Forgotten Battles of the Zulu War

By Adrian Greaves

Adrian Greaves uses his exceptional knowledge of the Anglo-Zulu War to look beyond the two best known battles of Isandlwana and the iconic action at Rorkes Drift to other fiercely fought battles.He covers little recorded engagements and battles such as Nyezane which was fought on the same day as the slaughter of Imperial troops at Isandlwana but has been eclipsed by it. Like the battles at Hlobane and Gingindhlovu.The death of the Prince Imperial, which caused shock waves round Europe and had huge repercussions for those involved, is examined in detail. The defeat of the Zulu Army at Ulundi was the culmination of the war and the author reveals new and shocking details about this battle.There is a hint of ominous events to come in the slaughter of Colonel Austruthers Redcoat column by Boers as they marched from Ulundi to Pretoria. This was the opening salvo of the First Boer War.This hugely informative book will fascinate fans of this period of our Imperial history.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Feb 29, 2012
• ISBN: 9781844689392

Adrian Greaves

Dr Adrian Greaves FRGS, a former soldier and senior police officer, has devoted the last 20 years of his life to studying the Anglo-Zulu War. He is the founder of the Anglo Zulu War Historical Society, the author of numerous works including the bestselling Rorke’s Drift ( ) to which this book is a worthy companion. His books, The Curling Letters of the Zulu War, Redcoats and Zulus, Sister Janet, Who’s Who in the Anglo-Zulu War (2 volumes with Ian Knight) and David Rattray’s Guidebook to the Anglo-Zulu War Battlefield (Editor) have all been published by Pen and Sword Books Ltd.

Book preview

First published in Great Britain in 2012 by

PEN & SWORD MILITARY

an imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Limited

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Copyright © Adrian Greaves, 2012

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Contents

Acknowledgements

Maps

Glossary

Introduction

Chapter 1  The Invasion of Zululand

Chapter 2  Skirmish at Chief Sihayo’s Homestead

Chapter 3  The First Battle of Hlobane

Chapter 4  The Battle of Inyezane (Nyezane)

Chapter 5  The Battle of Ntombe Drift (Meyer’s Drift)

Chapter 6  The Second Battle of Hlobane

Chapter 7  Gingindlovu

Chapter 8  The Battle of Khambula

Chapter 9  The Battle of Ulundi

Chapter 10  Ntombe River Incident

Chapter 11  The Battle of Tsate

Chapter 12  The Battle of Bronkhorstspruit

Chapter 13  War’s End

Notes

Appendices

1. Bibliography

2. Poems and Prose

3. The Ultimatum

4. Battle Memo from Lord Chelmsford

5. Lord Chelmsford’s Isandlwana Telegram

6. The Death of Louis Napoleon, the Prince Imperial

7. Award of Rorke’s Drift Victoria Crosses

8. Private Wassall VC

9. The VCs of Lieutenants Coghill and Melvill

10. Detailed British Casualties

Index

Acknowledgements

I dedicate this book to my wife Debbie for her unflinching love, encouragement and patience, especially since my accident in 1985 that so dramatically changed our lives. I also especially acknowledge Consultant Surgeon Cliff Stossel and his wife Katie for their ongoing support and kindness during the many years of surgery I have undergone. It was my greatest pleasure, eventually, to accompany them around the stunning battlefields of Zululand and introduce them to my many South African and Zulu friends.

I also gratefully acknowledge the kind and generous assistance and permissions of the following people, without whose cooperation and assistance this work would have been incomplete. Ian Knight for his general technical advice and support; Nicky Rattray for the use of her magnificent accommodation at Fugitives’ Drift Lodge in South Africa; Dave and Sue Charles for their input of Zulu culture; Major Martin Everett of the South Wales Borderers and Monmouthshire Regimental Museum at Brecon for his generous support and advice; Jason Askew for his remarkable artwork and Zulu War pictures; Ron Sheeley for the use of his photographs; and the Anglo Zulu War Historical Society for granting me access to their repository of research material. I also acknowledge Dr Lita Webley of the Albany Museum, Grahamstown, South Africa, and my son, Captain Andrew Greaves RA, who provided me with archaeological material and advice relating to the battlefields. Brian Best kindly checked my research of the Victorian period.

I respectfully acknowledge and thank Dr David Payne for his gentle and wise suggestions, and Geoff Fawcett for tactfully steering me through the necessary complexities of initial proofreading; their suggestions always made sense. Lastly, no one else had any direct control or influence over the final draft – I alone accept responsibility for any factual errors or omissions, although I have always based my conclusions on empirical research and primary sources, which I have quoted in order to assist readers who wish to research further.

Adrian Greaves

Tenterden

July 2011

British invasion routes into Zululand.

Lord Chelmsford’s invasion route from Helpmekaar.

The Battle of Hlobane.

The Battle of Nyezane.

The Battle of Ntombe.

The Battle of Khambula.

The Battle of Gingindlovu.

The Battle of Ulundi.

