Creativity: Research, Development, and Practice

By Mark A. Runco

Creativity: Research, Development, and Practice, Third Edition, summarizes the research on the development, expression, and enhancement of creativity. It draws from the full range of disciplines studying creativity, including psychology, business, education, economics, philosophy, neuroscience, and more. This volume includes exploration of research on the nature/nurture debate, what influences creativity, how creativity is related to personality, how social context may affect creativity, mental health, and its relation to creativity, gender differences, and how creativity is related to and differs from, invention, innovation, imagination, and adaptability.

The third edition has been thoroughly updated, with a new chapter on psychometrics and substantial updates on the biology and neuroscience of creativity, politics, and creative cognition. It includes quotations, graphics, boxed controversial issues, and biographical examples from unambiguously creative individuals.

• Summarizes research from the full range of perspectives on creativity
• Includes a new chapter on the psychometrics of creativity
• Distinguishes controlled cognition from associative and intuitive cognition
• Features substantial updates on the biology and neuroscience of creativity
• Explores creativity research relating to media, business and leadership
• Addresses the big issues, including cultural differences, traditional intelligence, computer and animal creativity, and more

• Language: English
• Publisher: Academic Press
• Release date: Mar 11, 2023
• ISBN: 9780081026182

Mark A. Runco

Mark Runco, Director of Creativity Research & Programming, Southern Oregon University, Ashland OR, USA Mark Runco earned his Ph.D. in cognitive psychology from the Claremont Graduate School in California and has studied creativity ever since. He is currently a Director of Creativity Research & Programming, Southern Oregon University, Ashland OR, USA He began his teaching career as an assistant professor of psychology at the University of Hawaii, Hilo. He then taught at Cal State Fullerton for 22 years. He was also an adjunct professor at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration for nearly 15 years and lectured regularly at Universidad de Cantabria in Spain and Shaanxi Normal University in Xi'an, China. He is a distinguished consulting faculty member at the Saybrook Graduate University in San Francisco and remains on the University of Georgia Graduate Faculty Mark developed nine seminars on creativity, including "Creativity: What It Is and What It Is Not," "The Assessment of Creativity," "Creative Cognition," and "Social Contexts for Creativity." He is Fellow and past president of Division 10 (Psychology, Art, Creativity, and Aesthetics) of the American Psychological Association. Mark also founded the Creativity Research Journal, which he still edits, along with two new journals: Business Creativity and the Creative Economy, and the Journal of Genius and Eminence. In 2010, Mark published the "rCAB" (Runco Creativity Assessment Battery), a comprehensive battery of tests for the assessment of creativity. He has published over 300 articles, chapters, and books on creativity, its measurement and enhancement. His textbook Creativity: Theories and Themes: Research, Development, and Practice has been translated into 10 languages. The 3rd edition will be published in 2020. He also was an Editor-in-Chief of the Encyclopedia of Creativity, which was published in 1999 and the second edition, which was published in 2011.

Book preview

Creativity

Research, Development, and Practice

Third Edition

Mark A. Runco

Southern Oregon University, Ashland, OR, United States

Table of Contents

Cover image

Title page

Copyright

Dedication

Preface

Chapter 1. Cognition and Creativity

Introduction

Analogical Thinking and Metaphor

Overinclusive Thinking

Restructuring and Insight

Experience, Expertise, Information, and Insight

Transformational Capacity

Problem Solving

Problem Finding

Stage Models

Intuition

Unconscious Processes and Creative Cognition

Mindfulness

Synaesthesia

Conclusions

Chapter 2. Personality and Motivation

Introduction

Classic Studies of Personality and Creativity

Longitudinal Studies

Personality of Artists

Autonomy, Independence, and Nonconformity

Self-control

Controlled Weirdness and Deviance

Psychoticism

Impulsivity and Adventurousness

Contrarianism

Childlike Tendencies, Playfulness, Daydreaming, and Paracosms

Perseverance and Persistence

Openness to Experience

Conscientiousness

Anxiety

Tolerance of Ambiguity

Sensitivity

Confidence

Self-promotion

Introversion

Competitiveness

Paradoxical Personalities and Antinomies

Self-actualization

Motivation

Values

Creative Personal Identity and Creative Personal Efficacy

Values, Risk Tolerance, and Psychological Androgyny

Conclusions

Chapter 3. The Psychometrics of Creativity

Introduction

Reliability and Validity

Validity and Reliability

Divergent Thinking Tests

Criterion Measures of Creativity

Creative Competencies

Likert Scales

Managerial Measures

Ratings by Parents and Teachers

Expert Raters

Product Assessment

Advertising

Entrepreneurship

Domain-Specific Measures

Conclusions

Chapter 4. Biological Perspectives on Creativity

Introduction

Hemispheric Asymmetry and the Split Brain

Handedness and Hemisphericity

Brain Waves and the Electroencephalogram

Prefrontal Cortex

Hierarchies Within the Brain

The Cerebellum and Creativity

The Emotional Brain

Manipulations of the Human Brain

The Brain of Albert Einstein

Altered States and Brain Function

Genetic Basis of Creative Potential

Intersections, Idiosyncrasies, and Internal Validity

Conclusions

Chapter 5. Health and Clinical Perspectives

Introduction

Affective Disorders

Affect and Mood

Suicide

Stress

Anxiety

Alcoholism and Drug Abuse

Primary and Secondary Process

Psychosis and Psychoticism

ADHD and Creativity

Dyslexia and Physical Impairments

Adaptability and Maladaptations

Self-actualization and the Courage to Create

Some Treatment Options

Conclusions

Chapter 6. Social, Attributional, and Organizational Perspectives

Introduction

Social Influences on Environments and Settings

Social Judgment

Concerns With Social and Attributional Perspectives

Bias in Social Judgment

Collaboration and Creativity

Competition and Creativity

Person–Environment Interactions

Professional Marginality

Organizational Climate

Leaders and Leadership

Organizational Attitude

Communitarianism and Creativity

Aggregate Creativity and Society at Large

Human Capital and the Creative Class

Conclusions

Chapter 7. Culture and Creativity

Introduction

Collectivism and Creativity

Culture, Socialization, and Values

Cross-Cultural Comparison Error

Stop Rules, Conventions, and Cultural Inhibition

Tolerance, Talent, and Technology

Empirical Comparisons of Cultures

Culture, Family, and Education

Cultural Traditions and Creativity

Cultural Influences on Organizations and Business

Cultural Products and Processes

Implicit Theories

Cultural Metaphors For Creativity

Conclusions

Chapter 8. History and Historiometry

Introduction

Historical Analyses

Prehistory

The Earliest Creativity?

