British Foreign Office Documents on the Macedonian Question, 1919-1941

By Anthem Press

This book of documents aims to analyze the British Foreign Office’s policy regarding the Macedonian Question in the interwar period and its reflection on the diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Bulgaria as well as with the other Balkan countries involved. The selected documents review the policy of the British Foreign Office towards the Macedonian Question. The British Foreign Office’s policy, formulated at the Paris Peace Conference, had always been aiming at weakening the issue. Gradually, the British diplomatic efforts focused on prohibiting the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and on its complete disbanding. The end of IMRO in 1934, however, did not bring the desired end to the Macedonian Question. WWII revived the unresolved national questions once again. 

The selected documents have not been published yet and are of great use and interest for many scholars and students. The presented documents are not only part of the diplomatic correspondence between Sofia and London but also part of the correspondence between the British Foreign Office and its representatives, mainly Athens and Belgrade.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Anthem Press
• Release date: Mar 31, 2021
• ISBN: 9781785277276

Book preview

British Foreign Office Documents on the Macedonian Question, 1919–1941

British Foreign Office Documents on the Macedonian Question, 1919–1941

Edited, with an Introduction, by

Ilko Drenkov

Anthem Press

An imprint of Wimbledon Publishing Company

www.anthempress.com

This edition first published in UK and USA 2021

by ANTHEM PRESS

75–76 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8HA, UK

or PO Box 9779, London SW19 7ZG, UK

and

244 Madison Ave #116, New York, NY 10016, USA

© 2021 Ilko Drenkov editorial matter and selection

Consultant Editors: Ivan Metodiev Petrov and Lynnette G. Leonard

The moral right of the authors has been asserted.

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2021933112

ISBN-13: 978-1-78527-725-2 (Hbk)

ISBN-10: 1-78527-725-1 (Hbk)

Cover Image: Courtesy of The National Archives (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/)

This title is also available as an e-book.

CONTENTS

Introduction

Brief Historiographical Review

The Beginning of the Macedonian Question

The Macedonian Question at the Paris Peace Conference (1919)

Impositions of the New Status Quo (1920–1925)

The Mitigation of the Macedonian Question (1926–1929)

The Subsiding of the Macedonian Question (1929–1934)

Revisionist Awakening (1934–1941)

Conclusions

1. TNA FO 608/44, pp. 264–266: Harry Lamb to Lord Curzon. Sofia, 7 April 1919

2. TNA FO 608/44, pp. 369–370: Letter from General Baird to Military Intelligence, War office, London. 2 September 1919

3. TNA FO 371/6197, pp. 105–106: Peel to Curzon. Sofia, 10 February 1921

4. TNA FO 371/5811, pp. 96–114: Peel to Curzon. Sofia, 21 June 1921

5. TNA FO 371/5811, pp. 133–139: Peel to Curzon. Sofia, 29 June 1921

6. TNA FO 371/7377, pp. 179–180: Lindley to Curzon. Athens, 25 March 1922. Enclosure, Colonel Corfe

7. TNA FO 371/7377, p. 191: Curzon to Lord Hardinge. Foreign Office, 12 April 1922

8. TNA FO 371/7375, pp. 45–47: Graham to Curzon. Rome, 10 May 1922. Enclosure, Major Duncan

9. TNA FO 371/8562, pp. 237–238: Erskine to Curzon. Sofia, 6 June 1923

10. TNA FO 371/8566, pp. 44–50: Notes on a Tour Made by the Mixed Commission on Greco-Bulgarian Emigration in Western and Central Macedonia. Colonel A. C. Corfe, 20 August 1923

