Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIA

By Nigel Askey

Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation includes full analyses of the Axis and Soviet armed-forces organisation, weapons, equipment, personnel, transport, logistics, war-production, mobilisation and replacements during 1941. Uniquely, the work employs a sophisticated military s

• Language: English
• Publisher: Nigel Askey
• Release date: Feb 7, 2018
• ISBN: 9780648221937

Book preview

Introduction

On 22nd June 1941 the Wehrmacht launched the largest invasion in recorded history, under the code name Operation Barbarossa. Operation Barbarossa needs no introduction to students of the Second World War, as it is unrivalled in military history for size, speed of operations, and the magnitude of its geographic objectives. The Wehrmacht’s objective was no less than the complete defeat of the USSR, a nation possessing by far the largest army and air force in the world at that time. This study focuses on the period from 22nd June to 31st December 1941: the period when the Soviet Union came closest to defeat, and arguably the only period when Germany could still win WWII outright. Since the end of WWII, debate has raged about the key operational and strategic decisions made by the German and Soviet high commands, especially during the critical period from July to September 1941.

Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation is essentially the history of the Axis invasion of the USSR during 1941, expressed in the form of a detailed statistical analysis and an accompanying military simulation methodology. The objective of this work is to create the most historically accurate, advanced and comprehensive quantitative model yet, of the first six months of the largest and costliest military campaign in history (encompassing Operation Barbarossa and Operation Typhoon). The work includes full analyses of the belligerents’ military, economic and logistical structure and capabilities, as related to their war effort on the East Front during 1941. This includes extensive data on: the structure of the relevant military and security organisations (land, sea and air), the available equipment and personnel, analyses of the weapons used, transport, logistics, economic production of war materials, mobilisation, and the replacements available and used during the campaign.

In addition, this enormous amount of historical data is organised and presented in such a way as to be ‘ready’ for incorporation into a comprehensive computer based military simulation of Operation Barbarossa. The work therefore includes an analytical and quantitative based methodology for creating a mathematical model of a country’s armed forces and its overall war effort. This is the bulk of the content of Volume I. The methodologies defined in this work are designed to be generic, in that they can be employed to create a military simulation of a campaign other than Operation Barbarossa. One of the distinguishing features of this work is that it formalises and documents a military simulation methodology extending from the tactical to the strategic level. This includes a formal methodology to calculate and assess an armed force’s Relative Overall Combat Proficiency (ROCP), detailed in Volume V and applied to the forces involved on the East Front during 1941.

However, the user is not obliged to follow or even understand the details of the quantitative methodology used if they so choose. Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation is structured so that the user does not need to be familiar with military simulation technology or terminology: the historical data is presented and referenced for the user to conduct their own research or analyses, or extract specific historical data regarding the campaign. The analytical methodology employed is mostly transparent to the user in subsequent volumes (see below), and they may not even be aware that it is being employed. Nevertheless, the analytical discipline enforced by the methodology is present at each stage, and all the belligerent nations and their armed forces undergo the equivalent detailed scrutiny.

The work spans the disciplines of military history, operational research, applied physics and mathematics, statistical analysis, and analytical methodology (usually relating to modern military simulations or war gaming). Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation does not assume the reader has detailed knowledge of the history of the East Front in WWII or extensive knowledge of the disciplines mentioned.

The key rationales behind this work are:

To bring together an immense amount of information from many disparate sources, and present it in the form of a large ‘data-warehouse’ in a single work. The professional researcher or amateur scholar of WWII is provided with a comprehensive data source, containing the details of all the armed forces involved on the East Front from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. Currently there is no single source detailing the actual land, air and naval forces involved in Operation Barbarossa and Operation Typhoon.

To fully analyse the belligerents’ economic and logistical capabilities, as related to the East Front in 1941 and in the strategic context of their overall war effort.

To bring in-depth quantitative analyses to bear on the most probable outcomes resulting from different (historical) operational and strategic decisions, by the German and Soviet high commands during 1941. It presents the advanced student of this campaign with a mechanism to quantitatively analyse in-depth, the actual forces involved, and much more significantly, to examine the probable outcome of various ‘what if’ scenarios. In so doing, many of the historically accepted myths surrounding Operation Barbarossa are exposed, while other less appreciated historical factors are shown to have been far more significant than commonly perceived.

To provide the user with a generic methodology for researching, cataloguing and building the elements needed to create a realistic simulation of a historical military event.

To demonstrate the application of quantitative analysis to military history (as opposed to largely qualitative analyses), and to demonstrate the potential power of modern military simulations in the study of military history. Selecting the largest land campaign in history as the historical case study, demonstrates the scalability of the methodology employed. In addition, incorporating the multitude of interrelated factors and circumstances faced by each of the belligerents on the East front during 1941, makes it evident how sophisticated and historically accurate operational-strategic military simulations provide a most powerful method of studying military history available today. In so doing, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation produces a new perspective on a very famous, immensely important and tragic historical event.

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Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation is separated into six volumes as follows:

Volume I - The Concepts and General Structure of the Integrated Land and Air Resource Model (Part I), and The Methodology Used for Analysing Weapon System Effectiveness, and the Structure of the 1941 Soviet and Axis Resource Database (Part II).

The table of contents for Volume I is shown in Appendix A.

Volume IIA and IIB - The German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht), Mobilisation and War Economy from June to December 1941.

The size of Volume II dictates it is published in two parts. The table of contents for Volume IIB is shown in Appendix B.

Volume IIIA and IIIB - The Soviet Armed Forces, Mobilisation and War Economy from June to December 1941.

The size of Volume III dictates it is published in two parts. The table of contents for Volume IIIA is shown in Appendix C, and the table of contents for Volume IIIB is shown in Appendix D.

Volume IV - The Finnish, Rumanian, Hungarian, Slovakian and Italian Armed Forces Involved on the East Front in 1941.

Volume V - Relative Overall Combat Proficiency (ROCP): the ROCP of Soviet and Axis Forces on the East Front during WWII.

Volume VI – The Science of War Gaming, and Operation Barbarossa, the Complete Operational - Strategic Level Simulation from 22nd June to 31st December 1941.

Volume VI, the final part of the work, will include the actual Operation Barbarossa simulation.¹ This uses the methodologies and most of the historical data presented in the preceding volumes. Using the work and data in the simulation as a historical reference, the user is able to wander through this momentous historical event, changing variables if desired, and still be in context. This allows close examination and analysis of almost all the military aspects associated with Operation Barbarossa.