Ancient History

Romanticism

Influences on History and Creativity

A Genius Ahead of His or Her Time?

Multiple Discoveries and Simultaneities

Serendipity

Tools and Creativity

Lamarckian Evolution and Change

Domain Differences and Domain-Specific Microgeister

Economic Changes Influencing Culture and History

Creativity in Portland, Oregon

War and Religion

Trigger Effects and Emergenesis

Matthew, Pygmalion, and Founder Effects

The Individual in History

Historiometry

Limitations and Disadvantages of the Historical Approach

Reputational Paths

Art History

Social Contexts Change Through History

Conclusions

Chapter 9. Creativity and Politics

Creative Political Products

Which Specific Political Factors Influence Creativity?

Individualism and Freedom

Political Events

Conservatism

Conclusions

Chapter 10. Developmental Trends and Influences on Creativity

Introduction

Trends and Stages of Development

Watching TV or Streaming at Home

Peer Status and Creativity

Adult Development

Conclusions

Chapter 11. Educational Perspectives

Introduction

The Ideal Student

Implicit Theories of Teachers

Teaching Experience

Classroom Environment and Setting

Teachers and Mentors

Ego Strength and Self-Efficacy

Creative Attitudes

Problem Finding and Education

Enhancing Imagery and Artistic Skills

Brainstorming

Information and Creativity

Explicit Instructions

Learning Theories

Goodbye Teacher

Generalization and Maintenance

Preparing Students for the Unforeseeable Future

Special Populations

Gifted Students

Conclusions

Chapter 12. Enhancement and the Fulfillment of Potential

Introduction

Tactical Creativity and Metacognition

Shift Perspectives

Turn the Situation Upside Down

Find or Apply an Analogy

Borrow, Adapt, or Steal Tactics

Consider the Natural World

Simplify

Experiment

Deviation Amplification

Persist

Travel

Question Assumptions

Redefine the Problem or Situation

Keep an Open Mind

Contrarianism

Don't Be a Damn Fool

Let It Happen

Avoidance Tactics

Flexible Use of Tactics

Dreaming and Imagery

Programs and Multiple Step Methods for Creative Thinking

Ideal

Odyssey of the Mind

Tactics for Organizations

Enhancement in the Classroom

Creativity and Education of Older Adults

Tactics Specifically for Discovery

Techniques for Invention

Triz

Analyses of Enhancement Efforts

Conclusions

Chapter 13. Creativity and Philosophy

Philosophy in Everyday Decision-Making

Subjectivity and Objectivity

Existentialism and the Creative Synthesis of Opposites

Transcendence

Philosophy of Science

Philosophy and Art

Pragmatism

Conclusions

Chapter 14. Conclusion: What Creativity Is and What It Is Not

Introduction

Creativity and Intelligence

Imagination

Originality

Innovation and Creativity

Invention Versus Creativity

Discovery and Creativity

Discovery of Chaos

Serendipity and Intentions

Creativity as Irrational or Rational

Pseudo-Creativity

Adaptability and Creativity

Art and Mating-Display and the Reproductive Benefits

Flexibility

Distribution of Creative Talents

Is Creativity Only for Humans?

Proactive Creativity

Conclusions

References

Index

Copyright

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Dedication

Psychologists often speak of individuals like me as part of the sandwich generation, so named because both our parents and our children are involved in our lives. Typically, the sandwich generation implies a stressful life. What is not recognized nearly enough is that individuals like me—with parents and children actively and regularly involved in our lives—are the luckiest people alive. I am enormously happy to be in the middle of the sandwich. This book is dedicated to sliced bread–or, less metaphorically, to my family.

Preface

Creativity is an important and fascinating topic of study, but difficult to define. This difficulty is due in part to its diverse expression; creativity plays a role in technical innovation, education, business, health, economics, design, the arts and sciences, and many other endeavors. Many eminent individuals are famous precisely because of their creativity. Most everyone else is creative in the everyday sense of coping, adapting, solving workaday problems, and changing perspectives to think in new ways. Although there is controversy about children, the view held in this textbook is that they too are creative. They may not produce things that change the world, but they are original and effectively expressive in their art, their dancing and singing, their imaginative play, and their questioning. It is even possible that children are more creative than adults, given their spontaneity and lack of inhibition. Unlike adults, children do not rely on past experience, assumption, and routine. This gives them a huge advantage. One of the questions addressed in the current volume concerns age differences and developmental trajectories.

A broader question concerns enhancement and the fulfillment of potentials. With its role in so many endeavors and its relationship to health and development, we have an obligation to do what we can to fulfill creative potentials. The first step is to carefully define creative potential. This volume reviews a number of studies that help in this regard. There is also a chapter devoted to enhancement methods and quite a bit of material about education, both formal and informal, which supports creativity.

There are numerous approaches to the study of creativity. Most of these offer something useful, at least if they use reliable methods. However, the creative process is multifaceted, often nonlinear, and not entirely rational. An eclectic approach is necessary. This textbook captures the eclectic approach to creativity. At least as important is the breadth: There are chapters devoted to creative cognition, social and organizational views, personality, development, health, and education, as well as chapters covering creativity in the context of history, politics, and philosophy. The last chapter examines what creativity is and what it is not. It explores how creativity is related to, but distinct from, other important human capacities and behaviors, including intelligence, invention, innovation, imagination, and adaptability.

Each of the major theoretical perspectives on creativity is examined in this volume. Some of them, such as evolutionary theory, are discussed in various chapters. Indeed, although each of the chapters has a focus (e.g., health), many topics are discussed in more than one chapter. Take the philosophy of creativity: A chapter was added to the 2nd edition to review philosophy as related to creativity, but philosophy is also relevant to creative potential, the value of creativity, decisions about including social context in a definition vs focusing instead on the individual, and much more. It is therefore discussed in several of the chapters.

A chapter devoted to philosophy and creativity may surprise some readers, given that creativity is a regular topic for the social and behavioral sciences, and philosophy is not a science. Philosophy is, however, very relevant to the scientific study of creativity! Indeed, there is a moderately sized field devoted to the philosophy of science. Just as you might say that all good science is creative, so too is all good philosophy creative. There is a kind of bidirectionality here, which is a concept that is used many times herein. Good science is creative, and the best approach to creativity is scientific. It works both ways.

Then there is politics, a topic which was also added to the 2nd edition. There it was quite brief and fairly abstract. Things have changed dramatically since the 2nd edition was released. For this reason the chapter on politics was expanded, and a number of new political issues and applications have been included in other chapters (e.g., History, Philosophy) as well. These are important additions to this volume, given what might be called the current Zeitgeist, in the United States and around the world. One political party in the United States, for example, has begun to ban books, refute factual history, attack teachers, and even deny science! Then there is the enormous amount of mis- and mal-information floating around. Some of these things stifle of creativity and innovation. The research on patents, summarized herein, offers empirical evidence of just that.

