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Troubled Skylines: Travails of Nigerian Commercial Aviation
Troubled Skylines: Travails of Nigerian Commercial Aviation
Troubled Skylines: Travails of Nigerian Commercial Aviation
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Troubled Skylines: Travails of Nigerian Commercial Aviation

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This book is a collection of materials from many of the articles I have written on occurrences that span a period of more than ten years about Nigeria’s aviation industry. I could not have done this alone from outside the industry without the opportunity given to me to serve in various committees by persons with authorities in the sector.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateNov 11, 2019
ISBN9781728395272
Troubled Skylines: Travails of Nigerian Commercial Aviation

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    Troubled Skylines - John Oladipo Ojikutu

    2019 John Oladipo Ojikutu. All rights reserved.

    No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the written permission of the author.

    Published by AuthorHouse 11/06/2019

    ISBN: 978-1-7283-9528-9 (sc)

    ISBN: 978-1-7283-9529-6 (hc)

    ISBN: 978-1-7283-9527-2 (e)

    Library of Congress Control Number: 2019918096

    Any people depicted in stock imagery provided by Getty Images are models,

    and such images are being used for illustrative purposes only.

    Certain stock imagery © Getty Images.

    Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, any web addresses or links contained in this book may have changed since publication and may no longer be valid. The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher, and the publisher hereby disclaims any responsibility for them.

    Troubled Skylines is dedicated to the innocent victims of the various accidents between 2005 and 2012, particularly the sixty-six students of Loyola Jesuit College who died in the Sosoliso plane crash in Port Harcourt in December 2005 while they were returning home for the Christmas holiday; the family 7 members of Onyeka Anyene who died in Dana air crash of Sunday June 3rd 2012 they were all on holiday from the US. They all died not by their own choice but through lapses in safety regulation enforcements and compliance, and the management of the poor management of aviation emergency services.

    To the late Group Captain Ben Aigbomian, who advised and encouraged me to redirect my four years’ experience as the military airport commandant (MMIA) and directing staff at the command and staff college, Jaji, towards training in aviation security, consultancy services and related matters rather than the general course of supply contracts known amongst retired officers. It was Ben who facilitated my first live television interview programme on the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), Lagos, following the crash of a Bellview Airline aircraft in December 2005.

    To the late Mr. Sam Owolabi Akerele, the chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Safety Recommendation for Airspace Management and Nigerian Metrological Services (NIMET) 2007-2008, who invited and included me as a member of the committee. It was in that committee that I began to see the adversities of civil aviation more than I knew before my retirement from the armed service.

    To the professionally inclined men and women working in the public and private sector of the industry, day in and day out and performing their duties with little training but with their best efforts. They make many attempts to safeguard the industry yet receive little or no recognition of their ability.

    Lastly, to my loved and cherished family and friends who have been the sources of encouragement to me in the writing of this book.

    CONTENTS

    Foreword

    Acknowledgement

    Group 1: Introduction and Unstable Policies

    Introduction

    Find Actual Earnings On Tsc/Csc/Cic At Ncaa To Enhance The Federation Account

    September 2019

    The Battle for the Soul of a New National Carrier

    2018

    No Requiem for National Carrier as Nigeria Air Project

    October 2018

    Blame Games on Policies and Regulations

    November 2017

    In Support of Government Efforts to Establish a National Carrier

    August 2017

    Airports for Concession, Not Privatisation

    2016

    Aviation Intervention Funds and the Politics of Economic Exploitation

    February 2016

    Unrealistic Federal Inland Revenue Service Taxes on Passengers and Private Aircraft Owners

    May 2015

    Nigeria Civil Aviation Policy Challenges and Suggested Road Map for President, General Mohammadu Buhari (GCFR)

    April 2015

    Nigerian Aviation Policy: The Challenges

    July 2013

    Mr. President, Don’t Merge FAAN with NAMA, Fuse Aviation and Transport Ministry (Part 1)

