Gommecourt

By Nigel Cave

Designed to act as a diversion to the 'big push', Gommecourt was an attempt to force the Germans to commit their reserves to the front line before the main battle took place. This Battlefield Guide tells the reader what happened and relates it to the ground as it now stands today.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Feb 14, 1997
• ISBN: 9781783409181

Nigel Cave

Nigel Cave is the founder editor of the Battleground Europe series; his association with the Company goes back some thirty years.

Book preview

INTRODUCTION

Gommecourt is a typically sleepy Somme village, protected to its west and north by woodland. In the summer of 1916 it was under German occupation, occupying a quite pronounced salient in the line with reputedly the westernmost point of German occupation in France being marked by the ‘Kaiser’s Oak’ at the extremity of Gommecourt Park.

On 1 July the village was to be the objective of two of the Territorial divisions serving in the British Expeditionary Force - the 56th and the 46th, the former consisting of London regiments and the latter those from the North Midlands. The attack was to be a diversion from the main thrust of the Anglo-French onslaught, which was to stretch from the hamlet of Serre in the north to Montauban in the south. The main battle came under the command of General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army; the attack on Gommecourt under General Sir Edmund Allenby’s Third Army.

Gommecourt, looking East. In the foreground is Gommecourt Park, to its left rear Gommecourt Wood and in the middle distance Pigeon Wood.

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The aim of this diversion was, at the least, to divert German men and equipment from the ‘Big Push’ and to keep them uncertain of the extent of the allied attack. The action at Serre, where the aim of the British was to act as a hinge for the general breakthrough further south, was particularly fraught, and thus the diversion was seen as essential if the Germans were not to concentrate resources on this seemingly insignificant part of France. A minor bonus, if success was achieved, would be the removal of a not particularly troublesome salient into the British lines. Certainly there was absolutely no intention of following up any success, as there were no troops available.

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WELL MET! GREAT BRITAIN JOINS HER ALLIES IN THE FIELD.

As far as the French were concerned, it was about time in July 1916 that the British put some of the pressure on the Germans.

If a diversionary attack had to be launched, Gommecourt was not a particularly suitable spot - it was a well-established German stronghold, the two divisions were recent arrivals to the place (they took over the line in mid May 1916), and if captured positions had to be evacuated, the line of withdrawal was highly vulnerable to German fire. Allenby and VII Corps commander (Snow) both suggested that Arras would be a better place to attract German reserves and artillery - a view with which the Official History concurs, although even this document, generally critical of the Gommecourt attack, is forced to conclude that such an action, ‘would not have prevented the enemy from using the guns which he had in the vicinity of Gommecourt against the northern flank of VIII Corps (attacking at Serre).’

The Germans had fortified Gommecourt extensively, partly because of its naturally strong defensive position and partly because of attempts by the French earlier in the war to oust them. Dugouts were particularly deep (many forty feet and more, with electricity and kitchens), interconnected and with tunnels to the rear; there was defence in depth, with a couple of switch lines; a very strong redoubt (the Maze to the British, Kern Redoubt to the Germans); and reinforced communication trenches that meant that a well-disciplined garrison could contain a breakthrough in any part of the sector.

The British intended to launch their attack at the base of the Gommecourt salient and then join up in the rear, using the German Ist Switch Line as their meeting and consolidation position. This meant that the village proper (and the troublesome redoubt) would be bypassed and dealt with at leisure once the new line was established. This first phase of the attack was scheduled to take thirty minutes. The capture of the village and its related defences, now to the west of the British line, would take place some three hours later, after the position had been softened up by the concentration of artillery. This part of the plan reveals one of the great weaknesses of the assault - the lack of time for