Glossary

Readers’ Guide to Terms Used

I acknowledge that the correct title for this campaign isThe Anglo Zulu War of 1879. Nevertheless, for ease of reading I have used the term Zulu War throughout, unless otherwise indicated.

Likewise, there are various spellings for many Zulu place names and names of individuals. This book has used common usage and avoided traditional Zulu spellings, with which the English speaking world tends to struggle. For example, King Cetshwayo is used in preference to King Cetshwayo kaMpande and I use Isandlwana in preference to iSandlwana, Isanblana, Isandula or Isandhlwana. Where such names are used or misspelt in quoted accounts, then the original is used.

As measurements used during the Zulu War are historically Imperial, I have used Imperial measurements throughout.

A glossary of common Zulu words and British military terms encountered during the Zulu War of 1879

ZULU WORDS

Amabutho (s.ibutho) – guilds or regiments made up of Zulu warriors according to age groups.

Amakhanda (s.ikhanda) – the royal household.

Assegai – term used originally to describe the assegai tree, more commonly used to describe the flat-bladed spear made famous by Shaka.

Donga – a dry water gully or gully caused by erosion.

Drift – a shallow crossing point of a river, i.e. Rorke’s Drift.

Imizi (s.umuzi) – Zulu homestead, usually described as a kraal. To the Zulus, a kraal is where cattle are kept.

Impi – Zulu term for a group of warriors, or commonly by the British during 1879 to describe a force of Zulu warriors or the Zulu army.

Impondo Zankomo – the infamous ‘horns of the buffalo’ tactic of the Zulus in attack.

inDuna – senior Zulu advisor.

Isigodlo – frequently misused term to describe the king’s women or harem; its correct usage should denote the royal household.

ka – the son of, or to denote the surname, i.e. Cetshwayo kaMapande.

Kaffir – member or language of South African people of the Bantu family

Kop – a hill, i.e. Spion Kop, also koppie or kopje.

kwa – a common Zulu prefix to mean ‘of’ or ‘from’, i.e. kwaJimi = Jim’s Place (from James Rorke of Rorke’s Drift).

Nek – a shoulder or ridge linking two hills.

BRITISH MILITARY TERMS

Banquette – a step built inside a defensive rampart to enable troops to fire over the structure.

Brevet rank – an instant field promotion, usually for bravery that took precedence over his former rank. It did not attract the pay of the higher rank but gave priority for promotion.

Embrasure – an opening in a defensive position.

Laager – a term used by the Afrikaan trekkers for a defensive position made by a circle of wagons. Also used by the British for a fortified position.

Picket (or picquet) – a lookout or observer, usually placed in front of a defensive position.

Redoubt – a defensive position or fort, usually temporary.

Traverse – a wooden parapet between two positions to prevent enfilade fire by the Zulus.

Vedette – a mounted picket.

British regiments, corps and units involved during the Zulu War of 1879

Colonial units involved during the Zulu War of 1879

Zulu regiments involved in the defence of Zululand 1879

*Zulu units that briefly violated the Natal border at Rorke’s Drift on the night of the 22nd January 1879.

Introduction

The difficulty of seeing things correctly, which is one of the greatest fictions in war, makes things appear quite different from what was expected.

Claus Von Clauswitz

There are a number of truisms surrounding war and historians accept one in particular, that nations have always gone to war to protect their vital interests, interests that are usually related to trade or national security, even where the other state in question might have legitimate reason to oppose such action. It is also a truism that the British public have always supported their army in wartime. The Zulu War is a perfect example of both, but I will show that, although the public support for the Army remained constant even after the Zulu War’s conclusion, public support for the decision makers could not endure once the true reasons for the war and the questionable conduct of its troops became well known. The war in Zululand was unexpected by British politicians and their public who were just settling down to follow the course of another war to wrest Afghanistan from the Russians; so at the beginning of 1879 events in Zululand were considered to be comparatively unimportant.

It was post Zulu War disillusionment that disturbed the balance of public support and this disillusionment rapidly grew to such an unprecedented level that the British government of Disraeli was toppled in the following general election. Too much negative news had progressively repressed earlier public excitement that accompanied the first news of the invasion of Zululand, but these factors alone are only part of the reason for so many battles of the Zulu War having become forgotten over time. If the politics behind the campaign are disregarded, the war itself is a remarkable story of classic heroism mixed with unusual elements of cowardice; of bravery by the fighting officers and soldiers versus avarice at high levels, and of an impossible mixture of national pride with stubbornness by all those involved, be they the invading Briton, the land-hungry Boer farmer or the black African fighting to keep invaders from his lands.