11. TNA FO 371/8563, p. 157: Erskine to Curzon, Sofia, 28 November 1923

12. TNA FO 371/10667, p. 200: Erskine to Chamberlain, Sofia, 11 March 1925

13. TNA FO 371/10668, pp. 96–99: Foreign Office Memorandum, Situation in Bulgaria. 9 April 1925

14. TNA FO 371/10793, pp. 100–104: Footman to Kennard, 30 June 1925

15. TNA FO 371/10673, p. 5 (1–6): Stevenson to Chamberlain. Sofia, 26 October 1925

16. TNA FO 371/10667, pp. 205–208: Kennard to Lampson, 30 October 1925

17. TNA FO 371/10667, pp. 210–214: Bateman to Kennard, 7 November 1925

18. TNA FO 371/11337, pp. 24–25: Memorandum on Serbian Minorities in Greek Macedonia. C. H. Bateman. Foreign Office, 3 March 1926

19. TNA FO 371/11405, pp. 91–95: Kennard to Chamberlain. Belgrade, 21 April 1926. Situation in Serbian Macedonia. Enclosure by R. A. Gallop, 19 April

20. TNA FO 371/11337, pp. 31–34: Kennard to Howard Smith. Belgrade, 28 April 1926. Enclosure, R. A. Gallop, 23 April

21. TNA FO 371/11405, pp. 129–130: Kennard to Chamberlain. Belgrade, 26 May 1926

22. TNA FO 371/11217, p. 143: Erskine to Chamberlain. 1 July 1926

23. TNA FO 371/12086, pp. 180–181: Erskine to Chamberlain. Sofia, 25 November 1927

24. TNA FO 371/12090, p. 161: Chamberlain to the Marques of Crewe (Paris). 11 October 1927

25. TNA FO 371/12092, pp. 195–201: Memorandum by Bateman. 28 November 1927

26. TNA FO 371/12855, p. 175: Chamberlain to Dodd. 16 January 1928

27. TNA FO 371/12855, pp. 241–248: Kennard to Chamberlain. Belgrade, 31 January 1928

28. TNA FO 371/12856, pp. 63–64: Kennard to Chamberlain. Belgrade, 6 March 1928: Memorandum Respecting Suggestions for the Removal of Discontent among the Peasant Population of Southern Serbia. D. J. Footman. Skopje, 5 March 1928

29. TNA FO 371/12856, p. 110: Sperling to Chamberlain. Sofia, 12 July 1928

30. TNA FO 371/12856, pp. 228–230: Memorandum by Bateman. Foreign Office, 18 October 1928

31. TNA FO 371/12856, pp. 244–248: Sargent to Sperling. Foreign Office, 22 October 1928

32. TNA FO 371/12857, pp. 36–49: Dodd to Chamberlain. Sofia, 5 December 1928

33. TNA FO 371/12857, pp. 28–29: Memo by Sargent. Foreign Office, 18 December 1928

34. TNA FO 371/13571, pp. 219–221: Notes on the Present Situation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. C. H. Bateman. Foreign Office, 26 July 1929

35. TNA FO 371/13573, pp. 84–94: Foreign Office, Macedonian Question. 6 December 1929

36. TNA FO 371/14315, pp. 94–97: J. Balfour. Foreign Office, 13 March 1930

37. TNA FO 371/14315, pp. 83–85: Memorandum for the Secretary of State. John Balfour. 24 March 1930

38. TNA FO 371/14316, pp. 152–160: Waterlow to Vansittart. Sofia, 21 May 1930

39. TNA FO 371/14316, pp. 150–151: Minutes by John Balfour on Waterlow’s Letter from 26 May 1930. Foreign Office, 2 June 1930

40. TNA FO 371/14324, p. 131: Memorandum by Orme Sargent. 21 June 1930

41. TNA FO 371/14316, p. 214: Conclusions of the Memorandum on Macedonian Question. Central Department of Foreign Office. 1 July 1930

