Salvaging Wesley's Agenda: A New Paradigm for Wesleyan Virtue Ethics

By Kevin Twain Lowery

Kevin Twain Lowery believes that two of John Wesley's most distinctive doctrines--his doctrines of assurance and Christian perfection--have not been sufficiently developed. Rather, these doctrines have either been distorted or neglected. Lowery suggests that since Wesleyan ethics is centered on these two doctrines, they need to be recast in a schema that emphasizes the cognitive aspects of religious knowledge and moral development.
Salvaging Wesley's Agenda constructs such a new framework in three stages. First, Lowery explores Wesley's reliance upon Lockean empiricism. He contends that Wesleyan epistemology should remain more closely tied to empirical knowledge and should distance itself from mystical and intuitionist models like Wesley's own "spiritual sense" analogy. Second, examining the way that Wesley appropriates Jonathan Edwards's view of the religious affections, Lowery shows that Wesleyan ethics should not regard emotions as something to be passively experienced. Rather, emotions have cognitive content that allows them to be shaped. Third, Lowery completes the new framework by suggesting ways to revise and expand Wesley's own conceptual scheme. These suggestions allow more of Wesley's concerns to be incorporated into the new schema without sacrificing his core commitments.
The final chapter sketches the doctrines of assurance and perfection in the new framework. Assurance is based on religious faith and on self-knowledge (both empirical and psychological), and perfection is understood in a more teleological context. The result is a version of Wesleyan ethics more faithful to Wesley's own thought and able to withstand the scrutiny of higher intellectual standards.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Pickwick Publications
• Release date: Mar 15, 2008
• ISBN: 9781630878429

Kevin Twain Lowery

Kevin Twain Lowery is an associate professor at Olivet Nazarene University, where he teaches theology and philosophy. His academic specializations and interests include moral philosophy, Enlightenment thought, and the interaction of ethics with science and religion. He is the author of The Maturity of Belief: Making Religion More Intellectually Sound.

Book preview

Salvaging Wesley’s Agenda

A New Paradigm for Wesleyan Virtue Ethics

Kevin Twain Lowery

2008.Pickwick_logo.jpg

Salvaging Wesley’s Agenda
A New Paradigm for Wesleyan Virtue Ethics

Princeton Theological Monograph Series 86

Copyright © 2008 Kevin Twain Lowery. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in critical articles or reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. Write: Permissions, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 199 W. 8th Ave., Suite 3, Eugene, OR 97401.

www.wipfandstock.com

isbn 13: 978-1-55635-377-2

eisbn 13: 978-1-63087-842-9

Cataloging-in-Publication data:

Lowery, Kevin Twain

Salvaging Wesley’s agenda : a new paradigm for Wesleyan virtue ethics / Kevin Twain Lowery.

Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick Publications, 2008

Princeton Theological Monograph Series 86

xx + 328 p.; 23 cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

isbn 13: 978-1-55635-377-2

1. Wesley, John, 1703–1791—Ethics. 2. Christian ethics. I. Title. II. Series.

BX8495.W5 L69 2008

Manufactured in the U.S.A.

Princeton Theological Monograph Series

K. C. Hanson, Charles M. Collier, and D. Christopher Spinks, Series Editors

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To Jean

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Jean Porter for her input in the writing of this project. She has patiently and persistently helped me to nuance and clarify my thoughts, and I have greatly benefited from her experience and expertise as a scholar and writer. Also, Jennifer Herdt, Randy Maddox, Maura Ryan, and Gerald McKenny all provided comments on earlier revisions of this manuscript which have likewise been invaluable.

Abbreviations for Citations

Edwards

CF Charity and Its Fruits. Edited by Tyron Edwards. Reprint, Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth Trust, 1969.

DM The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God. 1741. Reprint, in Jonathan Edwards on Revival. Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1999.

FW Freedom of the Will. Edited by Paul Ramsey. Vol. 1 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957.

Im Images or Shadows of Divine Things. Edited by Perry Miller. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1977.