It is no exaggeration to state that democracy is under attack. The social sciences, including those concerned with creativity, can help to counter the attack. Consider, for example, the tendency of the minority party in the United States to create problems to distract voters. Note the key phrase, create problems. For years those studying creativity have recognized that problems can be created. Often problem creation offers clear benefits. It can help to identify concrete and operational problems within ambiguous situations rife with uncertainty. Indeed, research summarized herein implies that creative solutions may require creative problems. Einstein himself said that his breakthroughs depended more on problem formulation than problem-solving. Sadly, the minority party in the United States has repeatedly created false problems which give them something to criticize. Sometimes the problems identified are used as distraction so voters are less likely to think about real issues. Consider, for example, that until recently Critical Race Theory was only discussed in graduate courses and in an academic fashion, but the minority party recently claimed that it was a part of elementary education and was being used to indoctrinate young students. That is patently false, but it riled up parents. This is just one example of a false problem being used politically. It is also an example of malevolent creativity, another topic that receives quite a bit of attention in this edition of this textbook.

There is even politics in the psychometric chapter. That chapter is new to this 3rd edition and emphasizes the need for valid and reliable information. Validity and reliability are central to psychometrics and frequent considerations in the creativity research—and most of the sciences. They are also both antithetical to the fake news so often broadcast by the occupant of the White House 2016–2020 (and other authoritarians around the world). The psychometric chapter also discusses the benefits of quality control when considering new information, and this too applies to results from research or test scores but also to everyday life. Quality control is assured when the scientific method is used and when data are collected and the validity and reliability of those data are checked with psychometric procedures. This is the information that should be used when making any decision, be it in creative studies, or in education, business, or everyday life. Arguably, the area where qualify control is needed more than any other is politics. That is in part because, as detailed in Chapter 9, political decisions influence so many things (e.g., the economy, education, international affairs) and so many people. Yet here again the administration elected in 2016 preferred information that fit certain biases rather than that which has undergone quality control. That may sound like a partisan statement but it is easy to prove: Think of the coronavirus and the absurd claims that the President knew more than the scientists who had years of training and decades of relevant experience, or the President's suggestions, such as injecting bleach into the blood stream to cure coronavirus. The point here is that the new chapter on psychometrics presents ideas and concepts with wide ranging implications, even outside of research and other testing applications, and politics offers good examples of why these concepts and methods are needed. I for one avoided bleach injections and, at least as important, avoided MDs or quacks who suggested treatments that had not been supported by valid and reliable data.

Creative cognition continues to receive a great deal of attention. This 3rd edition therefore includes discussions of dual process, conceptual blending, recent extensions to associative theory, the default network, and cognitive hyperspace, just to name a few examples. The discussion of IQ and intelligence has been moved out of the chapter on cognition because it fits best in Chapter 3 (see Discriminant Validity). Intelligence is also mentioned in the concluding chapter as part of the discussion of What Creativity Is Not. Issues of technology as related to creativity have also been moved to the terminal chapter and make up part of the section, Is Creativity Uniquely Human? This section explores both computer and animal creativity. Material was also added to the discussion of bilingualism and creativity. The summary of the research on serendipity is now connected to the role of intentions in creative efforts, as is the material on decision making. The chapter devoted to the biology of creativity has of course been dramatically updated. The neuroscience of creativity may be growing faster than any other approach. A huge amount of new information is available in the neuroscientific research on creativity, and the methods have provided tests of concepts that previously could not be tested. Note that there are concerns. One significant concern reflects the fact that much of the neuroscientific research on creativity is conducted in laboratories, which means that while internal validity (control) is impressive, external validity (generalizability) is uncertain, to say the least.

Mostly new research was added to this volume, and there was also a bit of streamlining, but a few older theories and research findings are now cited. This is because there were gaps in the previous volume. A good example is that of Rothenberg (1987) on the creation of the self, now explored in the chapter on personality. Then there are new investigations of old topics, including the threshold theory. Several meta-analyses have been done on threshold theory. As a matter of fact, this volume summarizes well over a dozen meta-analyses related to creativity. Meta-analysis is such a robust methodology and quite a few topics (e.g., threshold theory, mood, problem finding, birth order, psychoticism, teachers' ratings, curiosity, enhancement) have benefitted.

Streamlining was accomplished with some reorganization. More precisely, more than once material previously presented in various chapters was brought into one location. Still, as implied just above, there are topics that come up in more than one chapter. Anxiety and flexibility, for example, are discussed in the chapter on health (Chapter 5) but also in the chapter on personality (Chapter 2). The writer in me wanted to discuss these two things in only one place, for terseness, but because this is a textbook, accuracy won out. Additionally, there is the advantage of displaced practice. That term describes how it is best for understanding if there is exposure to a new idea, and then time away, and then more exposure to the same idea. I know displaced practice works well, and there are data to support it, some suggesting that it is the best, most effective method for learning! Other examples of displacement in this volume include the concepts of domains and marginality.

This is primarily a textbook. It may, however, also be useful to researchers and practitioners, given the emphasis on scholarly, scientific, and objective research and the theories that are constructed from it. It is my hope that this volume will also capture at least some of the intrigue of the fascinating subject.

Mark A. Runco

Medford, OR, United States

Chapter 1: Cognition and Creativity

Abstract

This chapter discusses creative cognition. It draws from the plentiful research that uses cognitive theories. These focus on thinking skills and intellectual processes. That is a simple statement but the approaches to creative cognition are extremely varied. There are bridges between basic cognitive processes (e.g., memory, attention) and creative problem solving, as well as connections with intelligence, problem solving, language, and other capacities which tell us about individual differences. The basic processes are generally nomothetic, meaning that they represent universals. One oft-used model of creative cognition involves divergent thinking. It is used by an individual when he or she is faced with an open-ended task. In that light divergent thinking is a kind of problem solving. Divergent thinking is not synonymous with creative thinking, but it does tell something about the cognitive processes that may lead to original ideas and solutions. Other theories of creative cognition look to associative processes. Associative theories focus on how ideas are linked. Cognitive theories of creativity often focus specifically on the problem-solving process. A problem can be defined as a situation with a goal and an obstacle. Creative cognition is not only used for problem solving, however. It is often used for problem finding or even self-expression. The relationship of problem finding and problem solving is explored herein, as is the stage model of creative cognition.

Keywords

Associative theory; Incubation; Insight; Intuition; IQ; Metacognition; Mindfulness; Overinclusive thinking; Problem finding; Problem solving; Structure of intellect; Threshold theory

You can only perceive beauty with a serene mind.