    October 2011

    Mr. President, Don’t Merge FAAN with NAMA, Fuse Aviation and Transport Ministry (Part 2)

    June 2011

    Group 2: Aeronautical Services and Challenges

    Leaky Sky Of The Tracon

    October 2018

    Absence of Periodic Maintenance, the Crux of Airport Certification, and Operators Insurance

    August 2017

    Port Harcourt Deserves Better Attention in the Airport Remodelling Plan

    September 2014

    Strategic Importance of the Nigerian Airspace

    23 August 2010

    Enhancing Safety in the Nigerian Airspace: Civil-Military Coordination

    8 September 2009

    Group 3: Airline Business and Government Oversight

    A Roadmap In 2019 To Next Level

    August 2019

    Boosting Investments In Nigeria Aviation – Is Government Really Suppressing Private Airlines Growth?

    July 2019

    The Airlines Operators Travails Are Beyond Aeronautical Charges And Vat

    March 2019

    High Number Of Flight Delays And Cancellations: Whose Fault?

    August 2018

    Airline Operators Capacity Utilisation And Need For Merging

    June 2018

    Re: Ncaa Rejoinder On The Declared 2017 Airline Ticket Sales Earnings

    June 2018

    The Disparity In Recorded Sales Charges And Manipulation Of Earnings

    February 2018

    A Case For Nigerian Low-Cost Carriers (Lcc)

    September 2017

    Private And Public Operators’ Charges And Responsibilities To Government On Earnings

    July 2017

    Ncaa 2017 Press Conference And Airline Earning For 2015 And 2016: Are The Earning Data, Actual Or Estimate?

    February 2017

    Airline Debts And Aviation Intervention Funds: Probe Banks, Amcon, And Nass

    February 2017

    Aviation Foreign Exchange Earnings And Spending Not Scarcity Of Foreign Exchange

    October 2016

    Removal Of Subsidy On Jet-A1: Cost Of Foreign Exchange Or Quality Control?

    May 2016

    Domestic Airlines’ Recurring Debts And The Way Out

    April 2016

    Fresh Bailout (Another Intervention Fund) For Private Airlines

    August 2015

    Exploitation Of Basas And Commercial Agreements For Foreign Airlines Kill Nigerian Domestic Airlines

    July 2015

    Profiles Of Internally Generated Revenue Of The Nigeria Civil Aviation Government Agencies (Faan And Nama) And Regulator (Ncaa)

    August 2014

    Don’t Impose Airport Development Levy; Account For Internally Generated Revenue, Intervention Funds, And Loans

    July 2014

    Political Interference: Misapplication Of Appropriation Funds

    August 2013

    Re: Bailout For Nigerian Domestic Airline Operators From The N500 Billion Intervention Fund

    July 2013

    Aviation Intervention Funds And Economy Of Input On Safety, Security, And Regulations

    August 2012

    Promoting Foreign Airlines To Spite Domestic Airlines

    2011

    The Battle To Gain Heathrow For Arik

    August 2010

    N19.5 Billion Aviation Intervention Fund: A Call For A Ministerial Evaluation Of Infrastructure Reform And A Re-Evaluation Of The Entire System

    April 2007

    Group 4: Aircraft Accident Management and Investigation

    The Recurrent Overruning Of Port Harcourt Airport Runway In Rain; A Failure To Implement Safety Recommendations

    June 2019

    Airlines Inflight Emergency Plans And Passengers Voluntary Support

    May 2019

    Nig 002 – Planning, Management, And Conduct Of The Flight Operation

    February 2019

    Dana Air Crash Report, Part 1: Human Negligence, Not Human Error

    March 2017

    Dana Airline Crash, Part 2: Human Negligence And Possibly Fuel Starvation, Not Human Error

    April 2017

    Revitalise Accident Investigation Bureau For Credible Accident Investigative Reports