To put this state of affairs in context, the year 1878 saw mounting discontent and uncertainty fermenting in southern Africa. Advised by its resident officials in the Cape, the High Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere (Frere) and his army commander Lord Chelmsford, the British Government in London had erroneously been led to believe there was a potentially serious risk that King Cetshwayo’s fearsome Zulus could sweep across the long and unprotected border and invade British controlled Natal. The belief that a Zulu invasion was probable was quietly planned by Frere and Chelmsford and their orchestrated rumours soon began to cause serious alarm among the growing white population of Natal who, in turn, put increasing pressure on those in charge, namely Frere and Chelmsford, to neutralise the Zulu threat. In reality, there was no such threat; a Zulu invasion was neither possible nor probable and so perception of the situation by Colonial Office officials in London was as faulty as that of the increasingly terrified Natalian civilians. Nevertheless, Frere and Chelmsford chose to resolve the dubitable threat of a Zulu invasion by wilfully serving the Zulus with an impossible ultimatum. (See Appendix 3.) The terms were deliberately set by Frere’s officials to be far beyond the bounds of anything the Zulu king could agree and so Zulu non-fulfilment of the ultimatum terms became the official justification for Frere to fulfil his personal ambition, to authorise the invasion of Zululand and for Britain to go to war.

Frere and Chelmsford initiated military action in total disregard of the rights of the Zulus and did so in the belief that the campaign would be over in weeks, and with minimal loss to Britain. Both officials knew that, assuming the invasion of Zululand went according to plan, their decision would certainly meet with the fulsome approval of the home government and the British people, whose experience of colonialism led them to expect only quick and easy victories. But Frere and Chelmsford were taking two calculated risks; no one outside South Africa was aware of their proposed invasion, which would commit all their available resources to the campaign, and no modern army had fought the Zulus.

Their blunder was enormous; these two highly placed and experienced British officials completely miscalculated the effect of their actions. Instead of a quick and successful campaign, they committed Britain to a humiliating, expensive and tragic war that accentuated her army’s previously unknown deficiencies, some of which had already been highlighted by its recent failed campaign against King Sekhukhune’s Pedi nation in the neighbouring Transvaal. Then, at the conclusion of the Zulu campaign, instead of returning home, British forces recovering from fighting the Zulus would have to be committed to a renewed campaign against King Sekhukhune’s defiant Pedi people before going on to tackle the even more disastrous Transvaal rebellion, which swiftly led into the Anglo-Boer war.

Scenario

In 1878 Sir Bartle Frere was encouraged to invade Zululand because he saw a campaign against the Zulus as a straightforward and easy means to sweep away any manifestation of festering native dissent in South Africa, whether real or perceived. In the case of the Zulus, the amount of dissent was minimal; they were a peaceful nation and their ruler, King Cetshwayo, was well disposed to the British. What caused some offence to Frere was King Cetshwayo’s reluctance to submit to British demands for Zulu labour to work in Natal and the Transvaal, and to have his country administered by the British.

To the north of Zululand British forces had recently been attempting to control the militant rebel leader, Prince Mbilini, who had a long history of raiding Boer farms around Luneburg and stealing Boer cattle; worse was Mbilini’s enthusiasm for murdering their native workers. Further to the north of Mbilini’s sphere of influence was Sekhukhuneland, where the Pedi people under King Sekhukhune had likewise been in a state of rebellion against anyone white and who regularly interfered with British lines of communication between Natal and Pretoria, the capital town of the Transvaal Republic that had been annexed by Britain only the year before in 1877. By this annexation, the British inherited not only the Boers’ long-standing border dispute with the Zulu kingdom but also the legacy of conflict and bitterness with the Pedi nation, which came to a head following a minor dispute between the Boers and Pedi raiders in 1876, which in turn then led to full-scale war when the Boers commenced operations by advancing on Sekhukhuneland. They chose to attack along the course of the Olifants River towards the first rebel stronghold but, after a chaotic two-day operation, their morale had begun to crumble even before they reached the first Pedi stronghold. The Boer commandos had been reinforced by 2,500 neighbouring Swazi allies and it was they who bore the brunt of any skirmishing. The Boers then attempted to advance further towards Sekhukhune’s main stronghold but when the Swazis abandoned the campaign in disgust, Boer morale collapsed and their motley invading force retreated, leaving Sekhukhune unscathed and free to continue his marauding.

The Boer campaign had been a military and political disaster for their floundering Republic and was one of the factors used by the British to justify their intervention and annexation of the Transvaal in April 1877. Meanwhile, British attempts to establish authority over the Pedi were likewise firmly rejected by Sekhukhune. In the official history of the Zulu War it is interesting to note that the British blamed Sekhukhune’s recalcitrant attitude largely on the fictitious influence of the Zulu King Cetshwayo. In any event, the beginning of April 1878 saw British troops moved towards the Sekhukhuneland border to defeat the Pedi and thereby, in theory, finally resolving matters. There was another reason for attacking the Pedi; with the invasion of Zululand in advanced preparation, Frere and Chelmsford did not want a rebellious Pedi army actively operating behind their northern supply lines into Zululand. Since the recent annexation of the Transvaal, the Boers living in and around Sekhukhuneland had become quasi British subjects so Frere had some misplaced trust in the Boers that they would not rebel, but many were on the point of abandoning their farms to the Pedi marauders, which Frere feared would give the Pedi greater control in the area. It was clear to Frere that British