Misc1 The Miscellanies (Entry Nos. a–z, aa–zz, 1–500). Edited by Thomas A. Schafer. Vol. 13 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.

Misc2 The Miscellanies (Entry Nos. 501–832). Edited by Ava Chamberlain. Vol. 18 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.

NSC A Narrative of Surprising Conversions. 1736. Reprint, in Jonathan Edwards on Revival. Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1999. (Referenced above in The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God)

OS Original Sin. Edited by Clyde A. Holbrook. Vol. 3 of The Works of Jonathan 
 Edwards. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970.

RA Religious Affections. Edited by John E. Smith. Vol. 2 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959.

Ser1 Sermons and Discourses, 1720–1723. Edited by Wilson H. Kimnach. Vol. 10 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.

Ser2 Sermons and Discourses, 1723–1729. Edited by Kenneth P. Minkema. Vol. 14 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

Ser4 Sermons and Discourses, 1734–1738. Edited by M. X. Lesser. Vol. 19 of The 
 Works of Jonathan Edwards. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.

ThR Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England. 1740. Reprint, New York: American Tract Society, [18—].

TV The Nature of True Virtue. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1960.

Kant

CJ Critique of Judgment. Translated by J. H. Bernard. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000.

CPr Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Lewis White Beck. New York: Macmillan, 1993.

GMM Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by James W. Ellington. 
 Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981.

LE Lectures on Ethics. Translated by Louis Infield. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1963.

LPT Lectures on Philosophical Theology. Translated by Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.

MM The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996.

PP Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Translated by Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983.

Rel Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Translated and edited by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Locke

Disc A Discourse of Miracles. Included in The Reasonableness of Christianity. Edited by Ian T. Ramsey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.

Essay Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Collated and annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser. 2 vols.. New York: Dover, 1959.

Let A Letter Concerning Toleration. New York: MacMillan, 1988.

RC The Reasonableness of Christianity. Edited by Ian T. Ramsey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.

Wesley

CP The Christian’s Pattern, or An Extract of The Imitation of Christ by Thomas 
 à Kempis. Reprint, Salem, OH: Schmul, n.d.

NNT Explanatory Notes upon the New Testament. London: Epworth, 1976.

WHS The Work of the Holy Spirit in the Human Heart. Abridgement of The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God and A Treatise on the Religious Affections. Abridged by John Wesley. Reprint, Salem, OH: Schmul, 1998.

WW The Works of John Wesley. Begun as The Oxford Edition of the Works of John Wesley. Oxford: Clarendon, 1975–1983. Continued as The Bicentennial Edition of the Works of John Wesley. Nashville: Abingdon, 1984–. 35 total vols. to be eventually printed.

WWJ The Works of John Wesley. 14 vols. Edited by Thomas Jackson. London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 1872. Reprinted often. (For the sake of reference, all citations from the Bicentennial edition will also include the volume and page number from the Jackson edition in brackets, e.g. [J x:xxx].)

Introduction

My Interest in This Subject

As a descendent of a long line of Methodists, I was raised in that tradition for the first ten years of my life. My parents subsequently joined a Holiness church, and I was steeped in traditional Holiness teaching in the years that followed. However, I knew very little about John Wesley himself until I discovered him during my days as a seminary student. As I delved into his writings, I became convinced of several things. First, Wesley’s thought is more nuanced than has been commonly assumed. Although he is certainly not the most profound thinker of his time, there are few figures in Christian history who are more eclectic than he is. Indeed, if anyone practiced folk theology, it was Wesley’s followers, not Wesley himself.

I also came to agree with the Holiness tradition that the doctrine of perfection is at the core of Wesley’s theological agenda. However, it became apparent to me that, contrary to what I had been taught, Wesley’s view of perfection is significantly different from that of the Holiness tradition. I found Wesley’s view to be intellectually more sophisticated and appealing than the Holiness view, but this was not surprising to me, because the Holiness people have been shying away from their own teaching for the past few decades. Ironically, one would be hard pressed to hear Wesley’s view articulated today, even in the local church. The vast majority of Methodists gave up on the doctrine of perfection over a century ago, and very few Holiness people know what Wesley actually taught. To their credit, the Holiness people did their best to carry the banner for Wesley, so to speak. Nevertheless, the traditional Holiness teachings on sanctification are based on an overly simplistic, mystical model of moral transformation that cannot be salvaged, but should be abandoned altogether.