    August 2015

    Emergency Management And Rescue Operations On Bristow Helicopter Crash

    20 August 2015

    As It Was With Dana, So It Was With Aero

    July 2015

    Aircraft Collision: Emirate And Hak Air

    8 July 2015

    Aircraft Collision 2: First Nation Air Collision

    17 July 2015

    Aircraft Accident Investigations And Reports: The Challenge To The Aib

    December 2014

    Aircraft Accident Investigation Reports

    November 2012

    Dana Air Crash Coroner’s Inquest: Between Aviation Emergency Management Programmes And Passengers Fundamental Rights

    August 2012

    Dana Air Crash: A Submission To The Lagos State Coroner’s Inquest On Emergency Management And Rescue Operations

    July 2012

    The Missing Aircraft And The Missing Points

    April 18, 2008

    Glossary

    FOREWORD

    All over the world, aviation has become the engine for economic growth. All countries under the umbrella of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are constantly seeking ways to make air transportation safe, secure, efficient and reliable.

    The author, Group Captain John Ojikutu (Retired), has taken a critical look into the development of Nigerian civil aviation from its inception, in particular examining the various steps taken by the government to develop air transportation in Nigeria. The establishment of the national carrier, Nigerian Airways; provision of modern aircraft; manpower development and the establishment of Nigerian College of Aviation Technology (NCAT) Zaria; the ambitious airport development program with modern air navigational landing aids and the creation of FAAN and NAMA are all the outcome of government initiatives.

    The author has reviewed the various transitions in the management of civil aviation first as a unit in the Department of Works to Civil Aviation Department (CAD) in the Ministry of Transport and the subsequent establishment of an autonomous Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority to regulate commercial aviation safety without political interference. He has examined the various reforms and huge investments in aviation infrastructure undertaken over the years and critically assessed how Nigerian commercial aviation is being run by domestic operators and the regulatory oversight on safety, security and infrastructural development.

    The author, in several articles in this book, has also looked into the gains and losses in bilateral air service agreements (BASA); foreign airline domination; poor performance of Nigerian airlines on international routes; the rate of entry and exit of airlines on domestic routes and the overall success rate when compared with other African airlines, notably Ethiopian airlines.

    In recent years, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the role of safety culture in global aviation safety programmes, particularly as part of an established safety management system (SMS) as well as issues related to risk management and human factors. This is the industry the author as a practitioner, has critically reviewed while examining the successes and failures, the environmental challenges, and the huge opportunities that lie ahead.

    No doubt, safety, security, infrastructural lapses and inadequacies in commercial regulatory oversight on domestic operators get the biggest hit in most of the articles in this book. The tone of the author is pretty high and may sound offensive; in fact, not everyone will necessarily agree with some of his assessments. But the message he is trying to convey, particularly the lack of corporate governance structure, inconsistent government policies, cases of inept management, and corrupt officials, is so loud and clear. The book is an eye-opener to many of our woes in the industry.

    I, therefore, recommend the book to all and sundry, particularly aviation practitioners, government officials, regulators, judiciary, the general travelling public, and the media. Safety is not a destination but a journey of life.

    Dr. Harold O. Demuren

    Former Director-General

    Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA)

    Member, Flight Safety Foundation

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

    This book is a collection of materials from many of the articles I have written on occurrences that spanned a period of more than ten years in the Nigerian aviation industry. I would not have been able to do this alone from outside the industry without the opportunity given to me to serve in various committees by people with authority in the sector most especially Captain Dele Ore under whose leadership I joined the Aviation Round Table (ART).

    In particular, I must acknowledge the late Professor Babalola Borishade, a former Minister of Aviation (2005-2006), who allowed my inclusion into the Committee on the Implementation of Safety Recommendations for the Nigerian Airspace Management and Nigerian Metrological Services (NIMET) and the Presidential Sub-Committee on the Investigation of the Implementation of Total Radar Coverage for Nigeria (TRACON) and the Safe Tower.