Further detailed information on Operation Barbarossa, changes of publishing schedule for impending volumes, and ongoing content updates, can be obtained from the website operationbarbarossa.net.

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This volume (Volume IIA) essentially consists of two main parts. The first part focuses on the German weapon systems and combat squads used in the campaign in the East during 1941. The weapon systems considered include everything from small arms and MGs, to the heaviest tanks, artillery pieces and aircraft. A brief history of the weapon system is provided, and the methodology detailed in Volume I is used to assess each weapon system’s inherent ‘combat power’. The various analyses provide quantitative data on each weapon system’s and squad type’s’ overall attack and defence strengths, as well as other combat attributes such as the relative anti-tank, anti-personnel and anti-aircraft values.

The second part of Volume IIA focuses on the detailed Tables of Organisation and Equipment (TOE or German equivalent term: Kriegstarkenachweisungen - KStN) for German land combat units from 22nd June to 31st December 1941, as well as the unit’s actual organisation and equipment in 1941. The units considered include those in German Army (Heer), Waffen SS, Luftwaffe and other security forces. All significant land units are included, ranging from the large panzer and Waffen SS motorised divisions, down to small units assigned to individual corps and armies. The latter includes such small units as individual anti-aircraft companies, various types of rail-road engineer companies, military-police (MP) units and Landesschutzen (LS) battalions. In all cases the combat units are presented in table form, using the weapon systems and combat squads previously analysed.

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Finally, it is worth stating that Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation is a massive project, and one which is likely to be ongoing, reviewed and updated for many years to come. Research for this project goes as far back as the 1980s, with the 1990s and the opening of many of the Russian (ex-Soviet) archives as an enabling milestone. However, there are still many areas of contention and missing detail (especially Russian and ex-Soviet areas), and in this regard the details of the work may never be ‘complete’. Nevertheless, these updates and changes will now be relatively minor, and although they may be pleasing to include for the military history purist, they would not have significantly affected the outcome of Operation Barbarossa at the macroscopic operational-strategic level.

Is all this research and work worth the effort for one campaign during WWII? Consider that the Axis invasion of the USSR in 1941 was by far the largest land invasion in recorded history, and one which ultimately led to the greatest loss of human life ever experienced in a single campaign. In addition, this campaign was by far the most decisive of WWII, and the one in which the Axis powers came closest to outright victory. Ultimately, over 70% of the German Army’s WWII casualties were sustained on the East Front, while Soviet military casualties suffered while fighting the Axis powers in the western USSR amounted to a staggering 29,593,000 persons. Notwithstanding the huge Western Allied war effort, there can be no doubt where the centre of gravity of the fighting during most of WWII was, and where the outcome of WWII mostly hinged.

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¹ At this time it is envisaged that it will employ The Operational Art of War (TOAW, currently version III) system, developed by Talonsoft and currently marketed by Matrix Games. If a superior system becomes available, especially one where the space and time scales can (also) be altered, then this will be reviewed. The necessary ‘scale’, to do justice to Operation Barbarossa: Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, is a minimum of 5-8km per hex and one day (24 hour) turns. The reasons for this, and the many pitfalls of inappropriate space-time scales in military simulations, are also reviewed in Volume VI.

1.Overview of the Structure and Terms Used in the German Fully Integrated Land and Air Resource Model (FILARM)

This chapter presents an overview of the German FILARM model, which is detailed in the subsequent chapters of Volumes IIA and IIB of this work. The aim here is to provide the reader with an overview of the German model so that the reader can understand the basic elements of the model and how it aligns with the overall FILARM model structure defined in Volume I Part I 3.² It is recommended the reader go through this chapter in Volume I, which also defines the main concepts, terms and acronyms used in the FILARM model.

The reader or researcher can also use this overview as a guide to the relevant chapter and section which contains the specific information they require. For example, information relating to German artillery weapons is found in section IIA 2. 4) (volume IIA, chapter 2, section 4)), while information relating to German corps artillery unit organisations is found in section IIA 3. 10) c.

The German 1941 Fully Integrated Land and Air Resource Model (German FILARM) uses the following chapters and major sections.

Volume IIA

1)  Chapter IIA - 2: The German Personnel and Equipment Resource Database

The German personnel and equipment resource database chapter contains an analysis of all the significant weapon systems and combat squad types available to the German armed forces during 1941. It includes light and heavy infantry weapons, German squads equipped with light infantry weapons, artillery weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, tracked, half-tracked and wheeled AFVs (Armoured Fighting Vehicles), armoured trains, transport vehicles, prime movers, and all the main aircraft types.

As well as a brief history, the individual weapon system (including aircraft) and squad characteristics are analysed using the methodology detailed in Volume I Part II - ‘The Methodology Used for Analysing Weapon System Effectiveness, and the Structure of the 1941 Soviet and Axis Resource Database’. The parameters calculated using this methodology include:

Individual Weapon Combat Power Coefficient (WCPC) values.

Individual weapon system and squad Overall Combat Power Coefficient (OCPC) values.³

Additionally, specific combat attributes are calculated for each weapon system and squad type in the German personnel and equipment resource database. These combat attributes include the following: ⁴

Relative Overall Attack (ATT) value and Relative Overall Defence (DEF) value.

Effective Combat Ranges (R) and Aircraft Combat Radius (R).

Relative Anti-Personnel (APer) value.

Relative Anti-Armour (AT) value.

Relative Anti-Aircraft (AA) value.

Relative Fortification Destruction Effect (FDE) value.

Relative Armour Defence Strength (ARM) value.

Relative Assault Defence Strength (ADS) value and Relative Assault Attack Strength (AAS) value.

Relative Overall Mobility (MOB) value.

Relative Supply Demand Factor (SDF) value.

These combat attributes would be used to simulate the basic combat power of German weapon systems and squads in any computer based simulation of Operation Barbarossa, such as that discussed in Volume VI.⁵

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2)  Chapter IIA - 3: The Tables of Organisation and Equipment (TOE) for German Land Combat Units from 22nd June to 31st December 1941, and the Unit’s Actual Organisation and Equipment in 1941

All combat capable organisations in the German armed forces are defined as combat units, and almost all these combat units had a Table of Organisation and Equipment (TOE) regardless of their size. The German equivalent term was Kriegstarkenachweisungen (KStN) while the Soviet term was Shtaty. Chapter IIA 3. (by far the largest chapter in the German FILARM model) contains analyses of the TOEs of German land combat units Deployed (D) on 22nd June 1941, and land combat units which were newly mobilised from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. Deployed (D) units existed and were available between 22nd June and 4th July 1941 (refer to the ‘German Deployment Matrix’), while newly mobilised units include Mobilised and Deployed (MD) units, and Mobilised and Not Deployed (MND) units.⁶ The TOEs for individual combat unit types (e.g., infantry divisions or panzer divisions, etc.) are shown in terms of the German Personnel and Equipment Resource Database (chapter IIA 2., above).