Although Wesley’s view is also insufficient by contemporary standards, it does show some promise as a basis for development, because it is founded upon an empirical account of the moral agent. It became my conviction that Wesley’s view of perfection could be developed in a way that would make the doctrine more intellectually viable and more appealing to other Christian traditions. For instance, Catholic spirituality is replete with references to the pursuit of perfection. In contrast, a Protestant emphasis on perfection has been relatively absent outside the Wesleyan traditions. However, this lack can largely be attributed to the Reformation account of sin and depravity. When this difference is taken into consideration, one will find that the vast majority of Protestant traditions are not antinomian, but stress the importance of personal growth and piety. I cannot help but think that a nuanced account of the doctrine of perfection would be a useful resource for a number of Christian traditions.

Formulating a Particular Approach

When I began my doctoral studies at the University of Notre Dame, I intended to explore the compatibility of Wesley’s view of perfection with that of Thomas Aquinas.¹ After all, Aquinas offers an account of perfection that is fairly nuanced, for he outlines the degrees of perfection that one can reasonably expect to attain, depending upon one’s set of circumstances. Moreover, since his virtue theory is a fairly sophisticated development of Aristotelian ethics, Aquinas seemed to be a good resource for Wesleyan thought. This conclusion was grounded in my belief that that Wesley is, in many key respects, an Aristotelian at heart. I believe that it can reasonably be argued that Wesley never veered from his Aristotelian framework. The influence of Cambridge Platonism on Wesley seems to be superficial at best, and Wesley’s attraction to the mystics was short-lived. Of course, Lockean empiricism was a formative influence on Wesley, but this is not incredible, since empiricism itself can be traced back to Aristotle.

It was my desire to develop Wesley’s thought, not merely restate or recover it. As such, I began to research Wesley’s immediate intellectual context, especially his dependence on Locke, the influence that Edwards had on him, and some of the more notable figures in British empiricism. Several things became apparent to me. First, Albert Outler is correct in characterizing Wesley as an eclectic thinker, and this is evidenced in his writings. However, since Wesley did not annotate his writings, his use of other sources will only be recognizable to those who have familiarity with them. Consequently, I came to believe that Wesley is best understood by those who have a certain mastery over the sources that were at his disposal.

Second, Wesley’s thought, in particular ways, is much closer to the Enlightenment than has generally been recognized. George Cell Croft suggested this in the early twentieth century, but it seems that since he overstated his case somewhat, the thesis was too quickly dismissed out of hand. Wesley’s relation to the Enlightenment is more comprehensible when the foundations and limits of his epistemology are more clearly defined. Third, Wesley developed his own thought over time and was thus opposed to dogmatism. Therefore, suggesting that his thought be developed further is actually in accord with his own concerns.

All of this led me to conclude that the best way to develop Wesley’s thought is to follow the trajectory of his thought. From this perspective, the path to Wesleyan intellectual development does not primarily lead to Aquinas, the mystics, the Reformers, or to the Eastern church. Rather, since Wesley’s thought reflects significant interaction with the Enlightenment thought of his day, his thought must now be brought into tension with subsequent elements of the Enlightenment. Wesley is a part of British empiricism, so it stands to reason that the place to start is with Kant, whose thought serves as a corrective to that tradition. My first exposure to Kant’s writings was not very memorable, to say the least. However, I returned to his works several years later, and as I probed them more deeply, I began to have a growing fascination with Kant and his thought. The zenith of this attraction occurred with my first reading of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, which awakened me from my dogmatic slumber.² Since that time, I have come full circle in my respect for Kant, and I now consider myself better able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his thought. I do not consider myself to be a Kantian per se, but I do admire the way that Kant addresses a number of key issues. Besides, he is one of the most pivotal figures in intellectual history.