Henry David Thoreau

Trouble with you is the trouble with me. Got two good eyes but still don't see.

Grateful Dead

Advance Organizer

• Universals

• Structure of Intellect and Associative Theory

• Dual Process

• Analogies/Metaphors

• Conceptual Structures

• Insight and Logic

• Expertise

• Problem Solving and Problem Finding

• Stage Theories of the Creative Process

• Intuition and the Unconscious

• Componential Models

• Cognitive Style

• Tactics and Metacognition

• Interpretive Processes

• Synesthesia

Introduction

Cognitive theories focus on thinking skills and intellectual processes. Cognitive theories are quite numerous; there may be more cognitive theories of creativity than any other kind of theory. This is because there is an intuitively obvious connection between cognition and creativity, and evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that intuition is a useful source of information! In addition, cognitive research is often very scientific. In other words, we can study the cognitive bases for creative problem solving, and we can often do so in reasonably valid and reliable ways, in a controlled laboratory setting or with reliable online and paper-and-pencil tests. Some approaches to creativity do not allow such experimentation and rigorous research. No doubt the prevalence of cognitive research on creativity also reflects the fact that virtually all human behavior has a cognitive basis. Creative behavior must also have a basis in cognition.

Theories of creative cognition are quite varied. This is in part because there are various cognitive processes (e.g., attention, perception, memory, information processing) but also a range of expressions of creative cognition (e.g., problem solving, metaphor, language).

The basic cognitive processes are generally nomothetic, meaning that they represent universals. These are things shared by all humans. Individual differences represent the dimensions along which people vary. There are both cognitive universals and individual differences in creative cognition.

This chapter presents an overview of the available theories of creative cognition. We begin with the structure of intellect theory because it was one of the first scientific theories to recognize creative cognition. Much of that theory has been replaced, but it is still useful as it describes ideational processes. We also explore the possibility that creativity can sometimes be a kind of problem solving. We will also review research on incubation, insight, and expertise. As suggested above, cognition is related to many kinds of creative behavior. This chapter summarizes what is known about each.

Universals

Research on universals is sometimes described as nomothetic, but care should be taken when using this term. The word nomothetic is used to describe the kinds of laws that are found in a legal system, not laws in the sense that science defines them. Laws in the sciences refer to general rules, so there is a parallel, but it is only a parallel. Strictly speaking, it may be best to discuss universals in creativity and avoid the term nomothetic.

Similar confusion arises with the complementary term idiographic. An ideograph is a symbol, but idiographic has been used to describe the scientific emphasis on individual differences. This makes sense if you think about the more common term, idiosyncratic. The confusion here, then, is simply spelling (idiographic vs. ideographic). It certainly is useful to distinguish universals from individual differences.

Structure of Intellect

J.P. Guilford is given quite a bit of credit for establishing the science of creativity. He was the president of the American Psychological Association and devoted his Presidential Address to creativity (Guilford, 1950). He argued that creativity can be studied objectively. At this time, few shared his belief about an objective science of creativity. For the next 4 decades, Guilford attempted to develop a science of creativity. For Guilford, creative cognition was just one aspect of cognition. His Structure of Intellect theory attempted to explain all of cognition.

Guilford (1968, 1986) eventually identified 180 different aspects of the intellect. His view was, in this sense, about as far away from that of IQ theories as you can get. IQ tests typically assume that there is one general intelligence (or g) that underlies every intelligent act. Admittedly, Guilford's Structure of Intellect model was flawed. Critics disliked the statistical methods used to separate the 180 cells (Carroll, 1968). Yet even if Guilford's methods were questionable, his conception of divergent and convergent thinking has proven to be quite useful. Indeed, much of his thinking on creativity was, and remains, remarkably influential (see Runco, 1999d). The Creativity Research Journal devoted an entire issue to Guilford's work, 50years after the famous Presidential Address (Plucker, 2001).

Divergent thinking is employed when an individual is faced with an open-ended task (examples are given in Chapter 3). From this perspective, divergent thinking is a kind of problem solving. Unlike convergent thinking, where the individual gives the one correct or conventional response (e.g., Who won the 1988 World Series?), divergent thinking allows numerous and varied responses. When used as a test, individual differences may be found in fluency (the number of ideas), originality (the number of unusual or unique ideas), and flexibility (the number of different categories implied by the ideas) (Acar & Runco, 2019).

Khandwalla (1993) presented an interesting view of divergent thinking. He used protocol analysis. This asks participants to think aloud while working on a divergent thinking task (i.e., list objects that are green, liquid, and funny). The participants are encouraged to express whatever comes to mind. Khandwalla was able to identify a number of distinct problem-solving categories and micromechanisms in the analysis of the 10 most detailed protocols. Very telling were the transitions, from one solution or idea to another. Five general solution categories were identified: ideation, problem structuring, search, feeling, and evaluating. Each had subcategories. Further analysis indicated that ideation was used most frequently (37.1% of the think-aloud reports). Next was evaluating (21.3%), search (15.9%), problem structuring (14.4%), and feeling (11.2%). Ideation was negatively correlated with feeling (r = −.67), structuring (−.49), and search (−.31) but positively associated with evaluations (0.24). Research at about the same time reported that divergent thinking is indeed moderately correlated with the skill at evaluating ideas (Runco, 1989a; Runco & Vega, 1991; Runco & Smith, 1992).

Guilford's work and the theory of divergent thinking are all about the ideational contributions to creative cognition. Subsequent sections of this chapter review other contributions.

Divergent Thinking Before Guilford's Structure of Intellect

J.P. Guilford is usually given credit for distinguishing between convergent and divergent thinking, but a few earlier scientists did recognize the value of ideation. Alfred Binet, for example, who developed the immediate precursor to IQ around 1900 included an open-ended similarities task not unlike those found on modern-day divergent thinking tests (Binet & Simon, 1905). Here are sample items from Binet and Simon's (1905) first test of intelligence.

1. Unwrapping candy

2. Follow simple directions

3. Name objects

4. Name objects in pictures

5. Compare two weights

6. Compare two lines

7. Vocabulary

8. Repetition of sentences

9. Repetition of digits

10. Identify differences (e.g., fly and butterfly)

11. Identify similarities (e.g., blood and a poppy)

12. Order weights

13. Complete sentences

14. Cut paper

15. Define abstract terms

16. Visual tracking (i.e., follow moving object with head and eyes)

17. Tactile prehension (i.e., pick up particular object)

18. Distinguish edible and inedible objects

Adapted from Willerman (1979), pp. 85–86.

