Bazentin Ridge: Somme

By Edward Hancock

The book covers in detail the attacks of 14–18 July 1916 against the Bazentin Woods and villages and beyond. Walks and tours of the surroundings areas are included with detailed action maps.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Sep 13, 2000
• ISBN: 9781473812291

Book preview

INTRODUCTION

At 03.20 hours, in the indistinct light of the mist-clouded early dawn on the morning of Friday 14 July 1916, the bombardment on the German second line defences, increased to an unprecedented intensity along the 6000 yard front from west of Bazentin le Petit Wood to Longueval and continued for five searing minutes. This heralded the start of what is officially known as The Battle of Bazentin Ridge.

Although this ferocious battle, short in duration, started with a surprise attack, it was not totally unexpected by the German command. In fact, German war records of the time detail the plans which were being effected to strengthen the defence resources on this front following the advances by the allies in this sector since the start of the Somme battle on the 1st July 1916 and the recent bloody capture of much of Mametz Wood.

The battle plan of XV Corps, devised by Fourth Army commander, General Rawlinson, with the agreement of his field infantry commanders, was that, in secrecy and silence, and under the cover of darkness, four divisions of British infantry (9th, 3rd, 7th and 21st) with support troops, were to be in position ready to storm the German second line positions immediately on cessation of the short, intensive artillery barrage. This was received with some reservation by the Commander in Chief and his staff, and scoffed at by General Foch, the commander of the French forces immediately south of the British Fourth Army.

Fourth Army commander, General Rawlinson.

The innovative short barrage (suggested by the artillery commanders of the 3rd and 9th Divisions) carried out by all massed available guns of XIII and XV Corps, was followed by an equally innovative creeping barrage using HE shell only (18-pdr, 4.5-inch and medium howitzers), which proved entirely satisfactory and relatively easy for the infantry to follow.

The first objectives were the capture of the German front and support trenches, from Delville Wood through Longueval, to the south of Bazentin le Grand village and wood and across the south of Bazentin le Petit Wood, to link with III Corps (1st Division), whose objective was to capture Contalmaison Villa, thereby securing the left flank. The second objectives immediately following were to secure Delville Wood, the remainder of Longueval village, and the two Bazentin woods and villages.

An aerial view of the battlefields from above Mametz Wood with the line of the German front line trench indicated.

This operation would enable an immediate assault on High Wood, and the capture of this strategic strong point that lies on the crest of the ridge north west of Longueval. Just how close this operation came to complete success will be evident as the account of the action unfolds. This book covers the action undertaken by the 7th and 21st Divisions, and the adjoining 9 Brigade, and their assaults on the Bazentin woods and villages, the action of the 3rd and 9th Divisions east of the Bazentins to Delville Wood will be, or have been, covered in other books in the series.

Chapter One

A DARING SCHEME: PLANNING AND

PREPARATIONS

The plan devised by General Rawlinson, commanding the British Fourth Army, and his corps commanders for the assault on the second German line of defences: using surprise tactics; using four battalions to attack a 6,000 yard front before dawn, having assumed their forward positions silently, and in secrecy, and in full battle order during the preceding night; and ready to assault the opposing trenches after a short artillery barrage, was not initially accepted by his Commander in Chief, General Sir Douglas Haig.

The British ‘new army’ battalions assigned to this attack, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, were not sufficiently experienced to undertake such a complicated night operation as that proposed. The counterproposal from GHQ was that the Bazentin part of the front (where the distance between the British positions and the German second line defences was shortest) be attacked by the 7th and 21st Divisions some two hours before sunset and, after the successful achievement of objectives, the remainder of the front be then attacked in flank eastwards from the Bazentins, whilst the 3rd and 9th Divisions moved northwards in daylight the following morning.

On 8 July 1916 General Rawlinson issued the preparatory order to attack the German second line, albeit certain key points – Contalmaison, Mametz Wood, and Trones Wood – necessary to facilitate the planned attack, were not yet secured.