42. TNA FO 371/14317, pp. 203–205: N. Henderson to Sargent. Bled, 23 July 1930

43. TNA FO 371/ 15172, pp. 86–87: Waterlow to Sargent. Sofia, 31 December 1930

44. TNA FO 371/16683, pp. 29–32: Foreign Office Memorandum on Balkans and Turkey, 1932–1933, 1 January 1934

45. TNA FO 371/19486, pp. 193–195: Bentinck to Samuel Hoare, Sofia, 26 September 1935

46. TNA FO 434/3, PaRtY//, pp. 417–419: R. Campbell to Eden. Belgrade, 25 May 1936

47. TNA FO 371/22329, pp. 2–4: Edward Coote to Halifax. Sofia, 23 September 1938

48. TNA FO 371/23718, pp. 279–287: Memorandum on Bulgaria by Orme Sargent. FO, 15 April 1939

49. TNA FO 371/24880, pp. 110–114: Rendel to Halifax. Sofia, 5 January 1940

50. TNA FO 371/24880, p. 183: Cypher Telegram from Rendel (Sofia). 15 August 1940

51. TNA FO 371/24880, pp. 184–186: Rendel to Nichols, Sofia, 25 August 1940

52. TNA FO 371/24880, p. 219: Cypher Telegram from Campbell (Belgrade). 3 September 1940

53. TNA FO 371/24880, pp. 241–252: Commander Errington to Dixon. 7 September 1940

54. TNA FO 371/29785, pp. 1–8: R. Cambell to Halifax. Belgrade, 6 November 1940. Enclosure Report on the General Situation in Southern Serbia by Mr. Thomas, British Vice-Consul at Skopje

55. TNA FO 371/29728, pp. 100–105: Amnesty for Macedonian Revolutionary leader Ivan Mihailoff; James Bowker to Phillip Broad, 30 May 1941

Bibliography

Index

INTRODUCTION

If you know a little about the Macedonian Question,

you will take a side;

If you understand it deeper, you will realize how complex it is;

And if you understand it fully–

you will abandon any discussion about it.

My grandfather, a refugee from Aegean Macedonia.

For 140 years, the Macedonian Question has been on the political map as a key issue for the countries of Southeast Europe. The United Kingdom became one of the main international factors that brought about the creation of the Macedonian Question. Immediately after the Congress of Vienna, during the existing ‘Metternich’ system and especially after 1856, the United Kingdom was successfully coordinating and directing the foreign policy strategy of civilized Europe towards the Ottoman Empire. The Macedonian Question proved to be an excellent tool, especially in the rearrangement of political schemes after the two world wars. The United Kingdom’s foreign policy played a significant role in the region and the political history of Europe.

The British interest was primarily related to the three parts of Macedonia located in the three neighbouring Christian countries: Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1929) – countries with different status and geopolitical strength. The exacerbation of the Macedonian Question was marked by the establishment of the threefold dismemberment of the Ottoman province in 1913. Its name, Macedonia, was not well accepted in the empire. Macedonian nationalism appeared more than a century later than the Serbian, the Greek and the Bulgarian due to the lack of ethnic preconditions for its earlier emergence. The United Kingdom’s attention on the Balkans was mainly focused on the events happening in Bulgaria. Since the country had revisionist attitudes, it became problematic for the status quo. The British correspondence with Bulgaria prevails because the Macedonian Question was considered unsolved in the defeated country, while the other two – Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were satisfied with their territorial achievements and were in favour of subsiding the problem and keeping the status quo.

This book explores the intersection of the United Kingdom’s diplomatic efforts and the development of the neuralgic Macedonian Question. The collection of documents covers the British Foreign Office’s policy regarding the Macedonian Question in the interwar period (1919–1941) and its reflection on the diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Bulgaria, as well as with other Balkan countries involved. In 1941, the British Foreign Office stepped back and gave ground to the War Office in the region. The selected 55 documents have not been published before and could be of great use and interest for many scholars and students. The documents are derived not only from the diplomatic correspondence between Sofia and London, but also from the correspondence with and from other British Foreign Office representatives, mainly Athens and Belgrade. The documents are presented in their original spelling without correcting any mistakes or unifying different spelling of geographical places. The term Macedonia, both in the introduction and in the documents, is used as a geographical entity.

Brief Historiographical Review

The Macedonian Question is an issue that is both politically and emotionally saturated. It has been an integral part of the Balkan national-territorial disputes.

Many scholars have analysed the various aspects of the Macedonian Question and the influence of the European diplomacy upon it during the interwar period.