A Convergence–Divergence Continuum

The distinction between divergent and convergent thinking implies a dichotomy. Very likely, divergent thinking and convergent thinking are actually two ends of a continuum (Eysenck, 2003). This may make the most sense, given we know about individual differences (they tend to fall along continua), and it is apparent when various divergent thinking questions are examined. Some are clearly more open-ended than others. Along the same lines, it is probably most accurate to think about problem solving as involving both divergent and convergent thinking. In the natural environment, it is unusual to find a problem that relies completely on one or the other. Most often, both divergent and convergent thinking are useful.

Divergent thinking is not synonymous with creative thinking, but it does tell us something about the cognitive processes that sometimes lead to original ideas and solutions. No wonder divergent thinking tests are the most commonly used estimates of the potential for creative thought. They have a solid theoretical base, in both the Structure of Intellect model and in Associative Theory (outlined next); they have reasonable reliability and validity (see Chapter 2); and there is a vast literature available to assist interpretations. Divergent thinking tests can be used as exercises, as well as tests, in training studies and programs, in classrooms and in organizations (Runco & Basadur, 1993). Chapter 11 presents a large number of exercises and tactics for original and flexible ideation.

The theory of divergent thinking was not just supported by the Structure of the Intellect. It was also supported by research on associative processes.

Associative Theory

Associative theories focus on how ideas are generated and how one idea leads to the next. If you look back on the history of psychology, you will see that the interest in associative processes can be traced back hundreds of years, to John Locke, Alexander Bain, David Hume, and others (Marx & Hillix, 1987; Roth & Sontag, 1988). These theorists typically are described as philosophers, and certainly, they were not experimental scientists. They occasionally offered hypotheses but were unable to test them in a modern scientific sense. It was Mednick (1962) who brought the associative view into modern psychology. He proposed the associative theory of the creative process and offered several empirical tests of the theory. Perhaps most important was his finding that original ideas tend to be remote. The first things we think of when faced with a problem are typically not very original. Instead, original ideas are usually found only after we deplete the more obvious ideas. This was confirmed by Runco (1986e) and Milgram and Rabkin (1980) and much later labeled the serial order effect.

A very simple experimental technique for examining remote associates and ideational patterns—one you may choose to try—involves counting responses to an open-ended task (e.g., a divergent thinking test question, such as list as many square things as you can), and finding the half-way point. If 20 answers are given, two sets of 10 ideas can be compared in terms of the number of original ideas. Results from several independent projects using this technique suggest that original ideas tend to come later in a set of responses. Some research has found that ideas are no more flexible and varied in the second half compared to the first (Mednick, 1962; Milgram & Rabkin, 1980; Runco, 1985), but other research has reported flexibility effects (Wu et al., 2021).

This line of research confirms that ideas can be counted in a reliable and objective fashion, and ideas can be used as an indication of how people generate solutions to solve problems. The notion that original ideas come late in the associative chain implies that we should take our time when faced with a problem, to ensure that we get to those remote ideas.

Mednick (1962) proposed that creative individuals are better at finding remote ideas. His device for the assessment of creative thinking was the Remote Associates Test (RAT). The RAT contains analogies with three given elements and one blank (e.g., River:Blood:Note:). Empirical investigations of the RAT indicate that it lacks discriminant validity, with scores that often are moderately correlated with scores from tests of convergent thinking or verbal ability. Still, Mednick's theory of remote associates is laudable in its offering testable predictions about creative cognition. An example is Mednick's notion that the greater the number of instances in which an individual has solved problems with given materials in a certain manner, the less the likelihood of his attaining a creative solution using these materials (p. 223). Later in this chapter, the potential inhibitive impact of experience and expertise will be explored (also see Runco et al., 2006).

The RAT presents questions verbally, and the examinee responds verbally. As such, it is open to a verbal bias. This implies that the resulting scores may be significantly influenced by verbal ability, which is not the skill targeted by the test (e.g., creativity). Behaviorally, this means that all individuals with moderate or high verbal abilities will do well on the RAT, and all individuals with low verbal abilities will do poorly on the RAT, even though the RAT was designed to test associative and creative potential and not verbal ability. Several investigations have empirically determined how the RAT can provide useful information about creative potential (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Martindale, 2007). The Compound Remote Associates test may avoid the biases of the original RAT. Marsh et al. (2021) reported research using the compound RAT and identified specific cognitive underpinnings (i.e., subvocalization and semantic activation) of associative thinking.

Dual Process Creativity: Spontaneous and Deliberate

Associative theory may represent one of several processes contributing to creative cognition. Other processes have been described in various dual-process theories. As Allen and Thomas (2020) described it, dual-process theory is really about general cognition, but it says much specifically about creative cognition. It is called dual process because it posits two types of thinking. Type 1 is fast and seemingly automatic, while Type 2 is deliberate and relatively slow. Associative thinking is usually categorized as Type 1. As you might expect, given that creative thinking is not a unitary thing, at times both Type 1 and Type 2 thinking may be involved. Exactly how they interact is up for debate. According to Allen and Thomas (2020, p. 396)

A default-interventionist model would suggest that Type 1 thinking occurs first, and then may be revised by Type 2, which is more deliberative and therefore slower. In contrast, a parallel-competitive model of Type 1 and Type 2 processing would suggest they are occurring at the same time (Evans, 2007). Although a parallel-competitive model may not apply over a brief timeframe, it is likely that over the course of a longer creative endeavor, Type 1 and Type 2 thinking will occur to differing degrees, and so a parallel model may be applicable over a longer timeframe.

Allen and Thomas (2020) favored the labels Type 1 and Type 2 over System 1 and System 2 because the latter suggest some structural or neuroanatomical basis that they felt was lacking. Others have proposed neuroanatomical bases for dual processes, but care must be taken because there is some disagreement about what processes are involved. Dietrich (2004), for example, felt that deliberate processes reflect an active dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) but an inactive ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). What he called spontaneous processes, on the other hand, sometimes involve spreading activation and may involve temporal occipital parietal (TOP) regions more than DLPFC regions. Dietrich (2004) based this view on anecdotal as well as experimental findings. He cited the work on defocused attention (Eysenck, 1995; Martindale, 1999), as well as anecdotes such as Kekulé's. (The Benzene ring ostensibly came to Kekulé in a dream about snakes.) Deliberate processes are methodical and, for Dietrich, consistent with Edison's reports of trial and error and Watson and Crick's work on the double helix of DNA. Kounios and Beeman (2014) also recognized deliberate processes, but they contrast these with processes involved in insight, namely, semantic coding and the internally focused attention of the right hemisphere. They supported this view of dual process with evidence from resting-state brain activity.

