Understanding Organizational Change

Understanding Organizational Change As Changing The Play

Using The Theatre Metaphor To Understand The Formula For Change

You Must Know Where You Are In Implementing A Culture Of Safety

Be Ready For Mind-Clearing Examples To Introduce Each Chapter

Introducing The Example Culture Of Safety Project

Summary

Part Three: Preparing Leadership For Implementation Of A Culture Of Safety

Chapter Six Leadership Principles For Culture Change

Part Four: The Mechanics Of Implementation Of A Culture Of Safety

Introduction To Chapters Seven Thru Eleven

The Recipe Format

Preview Of Project Management Steps

The Organization Of The Chapters Ahead

Chapter Seven Communicating A Clear Vision Of The Culture Of Safety

Construct The Detailed Vision For The Culture Of Safety

Designing The Culture Of Safety

Identify And Dispel Deadly Assumptions That Will Disable Implementation Of A Culture Of Safety

Take These Action Steps To Communicate The Vision Of The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 1A: Construct The Detailed Vision Of The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 1B: Construct The Case For Changing Operations To A Culture Of Safety

Requirement 1C: Ensure Management Understanding And Agreement With The Culture Of Safety

Conducting Management Work-Through Sessions

Requirement 1D: Communicate The Vision Of The Culture Of Safety The Right Way To The Entire Organization

Requirement 1E: Ensure Employee Translation Of The Vision Of A Culture Of Safety

And In Conclusion…

Chapter Eight Altering Work Processes And Procedures For The Culture Of Safety

Identify And Dispel Deadly Assumptions That Will Disable Cos Process Alterations

Take These Action Steps To Alter Work Processes For The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 2A: Identify The Process Alterations Needed For The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 2B: Alter And Test Processes Critical To The Change

Requirement 2C: Alter Process Measures, Goals And Objectives

Requirement 2D: Alter And Test Work Procedures For Altered Processes

Requirement 2E: Eliminate Old Measures, Goals, Objectives And Procedures

And In Conclusion…

Chapter Nine Altering Facilities, Equipment, And Technology For The Culture Of Safety

Change Requires Fet Alterations

Fet Alterations Require An Implementation Framework

Identify And Dispel Deadly Assumptions That Will Disable Fet Transition

Take These Action Steps To Transition Fet To The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 3A: Identify The Fet Alterations Needed For The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 3B: Alter And Test Fet Critical For The Change

Requirement 3C: Alter And Test Fet Controls

Requirement 3D: Alter Or Create Operating Guidelines For All Involved Fet

Requirement 3E: Eliminate Old Fet And Operating Guidelines

And In Conclusion…

Chapter Ten Altering Performance Management For The Culture Of Safety

Take These Action Steps To Transition Performance Management To The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 4C: Train All Employees In Their New Roles

Requirement 4D: Identify And Alter The System For Monitoring Performance Under The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 4E: Alter And Communicate Compensation Payoffs

And In Conclusion…

Chapter Eleven:

Manage The Change To The Culture Of Safety As A Formal Project

Leadership For The Culture Of Safety Project

Managing Risks In The Culture Of Safety Project

Identify And Dispel Deadly Assumptions That Will Disable Project Management For The Culture Of Safety

Take These Action Steps To Use Project Management For Cos Implementation

Requirement 5A: Develop Project Charter For Executive Approval

Requirement 5B: Set And Communicate The Master Schedule For Implementation Of The Culture Of Safety

Requirement 5C: Use Week-At-A-Time Scheduling With One-On-One Assignments For Implementing Culture Of Safety Work

Requirement 5D: Regularly Check Implementation Progress And Re-Schedule As Needed

Requirement 5E: Confirm, Stabilize And Celebrate The Implementation Of The Culture Of Safety

Part Five: The Continuing Culture Of Safety

Chapter Twelve The Continuing Culture Of Safety

References And Readings

Appendix A Of Detailed Steps And Scripts For Selected Chapters

Appendix Of Detailed Steps And Scripts For Chapter Seven

Appendix Of Detailed Steps And Scripts For Chapter Eight

Appendix Of Detailed Steps And Scripts For Chapter Nine

Appendix Of Detailed Steps And Scripts For Chapter Ten

Appendix B Task List For Successful Implementation Of The Culture Of Safety

Appendix C Detailed Steps In The Three Phases Of Implementation Of The Culture Of Safety