As with most armies, in the German Army the TOE of a combat unit was often not its actual strength. However, due to the build-up of forces and preparations for Operation Barbarossa, in late June 1941 the German Army’s combat units were closer to their TOE strengths than at any other time during WWII. After this time, steady casualties and attrition on multiple fronts ensured that the large majority of the German Army’s combat units never again came as close to their full TOE strengths.⁷ Nevertheless, on 22nd June 1941 a great many units were still not at their authorised strength or/and were not organised exactly as per the unit type’s TOE. There were main two reasons for this:

Firstly, shortages of equipment meant that many divisions either did without altogether or substituted other equipment in its place. For example, in German 2nd Wave Infantry Divisions the regimental anti-tank companies were authorised 9 37mm Pak 36 and 2 50mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns. However, due to shortages of the Pak 38 gun, most of the regimental anti-tank companies in these divisions had 12 Pak 36s instead. This also meant that the latter regiments had different numbers and types of towing vehicles and other support elements. There are a great many examples like this, in almost all division types, as well as in smaller ‘corps’ and ‘army’ support units.

Secondly, many German divisions simply deviated slightly in their individual TOE organisation from the ‘standard’ structure. The reasons for this are unclear but were possibly due to the evolutionary nature of the German Army or/and the fact that divisions were mobilised in diverse military districts. In addition, KStN could be modified by General Army Memorandums (Allgemeine Heeresmitteilungen – AHM) and also by orders issued by the various arms inspectorates or higher headquarters. These departments continually changed and modified KStNs, sometimes by as little as one vehicle. On 22nd June 1941 some units were actually over strength, usually due to some unique organisational feature, although this was relatively rare.

In addition to the above, the German Army, and Wehrmacht in general, had a large number of completely unique units. Examples in June 1941 included the 7th Flieger Division, the 900th Motorised Lehr Brigade, the Gross-Deutschland Motorised Infantry Regiment, and the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) Motorised Brigade.⁸ All these units had both unique organisations and actual strengths on 22nd June 1941.

For the above reasons, in chapter IIA 3. we examine each German division type’s TOE separately, and where appropriate detail the individual divisions of that type which deviated from this ‘standard’ TOE structure in any known way. In addition, where known, the actual personnel and equipment in an individual division is shown. For Deployed (D) units the organisation and strength between 22nd June and 4th July 1941 is used, and for MD units the known strength when the unit arrived on the East Front is used. Note, MND (Mobilised and Not Deployed) units were not deployed to an active front in 1941, so the strength used is that achieved by late December 1941.

Additionally, for the most important combat unit types such as infantry divisions, panzer divisions and Waffen SS motorised divisions, various analyses (some extensive) are included as to why certain German TOE structures were so effective compared to many contemporary armies in 1941. Comparisons are made with particular reference to the Red Army’s divisional structures during 1941. Also, for the most important divisions a summary of the unit’s history is included from the time it was formed to the end of 1941. This includes information on its formation, any major structural modifications and its battle record.

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The German land combat units are categorised and analysed under the following chapter-section numbers (refer Volume IIA Table of Contents for full section and subsection details):

IIA 3. 2) - German Army Infantry Units. Includes: infantry division waves (welle), the German division’s organisation and equipment (enhanced combat efficiency), the 1st to17th wave infantry divisions, the 250th Infantry Division (Spanish), separate infantry regiments and separate infantry battalions.

IIA 3. 3) - German Army Armoured and Mechanised Units. Includes: 1940 vs. 1941 panzer division, German panzer division TOE vs. Soviet tank division TOE, equipment shortages and variations in Panzer Divisions, the 1st to 24th Panzer Divisions, the 5th Light Division, separate panzer brigades, separate panzer regiments, separate panzer battalions and panzer companies, flame-panzer battalions, assault gun battalions and self-propelled panzerjager battalions (armoured).

IIA 3. 4) - German Army Motorised Units. Includes: motorised divisions, separate motorised infantry brigades, separate motorised infantry regiments and separate motorised infantry battalions.

IIA 3. 5) - German Army Cavalry Units. Includes the 1st Cavalry Division.

IIA 3. 6) - German Army Mountain Units. Includes mountain divisions and separate mountain units.

IIA 3. 7) - Luftwaffe Airborne Units. Includes the 7th Fleiger Division and separate airborne units.

IIA 3. 8) - German Army, Military-Police and Police, Security, Guard and Militia Units. Includes: security divisions, separate security brigades, separate security regiments, separate guard battalions (Wachbataillon), the Landesschutzen force and militia battalions (Landesschutzen-bataillon), military police units, and Ordnungspolizei forces.

IIA 3. 9) - Waffen SS Combat Units. Includes Waffen SS motorised divisions, Waffen SS motorised brigades, Waffen SS cavalry units, the SS Polizei Division, and separate Waffen SS Freiwilligen infantry regiments and battalions.

IIA 3. 10) - German Army Corps, Army and Army Group Level Units. Includes: higher headquarter units, higher headquarters signal units, artillery units (all types), rocket artillery (Nebelwerfer) units, anti-tank units, army anti-aircraft (flak) units, machine gun battalions, combat engineer (Pionier) and special engineer units, army construction units, armoured trains, and railroad engineer (Eisenbahn Pionier) and construction units.

IIA 3. 11) - Luftwaffe Anti-Aircraft (Flak) Units. Includes Luftwaffe flak HQs, Luftwaffe mixed flak battalions and Luftwaffe light flak battalions.

The last section in chapter IIA 3., section 12), is an examination of the authorised sizes of German divisions and brigades fielded from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. This includes calculations for the relative size of the German divisions and brigades fielded in 1941, using the methodology defined in Volume I Part I 9., and an application of the Minimum Divisional Size (MDS) value.⁹ From this analysis we gain an appreciation of which German land combat units could reasonably be called ‘divisional sized’ units, and a better understanding of the relative size and power of the German ground forces fielded during 1941.

