Le Cateau

By Nigel Cave and Jack Sheldon

Le Cateau (26–27 August 1914) was the second major action fought by the BEF in the Great War. His men exhausted after fighting at Mons and by the subsequent speedy retreat, Lieutenant-General Horace Smith-Dorrien (commanding II Corps) decided that he had to make a stand in the vicinity of Le Cateau.There his men took on elements of four German corps in an action that succeeded in giving the BEF a respite, but at considerable cost. Amongst other elements of controversy in the conduct of the battle was the handling of the Royal Artillery.The battle also undermined the already fraught relationship between Smith-Dorrien and the BEF's commander, John French. The battlefield today remains largely as it was, open countryside, and it is an ideal location to view one of the most significant British battlefields of the early days of the war.In this action no less than five Victoria Crosses were won, three of them in one howitzer battery and two by men of the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Mar 26, 2008
• ISBN: 9781783460700

Nigel Cave

Nigel Cave is the founder editor of the Battleground Europe series; his association with the Company goes back some thirty years.

Book preview

Chapter One

THE RIGHT OF THE LINE: THE FIFTH DIVISION

The right of the Fifth Division: part of 14 Brigade

See Map p. 201

Amongst the first to be involved in the fighting at Le Cateau were the two elements of the 5th Division that happened to be to the east of, and almost in, Le Cateau itself – that is the 1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (1/DCLI) and the 1st East Surrey’s (1/E Surrey). This part of Fifth Division was to maintain contact with I Corps, further to the east (or, at least, that was the idea). The DCLI’s excellent regimental history (The History of the DCLI 1914 – 1919, Everard Wyrall) provides most of the material for what follows. At the outbreak of the war it required no less than 650 reservists (ie about 60% of a mobilised battalion’s establishment) to bring it up to strength, These men had to be assembled at Bodmin, the Regimental Depot, kitted out and shipped to the Curragh, near Dublin: and this was achieved within two days of mobilisation being ordered. Almost every man called up appeared at the depot – the exceptions (two) were at sea. If nothing else, this is a tribute both to the telegram system of the day and the quality of the contemporary public transport.

1st Battalion Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (1/DCLI)

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Note that letters in bold and in parenthesis are to be found on the map extracted from the DCLI history. 1/DCLI had suffered relatively few casualties during its time on the extreme left of the line (for much of the time) at Mons. Similarly, although being the rearguard of 14 Brigade and of the 5th Division from early morning until about 2pm on 25 August, it suffered few casualties from the enemy. However, from that time onwards, men began to fall out, utterly exhausted. It was very hot indeed, a heat that was relieved somewhat by a torrential downpour that commenced at about 5pm. The bivouac positions for 1/DCLI and half of 1/E Surrey were to the east of Le Cateau; they arrived at about 6pm after a march of over twenty three miles and were utterly worn out and completely soaked. Not only was it a march of twenty three miles – one has to include the heat, the extremely crowded and confused road traffic conditions and the great clouds of dust through which they would have had to march, never mind the rumble of firing and the threat of a probing enemy.

We bivouacked, in a drenched condition, in a field at the fork road [ie the Pommereuil road] on the south eastern outskirts of the town just as it became dark. The men were served out with rations, the first since 8pm the previous night. It may safely be said that the men were in an exhausted condition after the previous four days’ continuous strain and a rest was much hoped for.

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Map 4. The east of the battlefield, particularly that of 1st Duke of Cornwall Light Infantry.

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‘Early on that memorable day the Cornwalls, after a wretched night, ‘stood to arms’. It was still dark and their clothes were sodden with rain: many had not slept at all, even exhausted as they were on the previous night. ‘Stand To’ was the worst hour of the day: chilled through and drowsy, the bitter change from oblivion to consciousness amidst all the gloomy surroundings of war was a thing men experienced not only in those early days of 1914 but throughout the long years in France and Flanders that followed. Sleep was the only sedative, an anodyne which took away all remembrance: the thing which allayed pain, blotted out for an all too short period the ghastly horrors and surroundings of the battlefield.’