Appendix D Project Management

Leadership For The Culture Of Safety Project

Project Phases And Change Formula Combined

Managing Risks In An Implementation Project

Develop Project Charter For Executive Approval

The Organization Of The Implementation Project

Work Breakdown Structure

Integrating Project Management And Change Management To Set The Master Schedule

Week-At-Time Scheduling With One-On-One Assignments

Make Sure That Alterations Have Really Been Made

Celebrate Successful Completion Of Change Work

Endnotes

DEDICATION

Dedication by Dutch Holland

This book is dedicated to the little kids in my life: Everett (EJ), Hope, and Win. May they continue to flourish—and God Bless!

Dedication by Scott Shemwell

We live in a world of continuous change. This book is dedicated to my father, Elwood H. Shemwell (1922—) who has seen more change than most and guided many of us through disruptive transformation and restructure for almost a century. His continuing leadership is a testimony to timelessness of the challenges of change management and proof that the generational constraint on change many try to place are misguided. A member of the Greatest Generation, all of us owe him and his contemporaries for the freedom to change we enjoy today.

You don’t have to be afraid of change any longer! Change is the Rule offers entertaining and simple solutions that will help you move swiftly and efficiently through the growing pains of organizational change.

Ken Blanchard

Co-author, The One Minute Manager

and Leadership by the Book

Change is definitely the rule in today’s health-care industry. The old paradigms just don’t work today, nor will they in the future. Dutch Holland offers some insightful thinking on how to manage change to create the new paradigms that all successful organizations will need in the 21st century.

Mark A. Wallace

President and Chief Executive Officer

Texas Children’s Hospital

Houston, Texas

What a great uncluttered roadmap for understanding, embracing, and leading change. We have trained over 10 million leaders worldwide, and change is their biggest challenge. This book should be next on their reading list!

Dr. Paul Hersey

Chairman

Center for Leadership Studies

Home of Situational Leadership

Multiple rapid changes, successfully executed, will be the key to the 21st century business. Dutch lays it out—change must be managed. To expect transformation without good management is a dream. This is a book that must be on the desk of a successful 21st century CEO.

Major General John S. Parker, M.D.

Commanding General

USA Medical Research and Material Command

Simple ideas often turn out to be winners. Dutch first introduced his simple winning concept ‘Run-the-business: Change-the-business’ to our organization more than seven years ago. Managers who understand how to organize and handle these roles have been the key to the successful transformation of our company.

David G. Birney, President

Solvay Polymers, Inc.

"Organization change—on target, on time and on budget . . . what a concept!

How easy it is to forget these fundamentals when we leap off the cliff of organizational change! The basics aren’t new—but they’re organized in a way that you want to slap yourself on the forehead and say why didn’t I think of that!"

Katherine M. Tamer

Vice President and Chief Information Officer

United Space Alliance

"Dutch Holland, through his 30 years of experience as a businessman, sole-proprietor, entrepreneur and management consultant, has managed to assimilate a highly practical and common-sense approach to addressing change as a constant way of life in 21st century competitive business. Change Is The Rule will be among the required reading for my executive leadership team as we continue to drive for dramatic business growth and value creation for Texaco in the highly competitive domestic energy markets."

W. Robert Parkey, Jr.

President

Texaco Natural Gas Inc.

This book is a must read for anyone trying to manage the change process. A work of art that tells the reader in easy to understand language how to manage the process. It will serve as a desk reference the manager or executive can and should use for a successful outcome. In a real life application, Marathon Ashland Petroleum LLC followed this process in forming a successful merger of two petroleum companies.

J. Louis Frank, President

Marathon Ashland Petroleum LLC,

Findlay, OH

A NOTE TO THE READER

Each of us wants content served up in the way that best works for us. Deep down many of us wish to get the answers in a few clever and memorable sound bites (If the glove don’t fit, then you must acquit . . .! or If they just don’t get it, keep yelling until they regret it!") Sorry, but the explanation of the weighty and important concepts of the implementation of a Culture of Safety takes more than sound bites. We have, however, written the book to be as accommodating as possible with four options for gaining value from our content. Good luck!

