Loos: Hill 70: French Flanders

By Andrew Rawson

The Battle of Loos formed part of a wider offensive conducted by both French and British Forces in September 1915. The British First Army, under the leadership of General Haig, were to break through the German line at Loos thanks in part to their superior numbers, while other operations were to achieve a similar result in Champagne and at Vimy Ridge. Due to lack of artillery the Loos attack was planned to be preceded by a massive gas attack. Chlorine gas would hopefully entirely overcome the Germans inadequate gas masks and lead to a swift breakthrough. Unfortunately all did not go to plan. First some of the gas was blown back into the British trenches causing over 2,000 casualties. Then when the assault itself took place the attackers were met by fierce German resistance, none more so than at Hill 70 where the German defences were strong. Despite many waves of attack, very few troops made it into enemy trenches. After a few days the attack had to be called off. It had cost 60,000 British casualties for virtually no gain. Rudyard Kipling's son John, serving with the Irish Guards, was also lost.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Oct 20, 2008
• ISBN: 9781783400355

Andrew Rawson

ANDREW RAWSON is a freelance writer who has written several books, covering campaigns from the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II, including the 'British Army Handbook, 1914–1918', 'Vietnam War Handbook' and 'The Third Reich 1919–1939' for The History Press.

Book preview

Chapter One

PLANNING THE OFFENSIVE

The Battle of Loos was not an isolated assault, it was in fact one of three attacks designed to drive the Germans out of France. Preparations for an autumn offensive were well under way even before the Second Battle of Artois had drawn to a close. General Joffre proposed to throw the entire weight of his reserves against two points in the German line. It was an optimistic plan which, if successful, would push the invaders from French soil. In the Champagne region an attack driving northwards would advance towards the Ardennes. Meanwhile, a renewal of the offensive in the Artois Region would hopefully de-stabilise the Germans south of Lens. The convergent advances would then threaten the flanks of the pronounced salient astride the River Somme and River Aisne, forcing the Germans to retire across the Belgian border.

Map 1. The Western Front, showing Loos in relation to Ypres and Arras.

At the beginning of June General Joffre put a two-point suggestion to Field Marshal Sir John French. In order to build up an army for the Champagne offensive the British would take over the Somme region. He also wanted the British to attack alongside the French, striking the German line north of Lens. At first the proposal was accepted and First Army's commander, General Haig, was asked to prepare a plan for such an attack. A few days later Haig replied that in his opinion the Loos front was not suitable for offensive operations. The area consisted of open fields dotted with fortified villages and would be ideal defensive terrain. Instead General Haig advised that the British should strike north of the canal, as they had done in the spring.

Towards the end of June the respective general staffs and representatives from the munitions industry were in conference at Boulogne discussing plans for the following year. Their conclusions did not agree with General Joffre's plans for an autumn offensive. The spring campaign had proved that attacks on a narrow frontage could easily be contained by a small number of troops. What was needed was a broad front, up to fifteen miles wide, to enable a break though to succeed. The British would not have sufficient numbers to contribute to such an offensive until the following spring. It was also noted that only the shells of heavy calibre guns were capable of preparing the ground for the infantry, and neither army had sufficient numbers for a wide front. The spring offensives had also proved that the need for shells, in particular heavy calibre ammunition, far outstripped the current capacity of the combined munitions industries.

Although the Boulogne conference advised waiting until the following spring before taking the offensive, General Joffre was adamant that the Germans must be driven from French soil at the first opportunity. At the St Omer conference on 11 July he proposed taking the offensive at the end of August, by which time the British would have taken over the Somme front. General Joffre wanted assurances that the British would strike a simultaneous blow. However, Field Marshal French was this time more reserved in what he would offer. If the French Army broke through to the south of Lens, his Army would strike the weakened German line north of the city.

With the situation stalemated, Joffre waited until the end of July when he again asked for full co-operation from his ally at the Frevént conference. His efforts were in vain, neither general would change their views and for the next three weeks the two exchanged letters. Eventually, General Joffre, determined to press on with his plans, decided to adopt a different approach: diplomacy. On 16 August he welcomed Lord Kitchener to his headquarters for a discussion. Although there is no record of the meeting, when Kitchener visited Field Marshal French three days later it was obvious that a ‘deal’ had been struck. In the belief that the United Kingdom was the junior partner, he had agreed to support Joffre's plans. The following year, with the BEF swelled by the New Armies, the British would be able to argue its case on more equal terms.

There is no doubt that Kitchener would have been influenced by the global situation, for the Allies had suffered a string of set-backs throughout the summer. The attempt to knock Turkey out of the war, by invading the Dardenelles peninsula, had resulted in deadlock. Italy's first attempt to strike at the Austro-Hugarian Empire had also failed miserably. Meanwhile, in the east, the Central Powers had launched the Brest-Litovsk offensive, driving the Russians back in disarray. Kitchener was well aware that offensive action was needed on the Western Front to provide support and encouragement to their eastern ally. Lord Kitchener instructed Field Marshal French to co-operate fully with General Joffre, ordering him ‘to take the offensive and act vigorously’. To make up for the shortfall in artillery, gas would be used to surprise the Germans. As August drew to a close, plans were being drawn up and before long men and equipment began flooding into the Bethune area.

Map 2. Schematic map of First Army's battlefield.

GHQ neither wanted the attack, nor was it on their chosen ground. However, to prove to the Germans that the Allies were united, the British Army had to act. In Kitchener's own words;

…we must act with all energy and do our utmost to help France in their offensive, even though by doing so we may suffer heavy losses

The date was originally set for 8 September, but delays in preparing the Champagne sector for action forced a postponement until the