It is obvious that Wesley’s approach to ethics is vastly different from that of Kant in particular ways. For example, Wesley’s empiricism and stress on the affections do not have Kantian counterparts, yet they cannot be compromised. Nevertheless, Wesley and Kant share some of the same concerns, and Kant’s way of addressing them can inform the way that these concerns are addressed in Wesleyan ethics. My particular reading of Kant may be objectionable to some, but it is one that is defended by Kantian scholars like Barbara Herman and Christine Korsgaard, to name a few. As such, even if my interpretation of Kant is questioned, I do not feel that this prevents my appropriation of Kantian concepts in a Wesleyan schema.

The Significance of This Book for Wesleyanism

For about a century now, Wesleyans have been debating the nature of perfection, whether it should be regarded primarily as a process or as an event. This debate has become rather heated since Mildred Bangs Wynkoop’s book, A Theology of Love, was published in 1972, and although she is now posthumously regarded as a bold voice for change in the Holiness traditions, there is still a strong element of resistance to some of her claims. Most recently, the issue itself has given rise to several polarized groups. Randy Maddox and John Cobb offer a more gradualist reading of Wesley, insisting that a Wesleyan understanding of grace emphasizes human responsibility. Kenneth Collins believes that this reading of Wesley ignores his stress on the instantaneous and unfairly stereotypes the nineteenth-century Holiness Movement.

Along those same lines, Laurence Wood argues that Wesley should be interpreted through the lens of John Fletcher, his intended successor. Fletcher teaches that entire sanctification is essentially a personal, instantaneous experience of the baptism of the Holy Spirit. Meanwhile, Thomas Oord leads a movement to integrate Wesleyan theology with the process thought of Whitehead and Hartshorne. This not only reinforces the more gradualist reading of Wesley (and Cobb is himself a process theologian), Oord believes that such process thought can be used to formulate a Wesleyan response to postmodernism.

What I want to do is offer a realistic account of perfection that sees it as a complex process in which particular processes may culminate in due course. I decided to include the doctrine of assurance in this project not only because it is Wesley’s other distinctive doctrine, but also due to the fact that the quest for perfection and the quest for assurance seem to be at odds with one another. On one hand, when people feel secure about their salvation, they will be tempted to become complacent and not pursue perfection. On the other hand, when they feel the constant compulsion and need to progress morally, they might find it difficult to feel satisfied with their present state. I believe that this tension exists in Wesley’s thought, and, as I will try to show, is one that must be upheld.

I am not offering a proposal that will fully address, let alone resolve, the epistemological debates that exist in Wesleyan circles. However, the very nature of this project requires an analysis of Wesley’s epistemology, and this will be the focus of the third chapter. As my thesis unfolds, it will become apparent that I favor a more gradualist reading of Wesley. To be sure, the instantaneous is stressed in Wesley’s writings, but I believe that the innermost workings of his thought suggest a view of grace like that championed by Wynkoop, Cobb, and Maddox. Wesley often held contrasting views in tension. I will suggest that some of these points of tension should be retained, but I will also propose that others be resolved in a particular direction.

The Broader Usefulness of This Project

This project was designed to function as a solid intellectual study on several counts. Of course, it is a constructive work in the theory of virtue ethics, and it is hoped that Wesley can be introduced as an interlocutor in future discussions on the subject. To date, Wesley’s own views and agenda have not been given due consideration in this dialog. In a broader sense, this project is also a study in Enlightenment thought, focusing on Wesley, Kant, Locke, and Edwards. Perhaps this project can serve as a resource for other studies of these and other Enlightenment figures. Moreover, it is my desire to locate Wesley in the intellectual history of the Enlightenment and introduce him in such discussions.