    I cannot but be most grateful to Dr. Harold O. Demuren, former Director-General, Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, who immediately on assumption of office in 2006 invited four of us as consultants to join his aviation security (AVSEC) staff to prepare the authority for an International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) security audit and the first US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) category 1certification of 2010.

    The consultant team included Mr. Ayo Obilana, Group Captain John Obakpolo (Retired), and the late Mr. Sam Owolabi Akerele, all members of the Aviation Round Table (ART). The experience of working with people like Mr. Ademola Oladele, Mr. Olumide Oshineye, Mr. Peter Amasa, Mr. Akoja Okplefu, and all the staff of the NCAA Aviation Security Department was immensely beneficial. The experience contributed to my inclusion in the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Aviation Security Development Project in East Africa, in particular, Rwanda, where I worked for three months with a team consisting of nationals from Morocco, Kenya, and Argentina.

    I must thank Mrs Adeola Yesufu, a member of the ART, through whom I was invited to make a presentation to the committee on aviation to the National Transportation Infrastructure Integration; immediately thereafter, I was co-opted as a member of the committee.

    I must also acknowledge Chief Osita Chidoka, former Minister of Aviation (2014–2015), and Senator Hadi Sirika, Minister of State for Aviation, who both, at separate times, appointed me to serve as a member of committees on the implementation of accident investigation reports and safety recommendations. The committees, in 2014 and 2018, were chaired respectively by Captain Victor Iruobe, Special Assistant to the President, and Engineer Gbolahan Abatan; none of these men including the ministers had I ever met nor knew before being appointed a member of the two committees.

    I am particularly indebted to the followings for their encouragement and support at various times leading to the production of this book; Senator Hadi Sirika, Minister of Aviation; Air Marshals Paul Dike and Oluseyi Petinrin, both former Chiefs of Defence Staff; Captain Fola Akinkuotu, Managing Director, Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA); Captain Ado Sanusi, Managing Director, Aero Contractors Airlines; Engineer Saleh Dunoma, Managing Director, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria (FAAN); and Engineer Akin Olateru, Commissioner of the Accident Investigation Bureau (AIB).

    Finally, the following deserve my acknowledgement too for the cordial and brotherly relationship we all shared and enjoyed together at various levels and various times in the industry: late Air Commodore Falope, first Director-General of the now-defunct FCAA; Air Vice Marshal Ehigie, former Managing Director, NAA; Alhaji Ibrahim Auyo, who twice served as Managing Director, NAMA; Ibrahim Mamman, Sanni Mohammed Baba, Mr. Peter Igbinedion, and Mr. Sule Ozenua, all former Managing Directors of FAAN and Engineer Sam Oduselu, the pioneer, AIB Commission.

    All the experiences, friendly relationships I have expressed including my past as a Military Airport Commandant and the training workshops I have organised on the platform of Centurion Aviation Security and Safety Consults, formed the foundation of the articles in this book. I am therefore grateful to Mr Olumide Ohunayo, Ms. Taiwo Ajisefinni and the staff of Centurion Aviation Security and Safety Consults, especially Mr. Ezekiel Aigbomian, who helped to organise and proof read a number of the articles. In particular I appreciate Mrs Nnennaya Anwule and Mr. Sunday Odutola, both of whom I loaded with the work of typing all the materials many times over and over after many corrections.

    GROUP 1

    INTRODUCTION AND UNSTABLE POLICIES

    INTRODUCTION

    The rapid growth in air transport activities in Nigeria necessitated the establishment of the Civil Aviation Department (CAD), an entity formally in the works department and integrated into the Federal Ministry of Transport in 1965. The Ministry of Transport like other ministries was the organ of government responsible for formulating policies, regulating the industry, and providing some services, including aeronautical facilities, air traffic control, and so on, before the establishment of the Federal Civil Aviation Authority (FCAA) in 1990.

