Transformation Index BTI 2012: Regional Findings South and East Africa

By Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung

Der politische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstand eines Landes ist messbar: Im internationalen Vergleich lassen sich die Leistungen politischer Entscheidungsträger und die daraus resultierenden Transformationsprozesse gegenüberstellen.

Den Entwicklungsstand in 128 Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern dokumentiert die Bertelsmann Stiftung alle zwei Jahre in ihrem Transformationsindex: Anhand ausführlicher Ländergutachten beleuchtet der Index die Wirkung von Reformstrategien auf dem Weg zu rechtsstaatlicher Demokratie und sozialer Marktwirtschaft. Er gibt damit Akteuren in Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft wichtige Hinweise und Impulse für ihre Arbeit. Der Untersuchungszeitraum des "Transformationsindex BTI 2012" reicht vom Frühjahr 2009 bis zum Frühjahr 2011.

Die sieben ergänzenden Materialbände "Regional Findings" beinhalten die ausführlichen englischsprachigen Regionalüberblicke und Langfassungen der Länderberichte zu den sieben untersuchten Regionen: Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa; Lateinamerika und Karibik; West- und Zentralafrika; Naher Osten und Nordafrika; Östliches und südliches Afrika; Postsowjetisches Eurasien; Asien und Ozeanien.

The peaceful transition of authoritarian regimes towards democracy and a market economy poses enormous challenges for citizens and politicians alike. Around the world, under widely differing conditions and with varying degrees of success, reform-oriented groups are struggling to democratize their countries and to strengthen the market economy. Good governance is the decisive factor for the success or failure of any transition process.

The Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index is published every two years. The global ranking measures and compares transition processes worldwide on the basis of detailed country reports. Comparing systematically the status of democracy and market economy on an international basis, the BTI also provides comprehensive data on the quality of political management.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung
• Release date: Jun 27, 2012
• ISBN: 9783867934534

Book preview

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the

Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data

is available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

© 2012 E-Book-Ausgabe (EPUB)

© E-Book Edition 2012 Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh

Responsible: Matthias Jäger

Production editor: Christiane Raffel

Cover illustration: Getty Images; kopfstand GbR, Bielefeld

ISBN : 978-3-86793-453-4

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.org/publications

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/verlag

Table of Contents

Title Page

Copyright Page

BTI 2012 | Regional Findings South and East Africa

BTI 2012 | Angola Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Botswana Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management - I. Level of Difficulty

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Burundi Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Eritrea Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Ethiopia Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Kenya Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Lesotho Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Madagascar Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Malawi Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Mauritius Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Mozambique Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Namibia Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Rwanda Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Somalia Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | South Africa Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Tanzania Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Uganda Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Zambia Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Zimbabwe Country Report

Executive Summary

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Transformation Status

Transformation Management

Strategic Outlook

BTI 2012 | Regional Findings South and East Africa

By Siegmar Schmidt

¹

An overview of transformation and development in Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

This report presents the regional findings of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2012 for South and East Africa. More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org.

At first glance, political and economic transformation in South and East Africa has remained virtually unchanged since the last edition of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI 2010). On average, scores for political transformation in the region fell by a mere 0.09 points. Whereas improvements were recorded in eight of the region’s countries, the quality of democracy in eleven countries deteriorated, though most of these changes were slight (less than 0.02 points).

There have been no major changes in economic transformation as well. Nine countries made gains in this area, nine others recorded setbacks, and Botswana showed no change. Overall, the region saw only minimal improvement (+0.03). Yet, a clearly negative development in the region was observed in terms of transformation management, with the regional average falling by 0.16 points since the BTI 2010.

However, the average values level out the differences between developments in individual countries, which in some cases are rather significant. In terms of political transformation, only Kenya (+0.3) and Zimbabwe (+0.45) showed positive development. Despite some progress, however, Zimbabwe remains an authoritarian regime with catastrophic economic and social results, and it is in no way certain that this positive trend will continue. Scores particularly worsened in Madagascar, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia and Mozambique.

In Mozambique, judiciary independence, among other areas, scored lower than in the BTI 2010, giving an overall indication that the current government is not interested in furthering democratic reforms. In Rwanda, additional limits to freedom of assembly and freedom of opinion explain the more critical assessment of this authoritarian state, despite some rather successful economic modernization. In Eritrea, the dictatorial regime under Iasisas Afewerki continued to toughen the repression of its own population.

As before, Somalia still lacks an operable central government. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, functioning as an interim government, also made no decisive progress towards stateness, as it was unable to substantially weaken the militias; it survived only thanks to African Union intervention forces (AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia). Despite some success, the insufficiently equipped AMISOM, financed largely by the EU and comprising Ugandan military troops, was unable to end the violence or significantly weaken the Islamist al-Shabaab militia.

The international financial and economic crisis had a comparatively moderate effect on the economies in the region. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa cites a growth rate of 4.7 percent for 2010 – the same as for the crisis year of 2009 – and predicts an average growth of five percent for 2011. In this light, a pattern of differentiation between individual countries has emerged: Unequivocally negative effects are felt in countries with a strong dependence on the export of raw materials or relatively slight integration with international capital markets. The latter particularly applies to South Africa and indirectly to the economies of its neighboring states, which are closely linked to the South African economy (such as Lesotho and Namibia). Oil-producing Angola recorded revenue losses resulting from sinking prices for raw materials: GDP grew by a mere four percent in 2010, while the figure was over 22 percent in 2007. The copper exporter Zambia initially suffered from the fall of copper prices on the world market, but already by mid-2010 they had risen by almost 30 percent.

According to data provided by the International Monetary Fund, the global financial crisis hardly caused a decrease in remittances by Africans living abroad. Since most African migrant workers work in other African countries (usually in neighboring states) that were only moderately affected by the financial, and later economic crisis, the effects remained modest (with the exception of South Africa). Regional crises, such as in Côte d’Ivoire, produced stronger effects on remittances by migrant workers. If the economic crisis in parts of Europe and the United States continues and the North African states do not recover economically, the migrant workers’ countries of origin will feel stronger effects.