Nevertheless, the major focus of this project is the development of Wesley’s thought, and it is my belief that if this is carried out sufficiently, his thought can be a helpful resource for a number of Christian traditions. This would seemingly be the case judged by his eclecticism alone. The relevance of Wesley’s doctrines of assurance and perfection may not be quite so apparent. Since these doctrines represent his distinctive contributions to Christian thought, it might be assumed that they would not be useful to other traditions. However, I reject this assumption on two counts. First, assurance and perfection are central to Christianity in general, so they are the proper concerns of every Christian. In virtually every Christian tradition, believers desire to have some measure of assurance regarding their salvation. Granted, every tradition does not embrace perfection as a goal. Nevertheless, the pursuit of perfection is essentially the pursuit of holiness, and this is certainly a vital part of Christianity and relevant to all Christian traditions.

Second, I am offering a development of Wesley that is more fully engaged with the empirical sciences, especially an empirical knowledge of the self. To the extent that other Christian traditions share this objective, this project will be relevant to them. Science is increasingly providing us with a greater empirical account of the human psyche, and I believe that theology is better served when it utilizes science as a resource. Although this project is not interdisciplinary in the fullest sense of the word, it represents an attempt to develop a particular Christian tradition in that direction. As such, it can be a useful resource for moving other traditions in that same direction.

Key Terms in the Book

There are several terms that are used repeatedly throughout the book, each of which may require some explanation as to my precise usage of them. First of all, when I refer to Wesleyan ethics, I have in mind the broad, underlying principles of Wesley’s virtue ethics, not his special ethics which addresses specific issues. In effect, the book is concerned with the formation of Wesleyan moral theory.

The main objective of the book is to construct a paradigm for Wesleyan virtue ethics that is based on a more cognitivist approach to epistemology. I am aware that the term cognitivist has some technical connotations. For example, as Noah Lemos points out,

Critical cognitivism . . . [recognizes] . . . just four sources of our knowledge: external perception, memory, self-awareness or inner consciousness, and reason. It asserts (

1

) that we do know facts about the external world, other minds, and the past, (

2

) that we have no other sources of knowledge, and, therefore, (

3

) our knowledge of the external world, other minds, and the past is yielded by these four sources.³

The position I am advocating for Wesleyanism, and the one that I believe best represents Wesley’s view, is a modified form of this type of cognitivism, distinguished by two qualifications. First, this view would allow belief that God subtly speaks to us through natural means, i.e., the four sources of knowledge. This suggests that God generally communicates to us in ways that do not unduly coerce us or abrogate our responsibility to actively seek truth. In this way, even the truth given in special revelation (i.e., Scripture) is ascertained through our natural cognitive processes. Second, a Wesleyan perspective would certainly hold that since God is not limited, God’s self-disclosure and communication with us are not limited to natural means or to the normal course of events. God certainly has the ability to speak to us directly, and God can likewise choose to act in supernatural ways (i.e., ways that are out of the ordinary). Nevertheless, since there is integrity in divine truth, any knowledge that would presumably be received directly or supernaturally from God will nonetheless coincide with knowledge acquired through natural means. Consequently, even if knowledge were received directly and supernaturally, it would still be empirically or logically verifiable. The important thing is that knowledge is generally attained the natural way, so it is irresponsible to neglect this pursuit in hopes of receiving a direct or supernatural revelation.

This speaks to the type of mysticism that Wesley rejects. He certainly believes that God speaks to us, but he vehemently opposes the notion that natural means can be regarded as secondary or neglected altogether. On the other hand, Wesley also rejects naturalism that does not acknowledge God’s activity or communication with us. Therefore, when I argue that Wesleyan ethics needs to be distanced from mysticism and become more naturalized, I am suggesting that: (1) knowledge is usually mediated through natural means, (2) exceptions to this rule are verifiable through natural means, and (3) we have a duty to pursue knowledge through whatever natural means are at our disposal.