    The aviation reform of 1995 scrapped the FCAA and realigned some of its functions with those of the Ministry of Aviation and the Nigeria Airports Authority (NAA). This realignment led to the establishment of the Directorate of Safety Regulation and Monitoring (DSRAM) and the Directorate of Economic Regulation and Monitoring (DERAM) in the ministry and the creation of the FAAN as a parastatal of the ministry. The structure created by the 1995 aviation reform turned out to be at variance with the approved aviation policy as well as the recommendation of the ICAO and other international organisations. This development and other issues pertaining to domestic airline operators and other service providers created the need for the review of the 1989 civil aviation policy in 1998.

    The major highlights of the 1998 policy review were the recommendations for the creation of the NCAA, (out of DSRAM and part of DERAM in the ministry), for the safety and economic regulation of the aviation industry and (NAMA, out of FAAN) to provide navigational facilities, air traffic services, and aeronautical information services, among others. This restructuring, still made FAAN responsible for airport development and management.

    Like the 1989 policy, the 1998 reviewed policy was expected to last for ten years. However, certain developments in the industry, including government privatisation and liberalisation policies, the Yamoussoukro Decision of 14 November 1999, the Banjul Accord group agreement to liberalise air transport in West Africa, the Open Skies Agreement with the United States of America, and the desire of foreign carriers to operate into multiple points in Nigeria, necessitated a review of the 1998 policy in July 2001. The overall objectives of the 2001 review were to ensure that developments in international and domestic aviation were incorporated in the new policy.

    Under the various plans, broad pronouncements were made regarding government objectives leading to revolutionary airport development programmes, liberalising of the air transportation business, and provision of airports and air navigational facilities.

    The primary concern of the government with these unstable policies was still to provide safe, efficient, reliable, dynamic, customer-focused, and market-driven air transport services. This, it believed would make the country a leading hub in Africa and a major factor in global aviation and, at the same time, make a significant contribution to Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP).

    Generally, the primary role of the government in the aviation industry should be to provide an enabling environment for the growth of the industry and safe operation of aircraft and other attendant services. This should encourage the accessibility of air transportation to every part of the country for the citizens. Therefore, the policy thrust should:

    • create an enabling environment to encourage dynamic growth

    • enhance safety oversight through improved safety regulations

    • improve airport infrastructure and aviation security management

    • improve the airspace management

    • develop the aviation infrastructure

    • increase participation of the private sector

    • revive the national carrier through restructuring and privatisation

    • develop one or two national Airports into a hub for passenger and cargo transportation in Africa

    • eradicate corruption, touting, and other vices in the aviation system

    Globally, the commercial aviation industry constantly strives to improve safety and security in the way it operates and to ensure customer satisfaction and protection. But in Nigeria, the development pattern is neither consistent nor sustainable. While it is true that various ICAO and FAAN audits have generally given high ratings to the NCAA, the activities and profiles of most of the operators, government and private, the safety infrastructure, suggests the need for improvement to meet the global standards.

    Poor infrastructure and ineffective enforcement of regulations were compounded by political office holders who indulged in unnecessary interference in the sector by overriding regulations, management, and administration of the public operators’ decision. The need to help private operators with whom they had mutual interests, to gain commercial benefits were reasons for many interferences and sometimes, the incessant manipulations of earnings and losses in revenue generated by the government agencies and the public operators. These interferences have in certain cases caused distortions in various airport master plans, especially in Lagos and Abuja which have significantly affected the safe operations of flights in these airports and caused budget interventions at the expense of other social sector needs.

    Over the years, the enforcement or oversight of compliance to regulations has not been sufficient and effective in regard to security and safety issues on both the government and private operators. Despite the certification of some airports, there are worrisome issues involving reduced capabilities of landing aids and lightings; uneven runways and taxiways surfaces; insufficient skilled manpower; lack of adequate electricity to power the airport’s operations systems; and lack of funds, due mainly to recurring debts of the domestic airlines in particular. The NCAA has not been effective in ensuring that public and private operators comply with the economic regulations and explaining the various unnecessary and irregular government intervention that has not shown growth. Lack of due diligence, interference, and usurping the statutory roles of established government agencies are the bane of the industry.