The quality of transformation management in the countries of South and East Africa declined overall (by an average of 0.16). Nevertheless, the average transformation management remains in the upper middle range. A small group of countries comprising Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are largely responsible for this positive result. For years, the quality of management performance in the other states has remained weak. Considering the normative basis of the BTI – a market economy with sociopolitical safeguards and constitutional democracy – despite growth and modernization (Rwanda, Angola), several of the authoritarian regimes received relatively modest absolute scores in terms of management.

Political transformation

There is a predominance of deficient democracies in the region. The results of the 19 states studied were only slightly better than those in the neighboring region of West and Central Africa: two democracies in consolidation (West and Central Africa: one), 11 defective or highly defective democracies (eight), six autocracies (nine), of which one is a failing state (two). However, the gap between the two African BTI regions has narrowed.

Mauritius and Botswana, two states with relatively small populations, can be classified as democracies in consolidation. Democratic quality in Mauritius even improved slightly. Only a bit less successful are South Africa and Namibia, two states on the threshold of the democracies in consolidation category, with the BTI 2012 scores reflecting a slight improvement in the former (+0.15) and a relatively minor deterioration in the latter ( – 0.10). South Africa saw modest improvements in terms of democracy quality once the April 2009 elections were over, which had had polarizing political and societal effects. Also improving were Tanzania and, much more significantly, Kenya.

Table 1: State of political transformation

In contrast, the other states in the category of defective democracies show more significant deficits, often in the area of rule of law. While Kenya, on the basis of its new constitution, has improved from a highly defective democracy to a merely defective one, the coup in Madagascar led to the state’s demotion from a defective democracy to a moderate autocracy. Despite continuing setbacks, Zimbabwe can thank the work of the Grand Coalition for its new classification as a moderate autocracy. Rwanda, on the verge of autocracy in the BTI 2010, is now categorized as such, based in part on its undemocratic elections.

Uganda’s poorer score in terms of democracy quality ( – 0.15) can be blamed on, among other things, the restriction of freedom of opinion during the politically polarizing election campaign. Amid declining voter participation, President Museveni, in power since 1986, claimed a decisive victory with over 68 percent of the tallied votes. The ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), received 71 percent of the votes, leaving the president to preside over a comfortable majority.

Between 2009 and 2011 Kenya has paved the way for a fresh political start, having significantly improved the quality of its democracy since the BTI 2010 (+0.45). At the beginning of 2008 Kenya faced severe and violent political turmoil. An episode of clumsy electoral falsification in the December 2007 elections had prompted high-ranking politicians to incite riots among various ethnic groups. More than a thousand people were killed and hundreds of thousands were displaced. However, steps toward a new beginning were taken in the form of a functioning grand coalition between the Raila Odinga-led Orange Democratic Movement and the Party of National Unity, newly formed by Mwai Kibaki. In contrast to reactions to past episodes of violence, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for six high-ranking Kenyan politicians (drawing from both parties), who were accused of responsibility for the riots. At the same time the government established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. With the appointment of Patrick Lumumba to lead the anti-corruption authority – established largely as a result of massive pressure from donor states – the government seems earnest in curtailing the notoriously widespread corruption. Several ministers have already resigned in the face of allegations of corruption. Insofar as the prosecution of violence and corruption, the traditional culture of impunity for Kenyan politicians and officials appears to be coming to an end.

The most important step toward reform thus far remains the August 2010 adoption of a new constitution, which had been requested for almost 20 years, especially by segments of civil society, to curtail the extensive powers of the president and strengthen the system of checks and balances. The new constitution provides for the strengthening of a independent judiciary, decentralization, a new land law, stronger legislative oversight of the executive, and the establishment of a Supreme Court within one year. This document was approved in a referendum by 67 percent of Kenyans. It remains to be seen to what extent parliament is in a position to adopt the laws required to implement the constitution. To continue the reform process, a consensus between important politicians is needed to respect the new constitution and to compromise with one another in settling a multitude of controversial issues, such as those concerning the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Whether the hopeful developments continue will be determined in the BTI 2014. Political stabilization of the country would also have positive effects on the region, since Kenya is the strongest state economically and possesses considerable political weight. Kenya’s political importance and the interesting economic perspectives – were the country to remain stable – were also underscored by German Chancellor Merkel’s visit in August 2011.

As shown by the scores of Rwanda ( – 0.22) and Eritrea ( – 0.55), the degree of authoritarianism has increased in both countries. Ethiopia also continues under autocratic rule. Pressure on the Eritrean population is mounting, although the government already exercises total control over all areas of society and the state.

The August 2010 elections in Rwanda again showed that the population has no opportunity to bring about a change of government, since almost no opposition parties were allowed to participate in the elections and the government’s media monopoly deliberately leaves the population only minimally informed. The elections were free in name only and not at all fair. Its widespread democratic institutions are merely a façade, as power in the country is concentrated among the president, a small group of the military and high-ranking party functionaries. The policies of the Kagame government are oriented towards democratic principles to an ever smaller degree, as the government knows that this is tolerated by donors to the greatest possible extent.

This also applies for Ethiopia under the control of Meles Zenawi, who has ruled the country since 1995. The May 2010 elections were neither free nor fair, as opposition candidates and their supporters were met with severe force. The government now controls over 99 percent of the seats in parliament. The violence against the opposition continued even after the elections, and basic rights were restricted even more than before.

The lusophone countries of Angola and Mozambique show opposing trends. While the political transformation score for Mozambique dropped 0.2 points, Angola recorded a modest rise of 0.12 points. The new and in some ways vastly less democratic constitution of January 2010 did not yet factor fully in the evaluation, as it was not yet adopted. The new constitution further enhances the power of the president, which already dominates the political system. In various provisions, Angola’s new constitution effectively repeals the system of checks and balances. Presidential elections will no longer take place in the future, but rather the chairman of the strongest party in parliament will automatically become president. It remains to be seen whether this transition from a presidential to a parliamentary system will actually be carried out.