In a cognitivist schema, our knowledge is foundational to our beliefs, feelings, and dispositions. This implies that moral transformation itself is cognitive in nature. Once again, since this occurs through our natural cognitive processes, we are morally derelict if we seek it apart from natural means. This does not mean that one cannot hope for supernatural transformation, but it does mean that one cannot hope for such to the neglect of natural means.

1. My idea of bringing Wesleyan perfectionism into tension with Thomism is by no means novel. A year earlier, Ray Dunning had suggested that the thought of Aquinas would provide fertile ground for constructing a new paradigm for the Wesleyan doctrine of perfection. See Dunning, Christian Perfection. More recently, Stephen Long has undertaken a similar project, arguing that Wesley’s moral theology is akin to that of Aquinas. See Long, John Wesley’s Moral Theology,

171

–

207

.

2. In his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant states that this is the effect that Hume’s writings had on him.

3. Lemos,

73

.

part one

The Need to Develop Wesleyan Virtue Ethics

1

The Loss of Wesley’s Agenda

John Wesley has been called the single most influential Protestant leader of the English-speaking world since the Reformation.¹ That Wesley should be regarded so highly should be of little wonder, for he is a central religious figure in several respects. He is most readily recognized as the founder of Methodism, which not only has been a major influence in British and American religious history over the past two centuries, but continues to be a prominent Christian tradition in the world today. Moreover, Wesley is essentially the progenitor of the subsequent Holiness, Keswick, Pentecostal, and Charismatic Movements, all of which have their roots in the Methodist tradition.

However, Wesley’s importance goes beyond his impact on Christian history, for his eclecticism makes him a key figure for understanding the diverse strands of philosophy and theology that developed in the eighteenth century. According to Albert Outler, the intricacies of Wesley’s thought have often been overlooked, and Wesley is often not fully appreciated.

Obviously, Wesley can be read, and usually has been read, without the broad and intricate tapestry of his sources unfolded as a background for interpretation. This was part of the price he paid for self-divestiture of his theological apparatus. Even so, it is just as this background is recovered and reevaluated that Wesley emerges as a more interesting and impressive theologian than his stereotypes have presented—precisely because he was a folk theologian.²

There has been a renewed interest in Wesley scholarship in the past few decades thanks to the efforts of scholars like Outler and Frank Baker.³ However, too little attention has been devoted to the intellectual development of Wesley’s ethical thought. Historically, there has been an apparent lack of interest in Wesley beyond Wesleyan circles, and those who have examined Wesley’s ethics have either limited their investigations to his casuistry (i.e., his special ethics) or they have predominantly focused on theological themes to the neglect of their philosophical underpinnings.

Wesley’s Two Distinctive Doctrines

Wesley did not formulate his own systematic theology, much less a comprehensive moral theory. However, he had two ubiquitous concerns that arguably represent his most distinctive contributions to Christian thought: assurance and Christian perfection. I believe that the basic elements of a Wesleyan moral theory are best reflected in these two doctrines. However, I will suggest that these doctrines have not been substantially developed since Wesley formulated them himself. It is my theory that developing these doctrines will require the concepts that support them to be developed as well. I will propose the type of development that I believe will prove the most fruitful yet remain faithful to Wesley’s own concerns. Creating a new paradigm for Wesleyan ethics will be the first step toward the construction of a more comprehensive Wesleyan moral theory.

The doctrines of assurance and perfection are actually held in tension for Wesley. On the one hand, he wants to be certain of his standing with God. He wants to know not only that his sins are forgiven, but also that God is pleased with his life. On the other hand, Wesley contends that Christians must strive to be perfect as God is perfect, at least in a moral sense. There must be both progress and attainment in the Christian life. As such, the quest for perfection requires that there be some dissatisfaction with one’s present state.

Wesley’s understanding of these two doctrines matured throughout the course of his life, and this maturation of thought was not merely theoretical in nature, because Wesley allowed his views to be shaped by the experiences that he and others encountered. Regarding his understanding of assurance, the defining moment for Wesley was his well-known experience at Aldersgate.