I would point out the works of Kostadin Paleshutski and Dimitar Tyulekov as good introductory surveys.¹ Vasil Vassilev and Dimiter Mitev are the first researchers to study the connection between the Macedonian Question and the United Kingdom in the considered period. In his articles, Vasil Vassilev reviews the Foreign Office policy regarding key political events in the region such as the treaty of Neuilly (1919), the Nish treaty between Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1923), the Bulgarian-Greek protocol Kalfov-Politis (1924) and others.² Dimiter Mitev also works on that theme, and in addition to several different articles and books, he has published a two-volume book with British Foreign Office documents about the Bulgarian King Boris III.³ Ilko Drenkov contributes to the detailed revealing of the British Foreign Office realpolitik towards the Macedonian Question with an overview of the period after World War I until 1949, when the First Power gives its leading position to the United States and the USSR.⁴

Andrew Rossos maintains that Macedonian nationalism is young, new and late compared to the other nationalisms on the Balkans. He selectively extracts paragraphs from the British Foreign Office documents and considers the attitudes of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia towards Macedonia to be similar and expansionistic.⁵ This levelling of the three Balkan states is far from a detailed analysis and favours the reflective ethnonationalistic macedonism, better known and developed after World War II. The British Foreign Office documents presented in this book in their original transcripts clearly describe the fact that the three parts of Macedonia – Pirin, Vardar and Aegean – have split their fates after the Balkan wars and World War I, and that the respective Balkan states have different visions and policies towards the problem.

Maria Todorova’s essayistic works present a very professional and realistic understanding of the problem. Her imagining of the Balkans is far from any nationalistic points of views.⁶ A similarly unbiased approach can be found in other significant surveys by Angel Dimitrov, Alexander Vezenkov and Chavdar Marinov, who explain the connection and the dependence of macedonism with the communism after World War II in circumstances for its flourishment.⁷ Anastassia Karakasidou presents the transformations in the history of Greek Macedonia.⁸ Ivo Banac has detailed analyses and distinguishes the different stages of national developments in the Balkans. He states that the Bulgarian claims for Macedonia are more substantial than the opponents’ ones and describes the Macedonian Question after World War I as primarily Bulgarian.⁹

Many international authors contribute significant analyses about the history of the interwar period.¹⁰ Books and memoirs of British diplomats, who were in service in the region, are genuine references to the topic.¹¹ The Foreign Office itself publishes a small book called Macedonia right after signing the peace treaties at the end of World War I. This book sets the ground for the Foreign Office’s future policy towards the Macedonian Question. The book states that Macedonia is a conglomerate of amorphous ethnic groups and a prevailingly Bulgarian conscience due to the Bulgarian Church’s activities, which were much more successful compared to Greek and Serbian propaganda.¹² A very prominent historian, Misha Glenny, seconds the importance of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Macedonia.¹³ The book The British and the Balkans: Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900–1950 (Dublin, 2011) by Eugene Michail is a contemporary essayistic survey that is also a very good historiographic review on the subject.

In Yugoslav Macedonia, the main apologist of the contemporary macedonism is Ivan Katardzheiev.¹⁴ His followers, such as Todor Chepreganov and Zoran Todorovski, interpret the historical processes through the prism of the defence of the national identity.¹⁵ The political macedonism is emphasised in all of their works about the interwar period and there are visible efforts to present it as ethnonational.

The Beginning of the Macedonian Question

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the national movements for liberation from the Ottoman Empire attracted the attention of European diplomacy. In December 1876, an Ambassadors’ conference took place in Constantinople where the great powers decided to divide Bulgaria into two autonomous regions – western and eastern. The Ottoman Empire, supported by the United Kingdom, denied implementing the conference’s decision. This provoked the outbreak of the Russian-Turkish war in 1877, which ended in 1878 with a peace treaty signed on March 3 in San Stefano. The British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli perceived the newly formed big Bulgaria as a threat, manipulated by Russia, which jeopardises the British supremacy in the Mediterranean.¹⁶

The Treaty of Berlin (July 1878) left a part of the Bulgarian territory under the Ottoman Empire and transferred some parts to neighbouring countries, thus restricting the Russian influence in the region. Due to the Treaty of Berlin, there was constant tension among the Southeastern European countries at the end of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. The Macedonian Question and the questions of Dobrudja and Thrace, and – after World War I – the question of the Western regions came out as a result of the different Balkan states’ territorial aspirations. Bulgarians’ aim for national unification explains Bulgaria’s participation in the Balkan Wars and World War I, as well as its stance in World War II.