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Volume IIB

3)  Chapter IIB - 1: The Order of Battle (OOB) of German Land Combat Units from 22nd June to 4th July 1941

On 22nd June 1941 the Wehrmacht (including Waffen SS) had 202 divisions; made up of 153 infantry divisions, 20 panzer divisions, 11 motorised divisions (including the 5th Light in North Africa), 3 Waffen SS motorised divisions, 1 cavalry division, 6 mountain divisions, 4 light infantry divisions, 1 airborne division and 9 small security divisions. Of this number, 138 divisions were deployed in the east between 22nd June and 4th July 1941 in support of Operation Barbarossa. This includes combat units in OKH Reserve, which were in transit and arrived on the East Front by 4th July 1941. This force (on the East Front) comprised 91 infantry divisions, 17 panzer divisions, 9 motorised divisions, 3 Waffen SS motorised divisions, 1 cavalry division, 4 mountain divisions, 4 light infantry divisions and 9 security divisions. In addition to the divisions, there existed an enormous number of smaller combat units ranging in size from large brigades to small Flak companies. On 22nd June 1941 the large majority of these units were also deployed on the East Front attached to the various army and corps level HQs.

Chapter IIB 1. includes a full Order of Battle (OOB) for of all the German Army, Waffen SS, Luftwaffe Flak and coastal artillery units, in all the military districts and army commands in the Reich, from 22nd June to 4th July 1941. The German OOB is detailed in a series of large table matrices; effectively one for each Army, Panzer Group, Army Group Reserve, OKH Reserve, separate Corps Command (i.e. the Deutsches Afrika Korps) and Replacement Army, which together is termed the ‘German Deployment Matrix’. In the German FILARM model all combat units in the German Deployment Matrix are henceforth classified as having been in a Deployed (D) state.¹⁰ Note, all combat units in the German Deployment Matrix had a specific TOE, which is detailed in Volume IIA 3. (above).

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4)  Chapter IIB - 2: German Land Combat Unit Reinforcements on the East Front from 5th July to 31st December 1941

This chapter details the transfer schedule of German land combat units to the East Front from 5th July to 31st December 1941, by German Army, Waffen SS and Luftwaffe Flak units. It includes Deployed (D) land combat units transferred to the East Front from the Western Fronts or the Replacement Army, and land combat units which were mobilised after 4th July 1941 and then deployed to the East Front before the end of the year (i.e. Mobilised and Deployed (MD) combat units). The ‘East Front’ includes forces assigned to Army Group North, Army Group Centre, Army Group South, the Norway Army - Befehlsstelle Finnland (East Front only) and OKH Reserves. Also included is relevant information on the individual combat unit’s initial assignment on the East Front (if known).

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5)  Chapter IIB - 3: The Total Personnel and Equipment in a Deployed (D) State in the Reich from 22nd June to 4th July 1941

Chapter IIB 3. of the German FILARM model is concerned with how many of the available personnel (in the Reich) were allocated to ground combat units, how much of the available equipment was allocated to ground combat units, the availability of motorised transport for supply functions, and, in general, the extent to which the Wehrmacht and German war-economy were stretched in order to mount Operation Barbarossa in June 1941.

a.Section IIB - 3 - 1): The Total Personnel and Equipment Allocated to Combat Units and in a Deployed (D) state in the German Army, Waffen SS, Luftwaffe Ground Forces and Naval Coastal Artillery from 22nd June to 4th July 1941

Drawing on the relevant data in chapters IIA 3. and IIB 1. (above), this section ascertains the total personnel and equipment allocated to ground combat units, and hence in a Deployed (D) state, in the Reich from 22nd June to 4th July 1941. The information is presented in two large matrices which show the personnel and equipment in each Army, Panzer Group, Army Group Reserve, Army Group, OKH Reserve, separate Corps Command and the Replacement Army.

The first matrix is devoted to the personnel and equipment on the East Front from 22nd June to 4th July 1941. It includes all the ground forces in Army Group North, Army Group Centre, Army Group South, the Norway Army (Befehlsstelle Finnland - East Front only) and OKH Reserves. The second matrix is devoted to the personnel and equipment in the Western Fronts and the Replacement Army from 22nd June to 4th July 1941. It includes all the ground forces in the Norway Army (Norway occupation duties), Army Group D (France-Low Countries), the 12th Army (Yugoslavia-Serbia-Greece-Crete), the Deutsches Afrika Corps (D.A.K - North Africa), the Replacement Army, and Germany and the remainder of occupied Europe.

A very important ‘side subject’ is highlighted here: specifically the amount of rear-area transport that was available to the Wehrmacht in June 1941. This had a very strong influence on the German Army’s overall Supply Distribution Efficiency (SDE) and mobility during the 1941 campaign, which is covered in detail in chapter IIB 6. (refer entry, below).¹¹

b.Section IIB - 3 - 2): The Total Available Personnel and Equipment in the Reich on 1st June 1941

This section details the total personnel and equipment inventory that was available to the Wehrmacht (including the Waffen SS) on 1st June 1941. This date is selected because most of the historical inventory returns are dated for the first of the month, and information related to war production is most commonly stated as output by month. The subsequent subsections contain reviews (and analyses) of the available small arms and other infantry weapons, anti-tank weapons, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft weapons, tanks and other AFVs, motor vehicles and other transport types, and Wehrmacht personnel.

c.Section IIB - 3 - 3): The Proportion of Total Available Resources which were in a Deployed (D) State in the Reich from 22nd June to 4th July 1941

The last section in chapter IIB 3. establishes the proportion of total personnel and equipment (resources) that was available across the Reich, and which were already utilised in Deployed (D) combat units from 22nd June to 4th July 1941. It draws primarily on information presented in the previous two sections and involves some manipulation of the data: mainly grouping the total equipment allocated to combat units into appropriate equipment or weapon subtypes. This section includes an analysis of the above data, and some important conclusions regarding shortages (or not) of transport, weapons and equipment in the German Army, Waffen SS and Luftwaffe Ground Forces on 22nd June 1941. This analysis reveals some expected results, as well as some more surprising (and thus perhaps more illuminating) results.

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6)  Chapter IIB - 4: German Mobilisation after 22nd June 1941: the Actual Strength of German Land Combat Units Mobilised from 22nd June to 31st December 1941

While the Soviets embarked on what became the largest and fastest war mobilisation effort ever carried out by a single country, the German High Command appeared confident (and in the end over-confident) that their existing forces in the East would crush the USSR by year’s end. Consequently, the German forces Mobilised and Deployed (MD) on the East Front from June to December 1941 bordered on non-existent compared to the Red Army’s MD forces. In this chapter we focus on the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS forces that were mobilised during the second half of 1941, the resources available in the Reich to meet this demand, and the Replacements (R) available for combat units already deployed on the East Front during 1941.