In the evening I went very unwillingly to a society in Aldersgate-Street, where one was reading Luther’s preface to the Epistle to the Romans. About a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation: And an assurance was given me, that he had taken away my sins, even mine, and saved me from the law of sin and death.⁴

This event would later become the cornerstone of Wesley’s doctrine of assurance. At first, he did not interpret this experience as the witness of the Spirit, but as his true conversion. Five days later, he related this experience to a group of people gathered at the Hutton home, alleging that he had not been a Christian prior to that event. This led to an exchange of words between Wesley and Mr. Hutton. Wesley defended himself by arguing that we are saved through faith alone, and he now believed that he had lacked real faith before that time.⁵ It is not surprising that Wesley should take this stance, considering: 1) his Aldersgate experience occurred while someone was reading Luther’s preface to Romans, and 2) he was being heavily influenced at the time by the Moravians, a Lutheran pietist group.

Five more months passed, and Wesley felt that he had not yet received the witness of the Spirit that his sins were forgiven and that he was a child of God, yet he continued to wait patiently. Doing so was difficult, since he had observed others receiving this witness in less than an hour.⁶ Within a year of his Aldersgate experience, Wesley was already expressing serious doubts concerning his status as a child of God. It is important to note here the source of these doubts. For that reason, it is imperative to examine the passage in its entirety.

My friends affirm I am mad, because I said I was not a Christian a year ago. I affirm, I am not a Christian now. Indeed, what I might have been I know not, had I been faithful to the grace then given, when, expecting nothing less, I received such a sense of the forgiveness of my sins, as till then I never knew. But that I am not a Christian at this day, I as assuredly know, as that Jesus is the Christ.

For a Christian is one who has the fruits of the Spirit of Christ, which (to mention no more) are love, peace, joy. But these I have not. I have not any love of God. I do not love either the Father or the Son. Do you ask, how do I know whether I love God, I answer by another question, How do you know whether you love me? Why, as you know whether you are hot or cold. You feel this moment, that you do or do not love me. And I feel this moment, I do not love God, which therefore I know, because I feel it. There is no word more proper, more clear, or more strong.

And I know it also by St. John’s plain rule, If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For I love the world. I desire the things of the world, some or other of them, and have done all my life. I have always placed some part of my happiness in some or other of the things that are seen. Particularly in meat and drink, and in the company of those I loved. My desire, if not in a gross and lustful, yet in a more subtle and refined manner, has been almost continually running out towards this or that person. For many years I have been, yea, and still am, hankering after a happiness, in loving, and being loved by one or another. And in these I have from time to time taken more pleasure than in God. Nay, I do so at this day. I often ask my heart, when I am in company with one that I love, Do I take more delight in you or in God? And cannot but answer, In you. For in truth I do not delight in God at all. Therefore I am so far from loving God with all my heart that whatever I love at all, I love more than God. So that all the love I have is flat idolatry.

Again, joy in the Holy Ghost I have not. I have now and then some starts of joy in God: But it is not that joy. For it is not abiding. Neither is it greater than I have had on some worldly occasions. So that I can in no wise be said to rejoice evermore, much less to rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory.

Yet again: I have not the peace of God, that peace, peculiarly so called. The peace I have may be accounted for on natural principles. I have health, strength, friends, a competent fortune, and a composed, cheerful temper. Who would not have a sort of peace in such circumstances? But I have none which can with any propriety be called, a peace which passeth all understanding.

From hence I conclude (and let all the saints of the world hear, that whereinsoever they boast, they may be found even as I), though I have given, and do give, all my goods to feed the poor, I am not a Christian. Though I have endured hardship, though I have in all things denied myself and taken up my cross, I am not a Christian. My works are nothing, my sufferings are nothing; I have not the fruits of the Spirit of Christ. Though I have constantly used all the means of grace for twenty years, I am not a Christian.⁷

It is my contention that Wesley was driven by an ascetic moral rigorism, especially in his earlier years. He seemed to believe that all of our thoughts should be continually centered on God. One wonders whether the attainment of such an ideal is even psychologically possible. Likewise, the slightest offense or omission caused him great anguish. For instance, it is a well-known fact that throughout the course of his life Wesley lived as frugally as possible and gave the bulk of his income away to the poor. Moreover, he believed that each of us has a moral obligation to live the same way.