Option One: I want everything, big picture and all the details!!

If you are looking for a proven, easy-to-understand, easy-to-use model for successful implementation of a Culture of Safety, this is the right book. If getting it all is your goal, just read the book straight through. Take in all the logical steps for what to do, what not to do, and how to do each step for successful implementation of a Culture of Safety. As a thorough reader, you will get all the goodies you need to be able to implement a Culture of Safety, on target, on time, and on budget!

Option Two: I just want the meat, please!

OK, then read Chapters Two and Three about the Requirements and Elements of the Culture of Safety and then read Chapter Five Successful Integration of Culture of Safety into the Organization to get the key idea that changing an organization is like a theatre company stopping an old play and transitioning to a new one… on target, on time, and on budget. And that’s the meat? Yep, that’s all there is to it… except for a few million details we will cover in the chapters you elect not to read. (Not really, we will only cover a couple of dozen important action steps.)

Option Three: I just want to know about the

people-side of implementation, please!

That seems to be a reasonable request, and we have tried to help you out, although we do so with some reluctance. If you must, you should read Chapters Two and Three about the Requirements and Elements of the Culture of Safety, then read Chapter Five to get our implementation model and mindset, Chapter Ten to read about how to alter an organization’s performance management system for the Culture of Safety, and then Chapter Eleven to read about the project management that will be needed to put the people side into operation.

Option Four: I am a man on the move and I don’t have time to go through 250 pages. You got to be kidding!

We understand your pain and have tried to relive it. Just for you and your special case, you can skip the first 200 or so pages and go directly to Chapter Twelve, the last chapter. If that chapter doesn’t move you to read more of the first 200 pages, you probably shouldn’t take on responsibility for anybody’s safety!

PREFACE

Protecting Lives and Business Value with a Culture of Safety

The world of Offshore Safety is being shaped by major changes in the energy business. Geopolitics, new roles for oil and gas companies, and changes in the engineering workforce are simultaneously shaping the world of a Culture of Safety. In this chapter we will look at four major themes that characterize the new energy business and the implications of those themes for a Culture of Safety.

A Culture of Safety Hits the Headlines: The Shuttle Columbia

On February 1 of 2003 the Space Shuttle Columbia broke up some fifty miles above Texas as it was returning to land in Florida. Beyond immediate shock of disbelief, debris teams began to search the central Texas countryside for Shuttle debris and the remains of the Astronauts who had been on board. The search, that lasted several weeks, was the beginning of an intensive investigation into the cause of the tragedy. The investigation was to take several months of recovering debris and all available data about the flight so that extensive analysis could be done.¹

On liftoff, some 83 seconds into Columbia’s flight, an 18 inch by 6 inch block of foam insulation broke off the shuttle’s external tank and was blown back into the shuttle, hitting the left wing. Available camera evidence was inconclusive, so the engineers did not have a picture or any other data about what happened at the foam’s striking point. After months of analysis, simulations, and tests, engineers concluded that the 1.5 pound chunk of foam hit the left wing at just over 500 miles per hour. Some of the engineers were more concerned than others who felt that since it was foam, it could not have possibly caused any damage.

The concerned engineers wanted a US military satellite currently in orbit to take a close up picture of the shuttle’s wing. The request for the photography, however, somehow was lost in some communication confusion between the requesting engineers and their top management who would need to authorize the pictures. In short, the request for pictures was not approved, leaving the concerned engineers even more concerned. They desperately wanted to know whether or not damage had been done by the foam strike and whether or not such damage would be a crew and vehicle safety issue. Conversations took place in an open Mission Management Board Meeting with the concerned engineers in attendance even though their organizational rank was much lower that many of the key Managers running the meeting.

. . . The short exchange between the Chairman and a senior engineer effectively put to rest the issue of Columbian’s foam strike for the Mission Management Team. In the team’s collective wisdom, it was a tile maintenance problem—nothing more. The meeting ended a few minutes later.