    Some public operators in the sector exhibit the behaviours of self-regulatory agencies independent of the established regulatory Agency the NCAA, especially with compliance with the Nigerian Civil Aviation Regulations (Nig CARs) and AIB regulations. Unfortunately, the act establishing the NCAA does not sufficiently make it an autonomous agency as it does the AIB. In particular, the act that established FAAN requires the NCAA to get an article of comfort in a reviewed Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) act to enable it to override the FAAN act with a view to ensuring effective enforcement of compliance to safety regulations.

    The Federal and State governments would need to concession most of the airports because the present arrangements and earnings declared by the operating agencies cannot sustain the twenty-four federal and state airports. However, the government must be mindful of existing arrangements in the MM2 concession; the Chinese loans on the building of some terminals, and the joint-users arrangements with the military at some airports. For now, concessions must only be made on the non-aeronautical infrastructure and facilities and not so much on the aeronautical. Airport concessions will increase capacity, increase revenue generation and eliminate or reduce government budget allocations.

    Nigeria has about twenty-six airports, mostly managed by FAAN; nineteen of these are owned by the federal government, twelve have joint use with the military, six are state-owned, and one is owned by a private company. The average annual outbound and inbound passenger traffic in these airports is about 15 million in the last 5 years and air traffic at these two airports alone is about 200,000 within the same period; Lagos and Abuja airports account for 80% of this passenger traffic. The national passenger and air traffic figures are about the same for Johannesburg Airport in South Africa. About 30 million of Nigeria’s interstate road traffic passengers could still be captured annually as air traffic passengers if certain infrastructure deficiencies were properly addressed and concession service charges given to airlines to enable them to operate into about ten dormant and not too viable airports.

    The genesis of introducing private airline operations into the industry followed the liberalisation of the commercial operation around 1986. Before then, Nigeria Airways had a monopoly. Vanni Air Limited was a pioneer and was later followed by Kabo Air, Okada Air, and so on. Harco, Hold Trade, Gas, and ADC were licensed initially to operate unscheduled flights, while Nigeria Airways retained the monopoly of operating scheduled flights, which were usually irregular. In the 1990s to early 2000s, these airlines were more or less self-regulated; the oversight on their operations by the FCAA and later NCAA was not very effective, and this probably led to the multiple serial accidents recorded in 2005, 2006, and 2007.

    The major domestic airlines that operated in the 1990s and 2000s included Nigeria Airways, Kabo, Okada, ADC, Chachangi, Bellview, Sossoliso, Harka, EAS, and Aero. Others that operated briefly within the period are Triax, Bannex, Monarch, Dazab, Harco, and Holdtrade. The inexperience of the private operators in the sector and the haste to make huge returns without periodic financial planning for the sustenance of their operation are the major reasons most of them divested and reinvested their aviation earnings into other businesses. These are also reasons for their short lifespan in the industry.

    The shutting down of Virgin Nigeria by those behind the airline was done in a hurry; the simple directive of the authority asking the airline to shift its operations to MM2 should not have been a reason for Richard Branson to withdraw and shut down the airline’s operations. MM2 then and now is well equipped and could better serve the connections required by the airline for local, regional, continental, and limited facilities for intercontinental flights and passengers.

    The concession given to Bi-Courtney on the MM2 development should be seriously addressed to give hope in the quest for concession to the other airports and to encourage a successful development of the industry through the public-private partnership. The government should address the growing areas in the exclusivity of concession rights in concession agreements on which various courts have based their rulings in favour of Bi-Courtney. These addressed, there would be hope for the planned concession and the development of our airports to meet the best global standard.