Perhaps you have not seen it in this light before. When you are laying out that money in costly apparel which you could have otherwise spared for the poor, you thereby deprive them of what God, the proprietor of all, had lodged in your hands for their use. If so, what you put upon yourself, you are, in effect tearing from the back of the naked, as the costly and delicate food which you eat, you are snatching from the mouth of the hungry. For mercy, for pity, for Christ’s sake, for the honor of his gospel, stay your hand! Do not throw this money away! Do not lay out on nothing, yea, worse than nothing, what may clothe your poor, naked, shivering fellow-creature!⁸

When Wesley is judged in light of these moral preconceptions, he can hardly be faulted for desiring to be assured that his life is pleasing to God. Nevertheless, this does not obviate the need to scrutinize these preconceptions so that a more acceptable doctrine of assurance may be formulated. I believe that Wesley’s ascetic moral rigorism is countered by the positive place that he gives to self-love and by the duties we have to ourselves. This will also be addressed in subsequent chapters.

After Wesley felt that he better understood the witness of the Spirit, he defined it as follows:

The testimony of the Spirit is an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God, that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given himself for me, and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God.⁹

The connection between this statement and Wesley’s account of Alders-gate is patent. Not only are the same themes expressed, there is great similarity in the language as well. Apparently, this account is Wesley’s way of overcoming his own self-doubt and fear, and he practically admits as much, since he claims that the direct witness of the Spirit brings peace to those who are otherwise plagued with doubts.¹⁰ The direct witness also gives assurance to those who strive to be pleasing to God, but have no consciousness that they are forgiven.¹¹ Once again, it seems that Wesley has himself in mind.

Wesley also acknowledges the necessity of the indirect witness, which is essentially the witness of conscience.¹² The content of this judgment is primarily the observance of the fruit of the Spirit in one’s own life. Nevertheless, Wesley asserts that there is a direct witness of the Spirit beyond one’s self-evaluation, and he believes that this assertion is validated both by the plain natural meaning of Scripture and by the experience of many.¹³ Even if Wesley does not assume that other people share in his doubts and fears, he certainly supposes that all Christians experience trials and temptations, at least from time to time. When faith is tested in this way, only the direct witness can grant assurance.¹⁴

One might think that Wesley would eventually back away from these claims, especially after he had been repeatedly criticized for making them, but such was not the case. Instead, he continued to defend his basic definition twenty years later. In fact, he added to it. Whereas he had earlier claimed that the Spirit witnesses to us directly, he later asserts that this takes place immediately and directly.¹⁵ The emphasis on feeling is increased as well, for his later discourse describes the immediate influence of the Spirit as bringing a sweet calm.¹⁶

Wesley is indeed aware of the possibility (perhaps probability) that his insistence on the direct witness of the Spirit might lead to exaggerations and aberrations. If we deny it, there is a danger lest our religion degenerate into mere formality. . . . If we allow it, but do not understand what we allow, we are liable to run into all the wildness of enthusiasm.¹⁷ However, he is willing to run this risk, because he regards this as preferable to the omission of the doctrine altogether.

It more nearly concerns the Methodists, so called, clearly to understand, explain, and defend this doctrine, because it is one grand part of the testimony which God has given to them to bear to all mankind. It is by his peculiar blessing upon them in searching the Scriptures, confirmed by the experience of his children, that this great evangelical truth has been recovered, which had been for many years well nigh lost and forgotten.¹⁸

According to Randy Maddox, many aspects of Wesley’s thought weave around his doctrine of assurance.¹⁹ Likewise, John Cobb indicates that Wesley’s doctrine of assurance is closely linked to his pneumatology, for it is in this doctrine that Wesley’s belief in the immediate working of the Holy Spirit is