The Battalion was due to continue its retirement at 6.30am in line with French’s original orders – and no official order arrived to change that intention. It was all set up, in column of route (Y), with its head near the level crossing, to proceed from the eastern end of town through it and then off in a south westerly direction when, at the very moment set for departure, it came under small arms fire. Although some shelling had taken place to the west of the town shortly before this time, the DCLI were the first to be fired upon by infantry in what the British subsequently called the Battle of Le Cateau. The shots came from houses on the town side of the railway, about a hundred yards to the west of the assembled Battalion; although the Commanding Officer’s horse was hit, most of the damage was done to the Brigade Signals Section, which was already on the west side of the bridge Situated with them was part of 14 Brigade HQ, and Lieutenant J Dennis of the DCLI, the Brigade Machine-Gun Officer, was killed. (He has no known grave.) Immediately the men retired, through fields of allotments, to some high ground to the rear and occupied positions across the road (Z). The two and half companies of the East Surreys took up a position south of the road and to the rear of 1/DCLI.

The situation was uncomfortable, as there was a gap of some miles between these easternmost troops of II Corps and Haig’s already retreating I Corps; the only possible elements of support were some horse artillery, part of 1 Cavalry Brigade and Gough’s 3 Cavalry Brigade which were covering the gap between the two corps. The British were now under fire not only from the houses but also the railway embankment, which continued in a south easterly direction. There was no question of trying to force their way through the town. The solution was to take positions to the south, in more open ground. The situation became gradually more confused. Two companies (B and C) were sent forward to take up a position on the east side of the railway line that ran south from Le Cateau, towards St Souplet. A and D companies, with the East Surreys on their right, came up in support.

In the process, some men from A and D companies became separated and, hearing considerable fire from the west, moved towards it and eventually ended up on the high ground to the east of Reumont (X). They attached themselves to the 2nd Manchesters and then to the Argylls; eventually returning to the Battalion late at night.

By 10am the position had become serious. The Germans were keeping up an effective fire from positions on the railway embankments and cuttings, whilst at about that time considerable German activity could be observed north of the Le Cateau-Bazuel road. It was time to move on, and the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel MN Turner, decided to head south west in an attempt to rejoin the rest of the 5th Division. It was fortunate that the cavalry was available to provide some cover for the manoeuvre, which otherwise would have been all but impossible. It was not an easy move, as the Battalion (and the East Surreys who were with them) had to move separately; but they combined, by some miracle, as accounts make clear, at Escaufort and reorganised there, making contact with higher headquarters at about 1.30pm. The Battalion was moved to a position just south of Honnechy (W) as a right flank guard for the 5th Division; at 4pm it carried out a similar function nearby, on the Roman Road; and, finally, at 5pm set off southwards along the road.

However, in the confusion, some troops went east from Le Cateau; indeed the Battalion transport, under Lieutenant Benn – who was the Battalion Machine Gun Officer and whose account follows – was not to be heard of again until the early hours of 1st September, having earlier arrived miles south of here at Crépy-en-Valois.

Being a minute or two early [for the start of the retreat, at 6.30am] we sat down in fours on the right of the road where there were but few houses and had scarcely done this when fire was opened on us from houses at the bottom of the street, and at once the Battalion took to the open ground on the right [north] side of the road. This operation naturally led to companies getting mixed up as it appeared that there was no time to be lost, and in the absence of superior orders each officer did immediately what seemed good to himself. In a very short time the Battalion had opened up, but the general intention was not clear, though the East Surreys, who had not been fired on, and at least two companies of the DCLI, took the ground on the left of the road and began an advance. Gradually more and more men were transferred across the road and across the railway cutting from the high ground near which little groups of men could be seen advancing towards the more obvious Germans who, however, seemed to be firing at us from several directions.

I found that it was impossible to get vehicles across country so kept the Machine-Gun Section on the road on the right of our line [ie the Bazuel road] to prevent the Germans turning our flank, and all the first line transport of the Battalion together with that of the East Surreys was on the road, only further back behind, out of the way of stray bullets.

About 9am, or perhaps later, I discovered that I had lost touch with the Battalion and could not find them, although stragglers indicated that they had retired in a south westerly direction. Eventually I decided to take charge of the vehicles and try to work round and rejoin from