The Macedonian Question was a concern for Sofia, Belgrade and Athens immediately after the Treaty of Berlin in July 1878. From then on, until the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the British Foreign Office policy was supportive of the Ottoman Empire. The British isolation, established by Lord Salisbury, could not last forever and he realised that Bulgaria would not be a Russian satellite.¹⁷ Among the great state powers, the United Kingdom was the biggest advocate of the Ottoman Empire, as could be seen in the Treaty of Berlin. Benjamin Disraeli felt obliged to oppose the Russian threat to the Ottoman Empire.

In 1880, the next prime minister, William Gladstone, for whom the geopolitical criteria would give way to moral ones, abandoned the Balkan policy of Disraeli.¹⁸ Gladstone realised that the national aspirations of the Bulgarians were legitimate and the United Kingdom owed them help against the Ottomans. With the Top Hanne Act (1886), the Ottoman Empire accepted the Unification of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria under the leading diplomacy of the United Kingdom. After the establishment of the triple union between Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy in 1882, the United Kingdom was not able to maintain pure isolation, which characterised its foreign policy in the nineteenth century.

In 1893, in Salonika the Inner Macedonian Odrin Revolutionary Organization (IMORO) was created – to achieve the liberation and political autonomy for Macedonia and the Odrin region.¹⁹ IMORO played a significant role in attracting the great powers’ attention towards the Macedonian Question, which resulted in an increased pressure on the Ottoman Empire to make reforms in Macedonia.

In July 1903, in London, Lord Bryce, Noel Buxton, Henry Brailsford and other public officials established the Balkan committee. The purpose of the committee was to introduce the Macedonian Question to the British public and to build support. Noel Buxton was elected chairman.²⁰

In 1904, the official British policy paid much more attention to the processes in Southeastern Europe, and in Macedonia in particular, showing support for the religious and educational rights, the administrative improvements and so on. Right after the Ilinden-Preobrazen uprising in the fall of 1903, Bulgaria established its diplomatic representative office in London. The United Kingdom was pleased with the Bulgarian-Ottoman Agreement on 26 March 1904, which supported keeping the peace in Southeastern Europe. Meanwhile, Serbia and Greece increased their expansionist policy in Macedonia.

The British diplomatic suggestions for administrative reforms in the European parts of the Ottoman Empire received the support of the other great powers. The Bulgarian government and society were satisfied with the British initiative for reforms and viewed it as a way for improving the situation in Macedonia and the Edirne region and as a possibility for obtaining autonomy. In June 1908, Russia and the United Kingdom came to an agreement about the reforms in Macedonia, but the Young Turks Revolution in July 1908, brought back British trust in the Ottoman Empire.²¹ The British government realised that any kind of pressure on the Ottoman Empire would put it into Germany’s arms and, therefore, gradually abandoned the idea of implementing reforms in the Ottoman European provinces. Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece gave signs for starting a war against the Ottoman Empire even though the United Kingdom made efforts to maintain the peace.

The Balkan Wars from 1912 and 1913 led to the liberation of Southeastern Europe from the Ottoman Empire. According to the Bucharest peace treaty of 1913, almost all of Macedonia turned into parts of Serbia and Greece.²² The situation for the locals was very bad, and IMORO tried to attract the attention of the United Kingdom, France and Russia. Delegates were sent to these countries and the activities were coordinated with the Bulgarian government. The Macedonian Organization made negotiations with the Young Turks Committee, which had interests in Albania, and started illegal actions in the Vardar and Aegean Macedonia.