Another theory that posits dual processes involves the default network and the executive control network. As Beaty et al. (2016) described them, activity in the default network is associated with spontaneous and self-generated thought, including mind-wandering, mental simulation, social cognition, autobiographical retrieval, and episodic future thinking, while activity in the control network is associated with cognitive processes that require externally directed attention, including working memory, relational integration, and task set switching" (p. 2). Beaty et al. (2016) suggested that the default network contributes to the generation of candidate ideas in light of its role in self-generated cognition, whereas the control network often evaluates the efficacy of candidate ideas and modifies them to meet the constraints of task-specific goals (p. 2). Yoruk and Runco (2012) reviewed research on the default mode specifically as related to divergent thinking.

An investigation by Marron et al. (2018) suggested how associative processes, the default and executive networks, and spontaneous versus deliberate thought related to one another. Marron et al. started by recognizing the complex nature of creativity and the resulting difficulty in parsing the contributing processes. They wrote:

We found that: (1) the Default Mode Network (DMN), a network involved in self-generated and internally-directed thought, was more involved in chain FA [free association] than in other tasks expected to reflect more controlled forms of internally-directed thought, suggesting that the DMN involvement might be related to the unconstrained spontaneous nature of chain FA…; (2) higher scores on different behavioral measures from FA chains were related to higher activation of the DMN and to reduced activation of… a major node in the executive function network; (3) behavioral measures from FA chains were correlated with different aspects of creative performance but not with intelligence.

There are, then, different ways of labeling the processes involved in creative cognition, but it is clear that there is more than one process. This conclusion fits well with the recent findings from the neurosciences (i.e., that creativity depends on a network rather than just one structure of the brain). Important processes may be deliberate and mindful as well as spontaneous and associative, the latter being the default mode of the brain. More will be said about the brain and creativity in Chapter 4.

Analogical Thinking and Metaphor

Not everyone agrees that original ideas are found via associative processes. Some theories emphasize analogies and analogical thinking instead (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Harrington, 1981; Hofstadter, 1985; Mumford, 2020). There are many examples of analogies being used for discovery (e.g., Velcro and weeds, steam engines, and tea kettles), but not all of these are based on fact. Many of these—including the oft-cited case of Kekulé's discovering the structure of the benzene model, Archimedes, or even the planetary parallel of atoms (Finke, 1995; Gruber, 1988; Welling, 2007)—are based on the inferences of a biographer or the ex post facto introspection of the creator or discoverer himself or herself. In either case, there are potential problems of memory, honesty, subjectivity, self-promotion, and bias (Boxes 1.1 and 1.2).

Box 1.1

METAPHORICAL THINKING AND CREATIVITY

Gibbs (1999) suggested that people use approximately four frozen metaphors and two novel metaphors in every minute of discourse. Frozen metaphors are not novel. Novel metaphors require some creative thinking. The interesting thing is that when metaphors are used, something is gained (understanding, insight), but there is a cost as well. Information and detail about the original material are always lost (Runco, 1991a). No doubt, the benefits to communication and insight usually outweigh the loss.

Box 1.2

ANALOGIES AND ANALOGICAL THINKING

Many creative insights seem to have benefitted from analogical thinking. Here are some examples described in the creativity literature:

• Cotton gin (Eli Whitney saw a cat trying to catch a chicken through a fence)

• Telegraph (Samuel Morse ostensibly put stations in the telegraph after thinking about stagecoaches changing their horses periodically)

• Benzene ring (a snake biting its own tail)

• Oil pump (brine pump)

• Steam engine (Figure 1.1) (tea kettle)

• Underwater tunnels (worm tunnels)

• Velcro (burs or weeds)

• Heart as a pump

• Motion of electron like planets around sun (Niels Bohr)

Note: Analogical thinking was not necessarily involved in the ideas and inventions listed above. It is often cited in introspective reports, but these are suspect, given their subjectivity. In some instances, the analogical thinking is simply inferred, but again, it may very well be apocryphal.

Figure 1.1  The steam engine was apparently conceived by Watt using analogical thinking. It is analogous to the tea kettle. Source: Wikimedia Commons. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Watt_steam_pumping_engine.JPG

Analogical thinking is often used in arguments about authentic originality. Simplifying, if seemingly new ideas are actually just analogies of what already existed, are they truly original? Consider in this regard Bryson's (2013) description of the analogical thinking of Henry Ford. Ford is well known for cars but is typically viewed as creative in that he developed the assembly line method, which is what allowed automobiles to be made at a cost that would in turn so many people to purchase them. But this was not much of a breakthrough as it may appear because Ford was really just modifying an existing idea. As Bryson (2013, p. 235) put it,

one thing above all accounted for Ford's competitive edge: the moving assembly line. The process was perfected bit by bit between 1906 and 1914, not so much as a progressive systematic plan, but more as a series of desperate expedients to try to keep up with demand. The basic idea of an assembly line- or ‘progressive assembling,’ as it was first known-came from the movement of animal carcasses through the slaughterhouses of Chicago, which, as has often been noted, was actually kind of ‘disassembly line.’ Other companies used assembly line techniques—it was how Westinghouse made air brakes—but no other manufacturer embraced the system as comprehensively and obsessively as Ford. Workers in ford plants were not permitted to talk, hum, whistle, sit, lean, pause for reflection, or otherwise behave in a non-robotic fashion while working. Everything was arranged for the benefit of the production line. Henry Ford was always happy to take credit for the invention of the assembly line process, but it seems he may have been generous to himself.

The assembly line was impressively effective. Again quoting Bryson, thanks to the slickness of operations, the time it took to produce a Ford car fell from 12h in 1908 (which was already good going) to just one and a half hours after 1913, when the company's Highland Park factory opened. At the peak of production, a new car, truck, or tractor rolled off a Ford assembly line somewhere in America every 10s. By 1913, the company had sales of nearly 100million and profits of 27million. With the greater efficiencies, car prices fell too-from $850 in 1908, to $500 in 1913, and down to $390 in 1914, before settling at an almost preposterously reasonable $260 by 1927. (p. 235)

Are ideas found by analogy truly original? The issue is complicated by the fact that often the origin of the idea may be forgotten or intentionally ignored. Both Freud and Helen Keller discussed the difficulty of remembering where ideas came from.

There is a moderately large literature to help answer the questions about analogies. Weisberg (1995a) identified a number of creative ideas and solutions where information from a previous situation is transferred to the new situation that is analogous to the old (p. 62). Picasso seems to have drawn heavily from previous work, some of which was his own, and some the work of other painters (Miller, 1996b; Weisberg, 1995a, 1995b). Weisberg (1995b) suggested that most insights resulted from either a change in how the initial problem was interpreted or from the use of an unconventional approach or representation of the problem.