In terms of classification, Angola remains on the margin between a moderate autocracy and a highly defective democracy. To date, parliamentary elections have only occurred in 2008, and these were deemed to be just barely democratic by most external observers. Contrary to the constitution, the president is still not chosen through elections. Furthermore, the entire political process is under strict control of the executive. The country’s considerable oil wealth is controlled by a small group of advisors and dignitaries from the party and the military without any sort of required transparency. At the time of writing, President dos Santos, who has held the office for 32 years, announced that he will not run in the planned 2012 elections. Whether the far-reaching obstacles to transformation will give way remains questionable.

Severe repression in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda against generally weak oppositions as well as the aversion to wide-reaching political reforms in Angola reflect rulers’ fears of losing power. There is evidence that these can be interpreted as an over-nervous reactions to the rising Arab Spring. This applies particularly to Angola, where the government itself is reacting to weak protests on the Internet with countermeasures and organized demonstrations. It is unlikely that rebellions will spread from the North African and Arab regions through mass mobilization, at least in Rwanda and Angola, where recollections of violently quelled conflicts are firmly anchored in the collective memory. This can only change over the long term.

Within the region, Madagascar exhibits the strongest decline in democracy quality ( – 1.55). The country’s political development proceeded turbulently during the assessment period: In January 2009 security forces shot and killed over 40 people at demonstrations against President Marc Ravalomanana in the nation’s capital of Antananarivo. The protest initially centered on the shutting down of a television station and became increasingly political. Looting soon followed. At the peak of the demonstrations, the 34-year-old mayor of the capital, Andry Rajoelina, turned himself in. Rajoelina succeeded in winning the support of the military and at the end of May 2009, President Ravalomanana was forced to surrender. The military made Rajoelina head of government. The coup was relatively free of violence. Supporters of the former president responded with demonstrations.

The coup was condemned by the African Union as an unconstitutional change of government, most donors ceased their support and the African Union imposed sanctions. The Madagascan opposition, the African Union, the United Nations and international donors have all demanded a timetable for a return to democracy and fair elections. The Madagascar coup has thus far led only to a gradual decline in civil rights and the freedom of political participation, for under Ravalomanana as well, legally and constitutionally documented democratic rights were often violated by security forces.

The rise and fall of Ravalomanana’s government demonstrates a fundamental problem, which – in a somewhat lesser form – also exists in other sub-Saharan African countries: Democratic institutions are not respected by governments, and are too weak to form a counterweight to powerful political leaders. Politics – even in the mind of the public – is a struggle between big men, singular personalities all of whom are quite conscious that non-democratic veto powers such as the military can wield decisive influence within the political environment.

From the beginning of his term in office and until his reelection in 2006, Ravalomanana was considered a beacon of hope. The self-made businessman presented himself as the country’s nonideological, technocratic modernizer with impressive plans (e.g., Madagascar Action Plan). He orchestrated masterful appearances on the international stage as well. As a result, the populist president received massive support from abroad. As shown in the BTI country report for Madagascar, plans for modernization proved to be too ambitious, reforms became mired in their early stages, corruption could not be contained and living conditions for the wider public did not improve. Moreover, President Ravalomanana used his position to continue pursuing commercial interests and to enlarge his business empire while in office. As a result, he lost the support of the population. He then alienated the military and the elites when the government declared that it would lease roughly a third of the country’s viable land to the South Korean concern Daewoo.

The political turbulence – the end of which is unforeseeable – is leading to a stagnation of social and, in part, economic development, not least because very little assistance is being received from abroad for a country that is highly dependent on such support. The state’s future remains unclear, as there is still no consensus on a transition plan for the return to democracy as promised by the president. Even as the population grows increasingly impatient, at present there is still no fear that the country will slide into anarchy or civil war.

Economic transformation

The region comprises several of the world’s most underdeveloped countries. Most of them are considered to have poorly functioning or rudimentary market economies. Their economic systems possess obvious and fundamental flaws: The informal sector often plays a very important role, and state interference in the economy is common practice. However, the government does not act to regulate market forces or try to stabilize the market through its interventions. Interventions often serve the personal or group interests of the political elite, who must accommodate patronage networks. Positive growth hardly ever benefits the majority of the population. Foreign investments primarily target raw materials. Despite these problematic developments found in most countries (the exceptions are Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Mauritius), Angola, Zimbabwe and Kenya received significantly better assessments than in the BTI 2010. To a somewhat lesser degree, this also applies to Burundi, Mauritius, South Africa and Malawi.

In Zimbabwe, the National Union government succeeded in containing hyperinflation and achieving moderate economic growth. All three countries possessed a relatively low base level – violent ethnic confrontations in Kenya at the beginning of 2008 had an impact on the evaluations in the BTI 2010.

Burundi’s score showed moderate improvement (+0.29): In the BTI 2012, the country is classified as a poorly functioning market economy. Burundi’s advancement during the review period is attributable to improved scores on the questions dealing with equal opportunity, education policy and macrostability. These changes reflect the lasting yet fragile peace following the end of the civil war.

The positive developments in a whole series of states in South and East Africa also reflect the fact that the financial and economic crisis has had no serious repercussions there.

Despite forced modernizations in Ethiopia and Rwanda, these countries have experienced only marginal changes in comparison to the BTI 2010. Namibia, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania and Lesotho also showed only slightly positive or negative changes; Botswana’s score remained exactly at its previously high level. In Ethiopia, Tanzania and Lesotho, modest fluctuations from their results in the BTI 2010 caused them to be downgraded to poorly functioning or rudimentary market economies, as the BTI 2010 scores for these countries had placed each of them at the verge of the next lowest category.

Although Somalia – classified as a failing state in consideration of its scores in all three assessment dimensions – has some economic activity, there is no institutional state framework. Eritrea, Mozambique and Madagascar show the most significant declining tendencies. In Madagascar, results for economic transformation saw a relatively moderate drop ( – 0.29) after the coup. However, the ongoing political crisis will have grave long-term impact, especially on social conditions for the population and on education, as donor states that have provided tremendous support in this area continue to sanction the coup government by withholding development cooperation. The lower scores for Mozambique are a result of the bread riots in September 2010 and the growing wealth disparity that caused them.