As result of the freedom in the air which the Royal Flying Corps were enjoying at this time, the German second and third line positions were photographed carefully, and the ground objectives reconnoitred.

Big guns moving up to the front.

On 11 July a bombardment by the artillery of XIII, XV and III Corps on the German positions began, concentrating particularly on the lines of approach and key reserve points, effectively hindering the forward movements of vital replenishments and troops to the German front line. The progress of ammunition limbers to the British front positions was not particularly affected by German artillery action, (aerial observation being denied by the supremacy of the Royal Flying Corps), but the poor state of the ground between the forward dumps and the guns resulted in each round trip taking up to six hours. In addition there was a general shortfall in the quantity of ammunition available. The consequent restrictions limited the number of rounds allocated per day for the scheduled two day bombardment to: 25 per 15 inch; 50 per 9.2 inch; 110 per 8 inch; and 250 per 6 inch.

When the start of the operation was postponed the total quantity of ammunition allocated was increased to cover the additional day’s requirements. As well as ammunition, all manner of battle materials were brought up by night and stored in the area of Caterpillar Valley; the dumps, in the open, remained undetected and, largely undamaged.

In spite of GHQ doubts about the Corps plan, in the absence of contrary direction, the Divisional Commanders of the 3rd, 7th, 9th and 21st Divisions continued with preparations for a night attack in accordance with their agreed strategy, hoping that their plan would be finally agreed by GHQ.

General Rawlinson accepted and approved the arrangements for the night attack by the 9th Division (Major-General WT Furse) and the 3rd Division (Major General JAL Haldane) and wrote privately to Sir Douglas Haig urging acceptance of the plan. He stated that the alternative plan proposed would greatly reduce the width of the attack front and therefore allow the concentration of German artillery fire, that the element of surprise would be greatly reduced, and that to change the direction of attack and to have two directions of assault would pose very difficult manoeuvres under battle conditions.

This letter, which was received by General Haig early on the morning of 12 July, was augmented at 8 am by a final telephoned appeal from Major General AA Montgomery (Chief of Staff to General Rawlinson) to General Kiggell, the Chief of the General Staff. As a result of these last minute pleas, and encouraged by a report from his Artillery Adviser (Major-General JFN Birch) advising that the artillery was successfully meeting objectives and that a pre-dawn attack would leave the light of a full day to exploit the success, the Commander-in-Chief replied to General Rawlinson that he was now prepared to agree to the Fourth Army plan, and was sending General Kiggell personally to convey his decision agreeing to the plan for night assembly and dawn assault by XIII and XV Corps as proposed, on condition that the flanks were first secured by the capture of Trones and Mametz woods.

On the 12 and 13 July the British Fourth Army Headquarters received repeated telephone calls from the French Sixth Army Headquarters requesting, with increasing insistence, that the planned attack, regarded by the French Command as being foolhardy and doomed to failure, be cancelled.

On the evening of the 13th, General Balfourier, Commander of the French XX Corps,

a much beloved old gentleman, who still wore the French uniform of the Second Empire, complete with wide red trousers,

sent over the British liaison officer, Captain EL Spears, with a final message, pointing out that success was impossible using the inexperienced troops available for the planned night attack. Major-General Montgomery retorted,

Tell General Balfourier, with my compliments, that if we are not on Longueval Ridge at eight tomorrow morning I will eat my hat.

Little did Montgomery know that his remark would be repeated verbatim to the General.

Although some details, and certainly the date, were amended, XV Corps Operation Order No. 17 dated 11 July states that the attack by the 7th and 21st Divisions would start at 3.25 am on 14 July 1916 (was originally planned for the 13th), that the attack would be made in conjunction with a French attack to the immediate south of the British positions (although in fact this did not happen) and that III Corps would establish a strong defensive flank from the south west corner of Bazentin le Petit wood. An addendum added that Contalmaison Villa was to be secured by III Corps at the earliest possible moment, and that the attack was bound to that of XIII Corps (3rd and 9th Divisions) on the right