The concerned engineer sat by quietly as he had an hour earlier. He still worried about the lack of photos and the uncertainty in the damage assessment. But now he had a new concern. The assessment team still had not finished analyzing all of the six damage scenarios. The concerned engineer was not convinced that the Chairman understood that.

Our Boeing engineers still had to look at the main landing gear door and the seals around there, the concerned engineer said later. That was in work. It took two or three more days to finish, but the Chair’s remark that she had no safety of flight issues sounded like a refurbishment issue like someone said—the casualness of her remark . . . led me to believe that she didn’t get that we still had more work to do.

As the crowd began to file out of the room, the concerned engineer debated going over and saying something to the Chair. Astronauts Bob C and Jerry R already had stopped the Chair with their own concerns about the tile issue, where the loss of one tile starts a chain reaction of other tiles coming off. The concerned engineer asked another engineer for advice.

I felt like going in there and interrupting or waiting until they got through and just saying, Ms. Chairperson, I just want you to know that we are not finished, but I didn’t. I didn’t do any such thing, so I am waiting, the concerned engineer remembered. Mike, do you think she got the message that we are not finished? . . . Mike said to me, Well, what are the rules for engaging a manager here? What is the protocol for doing that? . . . and I remember saying, Mike, for an issue like this, where we have a flight safety concern, I don’t think the protocol should matter. It shouldn’t matter at all. We should do it. But, again, I don’t know . . .. He said, Oh, I think we told her that there was remaining work, and I said, Okay, I don’t know. Maybe she heard it. I don’t know. I don’t think she did, but I was doubting myself.

The concerned engineer left without speaking to the Chairperson. Later as he was leaving Building 30 to go back to his office, he saw the Chair getting into her car. Again, the concerned engineering debated approaching her. He kept walking.²

Records of conversations like those in the paragraph above were made available to the members of the CAIB along with information from several other key management meetings and interactions that had gone on during the ill-fated flight. Conversations between NASA managers and engineers were of great concern to the investigators as they concluded their final report.

A primary cause of the accident was labeled by the Investigation Board as a lack of a safety culture within NASA. The Board reasoned that the flawed culture at the time of the flight prevented the right conversations from being held between the right players at the right time and in the right forum to really get to the bottom of technical issues raised by some of the engineers.

"The report also concludes that NASA’s management system is unsafe to manage the shuttle system beyond the short term and that the agency does not have a strong safety culture.

The Board determined that physical and organizational causes played an equal role in the Columbia accident—that the NASA organizational culture had as much to do with the accident as the foam that struck the Orbiter on ascent."³

The Accident Investigation Board used comments like the following to describe what they called flaws in NASA’s Culture of Safety:

"Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including:

•   reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements);

•   organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements;

•   and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization’s rules."⁴

The flavor of a Culture of Safety comes through clearly in this NASA accident. Now let’s see if we find other safety culture issues in the upstream world.

A Culture of Safety in the Headlines Again: Macondo

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also referred to as the BP Spill) was an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on the BP-operated Macondo Prospect, considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry, being 8% to 31% larger in volume than the previously largest, the Ixtoc I oil spill. Following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, which claimed 11 lives, a sea-floor oil gusher flowed unabated for three months in 2010. The gushing wellhead was not capped until after 87 days, on 15 July 2010. The total discharge is estimated at 4.9 million barrels (210 million US gal; 780,000 m³).

A massive response ensued to protect beaches, wetlands, and estuaries from the spreading oil, using skimmer ships, floating booms, controlled burns, and 1.84 million US gallons (7,000 m³) of dispersant. After several failed efforts to contain the flow, the well was capped and declared sealed on 19 September 2010. However, the months of spill, along with response and cleanup activities, caused extensive damage to marine and wildlife habitats and the Gulf’s fishing and tourism industries, as well as human health problems.