The first two sections in this chapter focus on the methodology employed to analyse the German mobilisation (including defining D, MD and MND units), and the individual land combat units mobilised during the second half of 1941. This includes information on when and where the unit started its formation, its status by the end of 1941, and whether or not it was Deployed (D) to an active front line HQ during 1941.

Details on the newly mobilised German armoured, mechanised and motorised units, also enables us to build a ‘German Tank MD and MND Matrix’. The German Tank MD and MND Matrix presents a detailed picture of the tanks, assault guns and armoured self-propelled guns (together called AFVs) allocated to newly mobilised combat units from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. The matrix also tracks the following: AFVs allocated to panzer units Deployed (D) on 22nd June 1941 but not yet fully formed, AFVs allocated to refurbish/reorganise Deployed (D) panzer units during 1941, AFVs existing on 22nd June 1941 that were not allocated to any unit (hence were not Deployed (D) themselves) and which became serviceable and available before 31st December 1941, AFVs that became available due to the disbandment or reorganisation of units which were Deployed (D) on 22nd June 1941, and new AFVs manufactured from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. The last segment includes some surprising conclusions in regards to the AFV replacements actually sent to the East Front and the number of AFVs that were available but remained in the West during 1941.

a.Section IIB - 4 - 3): The Total Resources Allocated to Newly Mobilised Combat Units from 22nd June to 31st December 1941

Using the information above and the relevant sections from chapter IIA 3., the total resources allocated to MD and MND units from 22nd June to 31st December 1941 is established. In addition we are now also able to ascertain the additional ‘rear area transport’ available for supply distribution in the German armed forces from 22nd June to 31st December 1941.

b.Section IIB - 4 - 4): The Total Resources in the Reich that were Available for Use by Newly Mobilised Units from 22nd June to 31st December 1941

In this section we examine the total resources available in the Reich to newly mobilising German combat units during the second half of 1941. The resources available included: existing equipment resources that were not utilised by Deployed (D) units from 22nd June to 4th July 1941, all personnel mobilised (called up) after 22nd June 1941, commandeered equipment from the civilian economy (especially motorised transport), and weapons and transport manufactured from 22nd June to 31st December 1941.

For the latter, monthly production figures and inventories are used (where available) under the following subsections: small arms and other infantry weapons, anti-tank weapons, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft weapons, tanks and other AFVs, motor vehicles and other transport types, and newly conscripted Wehrmacht personnel.

c.Section IIB - 4 - 5): Resources Unallocated to any Deployed (D), MD or MND Units in 1941

Having determined the total resources used in all German D, MD and MND combat units in 1941, and having determined the total resources in the Reich that were available in 1941 (above), we are able to calculate the resources ‘left over’. In this section we consider the personnel and equipment initially unallocated to any Deployed (D), MD or MND units during 1941. Particular attention is paid to the number of personnel that went into ‘rear area’ support functions supporting the Army (Heer), Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and Waffen SS. In addition, German AFVs that became available due to the disbanding and reorganisation of Deployed (D) panzer units, and from refurbished captured stock, has to be taken into account. Note, these AFVs are also detailed in the ‘German Tank MD and MND Matrix’.

d.Section IIB - 4 - 6): The Proportion of Total Available Resources Allocated to Deployed (D) and Newly Mobilised Units in 1941

In section IIB 4. 6) we draw on the data in the preceding sections (as well as section IIB 3. 3) to draw conclusions in regards to the overall personnel and equipment shortages (or otherwise) in the German forces during 1941. A detailed comparison is made with the equivalent figures from the Soviet FILARM model to ascertain if the German mobilisation during 1941 suffered from the same weaknesses, bottlenecks and constraints as the immense Soviet mobilisation did during this period. The somewhat surprising conclusions from this analysis is that the primary limiting factors on the German’s mobilisation effort were political and the result of strategic policy, and were not primarily the number of available personnel and/or the amount of available equipment.

e.Section IIB - 4 - 7): The Resource Replacements (R) Available to the German Army, Waffen SS, Luftwaffe Ground Forces and Naval Coastal Artillery, from 22nd June to 31st December 1941

In the final section on German ground forces mobilised during 1941, the personnel and equipment utilised by the Germans as Replacements (R) for combat and attrition losses is considered.¹² The first step in this process is a detailed examination of the structure and function of the German Replacement Army and Wehrkreise (military district) system in Germany, and some of the annexed territories, during WWII. This little known system was probably one of the few German military-economic organisations (in WWII history) that proved more efficient and effective than its Western Allied counterparts.

The second step is an analysis of the Replacements (R) available to the Wehrmacht from June to December 1941, and then the actual Replacements (R) sent to the German ground forces on the East Front during the second half of 1941. The German Replacements (R) are considered in terms of the German Personnel and Equipment Resource Database (chapter IIA 2.), so they can be used in any computer based simulation of Operation Barbarossa. The discussion on German Replacements (R) during 1941 includes the following:

German personnel losses and replacements. This includes a look at the German OKW’s ready replacements earmarked for Operation Barbarossa, the number of ‘ready’ replacements in The Replacement Army, a comparison of the monthly German personnel casualties on the East front during 1941 against the replacements actually used (and vs. the number available), and some conclusions in regards to the German strategic policy decisions to restrict their personnel Replacements (R) during 1941.

German tank and assault gun losses and replacements. This includes a detailed examination of the panzer divisions' tank status around the middle of the 1941 campaign, German tank and assault gun losses and (tanks rebuilt) on all fronts from June to December 1941, new tanks produced (manufactured) from June to December 1941, tanks ready for issue by month (from new production) from June to December 1941, German tank Replacements (R) actually sent to the East Front from June 1941 to December 1941/January 1942, German tank Replacements (R) sent to the DAK (North Africa) from June 1941 to December 1941/January 1942, and conclusions in regards to the German strategic policy decisions to restrict their tank (and assault gun) Replacements (R) during 1941.

Small arms used in the Reich during 1941, including by all ground combat units and Replacements (R).

The personnel used by all types of Replacements (R). Here personnel used as ‘crews’ accompanying new weapon and transport type Replacements (R) are considered.