The Macedonian Question was on the agenda of the British Foreign Office in 1914–1915 when the United Kingdom was trying to attract Bulgaria as an ally in the upcoming war. Germany was much more generous to the Bulgarian goals of national unification and, therefore, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers. After fulfilling the national aim for unification of the lands and the population of Macedonia, Dobrudja and Pomoravie, the Bulgarian government of Vasil Radoslavov was not able to negotiate separate peace treaties and to justify the Bulgarian cause.²³ The United Kingdom also tried to arrange a peace treaty with Bulgaria but did not succeed because it was not able to guarantee unification. Bulgaria was on the losing side in World War I and, therefore, it was obliged to accept the conditions of the Treaty of Neuilly.

The Macedonian Question at the Paris Peace Conference (1919)

For many people at the Paris Peace Conference (1919), the Balkans posed a threat to Europe due to their unsolved national problems. The region was the successor to the collapsed Ottoman Empire and created a field for territorial arguments. The Macedonian Question was of secondary importance to the great powers whose primary interests were focused on the Straits and Thessaloniki. Balkan Mentality became a slur for the region and it acquired the nickname the Powder Keg of Europe.²⁴

The United Kingdom has traditionally considered Europe dangerous only when the balance of power is upset. With George Curzon and Eyre Crowe an era of strong British foreign policy, based on good coordination between ministries and headed by a Foreign Office, ended. The British historian Gordon Craig points to the fact that before 1914 no one could doubt and question the importance of the Foreign Secretary and the staff of the Foreign Office in advising the Cabinet on foreign policy.²⁵ Under Lloyd George and Ramsey MacDonald, the idea emerged that professionals in the Foreign Office were subservient to traditional concepts and lacked realism, and under Neville Chamberlain, underestimating the Foreign Office became the norm.²⁶ The negative trend began during the war and was clearly seen at the conference itself, when the British prime minister rejected diplomats in a way that was too humiliating for them.²⁷ Gradually, the Foreign Office lost its aura and the prime ministers and the military became paramount.

On 13 March 1919, the British and the American delegations together concluded that the fate of Macedonia would be decided by the allies and the Serbian government. On 26 May 1919, the United Kingdom, under pressure from France, refused Macedonia the implementation of the principle of self-determination by conducting a consultation among the population. The United Kingdom favoured the idea of the League of Nations governing Macedonia. Italy supported Macedonian autonomy. However, both proposals were opposed by France.²⁸

Bulgaria was not invited to present its views at the Paris Peace Conference. However, a comprehensive document was presented on its behalf, prepared by two of the best Bulgarian diplomats – Ivan Evstatiev Geshov and Dimitar Tsokov.²⁹ Bulgarians gradually lost the essential and impartial support from the Americans. On 27 November 1919, the Treaty of Neuilly was signed – South Dobrudja and Western Thrace were lost. The borders of 1913 between Bulgaria and Romania were not changed and South Dobrudja remained in Romania, despite Balfour frankly admitting that it is not equal and will not lead to peace in the Balkans.³⁰ At a meeting of the Supreme Council on 5 September 1919, after four months of debate, the decision was that the Bulgarian-Romanian border cannot be touched and will remain in position at the start of the war.³¹

Bulgaria was obliged to give back all of the occupied territories during the war. In addition, Bulgaria had to give to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the counties Dimitrovgrad, Bosilegrad and Strumica. Bulgaria transferred Western Thrace to Greece, despite having economic access to the Aegean Sea (port of Alexandroupoli) under Article 48 of the peace treaty.

Under the influence of the great powers who complied with the interests of Greece, Bulgaria signed the Convention of the voluntary exchange of populations, leading to an increase in the number of Bulgarians who left Aegean Macedonia further exacerbating the refugee issue, especially after the arrival of the Asia Minor Greeks after 1922.