The socioeconomic situation in Eritrea also borders on the catastrophic. Individual scores for the quality of political transformation and transformation management as well as those for economic transformation all indicate negative trends for this often neglected country. Scores for economic transformation fell 1.18 points, driven in no small part by the intensification of a program of indefinite popular conscription into the army and labor services. In addition, the ruling military exerts a near-total control over the country’s economy. Due to the extent of government repression, open opposition is hardly ever possible, but boycotts of state-organized assemblies are evidence that the population does not accept the status quo. Hundreds of thousands of people, especially the young, see flight as the only feasible option for bettering their lives. As a consequence, the country’s potential for development is diminishing.

Table 2: State of economic transformation

At first glance, the improvements in Zimbabwe are impressive (+0.71). But closer analysis puts things in perspective: On one hand the base level was very low due to the social and economic crisis stemming from the political situation. Furthermore, it remains to be seen to what extent the improvements can last and whether further stabilization of the economy can be achieved. After the GDP fell by approximately 40 percent (see country report) between 1998 and 2009, in 2010 the economy of Zimbabwe expanded again by 4.1 percent – other sources quote a figure as high as seven percent – while per capita income was also on the rise. The containment of inflation and the moderate economic growth in 2010 were largely brought about by Zimbabwe’s finance minister Tendai Biti, a member of the Movement for Democratic Change. The economy benefited from the raising of price controls and the suspension of the national currency, the Zimbabwe dollar. However, it will be a while yet before the economy recovers, as the per capita GDP in Zimbabwe fell by 34 percent between 1980 and 2010.

Social indicators paint a catastrophic picture: Life expectancy dropped by 12 years over the same period and the Ndebele ethnic minority was especially neglected, as it is suspected of supporting the opposition. Fundamental economic and social improvement for this country – which possesses great economic potential – can only be achieved through political changes that are thus far nowhere in sight. The coalition government is extremely fragile, as the two parties are very much at odds and each suffers from internal strife as well; there is no consensus over reforms that would result in political changes. The elections planned for 2012 could lead to renewed polarization and to violence from either side of the government, because recent history has shown that the 87-year-old Mugabe will cling to power by any means necessary, even at the cost of his country’s self-destruction. Additional tensions surround the question of who might succeed Mugabe.

Like Libya, Angola owns two percent of the world’s oil reserves and extracts 1.8 million barrels a day, accounting for 80 percent of the state’s income. Thus, there exists sufficient foundation on which to rebuild this war-ravaged country. The majority of the population shares none of the benefits from this oil wealth. Newer studies show that almost 37 percent of the population lives in abject poverty, most of it in rural regions where few signs of the strong economic growth can be detected. At the same time, a relatively small stratum of the population profits from the oil revenues and is becoming very wealthy. The government is just beginning to slowly reduce this extreme social inequality: During the evaluation period there was a significant increase in investments in education and health. Simultaneously, heavy investments were made in infrastructure, with China as the country’s main partner. Unemployment has consequently dropped. Above all, Angola’s higher score in the BTI 2012 (+0.71) is a result of its increased commitment to education and health. Also significant were its banking sector improvements and its successful macroeconomic stabilization following the crisis year of 2009. Angola’s high dependency on oil prices holds future risks in terms of price fluctuations.

Transformation management

In a comparison among regions, the countries of South and East Africa taken as a whole showed a decline in management performance ( – 0.16), attributable in part to significant management setbacks in Madagascar, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Eritrea, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia. Positive developments were indicated in Zimbabwe (beginning from a very low base level), Kenya and Malawi, and to a more limited degree in Angola and Rwanda. These last two countries saw improvements particularly in the areas of economic management, but not in the field of political management. The governments of Angola and Rwanda are pursuing an authoritarian modernization of their states and are rather reluctant (Angola) or not willing (Rwanda) to accept democratic principles.

In the first two categories – very good management and good management – there were no changes in comparison to the BTI 2010. Botswana only just attained the highest category, which Mauritius very nearly managed to achieve as well. Zambia has been demoted to the moderate category. Reforms initiated in Kenya towards a constitutional democracy were cause to upgrade this country’s transformation management from weak to moderate.

Table 3: Quality of transformation management

Zambia’s transformation management was downgraded to the moderate category in the BTI 2012. An essential cause for this was the government’s decreasing willingness to carry out reforms: Priorities and goals were only halfheartedly pursued. Causes of Uganda’s lower score for transformation management – a figure still significantly higher than the average for the subregions – include the state’s sharply increased budget deficit and its still-rampant corruption, which also involves the misuse of donor contributions. The budget deficit also stems from the misuse of state resources for campaign gifts (including those for members of parliament) and the appropriation of state funds by the governing party and by the president to finance costly election campaigns. Nevertheless, Uganda possesses relatively good transformation management when compared to other countries in and outside of the region.

Angola’s transformation management improved only slightly (+0.18) because of its mixed progress toward the BTI benchmarks of a democracy under the rule of law and a market economy anchored in principles of social justice. The country has made almost no progress in terms of the former and only slight progress in terms of the latter.

The fact that Rwanda has made serious efforts to improve the country’s well-being can be attested to by sources beyond the World Bank alone. President Paul Kagame, the office holder since 1994, is seen as the driving force for the country’s somewhat successful modernization. It is to the credit of the Rwandan government that several social indicators have improved over recent years. For example, child mortality rates have decreased, and the fight against disease has been successfully intensified. To this end, Rwanda has sensibly used support from international public and private donors, which has often reached very substantial levels. However, though this modernization effort has been at least partly successful and various measures have been effectively implemented, these steps have taken place under authoritarian auspices, and the BTI’s evaluation is accordingly ambivalent: while that government has made progress along the path of economic liberalization, as well as in the areas of effective prioritization and policy implementation, democracy scores have simultaneously decreased.

The Ethiopian government is pursuing a strict and authoritarian course for modernization, which is comparable to that of the Kagame government in Rwanda. Increased repression and the inconsistent implementation of market reforms – the government and the ruling party do not want to lose control of broad segments of the economy – have led to decisively lower scores for transformation management.