Numerous investigations have explored the causes of the explosion and spill. Notably, the U.S. government’s September 2011 report pointed to defective cement work on the well, finding BP most at fault but also faulting Deepwater Horizon operator Transocean and contractor Halliburton. Earlier in 2011, a White House commission likewise

•   blamed BP and its partners for making a series of cost-cutting decisions and

•   not having a system sufficient to ensure well safety,

but also concluded that the spill was not an isolated incident caused by rogue industry or government officials, but

•   resulted from systemic root causes and,

•   absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might well recur.⁵

The report stated that, although the events leading to the sinking of Deepwater Horizon were set into motion by the failure to prevent a well blowout, the investigation revealed numerous systems deficiencies, and acts and omissions by Transocean and its Deepwater Horizon crew, that had an adverse impact on the ability to prevent or limit the magnitude of the disaster. The report also states that a central cause of the blowout was failure of a cement barrier allowing hydrocarbons to flow up the wellbore, through the riser and onto the rig, resulting in the blowout. The loss of life and the subsequent pollution of the Gulf of Mexico were the result of

•  poor risk management,

•  last-minute changes to plans,

•  failure to observe and respond to critical indicators,

•  inadequate well control response, and

•  insufficient emergency bridge response training by companies and individuals responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of the drilling platform.

⁶

Once again, in the aftermath of a life-taking tragedy, investigators point not to one single cause of the problem but to a constellation of causes touching all of the players. In this case, it was clear to investigators that the part of the industry they investigated lacked a comprehensive Culture of Safety.

A Culture of Safety Defined

There is a lot of talk about a Culture of Safety, but most sources fail to provide clear definitions. Therefore there is an abundance of confusion and pick your own definition to fit your argument going on. Try the BSEE definition below:

The BSEE defines safety culture as the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety, over competing goals, to ensure protection of people and the environment.

This draft policy statement would apply to all lessees, the owners or holders of operating rights, designated operators or agents of the lessee(s), pipeline right- of-way holders, State lessees granted a right of use and easement, and contractors.⁷

⁷

Our definition below will hopefully provide an early anchor to this book and guide our discussion of a Culture of Safety.

Our Definition of a Culture of Safety

We define a Culture of Safety in the words of organization members as how we do things around here that have a direct impact on safety. Culture is the day-to-day way we approach the work of the company and deal with each other.

A Culture of Safety is the result of how the organization has reinforced safety behavior in the past… and the predictable path of how people will act toward safety in the foreseeable future if the reinforcement continues.

Our Goals for This Book

1.   To describe our view of the emerging concept of a Culture of Safety

2.   To show how a Culture of Safety can only be implemented by an organizational change

3.   To describe a method or a roadmap that an energy company might use to implement a Culture of Safety

This book and how it might be used

This book on changing organizations to operate with a Culture of Safety is all about doing organizational change successfully. This book is not about the psychological concepts and theories that underlie organizational change;⁸ it’s about the real-world practical actions that must be taken to make each organizational change successful.

Where do these practical actions come from? They come from the many lessons learned over time about leading an organizational change; from the literature of management, safety, change, and the social sciences; from the principles of project management, and from the lessons learned in the real world of organizational change. These practical actions come from those organizations that have mastered change and that have demonstrated time and again that they can successfully transition their organizations to new ways of working—on target, on time, and on budget!

First, the list of action steps that are designed to impact the moving parts of an organization can be used as tasks in a change project’s work breakdown structure and master schedule.⁹ Second, a change professional might use this book for its management and business language that bridges today’s world of business and many behavioral and change concepts. Third, the book might be used to give to managers as a part of a Project Manager’s explanation of how a culture change project might need to work. And last but not least, the information contained in this book about team composition, meeting agendas, and management scripts might assist a line manager or a Project Manager in planning his/her change work.

As a reader of this book you will learn to guide change—a subject that has not likely been a part of your business education. You will no longer feel lost during an organizational change like implementing a Culture of Safety—you will have a road map for implementation that you can confidently follow. You will know what concrete actions to take and when to take them. You will know what to expect of employees and how to work with them during the change process.

Best of all, as a reader of this book, you will never again look at organizational change, like a culture change, as a mysterious experience to be feared and fought. You will see organizational change as a set of concrete projects, creative acts of leadership than can be completed—on target, on time, and on budget!

The