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7)  Chapter IIB - 5: The Luftwaffe in 1941

All the previous chapters in Volume II (the German FILARM model) focused on land combat units. In chapter IIB 5. we focus on the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) during 1941.

a.Section IIB - 5 - 1): The Structure of the Luftwaffe: June to December 1941

The first step in scrutinising the Luftwaffe during 1941 involves an examination of its command structure and air-unit TOE organisations. This encompasses the higher level strategic and operational level organisations such as the Luftflotte, Fliegerkorps, Geschwader and Gruppe; and down to the tactical level organisations such as the Staffel, Schwarm and Rotte. All types of air unit are considered, including: fighter, heavy-fighter, night-fighter, ground-attack, dive-bomber, high-speed bomber, bomber, marine, transport and reconnaissance units. Similarly to the German land combat units, the TOEs for air combat units rarely corresponded to their actual strength: this is ascertained for individual air combat units in the next section.

b.Section IIB - 5 - 2): The Order of Battle and Actual Strength of all Luftwaffe Air Combat Units in a Deployed (D) State on 21st June 1941

In section IIB 5. 2) we consider the Order of Battle (OOB) and actual strength of all German air combat units, in all areas of the Reich, on 21st June 1941. Initially, the Luftwaffe higher-level organisation and chain of command on the eve of Operation Barbarossa is examined. This includes a look at the Luftgaukommandos (Air district commands) responsible for the Luftwaffe’s ground forces supporting the air operations (including the Luftwaffe Flak Corps’ supporting Operation Barbarossa).

The subsequent subsections are then devoted to a detailed examination of the air-units within each of the Luftwaffe’s main operational commands. These were as follows: Luftflotte 1, Luftflotte 2, Luftflotte 4 and part of Luftflotte 5 on the East Front; and most of Luftflotte 5, Luftflotte 3, X. Fliegerkorps, Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte and Luftflotte ObdL on the Western Fronts and in Germany. The actual strength of German air combat units includes the serviceability and numbers of operational aircraft. In addition, comparisons are made to relevant opposing VVS or RAF forces in June-July 1941, along with a brief history of air-operations within each of the operational commands (above).

c.Section IIB - 5 - 3): Luftwaffe Strengths on 21st June 1941

From the preceding sections (and a little additional information) it is now possible to obtain a complete picture of the Luftwaffe strength available to support Operation Barbarossa in June and early July 1941. This data is compiled and presented in this section. The Luftwaffe aircraft strengths on the East Front are then compared, quantitatively and qualitatively, with the opposing VVS forces in the Soviet Western Military Districts on 22nd June 1941.

There follows an objective analysis of the actual Luftwaffe forces available to support German ground operations during Operation Barbarossa, which reveals some startling results. Most obvious is the fact that the Luftwaffe forces fielded in support of Operation Barbarossa were relatively small by WWII standards, and were in fact ‘minimal’ when one considers the magnitude of the task facing them. The final subsection presents a compilation of data to show the overall Luftwaffe strengths on 21st June 1941, and the proportion of each type of aircraft assigned to the East Front and western fronts at this time.

d.Section IIB - 5 - 4): Luftwaffe Air Combat Unit Reinforcements: June to December 1941

In this section we examine the movements of Luftwaffe air combat units deployed on 21st June 1941 (i.e. Deployed (D)), as well as newly mobilised units, from June to December 1941. This discussion encompasses three general areas:

The transfer of Deployed (D) and newly mobilised air combat units to the East Front from 22nd June to 31st December 1941.

The transfer (withdrawal) of air combat units from the East Front to the west from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. This includes the withdrawal of Luftflotte 2 and II. Fliegerkorps, and their associated air units.

Air combat units that were newly mobilised from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. Newly mobilised units include units formed after 22nd June 1941 from existing training units or as completely new formations.

e.Section IIB - 5 - 5): Overall Luftwaffe Combat Aircraft Usage, Production and Replacements (R): 22nd June to 31st December 1941

In the final section relating to the Luftwaffe in 1941, we examine the overall usage and production of combat aircraft in the Reich from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. Note, combat aircraft in this instance includes transport and courier-liaison (army cooperation) aircraft, but excludes training aircraft. This analysis includes the following:

Combat aircraft used by newly mobilised air combat units, on the East Front and western fronts, from 22nd June to 31st December 1941.

Combat aircraft production (by type) from June to 31st December 1941.

Combat aircraft Replacements (R) sent to the East Front and western fronts from 22nd June to 26th December 1941.

Combat aircraft used in ‘rear area’ organisations from 22nd June to 31st December 1941.

A final review (analysis) is carried out on the Luftwaffe losses, on all fronts, from June to December 1941, and how this correlated to the Luftwaffe’s front line strength during this period. Luftwaffe losses examined include ground and air-crew personnel losses, as well as aircraft operational and combat losses. For context, these losses are also compared to the relevant VVS and RAF losses during this period.

***

8)  Chapter IIB - 6: The Supply Distribution Efficiency (SDE) for the Wehrmacht on the East Front from 22nd June to 31st December 1941

In chapter IIB 6. the methodology relating to SDE detailed in Volume I is applied to the German ground forces from June to December 1941.¹³ A force’s SDE has a direct impact on its Relative Overall Combat Proficiency (ROCP).¹⁴

The German SDE is considered for each of the following: the SDE for all Deployed (D) land combat units on the East Front from 22nd June to 4th July 1941, the SDE for all Reinforcement (R) land combat units on the East Front from 5th July to 31st December 1941, and the average SDE for all Deployed (D) and Reinforcement (R) land combat units on the East Front from 22nd June to 31st December 1941. In addition, (in a separate section) the supply and support infrastructure required to support Luftwaffe operations in 1941 is included in the overall analysis of the German armed force’s SDE during 1941.

In calculating the SDE for the German armed forces on the East Front from 22nd June to 31st December 1941, certain specific parameters are used. These relate to the unique conditions or circumstances faced by the Wehrmacht on the East Front during 1941. These factors include: specific weapon system or squad Supply Demand Factors (SDFs), the proportion of available rear area trucks, tractors and light transports allocated to rear area support functions, the average lift capacity of the Wehrmacht’s motorised vehicles and horse teams (measured in metric ton kilometres per day).

Finally, the Wehrmacht’s SDE is compared to that of the Soviet armed forces during 1941, and some relevant conclusions are drawn.

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9)  Chapter IIB - 7: German Naval Forces on the East Front: June to December 1941

The last chapter of Volume IIB (the German FILARM model) is devoted to the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) forces on the East Front during 1941. The initial section in this chapter is concerned with the German Navy’s high level command structure in June 1941. The subsequent sections are devoted to the objectives of the German naval forces in the Baltic in 1941, an analysis of the actual strength of German naval units in the Baltic during 1941 (down to individual named ship and submarine level), and a history of German (and Finnish) naval operations in the Baltic from June to December 1941.