    One major problem of private airline operators and even Nigeria Airways before it became defunct in early 2000 was the low airfare tariff. The complaints of low fare tariff by airlines would not make any economic sense if their airfare charges for about one hour are ₦20,000 @ ₦360/$, the same as it was when the dollar rate was ₦180/$. This issue of airfare tariff was twice suggested, in 1985-86 and 1990-93 to be domiciled in dollars. The argument behind this suggestion then was airline operating costs, depending mainly and basically on offshore components.

    In spite of their apparent shortcomings, Nigerian airlines are lavishly praised by some media, and sometimes by a privileged interest in government, making them believe that their operations cannot be subject to the oversight of the responsible authorities. Comments from these persons make the public think that they are self-regulating. How would an airline that was barely four years in operation owe debts of over ₦400 billion in spite of the provisions of the Nig CARs Part 18 for enforcement of compliance to economic regulation and oversight on airlines’ financial health? The two major domestic airlines were taken over by AMCON because of very poor financial health. Their indebtedness to banks, service providers, insurance, and staff salaries in multiple arrears totalled over ₦400 billion.

    Sales and service charge earnings, often generated by the NCAA from public and private operators on air traffic movement, are always at variance or in conflict and cannot be trusted. The airline operators’ profiles also have not suggested that they are sufficiently complying with the safety, security, and economic regulation of the Nig CARs. The Nigerian operators and their investors generally lack adequate knowledge of how the sector operates.

    With different aircraft types in their fleet with the same recycled business plans and sometimes different routes, they intend to always achieve the same results. But no sooner do they start operations that they began to experience huge economic stress. Within five years in operation, they start showing signs of operational distress in the number of flight delays and cancellations, which results in their early exit from the industry. They put blames on statutory charges and various government taxes for their financial stresses and eventual collapse. They fail to acknowledge the problems of single ownership, poor management structure, the lack of experience and basic knowledge of how commercial aviation operates as major reasons for their short lifespan in the industry.

    There is nothing to show in the growth of Nigeria’s domestic airlines. The government must bring to life a national carrier driven by the experience of foreign technical investors, the Nigerian credible investors, and the public. Aside from Nigeria Airways and Aero and possibly ADC, not many have had an effective lifespan beyond twenty years. Nigeria Airways and Aero nearly exceeded a forty-year lifespan because their foundations were nurtured by foreign technical partners. Nigeria Airways, a designated national carrier, was an offshoot of the British West Africa Airways, later British Oversea Airways Corporation (BOAC), while Aero, a private airline established in 1985, had its tutelage under a British technical partner which disengaged itself from the management in 2009. Within two years of the disengagement, Aero came under financial stress and up till 2017 when it went under Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) receivership. Even ADC (1991-2007) was initially owned and managed by four pilots formally of the Nigeria Airways (Captain Okon, Udom, Omame, and Alakija) before it went public in 1993. It went down after nearly twenty years in service.

    Generally, it has always been a tough time for the Nigerian aviation sector. As there have been times of tragedy of some sort, tragedies of deliberate commission and not necessarily omission of errors; tragedy of abuses of safety, security, and economic regulations; tragedy of the absence of bold and authentic leadership at the NCAA to enforce these regulations; tragedy of careless and reckless spending of internally generated revenue without statute for appropriation; tragedy of manipulation of earnings on charges, corruption, and cover-ups by government officials; tragedy of giving concessions on huge debts owed by some airlines to critical safety services providers without statutory authority and tragedy of insufficient skilled manpower and low morale of staff occasioned by the placement of new and unskilled staff who have no aviation experience in managerial positions over the older and more experienced staff.

    We have spent billions of naira buying equipment and constructing and reconstructing facilities too numerous to list or count. Unfortunately, not much has been done in areas of human capital development for the management of the investment in the sector. We forget that the equipment and facilities cannot function without trained and skilled manpower.