Welling (2007) defined analogical thinking such that it implies the transposition of a conceptual structure from one habitual context to another innovative context. The abstract relationship between the elements of one situation is similar to those found in the innovative context.

Dunbar (1995) focused on scientific analogies. He identified three different kinds:

• Local analogies (one part of one experiment is related to a second experiment).

• Regional analogies (involving systems of relationships, which are applied in one domain and later used in a similar domain).

• Long-distance analogies (a system is found in one domain but applied in a dissimilar domain). Long-distance analogies might explain the benefits of what has also been called marginality. Freud, Darwin, and Piaget were each professionally marginal in the sense of being outside the mainstream. Marginality is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.

A bit later Dunbar (1997) offered evidence that, among research scientists, analogical ability is one of the more accurate predictors of creativity.

Welling (2007) compared analogical, associative, and combinatorial thinking with abstraction. In doing so, he pointed out that analogies are unique in that no new cognitive structure is required (Welling, 2007). Some insights are dramatic shifts and can be explained in terms of cognitive restructuring. A person's thinking actually changes, and changes quickly, which is why insights may appear to be sudden. We will come back to this point later.

Welling (2007) also distinguished analogical thinking from combinatorial processes. In his words,

combination is the merging of two or more concepts into one new idea. It differs from analogy in the sense that this operation requires the creation of a new conceptual structure. Concepts can be combined either spatially—concepts are applied simultaneously—or temporally in which the combination results from the sequential applications of existing ideas.

Welling cited Campbell's (1960) blind variation and selective retention model, Mednick's (1962) associative theory, Finke et al.'s (1992) geneplore theory, and Koestler's (1964) bisociation process as examples of combinatorial creative processes. Scott et al. (2005) reported a series of empirical studies on creative combinatorial processes. Simonton (2021) described scientific discovery and invention as combinatorial processes.

Welling (2007) distinguished analogical thinking from abstraction. He defined abstraction as

the discovery of any structure, regularity, pattern or organization that is present in a number of different perceptions that can be either physical or mental in nature. From this detection results … a conceptual entity, which defines the relationship between the elements it refers to on a lower, more concrete, level of abstraction.

This is not merely the identification of patterns. It is instead the creation of new concepts, new classes, and new information. Welling gave Einstein's ideas of a continuity of space and time as an example of an abstraction. It represents a higher level of abstraction than had existed previously. Abstraction no doubt also operates in the arts. Consider the work of Andy Warhol or Roy Lichtenstein, for example, each of whom stood back, so to speak, and asked the viewer to question What is art? Is it a tomato soup can, or as simple as a cartoon figure?

There are several issues. First is Welling's (2007) conclusion that so-called high creativity is more readily associated with combination and abstraction operations, while everyday creativity is derived primarily from application and analogy operations. Clearly this is a simplification, but Welling admitted that some contradictory findings can be explained by the fact that high level creativity is often not the result of a single operation but results from a long period in which several operations are put to use during the discovery process. The second issue reflects the possibility that none of the [cognitive] operations generate entirely new knowledge because the result is always dependent on, or constructed with, previous knowledge. It may be tempting to assume that the ideas that result from abstraction are also the ones that are most impressive or revolutionary, but this is not the case. This of course takes us back to the question about analogical thinking and true originality. Is something truly original if it is similar to what came before it? This is an important question. We return to it in the Chapter 13 as well as in the last chapter of this book.

Conceptual Structures and Creative Cognition

Recall here Welling's (2007) tying the process of abstraction with concepts. This is interesting because it ties process with structure. Concepts represent one kind of cognitive structure, a cognitive structure being a collection of meaning. As we experience things, we organize our thinking. We make thinking easier by collecting information that is in some way related so it is all in one spot—in one concept. To think creatively, we must sometimes restructure those concepts instead of relying on existing concepts. In fact, various theories of creative cognition have described creative thinking as conceptual blending, cognitive restructuring, leaky concepts, and loose conceptual boundaries (Martindale, 1990; Turner & Fauconnier, 1999; Zabelina, Leary et al., 2015; Zabelina, Saporta et al., 2015). Apparently abstraction may lead to certain kinds of conceptual creativity. As Vartarian (2019) put it, one of the defining features of creativity is the ability to manipulate concepts flexibly…. Because metaphors can serve as vehicles for contemplating concepts at higher levels of abstraction, they make category membership more flexible. This explains why historically metaphors have been viewed as important in creativity.

This may all sounds a bit abstract, but that is because conceptual processes must be inferred. It is not like we can do an X-ray and see them. It might help to think about it in the context of divergent thinking. What if someone was asked to name all of the square things you can think of? In that case, square things is the concept. A person might answer the question about square things with baseball diamond, dice, window, books. Admittedly, these are not literally squares, but they do have four sides. The capacity to take some liberties is often a good thing and allows for originality. Such liberties—or creative license—are only problematic if taken too far or when convergent thinking is all-important. But what about the person who answers meal, root, my Dad's music? Those ideas are even further outside of the typical square concept. They are good answers, if you think about square meals, square roots, and music that is not hip, not modern—it is square. This example should demonstrate that a person can find highly original answers if there are loose conceptual boundaries (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2  Would you have thought of square root if asked to think of things that are square? How about square meal? These are not common answers probably because they require some creative license or, more operationally, loose conceptual boundaries. Image from the public domain. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3e/Nuvola_apps_edu_mathematics _blue-p.svg/640px-Nuvola_apps_edu_mathematics_blue-p.svg.png.

Overinclusive Thinking

Some of the things that contribute to creativity can be taken too far, in which case, they create problems. Indeed, the idea of optima applies very generally to creativity (Runco & Sakamoto, 1996). The principle of optima applies clearly to concepts and conceptualization. This is easy to see when concepts are explained in terms of categorization (Box 1.3). One way we structure our thinking and make our lives easier is to classify people, objects, and experiences into categories and other cognitive structures (Piaget, 1976). Usually, this dramatically improves the efficiency of our thinking. It can be taken too far, however. If we completely rely on categories, we might err by assuming that each member of a category is identical. This can be seen when we stereotype people or groups and assume that everyone in one group is the same (All lawyers are…). We might also err in the manner that Langer (1989) described, in which case, we rely too much on categories from our past experiences and do not notice the novelty and significance of new experiences.

Box 1.3

CATEGORICAL AND HIERARCHICAL THINKING

Did you ever wonder how a letter finds its way to its addressee (the recipient)? The answer is probably obvious to you because you have no doubt addressed many a letter. (I know I have written every creditor in the known universe. They often confuse me with my evil twin.) The postal delivery method was, however, not so obvious when the United States was just getting started. The inventor was none other than Ben Franklin. One interesting thing about the postal delivery method is that it is a method. It is not a thing, a product, but is instead a means or procedure. We often do not think of methods as inventions, but they certainly are as creative as products. Consider Henry Ford's assembly line (and the later methodological changes, mostly in Asia, to make the auto industry more efficient and cost-effective), Thomas Edison's invention factory, or McDonald's fast food methods (Bryson, 1994).