***

² Volume I Part I 3. - ‘The Structure of the Fully Integrated Land and Air Resource Model (FILARM)’.

³ Detailed in Volume I Part II 2. 2), 3) and 4).

⁴ Volume I Part II 3. - ‘Methodology for Calculating a Weapon System’s or Database Unit’s Specific Combat Attributes’.

⁵ Volume VI - ‘The Science of War Gaming, and Operation Barbarossa, the Complete Operational - Strategic Level Simulation from 22nd June to 31st December’.

⁶ Volume IIB 1. - ‘The Order of Battle (OOB) of German Land Combat Units from 22nd June to 4th July 1941’, and IIB 2. - ‘German Land Combat Unit Reinforcements on the East Front from 5th July to 31st December 1941’.

⁷ By 1943-44 this had become so chronic that the Germans were forced to radically reduce the size of their divisional TOEs. For example, the 1st Wave 1941 Infantry Division had three infantry regiments each with three battalions, while the Type 44 German Infantry Division had three infantry regiments each with two (reduced size) battalions.

⁸ The Waffen SS had their own KStN, many of which were different from the ‘equivalent’ Army KStN. The LSSAH was still a brigade in June 1941 and was also organised very differently to the Waffen SS Motorised Divisions.

⁹ Volume I Part I 9. – ‘The Concepts and General Structure of the Integrated Land and Air Resource Model - A Divisional Sized or Division Equivalent Combat Unit in WWII’ details the equations used for calculating a land combat unit’s ‘size’, and defines the Minimum Divisional Size (MDS) value. The latter is essentially the minimum sized combat unit that can be reasonably called ‘divisional sized’ or a ‘division equivalent’ in 1941.

¹⁰ Refer Volume I Part I 3. 3) a. i. – ‘The Structure of the Fully Integrated Land and Air Resource Model (FILARM) - Resource Allocation States inside the FILARM Model - Combat Units: D, MD and MND - Deployed (D)’.

¹¹ Volume IIB 6. – ‘The Supply Distribution Efficiency (SDE) for the Wehrmacht on the East Front from 22nd June to 31st December 1941’.

¹² Refer Volume I Part I 3. 3) c. – ‘The Structure of the Fully Integrated Land and Air Resource Model (FILARM) - Resource Allocation States inside the FILARM Model - Reserves and Replacements (R)’.

¹³ Volume I Part I 8. – ‘The Concepts and General Structure of the Integrated Land and Air Resource Model - Supply Distribution Efficiency (SDE)’.

¹⁴ Volume V - ‘Relative Overall Combat Proficiency (ROCP): the ROCP of Soviet and Axis Forces on the East Front during 1941’.

2.The German Personnel and Equipment Resource Database

In this chapter the methodology detailed in Volume I Part II, ‘The Methodology Used for Analysing Weapon System Effectiveness, and the Structure of the 1941 Soviet and Axis Resource Database’, will be used to analyse the weapon systems available to the Wehrmacht in 1941.¹⁵

Obviously not every single weapon sub-system will be analysed, but all the primary weapons available in the key categories are included. Where several weapon models existed for a particular weapon category, the most common weapon in service over the campaign period is used. For example, in the category of 10.5cm light field howitzers, the Germans had the old 10.5cm le FH 16, the 10.5cm le FH 18, the new 10.5cm le FH 18M, and a few 10.5cm le FH 18/39s in service. Although the improved 10.5cm le FH 18M was being manufactured in June 1941 (a longer range version of the 10.5cm le FH 18 manufactured since 1940), the 10.5cm le FH 18 constituted the bulk of 10.5cm light field howitzers in service with the Wehrmacht in the second half of 1941. Therefore the 10.5cm le FH 18 is used in the 10.5cm light field howitzers category in the Operation Barbarossa simulation.

There are currently many excellent publications available on German WWII weapons which detail the history and description of most of these weapons. Thus, we will not attempt to replicate this detailed information in this work. However a brief description is included for readers less familiar with some of these weapons, and we will be taking the relevant technical data from multiple sources and presenting this here for detailed analysis. All this information, along with the results of the analysis, is presented in eleven separate (double page) tables as follows:

Table Ger Res Database 1 details the Weapon Combat Power Coefficients (WCPCs), and Overall Combat Power Coefficients (OCPCs), for German Non-Mobile Weapon Systems and Squads (Stationary, Towed, or Carried Weapons and Squads).

Table Ger Res Database 1A details the values of the Specific Combat Attributes, for German Non-Mobile Weapon Systems and Squads (Stationary, Towed, or Carried Weapons and Squads).

Table Ger Res Database 2 details the WCPCs for the weapons carried on German Land Based Motorised Mobile Fighting Machines (MFMs), Part 1.

Table Ger Res Database 2A details the OCPCs for German Land Based Motorised Mobile Fighting Machines (MFMs), Part 1.

Table Ger Res Database 2B details the values of the Specific Combat Attributes for German Land Based Motorised Mobile Fighting Machines (MFMs), Part 1.

Table Ger Res Database 3 details the WCPCs for the weapons carried on German Land Based Motorised Mobile Fighting Machines (MFMs), Part 2.

Table Ger Res Database 3A details the OCPCs for German Land Based Motorised Mobile Fighting Machines (MFMs), Part 2.

Table Ger Res Database 3B details the values of the Specific Combat Attributes for German Land Based Motorised Mobile Fighting Machines (MFMs), Part 2.

Table Ger Res Database 4 details the WCPCs for the weapons carried on German Aircraft.

Table Ger Res Database 4A details the OCPCs for German Aircraft.

Table Ger Res Database 4B details the values of the Specific Combat Attributes for German Aircraft.

These tables can be viewed as a summary of the huge amount of technical information available on these weapons, as well as the results of the methodology detailed in Volume I Part II.

1)  German Light Infantry Weapons

a.Machine Guns

It is still sometimes stated that the German Army had better equipment (especially tanks and artillery) than the enemy armies it faced, particularly in the early years of WWII. In regards to most weapons (especially tanks and artillery), this statement is simply not true. However, in regard to light and medium machine guns it is true, and this situation remained essentially unchanged for the duration of the war. Ironically, many German weapons are often touted as being potential war winners, or at least far ahead of anything fielded by the Western Allies or the USSR in WWII. These weapons include the famous (or infamous) King Tiger Tanks, the V2 rocket, the Type XXI U-boat, and the Me 262 jet fighter bomber. In the rush to marvel at these weapons, most historians have overlooked a weapon which inflicted far more casualties on the Wehrmacht’s enemies than all the so called wonder weapons combined, and which took the Allies until the 1950s to produce a comparable weapon. This was the MG 34 and improved MG 42 machine guns.