Until a few years ago, Mozambique served as a paragon of post-civil-war reconstruction, showing high growth rates, promising political reconciliation between the former combatants of the war and correspondingly massive levels of support. However, donor states have become increasingly disappointed over the lack of development progress, the cause of which is largely political in nature: President Armando Emilio Guebuza, re-elected in 2009, has deepened the linkage between political and economic activity. This was also the conclusion of the African Peer Review Mechanism – a governance review process voluntarily adopted and conducted by fellow African states in which civil society representatives participate. The president, along with all leading Frelimo politicians, is active in the state and private economy. The elite of the Frelimo Party, which dominates Mozambican politics and society, have almost unchecked access to the country’s resources. Strong loyalty within the party, which dominates parliament, precludes any effective monitoring of the executive.

Popular discontent broke out into bread riots in September 2010, in the course of which over a dozen demonstrators were killed. Although the government later rescinded price increases for basic food items and electricity, the outbreaks revealed the population’s dissatisfaction, especially concerning social progress. Despite impressive growth rates of 6.4 percent and 7.0 percent during the global crisis years of 2009 and 2010, the poverty level in Mozambique has increased over recent years. Despite strong growth, Mozambique is ranked 165th of the 169 countries in the Human Development Index.

Mozambique’s reputation and credibility have suffered in the eyes of donor states, which provide an estimated 45 percent of the country’s budget. They criticize the persistently high level of corruption as well as problems with coordinating and implementing measures for development aid. These measures commonly fail due to inefficient bureaucracy, which often breaks down under the strain of implementing complex programs. Mozambique is becoming an ever better example of a country lacking good leadership.

South Africa’s management of the 2010 World Cup, the first on African soil, was outstanding. The global spectacle went off without a hitch, and fears that crime and disorganization would lead to disaster proved unfounded. However, hopes that the World Cup would strengthen the collective identity of South Africans were overblown. The reason for this was less the early elimination of Bafana, Bafana (Boys Boys), as the South African team is called, but rather the controversial debates, which continue to this day, over costs and the potential long-term gains for the country in terms of social and economic development. The government invested heavily in the construction of new stadiums and in insufficient infrastructure. Critics saw these investment billions as poor prioritization, pointing instead to the country’s acute problems of unemployment, poverty and housing shortages. With a final accounting of the World Cup still in the works, the direct and positive effects of hosting the event are sure to be limited. However, in the medium and long term, infrastructural measures and the country’s improved image, especially for tourism, can by all means pay off.

Outlook

In comparison to the previous evaluation period, BTI 2012 scores for political transformation decreased slightly in South and East Africa, while scores for transformation management were somewhat stronger. Only in the area of economic transformation did positive changes predominate. The zeal for reform has waned. For many heads of government and state, retaining power in the highest priority, whether or not by legitimately democratic means. Under the current circumstances, external donors could give impetus to further reforms. However, Western donor countries, who by and large share the normative model of the BTI, have seen their position weakened over recent years. This applies particularly in the cooperation with African states that depend less on development aid and can sell highly sought-after raw materials on the world market, such as Angola.

However, even those states that are heavily dependent on the inflow of foreign aid – including Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Malawi – do not automatically opt for democratization. On occasion, as in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Madagascar, they even place further restrictions on fundamental participatory rights. With the exception of Madagascar, this rarely has serious consequences. For most of those in power, violations of democratic norms lack consequences for a variety of reasons. First, a certain donor fatigue and a growing disinterest in Africa cannot be denied. This fatigue has been accompanied by a growing and fundamental questioning of development assistance and democracy promotion in general. Second, donor countries often pursue competing goals and priorities; particularly in countries such as Rwanda with a recent history of civil war, the interest in real or putative stability outweighs demands that human rights be respected. Moreover, a country such as Ethiopia is seen – at least by the United States and a handful of other donors – as an anchor of stability in a fragile region and an ally in the fight against terrorism. Criticism of the authoritarian regime is accordingly restrained.

A third factor has come increasingly into play in recent years: Since China, India and Brazil have engaged themselves more actively in Africa, new trade and export markets have developed. This has also widened the scope of political action afforded to African states. Some African leaders, such as those in Rwanda and Ethiopia, now consider the modernization successes of East Asian countries and China as a model for their own development. This is reflected, for example, in the South African debate over the goal of the developmental state, following the example of Malaysia.

In current African discussions, the state is allocated the central role of development agent. Non-Western partners’ renunciation of political conditionality requirements makes cooperation simpler and more attractive, and creates the impression that recipients are operating on an equal footing with donors. Nor should one underestimate the symbolic significance of the fact that some of these new donors were themselves victims of colonization, and thus eschew former colonial powers’ tendency to issue both advice and admonishments. The current economic and debt crisis in Europe and the United States has strengthened both Africa’s tendency to see the state as the driving force for development and its interest in authoritarian modernization. The environment for external support provided by the West is thus substantially less favorable than it was 20 years ago. China has already begun to participate more directly in development financing and the provision of credit. If more new donors follow this example, it will further diminish Western influence, and with it the opportunity to support democratic reforms.

References

Barajas, Adolfo, et al. The Global Financial Crisis and Workers’ Remittances to Africa: What’s the Damage? IMF Working Paper WP/10/24, 2010. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1024.pdf

Bröll, Claudia. Im Griff des greisen Diktators. FAZ. August 20, 2011.

Cornelissen, Scarlett. Fußball-WM 2010: Herausforderungen und Hoffnungen. In APuZ 1/2010: 12 – 18.

Distler, Werner and Kristina Weissenbach (eds.). Konsolidierungsprojekt Südafrika. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010.

Economic Commission for Africa. Economic report on Africa 2011. Addis Abeba, 2011. www.uneca.org/era2011/ERA2011_ENG-fin.pdf

Englebert, Pierre. Africa. Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009.

Hyden, Goran. African Politics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Kibreab, Gaim. Forced labour in Eritrea. Journal of Modern African Studies 47 (1): 41 – 72, 2009.