The other notable thing about the postal delivery method is that it relies on classification and hierarchical thinking. A letter is delivered by first identifying the country, then the state, then the city, and then the street and house number. (Zip codes expedite this process further, but if you just used a zip code, your letter would not be delivered. It is not specific enough.) Categories, sometimes called concepts or classifications, develop as we acquire knowledge. They represent one way that knowledge is structured: the individual puts similar things in one category (cats and dogs are in the animal category) and infers and constructs hierarchies based on super- and subclassifications. Categories make our thinking much more efficient, for we can often judge something based on the general category. (To answer the question, Do you like Siamese cats? you do not even need to know anything specific about that breed, if you are allergic to all cats. Siamese cats represent one subclass in the class Cats, which of course is a subclass of Mammals, Animals, and so on.) As a matter of fact, the taxonomic system (kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species) represents another very useful hierarchy.

The up-side of categorical thinking is that our thinking is more efficient, and the down-side is that our thinking is sometimes too efficient. It is too efficient when we do not notice details in a mindful manner. This can create problems for creative thinking; it is really just another way of saying that when we rely on categories we are making assumptions. Making assumptions, not looking at details, and mindless inattention each get in the way of original ideation and problem solving. In terms of the cognitive bases of creative thinking, the important points are that (a) our thinking is often structured and often organized in a hierarchical fashion; (b) creative thinking sometimes results when we ignore the conceptual boundaries that define categories; and (c) thinking that completely ignores those same boundaries is overinclusive and sometimes related to psychosis (Eysenck, 1997a).

Yet another theory of cognition suggests that sometimes categorization errors actually contribute to creative insights. I am referring to Eysenck's (1997a, 2003) theory of overinclusive thinking. Eysenck claimed that overinclusive thinking supplies the variations and options from which the individual may select useful and creative ideas. A great deal of attention indeed has been given to the production of variations and options (Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 2007), and no doubt using loose conceptual boundaries and including things in categories that others may not include could expand one's range of options. There is also a modicum of experimental research that suggests that creative insights sometimes result from a loosening of conceptual boundaries (Martindale, 1990).

Restructuring and Insight

Thinking is structured into concepts and categorizations. Creative thinking sometimes involves restructuring (Ohlsson, 1984a, 1984b). This may involve reorganizing information within a concept or reorganizing how concepts are structured in a hierarchy. Restructuring may also occur when the individual initially does not understand something because he or she is relying on one cognitive representation of the problem, but then the individual changes that representation—restructures it—such that it takes new information into account or in some way allows a better understanding. This is one explanation for insight. Chuderski and Jastrzebski (2018, p. 428) described insight in terms of problems that supposedly can only be solved by rejection of an initial faulty problem representation and sudden comprehension of another, nonobvious representation (restructuring).

Suppose you build a model of something out of Tinkertoys. Your model may be a 3D map of some kind, or it may in fact represent some object. Suppose, further, that you discover something new about the place you have mapped or the thing you have represented. You might remove a few Tinkertoy pieces and add a few. You do not need to start from scratch, however, and in fact, the restructuring may be fairly quick. Quick but dramatic changes are possible: Perhaps you built a model of a tall building, but then decide it needs to be even taller. You add long legs to the structure. That may require very little work, but the result is dramatically different. The building may double in height. Restructuring is a bit like changing your model, and sometimes fairly quick changes offer a dramatically different solution (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3  Thinking is structured much like buildings are structured. Structure is of course an analogy but fits well with theory and data. There are various kinds of structures, including concepts, scripts, and stereotypes. Photo by Jacek Dylag. https://unsplash.com/photos/yTia72jRItI

The idea of restructuring has a long history (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Kohler, 1925; Wertheimer, 1982 [1945]). The concept is often tied to gestalt theory. The gestalt term for it is Umstrukurierung. A gestalt is essentially the result; it is a meaningful whole, as in a whole and complete understanding. Gestalt psychology has been used to describe the perceptual process, the key idea being that humans have a tendency to make sense of our experience and can often construct meaning from partial information. We may perceive a few stars, for instance, but impose meaning such that we see a bear, a Greek god, or a dipper (big or little!). Our perceptual system completes the gestalt. More clinically oriented gestalt psychologists (Perls, 1978) felt that humans have a need for meaning and are unhappy without it. We can, however, impose meaning on our lives—even when there is little information to support it! A clinician will often help a client or patient find meaning and thereby happiness. This might even require an insight in the same sense that concept is used in the problem solving and creativity literature. The client's new understanding may be obtained quickly but with dramatic results.

An alternative explanation uses information processing theory and the idea of linear search (Newell & Simon, 1972; Ohlsson, 1984a; Weisberg & Alba, 1981). As Ohlsson (p. 65) described this perspective, to solve a problem is to proceed step-wise through the space of alternatives, until an action sequence is found which leads from the problem to the solution. Weisberg and Alba (1981) tested subjects with three insight problems—including the famous nine-dot problem (see Figure 1.7)—and concluded that the spontaneous reorganization [restructuring or insight] of experience does not occur during problem solving (p. 326). They rejected the ideas of insight, restructuring, and fixation.

Ohlsson (1984a, 1984b) suggested that the gestalt and the information-processing perspectives are compatible with one another. She acknowledged that the gestalt view is not as testable as it should be, for good science, and that it does not really help us to understand individual differences—or as she put it, good and bad thinking (Ohlsson, 1984a, p. 72). Individual differences may be explained in terms of previous experience (Epstein, 1990).

Schilling (2005) offered a small network explanation for insight. Here, insight is defined as:

a substantive shift or augmentation of a representation due to the addition or changing of either nodes (elements of information, or sets of information) or links (connections or relationships between nodes of information); … such a shift may often be the result of forging connections along a path that the individual perceives as atypical; and … the perceived significance or magnitude of the shift may be a function of both the unexpectedness of the connection, and the magnitude of change it creates in the network of representations.

Schilling relied on small network theory, which had been around since the 1950s but really came of age in the 1970s (cf. Watts & Strogatz, 1998).

Insights seem to be quick and spontaneous. That is one reason the lightbulb often is used to characterize an a-ha moment: It illuminates quickly, seemingly all at once. Yet the evidence suggests that insights may actually be protracted (Gruber, 1981b, 1988; Wallace, 1991). They are not instantaneous