The Macedonian Question was not solved at the Paris Peace Conference. Only Bulgaria among the Balkan countries supported the formation of an independent state of Macedonia because this would be the only way to protect the rights of the people inhabiting the region.³² The British historian Harold Temperley gave the most succinct and accurate description of the peace treaty with Bulgaria. He reported that the Treaty of Neuilly included direct precautions against future aggression and Bulgarian national desire for revenge and aimed to limit the strategic importance of Bulgaria to Constantinople and the Straits.³³

The British Foreign Office documents explained the subsequent influence of the exarchate and schools on the Bulgarian population’s consciousness in Macedonia. The foreign policy of London after the Treaty of Neuilly showed a double standard in protecting minorities and this reflected in the Balkans, particularly with the population in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia. The three Balkan countries – Bulgaria, Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – had interests and claims for the population in Macedonia, so the British Foreign Office would prefer to use the term Macedonian Slavs. The United Kingdom and its allies, creators of the Treaty of Neuilly, did not intend to keep minorities within individual countries as separate communities but wanted to prepare gradually the conditions for their rendering. While Sofia looked at the population in the Vardar Macedonia as a Bulgarian one, Belgrade thought it was Serbian and called the new citizens Southern Serbs. Minority issues researcher Patrick Finney notes that the British Foreign Office fell into a political paradox for the protection of minorities in Macedonia.³⁴ The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes exploited these weaknesses in the policies of the great powers and determined the Macedonian population in Vardar Macedonia as Serbian, thus violating minority contracts.³⁵

The conservative British government played a critical role in the formation of the British position at the Paris Peace Conference, as well as in the post-war settlement status quo. In October 1919, George Curzon was inaugurated as the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs.³⁶ The United Kingdom declined the requests of small players during the Paris Peace Conference and thus determined its role in the future – to watch over the imposed peace that rested on the fragile balance of power.

Impositions of the New Status Quo (1920–1925)

The first post-war years were a time to rebuild Bulgaria and restore Bulgarian confidence in the international community. Liquidation Authority representatives in Bulgaria noticed that the Bulgarian government was not happy with the military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly. Serbia and Greece closely monitored the situation and were ready to attack Bulgaria if necessary. The United Kingdom, eager to preserve peace and tranquility, managed to evade these outcomes.

On 9 August 1920, the National Assembly of Bulgaria ratified the Treaty of Neuilly, which opened the possibility to restore regular diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. The main foreign policy objective of the United Kingdom in the period between the two World Wars was to strengthen the peace frameworks imposed in Paris. This objective directed the activity of the British diplomatic representatives in Bulgaria. The foreign policy priority for the government of Alexander Stamboliiski aimed to take Bulgaria out of post-war isolation, thus demonstrating a willingness to listen to the advice of the British diplomats. The main obstacle for improving the external position of the country was IMRO, formerly IMORO, which in the spring of 1920 restored its illegal militia activity and replaced its aim to unite Bulgaria with one to preserve the Bulgarian identity in Macedonia. The Bulgarian government often demonstrated to the European and Balkan states its position on illegal organizations and tried to assure that it did not support the bands that created tension in the border regions.

The Bulgarian prime minister Alexander Stamboliiski went to the United Kingdom in the autumn of 1920. The visit spoke of the importance that the British Foreign Office had placed on Bulgaria. Bulgarian political pragmatists logically sought support first in London. Bulgaria was the first of the countries defeated in World War I to become a member of the League of Nations on 16 December 1920. Moreover, the Bulgarian agricultural government aimed to show abandonment of the Macedonian Question. For Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) the Macedonian problem did not exist, and that seemed acceptable for the British Foreign Office.

The new governments in the three parts of Macedonia were facing different difficulties associated with the administration of the newly annexed territories. Bulgaria’s neighbouring countries did not fulfil their commitments under contracts relating to the rights of the Bulgarian minority in their regions. This led to a deepening of the process of assimilation and denationalization of the Vardar, Aegean Macedonia and Western Thrace. Under the agreement of the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920), the Bulgarian minorities’ exodus from Western Thrace should have been voluntary. Voluntary was only a diplomatic term that covered serious violations of the rights of the Bulgarian population in the Greek territory.³⁷ In the region of Pirin (the Petrich district), there was no national oppression, but the agrarian authorities did not govern because of the leading role of IMRO. In its efforts to improve the external position of the country, Stamboliiski had to limit IMRO. To break the isolation of Bulgaria, Stamboliiski launched the idea of a rapprochement with Belgrade. The British Foreign Office was not a strong supporter of rapprochement between Bulgaria and Serbia as that might bring the eventual establishment of a federation that would jeopardise the faithful ally Greece.³⁸