Makgetla, Neva. The international economic crisis and employment in South Africa. New South African Review 1: 65 – 86, 2010.

Nebe, Johannes Michael (ed.) Herausforderung Afrika. Gesellschaft und Raum im Wandel. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011.

Stehnken, Franziska, et al. (eds.) Afrika und externe Akteure. Partner auf Augenhöhe? Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010.

Tripp, Aili Mari. Museveni’s Uganda. Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010.

BTI 2012 | Angola Country Report

Key Indicators

Sources: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2011. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $2 a day.

Executive Summary

Although transformation in Angola has progressed since the end of civil war in 2002, developments during the review period (2009 – 2010) cast doubt on the regime’s commitment to democracy. The government does target market economic development, but there is ongoing internal resistance to this orientation, which frustrates the consistent implementation of policies that could further this. The regime’s commitment to a market economy anchored in principles of social justice therefore remains questionable.

The country’s second parliamentary elections (following the first ones of 1992) were held in September 2008, giving the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola, MPLA) a massive majority (81.64%, or 191 seats out of 220) in the National Assembly. The second-place party is another former anti-colonial movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which received 10.39% of the votes (16 seats), followed by the Social Renewal Party (Partido Renovador Social, PRS) with 3.17% (8 seats). Only two other parties succeeded in winning seats in parliament: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), formerly an anti-colonial movement, which received 1.11% (3 seats), and the New Democracy Electoral Union (Nova Democracia União Eleitoral, ND), with 1.2% (2 seats). A total of 7,213,281 individuals voted, or 87.36 % of the electorate registered in 2006 – 2007. An all-MPLA government was formed. A key reason for this outcome seems to have been the poor credibility of the MPLA’s political rivals, but also the population’s desire to avoid violence after the traumatic experience of a decades-long cruel civil war. Therefore, the elections can be considered to mirror the public will in general, although the opposition parties reported a series of irregularities and the electoral campaign did not represent a level playing field.

Immediately after the parliamentary elections, a presidential election was announced for mid-2009, but was not held. Instead, a new constitution was approved in January 2010, stipulating that the president of the party obtaining the most votes in parliamentary elections be appointed president. Furthermore, the constitution is articulated in such a way that the president, who is also the head of government, controls in one way or another all political, administrative and judicial organs. As a result, the division of power, fundamental in a democratic system, is massively conditioned, in fact, all but abolished. The constitution thus formalizes a system in existence since Angola’s independence in 1975.

While the oil boom of recent years has boosted several sectors of the economy and created considerable wealth for a minority of the population, social inequality remains a serious problem. According to an Inquiry into the Well-Being of the Population (Inquérito sobre o Bem-Estar da População, IBEP) carried out in 2007 – 2008 by the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Naional de Estatística), 36.6% of Angolan families live below the national poverty line. However, most institutions in the country involved in social work believe the actual percentage to be much higher. The ruling class is in full control. Its comfortable access to oil revenues, coupled with the creation of an offshore economy and the entrepreneurial opportunities that have opened up in recent years, have permitted this class to expand its wealth considerably and sever most of their links to the broader population. Average Angolans have little or no say on political, socioeconomic or other important matters. So-called oil windfalls, as well as (more recently) unconditional oil-backed loans by the Chinese government have for long rendered ineffective the international donor community’s attempts to tie financial aid and development assistance to criteria of good governance. Nevertheless, out-of-proportion expenses, the international financial crisis and a temporary fall in oil prices have obliged the Angolan state, at the end of 2009, to ask the IMF for a loan of $1,400 million, on the basis of a stand-by arrangement, enabling it to satisfy a number of contractual obligations. In 2010, another loan of $1,000 million was obtained in order to (re-)establish macroeconomic equilibrium, reconstitute Angola’s international monetary reserves, and implement structural reforms, all of which helped the government reduce budget deficits in the non-oil sector. As a consequence, Angola is now subject to strict IMF monitoring, not only with regard to the immediate application of these loans, but directly or indirectly with regard to public finances. Until 2010, public expenditure had been subject to weak or non-existent monitoring mechanisms. Transparent regulations and legal institutions enforcing property and contractual rights were lacking or underdeveloped. Since 2010, clientelistic networks have continued to gain access to state funding sources, although this not in ways similar to years past. At the same time, serious efforts had been made to enhance the state’s technical capacities to plan and carry out policy measures. In all these respects, progress has been observed, but is far from advanced, in particular because corruption remains pervasive. Angola continues to number among the top ten most corrupt countries in the world (2010).

Innovative measures have created new and clearly more favorable conditions for the private sector. This has contributed to a marked increase in the number of foreign enterprises operating and investing in Angola. These measures have also facilitated the accumulation of local capital and the formation of an Angolan entrepreneurial class that is linked to, but increasingly independent of, the ruling cluster of those holding political power. In addition, Angola has begun to take in a substantial influx of human resources from abroad: in 2010, an estimated 300,000 Chinese were working in Angola, as well as an estimated 200,000 Europeans and Latin Americans, including about 100,000 Portuguese.

In 2010, the value of the commercial exchanges between Angola and China amounted to almost $25,000 million; China’s imports from Angola totaled almost $22,000 (about 55% more than in 2009), and Angola’s imports from China reached $2,000 million (16% less than in 2009). Over the years, short-term Chinese loans have been used in the domains of energy and water supply, education and health (buildings, equipment, personnel), construction and rehabilitation (roads, bridges, railways etc.), and agriculture. Most of the construction, rehabilitation and equipment projects were carried out by Chinese public enterprises and with a Chinese workforce. In principle, these firms are obliged to hire a percentage of Angolan citizens (i.e., 30% of their workforce), but this quota is rarely attained due to the lack of qualified Angolan personnel.