    The government’s focus should be more on safety and security regulations, away from the over-flogged mundane issue of airport terminal remodelling which has characterised the administration of successive governments and which has no relevance in any of the nineteen annexes of ICAO Conventions. We cannot continue to implement safety regulations and the enforcement of safety recommendations only on the pages of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations (Nig. CARs) manuals and the documents of Standard Operating and Maintenance Procedures. Enforcement of safety and security standards should not always rest on the private operators alone. The NCAA must effectively apply the same statute of these regulations on the government operators in the sector.

    NAMA would need an additional 300 air traffic control officers (ATCOs) to be trained to meet its shortfall in managing efficiently at least three shifts of air traffic control services in each of the twenty-six airports, particularly for manning four control services units of Aerodrome, Approach, Terminal, and Radar at the international airports. Similarly, FAAN would need over 500 additional aviation security staff to effectively man the defence layers of twenty-six airports which include the access control, passenger-checkpoint screening, checked baggage, and cargo screening, and the likes. At the moment, less than 40% of the present aviation security staff is certified by the NCAA for various security screening duties. Most airports’ perimeter fences are very porous, and there is no visible evidence that there are plans to upgrade them to security fences. These are tragedies waiting to occur at a time when we are being threatened daily by home-grown terrorists.

    The government should be focusing more on the training of the NCAA inspectors to enable it to carry out effectively the enforcement of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations (Nig. CARs) and the compliance to AIB safety recommendations on NAMA and FAAN operations in over twenty-six airports and the over fifty domestic airlines and private aircraft operators. The AIB, more than any of the agencies, has been hit by inadequate manpower. With only fourteen technical staff, nine of which are contract staff. The agency requires more attention than others if safety recommendations from the bureau are to be taken seriously in future.

    We have been too careless in the way we have managed aircraft accidents and reports, as if the victims, especially the dead ones, had no right to their lives. Between 2000 and 2015, there were sixty-three accidents and serious incidents with 150 safety recommendations. Less than 30% of these recommendations were implemented, and there has been no significant effort by the responsible authorities to ensure the implementation of the remaining 70%.

    Recent reports are showing that the government safety services providers have not implemented more than 63% of the safety and security recommendations recorded from past accidents in the last fourteen years. When safety recommendations from past accidents are not implemented, another accident could be waiting to happen, and that could be another tragedy if not a catastrophe.

    Human negligence as causes of accidents is generally not highlighted or reported, especially when these are human culpabilities. The ICAO Standard and Recommended Practices for Accident Investigation Reports in Annex 13 and other annexes often cited are the minimum standards and not necessarily the best standards and global practices. We need to find a way around these in the AIB regulations and develop national standards concerning the issues of human negligence where there is human culpability as the main cause of an aircraft accident, especially a commercial airline accident.

    There are reports at the AIB of frequent accidents or serious incidents by particular operators, and there has been no indication that necessary audits or surveys have been carried out on such operators by the responsible authority. For instance, there are AIB investigation reports showing that seven Bristow helicopters have been involved in seven accidents consecutively between 2007 and 2018 in the following sequence: 5N-BIQ and 5N-BOA in 2007; 5N-BDD and 5N-BGS collision in 2009; 5N-BKJ also in 2009; 5N-BFU in 2010; 5N- BMM in 2011; and 5B-BJQ in 2016.

    When safety recommendations from incidents, serious incidents, and accidents are not immediately complied with or the responsible authority is not effective in the enforcement on compliance to safety recommendations, other operators do not learn from the experiences of the incidents or accidents and there could be a repeat of the same accidents by the same operator or by other operators.

    FIND ACTUAL EARNINGS ON TSC/CSC/CIC AT NCAA TO ENHANCE THE FEDERATION ACCOUNT

    September 2019

    "Every time we turn our heads the other way when we see law flouted, when we tolerate what we know to be wrong, when we close our eyes and ears to the corrupt because we are too busy or too frightened, when we fail to speak and speak out, we strike a blow against freedom, decency and justice" Robert F Kennedy.

    The Punch Editorial of 29th August, 2019 captioned "MDAs abuse

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