The Bulgarian government wanted to legitimise itself to the world by opposing the acts of IMRO and made its actions public, proclaiming that it had taken all measures to avoid raids through the border. IMRO increased its raids and consequently in July 1922, the three neighbouring countries – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Greece; and Romania again warned Bulgaria that if it failed to establish order in the country, they would intervene to bring peace.³⁹ Bulgaria was again against the coalition of the Second Balkan War (1913).⁴⁰ Stamboliiski responded by offering joint Border Service of Yugoslavs and Bulgarians and promptly submitted a complaint to the League of Nations to investigate the situation in Macedonia. This prevented any united action of the three neighbouring countries. Stamboliiski was willing to pay the price for rapprochement with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and pressured IMRO. The government sent additional combat units in the Petrich region. The Macedonian Organization ostentatiously occupied Kyustendil on 4 December 1922. On 6 December 1922, the government imposed martial law in Kyustendil and the county.

The British Foreign Office approved the actions of Stamboliiski through which the agricultural leader broke the Bulgarian isolation following a policy of appeasement of the region and the detente with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The British Foreign Office also wanted the rapprochement between Sofia and Belgrade to be under the control of the United Kingdom. Because of a possible threat, the United Kingdom preferred to maintain a moderate but sustainable Serbian-Bulgarian hostility, rather than a rapprochement between the two countries, which might have led to an anti-Greek union. Peace was the key word in the British policy.⁴¹

The Bulgarian prime minister openly declared that Bulgaria was not interested in Macedonia. IMRO built a network of representatives in Europe and tried to establish connections with different bodies like the British Foreign Office, Fascist Italy, Hungary, Turkey, the Albanians and the Croatian Peasant Party of Stjepan Radic.⁴²

In March 1923, the governments of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes signed the Nis Agreement, which laid the foundations of cooperation against Macedonian activists. The agrarian government in Bulgaria made this a significant step towards the realisation of the policy of rapprochement with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and expected a peaceful settlement of the Macedonian Question, support for territorial access to the Aegean Sea and the general strengthening of the international positions of Bulgaria.⁴³

At the Lausanne Conference in 1923, Bulgarian interests were not supported. The official British policy in Lausanne was careful and avoided opening a way for a revision of the treaties. The Bulgarian government tried to negotiate for an economic outlet to the Aegean Sea but was rejected by the British Foreign Office in favour of Greece. All the British diplomatic energy focused on the exchange of population between Greece and Bulgaria.⁴⁴

IMRO prepared for active resistance to the implementation of the Nis Agreement and was among the supporters and executors of the coup of 9 June 1923. The British Foreign Office tacitly approved the coup that removed the threat of Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement and possible joint action against Greece. The United Kingdom never officially recognised the new government of Prof. Alexander Tsankov, but recognition was a pure protocol formality.

Tsankov’s government stated it would respect the Nis Agreement, but at the same time, the Macedonian Organization began a new offensive in Macedonia. The Bulgarian government, busy with its domestic approval, failed to put forward at the Lausanne Conference the question of protecting and defending the rights of the population in the Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, which frustrated IMRO.

The United Kingdom pressured Tsankov in late 1923 and early 1924, accusing him of tolerating the raids into the Vardar Macedonia. The Bulgarian authorities arrested some of the Macedonian activists to show the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the great powers that it did not intend to support any activities of IMRO. Prime Minister Tsankov said that Bulgaria would seek a solution to minority problems peacefully and did not intend to lead a military policy in Macedonia. Belgrade did not recognise that any Bulgarian minority lived in Vardar Macedonia. After eliminating the threat of Rome in January 1924, Belgrade focused its interest on the south and showed a desire to deal with