Since 2007, the government has ostensibly pursued policies targeting massive infrastructure reconstruction and rehabilitation projects, especially in the long-neglected provinces and in areas that had been under UNITA domination. However, the projects in formerly UNITA-dominated regions, especially Huambo and Bié, have suffered due to a halt in investments throughout 2009 and 2010. Overall, regional asymmetries continue to be blatant. Social problems have been addressed to some degree, especially in the areas of health and education. The public and private university systems underwent considerable growth in 2009 – 2010. In the political realm, a deconcentration policy was initiated, strengthening in principle not only the local and regional echelons of state administration and public services, CBOs (community based organizations) and NGOs, but also the traditional authorities in rural areas, who draw their legitimacy from defending the interests of their communities. However, to date, only very few of the local Consultation and Harmonization Councils (Conselhos de Auscultação e Concertação, CACs) operate in a satisfactory manner.

From 2002 to 2009, Angola managed to consolidate its macroeconomic situation successfully. It brought inflation down, GDP growth rates were among the highest in the world, and the country was a favorite destination for foreign direct investment on the continent. However, the economic situation has changed substantially since the beginning of 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis and the low crude oil prices in particular. Among the most serious consequences for Angola were adverse effects on export and tax revenues, the country’s currency exchange policy, on the management of its external monetary reserves, and on its financial liquidity, all of which effectively raised external and internal debt alike. All this forced the government to adopt in 2010 a set of austerity measures meant to reduce public expenditure and the budget deficit and to accept the aforementioned IMF loans. For this and other reasons, Angola remains ranked at the near bottom of the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom (2010: 161 out of 179).

History and Characteristics of Transformation

Angola’s current transition process is conditioned by four basic intertwined factors: its colonial heritage, its rich endowment in natural resources such as oil and diamonds, its post-colonial experience under a socialist-type regime, and 27 years of anti-colonial and then civil war.

The anti-colonial war, which began in 1961, was waged by three competing nationalist movements: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola, FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular pela Libertação de Angola, MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União pela Independência Total de Angola, UNITA). In the Cabinda enclave, the regionalist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC) was also active. The FNLA, MPLA and UNITA fought each other as well as the colonial regime. By the early 1970s, these groups’ military impact in Angola had been substantially reduced. Decolonization was brought about not through their activity, but mainly as a consequence of the 1974 pro-democracy military coup d’état in Portugal (which, of course, was in part influenced by the wars for liberation in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique). Civil war among the three movements broke out while the Portuguese were in principle still in charge. In 1975, the MPLA, benefitting heavily from its control of the country’s oil resources, declared independence and established a socialist regime supported by the Soviet Union and its allies, most prominently Cuba. UNITA, and initially the FNLA as well, fought a long and bitter war against the MPLA, with the help of the Mobutu regime in what was then Zaire, China, apartheid South Africa, the United States and other countries, funding hostilities in part through a portion of Angola’s diamond revenues.

By the time decolonization occurred in 1974 – 1975, Angola’s economy was centered on the interests and skills of the Portuguese metropolis and the local Portuguese community, and largely built on the exploitation and underdevelopment of the Angolan population. In political terms, the country’s recent experience had been only with a non-democratic regime, the colonial extension of the Salazar dictatorship. Following independence, the MPLA established a political regime inspired by the former Soviet model, sometimes dubbed Afro-Stalinism, which of course implied one-party rule and a centrally planned and coordinated economy. At its 1977 congress, it adopted Marxism-Leninism as its official doctrine, but the regime, while being authoritarian and centralist, in fact possessed only a relative few socialist trappings, and never came near a state of doctrinal communism (especially given that many of those who favored a genuinely communist orientation were massacred in 1977).

For decades, diamonds had been the single most important natural resource in colonial Angola. The exploitation of oil began near the end of colonial rule, and once fully developed after independence it rose to paramount importance in economic as well as political terms. Shortly after independence, the MPLA regime formed strategic alliances with multinational oil corporations. It financed its military and economic projects almost entirely through oil revenues, which rendered the productive capacities of most of the population irrelevant to the state. Failing agricultural policies based on collectivized state-owned farms and declining industrial output were compensated for by increased oil outputs.

The Angolan Civil War of 1975 – 2002 was deeply embedded in the Cold War, with socialist countries, especially Cuba and the Soviet Union, taking the side of the MPLA, and UNITA counting on the support of China, apartheid South Africa, the United States and others. However, endogenous factors such as ethnic and other social cleavages also played a crucial role. Changes in the international environment coupled with a military stalemate enabled the 1988 New York Accords to take place, which linked Namibia’s independence from South Africa to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Militarily weakened by the loss of Cuban forces and the end of Soviet military aid, the MPLA regime at the same time faced an economic crisis brought about by decreasing oil prices; meanwhile, the United States vetoed IMF and World Bank assistance for Angola. All this put pressure on the MPLA to negotiate, and peace negotiations began in Bicesse/Portugal (1990 – 1991). Both the United States and the Soviet Union participated in these negotiations, in which Portugal served as moderator. The MPLA and UNITA continued to jockey for power by carrying out military actions against each other during negotiations. The MPLA proved resistant to reform, and attempts to liberalize the political system were conducted as hesitatingly as were the peace negotiations. Behind this attitude was a nomenklatura clustering around (state and party) President José Eduardo dos Santos. This group held the reins in the political, administrative, military and economic domains, and derived substantial benefits from this position in a neo-patrimonial manner. Its members were convinced that only the exclusive vesture of power in the MPLA could guarantee their position and privileges.

However, the MPLA was forced in the course of the negotiations to agree to demands to introduce a multiparty system. At the third MPLA party congress, in 1990, the Angolan constitution was amended accordingly and the official Marxist-Leninist party doctrine was replaced by democratic socialism. The Bicesse Accords not only prescribed a cease-fire and the demobilization of both armies but also the new national army’s composition, requiring recruits as well as officers to be drawn from both sides, as well as the reestablishment of state structures in formerly UNITA-controlled areas. Elections were scheduled for November 1992, and a United Nations mission (UNAVEM) was tasked with monitoring the peace process. However, the peace and democratization processes were undermined by several factors: UNAVEM’s inappropriate mandate and weak financial support; an overambitious timetable; the winner takes all option for the formation of a new government after elections; and the fact that demobilization was not completed before elections. When the MPLA (54%) won the parliamentary elections against UNITA (34%), and UNITA’s leader Jonas Savimbi managed to get only 40.1% in the presidential elections, he decided to pull out of the process and alleged electoral fraud, although the United Nations and other international observers declared the elections to have been free and fair. Heavy fighting broke out immediately and lasted for yet another decade. For the next 10 years, Angola was divided into government/MPLA- and UNITA-controlled zones, but with intermittently intense guerrilla activities by UNITA in the former and incursions by government forces into the latter. In government-controlled areas, a formally democratic state existed, but in fact political and economic power was in the hands of a ruling class embedded in the MPLA, combining an authoritarian, clientelistic and corrupt regime with predatory capitalism.