The standard German machine gun in 1941 was the 7.92mm MG 34. The MG 34 was the world’s first General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), a term that is standard in today’s armies but was unknown in 1939. The MG 34 was the first true GPMG because it was used as the standard infantry squad automatic (on a bipod) as well as the platoon or company’s MMG-HMGs (on a tripod). It even had a respectable anti-aircraft (AA) capability due to its very high rate of fire (900 rounds per minute), accuracy and ammunition feed. The origins of the MG 34 go back to 1930 when the Swiss company of Solothurn produced a MG called the MG 30 which they offered to the German Army.¹⁶ The MG 30 was a very advanced design and was probably the first ‘straight line’ MG design. It incorporated a butt in prolongation with the barrel axis and an ingenious quick change barrel design, both features of the MG 34. However the German Army was not impressed with the weapon and asked Mauserwerke (Mauser) to improve on its design. Mauserwerke jettisoned the side feeding box magazine and designed a new belt feed mechanism which could also take the saddle drum magazine used on the MG 15. The bolt locking system, the recoil system, and the barrel changing system were also all redesigned. The resultant MG 34 was immediately accepted by the German Army for two main reasons: it was technically the finest weapon in its class in the world, and more importantly it fit in with the German Army’s infantry squad tactics which had been continually developed during and after WWI.

The most far reaching impact of the MG 34 was tactical rather than mechanical. To understand this very important fact, we need to digress slightly and examine in simple terms how infantry squads worked in combat during this period. The infantry squad was essentially the smallest self-contained manoeuvre unit on the battlefield. It was capable of independent action and had both the structure and morale to be sent into action unsupported. The typical infantry squad of 8-12 men and could be separated into four functional parts. These were: command (the squad leader), communication (radio if available, which they weren’t in the Red Army), heavy weapons section (LMGs, automatic rifles, heavy AT weapons), and assault section (rifles, SMGs, grenades, flamethrowers, light AT weapons). The assault section (also often called the rifle section) was usually the largest section in the squad, with the ‘command’ and ‘communication’ sections also part of this group when the situation required. In general terms the infantry squad operated as follows. In offensive situations the heavy weapons section was expected to cover and suppress the enemy’s firepower, enabling the assault section to close and neutralise the enemy position. In defence the heavy weapons section was expected to provide the bulk of the firepower needed to eliminate the enemy attack, with the assault section protecting the flanks of the main defence.

To fulfil these requirements, the ideal squad MG had to be: light enough to be carried forward by one man to directly support an attack, able to be brought into action within less than a minute, easily concealed, operated by one or two men at most, have adequate firepower (rate of fire, ammunition feed and accuracy) to suppress and inflict damage on the enemy defences, and be able to maintain a sustained fire for a long period (i.e. have adequate barrel cooling and be reliable). Like many technical specifications, the squad MG was a trade-off between conflicting requirements. Traditionally in MG design, ‘adequate firepower’, ‘cooling’ and ‘sustained fire’ meant belt fed ammunition and some form of assisted cooling such as water. These in turn meant the weapon was very heavy (far too heavy to be carried forward), difficult to conceal and slow into action. In addition, the voracious appetite for ammunition of automatic weapons meant the squad MG required an ammunition system which other members of the squad could support; specifically they could carry some of the required ammunition forward in support of the MG team.

The result was that every other army (except the German Army) opted for air cooled and magazine fed designs, which collectively became known as light machine guns (LMGs). It was felt that the LMG could still provide adequate firepower to ‘do the job’ and there was essentially no choice anyway. It was simply impractical to have anything but air cooled barrels and it was felt that having squad members festooned with ammunition belts was unworkable. Separate ammunition magazines (with 20-30 rounds each) could be carried by all squad members, and the resultant limitations on fire rate, coupled with a LMG designed to fire 400-600 rounds per minute, meant the cooling problem could be managed. The US army didn’t even opt for the LMG as the standard squad automatic in the interwar years. Instead they opted for the Browning automatic rifle (BAR) M1918A2. This was essentially a heavy automatic rifle with a bottom loading 20 round magazine (which is inconvenient to change in action) and an extremely violent action. At 10kg in weight, the BAR was as heavy as contemporary LMGs without the flexibility and firepower advantages of most current LMGs. Amazingly, the BAR remained the US army’s squad light automatic until after WWII.

Unfortunately for the rest of the world, the LMG compromise did not satisfy the German Army’s tactical combat requirements in the interwar years. Ever since the development of ‘shock troop tactics’ by the German Army in WWI, the Germans (along with some other armies) had struggled to find a MG which could meet all the demands required of a modern squad MG.¹⁷ They decided to pursue the concept of the General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG); a weapon capable of meeting the demands of the squad LMG and also powerful enough to equip the heavy MG platoons and companies. Firstly, they ignored the idea that having squad members festooned with ammunition belts was unworkable. As it turned out this was true, and I am often amused to see modern day infantry squads with belt ammunition draped over their shoulders on newsreels and photos! Secondly, the problem of cooling was solved by using a perforated air cooled barrel and more importantly, an ingenious and very rapid barrel changing system. Barrel changing was simplified by hinging the gun body to the rear end of the barrel casing; unlatching allowed the gun body to be swung sideways and the barrel pulled straight out of its bearings. In action, a good crew could change the barrel in 5-10 seconds! Finally, the Germans kept the MG 34 light enough to be carried and brought into action by one man. With a bipod attached to the barrel (standard in LMGs) the MG 34 weighed 12.2kg. This is only marginally heavier than the outstanding British Bren LMG at 10.1kg, the Red Army’s DP 1928 LMG at 9.3kg, and the US Army’s BAR at 10kg.¹⁸

If the MG 34 was required to fulfil the role of MMG (Medium MG) or even HMG (Heavy MG), it was fitted to a small tripod (weighing 6.75kg) or more commonly a large tripod (weighing 23.6kg). The large tripod incorporated a sprung cradle to reduce the recoil and vibration, and the facility for telescopic gun sights and remote firing capability on a fixed arc. On the large tripod, the MG 34 was effective out to 2,500-3,000 metres. Coupled with the much higher rate of fire, this meant that the MG 34 also outperformed most contemporary WWII HMGs. The only real weakness of the MG 34 was that it was too good! The quality of design and workmanship meant long and precise manufacturing processes, and the weapon was