In institutional terms, the political system was dominated by the presidency, although technically José Eduardo dos Santos had not been elected: As he had missed gaining an absolute majority (by less than 1%), a second round of elections would legally have been necessary to establish binding results. However, for 16 years there were no additional elections, and the president and parliament remained in office regardless of the fact that the constitution limited their mandates to five years. Behind the institutional screen existed an authoritarian regime practicing what has been called petro-diamond capitalism, driven by a rent-seeking class (or more precisely: a cluster of networks) that had developed out of the nomenklatura, and for which the president played a pivotal role. Corruption became pervasive in Angola, leading it to figure consistently at the bottom of Transparency International’s lists. The exodus from rural areas that had begun with the outbreak of the civil war intensified again, leading to an urbanization of slightly more than 50% of the population.

A lasting peace agreement was finally signed in April 2002, shortly after Jonas Savimbi was killed in action, in February 2002. The overall political regime remained the same and was extended to the previously UNITA-dominated areas, incorporating some UNITA followers into the system, including the government and the armed forces. However, as early as 2003, a transformation process that has since been defined as authoritarian reconversion began. Its main thrust was a consolidation of the macroeconomic situation, accompanied by a construction boom (infrastructure, housing, office buildings, hotels, etc.), an expansion and diversification of the service sector, increased state efficiency, a number of social measures, and an administrative deconcentration. One key outcome was a critical change in the social fabric, away from urban class formation (the constitution of an entrepreneurial class, accompanied by an expansion of the middle classes) to the return of a certain proportion of the rural refugees to their original areas of residence and agricultural activities (and the adapted reconstitution of rural communities).

Encouraged by what they perceived as a smooth process, and feeling external and internal pressure to obtain democratic legitimacy, the power-holders decided to hold parliamentary elections in 2008. Overall, however, the political playing field had not been leveled. Voting itself was accompanied by confusion and alleged irregularities. Several examples will suffice to illustrate this point. Observers and civil society organizations had doubts about the impartiality of the electoral management bodies. The polling was described as chaotic, particularly in Luanda, where 30% of voters were expected to cast their ballots. The National Electoral Commission (Comissão Nacional Eleitoral, CNE) failed to accredit the largest domestic observer group in Luanda. The MPLA obtained over 80% of the vote; UNITA’s share was limited to about 10%, and the FNLA and three additional new parties were reduced to marginal positions. Turnout was high, but international observers had some difficulties in declaring the election to be overall free and fair (as they had done for the 1992 election). However, in overall terms the results can be considered as corresponding to the electorate’s basic attitude. To a large degree, these results reflect less a preference for the MPLA and an acceptance of its regime than its rivals’ lack of credibility – and also the fear that a weakening of the MPLA combined with a strong UNITA could open the door for a renewal of violent conflict. In any case, the outcome of the elections made it possible for the powerful figures around the presidency to constitute a one-party government, and to rule supreme.

The elections in themselves did not change the fundamental characteristics of the Angolan regime, but justified the expectation that it would encourage the reformist forces among and around the powerful elite to press for the continuation of the slow and carefully controlled transformation process already under way (which is illustrated by the fact that in the 2009 Economic Freedom Index, Angola ranked 162 out of 179 countries, improving its position slightly).

However, the approval of a new constitution in January 2010, strongly reinforcing the powers of the president, reflected the strength of the prevailing autocratic tendencies. On the one hand, the constitution contains a number of technical improvements over the constitution of 1992, but on the other explicitly or implicitly concentrates power in the presidency, abolishing in fact the division of power between governmental branches that is essential for democratic systems. The president’s April 2011 discourse at the meeting of the Central Committee of the MPLA, reacting harshly to protest demonstrations held in March – April (see below), seems to point in the same direction. All this represents a major setback in the democratic transformation process.

While Angola was still in the process of drawing political conclusions from the 2008 elections, it received a major blow in the economic domain. Certain that oil and other revenues would continue to be high for the indefinite future, and even increase, the state had not paid adequate attention to creating sound economic policies, in terms of establishing a macroeconomic equilibrium, balancing budgets, or controlling expenditures and debt. As a consequence, the international crisis of 2008 – 2009 triggered a shock in Angola, obliging the power holders to adopt, under IMF control, a set of measures combining austerity with structural reforms and increased transparency. Also, they adopted a number of social policies in health and education in response to increasing public pressure.

However, these measures did not change the basic features of the regime, which continues to be authoritarian and corrupt, and whose practice continues to favor marked social inequalities.

The BTI combines text analysis and numerical assessments. The score for each question is provided below its respective title. The scale ranges from 10 (best) to 1 (worst).

Transformation Status

I. Political Transformation

1 | Stateness

Question Score Monopoly on the use of force: 8

Although the MPLA government lacked a monopoly on the use of force over much of Angola’s territory during the years of civil war, it demonstrated an impressive ability to survive. After the 2002 peace agreements, it succeeded in a relatively short period of time in establishing control over the whole country for the first time. The circulation of small arms remains a problem, because it facilitates urban criminality, but a nationwide campaign for the voluntary handover of firearms to the police, under way since 2007, has significantly contributed to rising security and safety levels.

However, the state’s monopoly on the use of force remains challenged by forces seeking autonomy for the enclave of Cabinda. Although the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) has suffered from internal divisions and unstable strategy, aspiration for autonomy remains strong