Art of Generalship

By Lt Gen K K Khanna (Retd)

History has thrilling accounts of brilliant Generals leading small armies to defeat huge forces of their opponents. Better the Generalship, greater the victories.

The Indian Army too has produced many great Generals, who have defeated evil designs of adversaries. Yet they have produced none like Rommel, Manstein, Model, or even like some old Indian warriors like Maharana Pratap, Hari Singh Nalwa, or Zorawar Singh.

India can and must produce Generals of that calibre; Generals who don’t just defend territory or restore status quo, but those who annihilate aggressors, to teach memorable lessons to adversaries who transgress, who initiate punitive actions for conventional and nuclear deterrence to be effective.

To produce Generals of such calibre, the first step is to understand what is good a Generalship. Then study Generalship in previous conflicts to appreciate achievements and also learn lessons from opportunities missed. Only then the Armed Forces can institute measures to improve the quality of Generalship for the future. This book is written to facilitate such study, in that order.

• Language: English
• Publisher: VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd
• Release date: Jan 1, 2015
• ISBN: 9789382652939

Book preview

PREFACE

My article ‘Army’s Most Critical Deficiency - Good Generals’ published in November 2012, was widely circulated and appreciated. While it raised eyebrows of many Generals, one colleague who appreciated my analysis asked me whether I intended following it up with recommendations for improvement. I declined explaining the subject was vast, and a whole book could be written on the subject. I did not anticipate that Lt Gen PK Singh, Director USI, would convince me to undertake a project under the Field Marshal Cariappa Chair of Excellence of the USI, to produce such a book. This book is the result of that brief conversation in December 2012. In a number of discussions thereafter, Gen PK has given me mature and balanced advice that I acknowledge gratefully.

This book is not a critique of senior leadership. It aims to bring out the achievements of Indian Generals and recommend measures to produce even better Generals in future. The recommendation to improve is not criticism; there is always room for improvement. Good is not always good enough. It can be improved in many ways, and we must aim to excel to produce outstanding Generals in future. In fact the resistance of seniors to accept that there is room for improvement is the biggest weakness in senior leaders in every field.

Many Generals hold the view that the system of assessment, reporting, and selection is the best that human brains can device, because the Generals are themselves the products of that system. Though even I have been approved and promoted by the same system, without having to represent at any stage, I have seen the potential of far too many officers wasted and a larger number promoted much above their competence levels to very high ranks; who have then bred mediocre officers below them. Most officers, including some in top ranks, firmly believe the system needs improvement.

There is no dearth of books on Generals, mostly biographies describing the lives of Generals or memoirs narrating course of their own campaigns or revealing ‘untold stories’, but very few books on Generalship and how Generals and equivalents should be produced. I analyse Generalship only from performance in wars and that too from accounts recorded by both adversaries wherever published.

For assessing Generalship in peace or ‘no war no peace’ or in internal conflicts, the feedback of subordinates provides reliable inputs. This has added to my own experience of over 50 years, having served in disturbed areas in every rank from 2/Lt to Lt Gen, except one. Having imparted instruction to Army personnel from recruits in an infantry training centre, to cadets at the Indian Military Academy, to post graduate students at the Defence Services Staff College and to prospective unit commanders at the Senior Command Wing at the Army War College, I know how leadership is developed in the Army. Having attended the Higher Command Course and the course at NDC I am aware how the Nation trains officers for senior ranks.

Add to this the knowledge and experience gained in command of formations, and finally having dealt with the products of the existing system in senior ranks, I strongly feel a few steps are essential to improve the quality of senior leadership to enhance combat effectiveness of the armed forces manifold.

In the accounts of Indian wars one would notice that in all books accounts of the land, air, and sea operations are found in different chapters. Possibly because the Services actually fought separate wars, by and large. Is that how India plans to fight in future? With Nations holding nuclear weapons?

The Defence Ministers have been responsible for the Defence of India. Then why is there no account of their contribution in any of the past conflicts, including the accounts produced by the MOD? It would be obvious that the Higher Defence Management needs a complete overhaul to be effective. At the same time we need more broad minded Generals, Air Marshals and Admirals for Higher Defence Management to fully utilise the military might of India in times of crisis, or else the Nation will pay a very heavy price without ever realising why.

In this book, maps are provided to help even the casual readers grasp campaigns in foreign lands but maps of Indian campaigns are not included since the campaigns are discussed at strategic and operational levels where the places mentioned are very well known. The Generals have executed no operational maneuvres which need maps for comprehension of the actions.

I would like to place on record my thanks for the help I received from a large number of learned personnel, in particular Lt Gen RK Nanavatty whose inputs helped ensure the book does not convey only my personal beliefs and views.

I received very useful feedback from young officers at the Indian Military Academy, from all arms and services and coming from different formations. Some had been my cadets when I had been the Commandant just a few years back.

Lt Gen Bakshi Joginder Singh, my first CO in 1967, patiently heard the planning of the entire project and offered sane advice. He was kind to write the foreword for the Book before he passed away on 19 July, before the book went for print.

Lt Gen Rajiv Bhalla, Colonel of the JAT Regiment gave very useful inputs. He has been Commander of the Higher Command Wing at the Army War College, has been the Director General of Military Training, and is now the Military Secretary.

I record my gratitude to Brig HS Chaudhary, my CO when I first commanded a rifle company, who read every word of the book and buoyed me up with his enthusiasm, whose mature comments balanced my views. With his passion for Indian History, his spirit and driving force, he took the trouble to carry out research, and procured books to give me valuable advice.

Invaluable has been the contribution of Col BD Dangwal, a thoroughbred regimental soldier and gentleman with the highest values, who came in when I wrote the draft and was looking for a very balanced personality to read it before I finalised the project report to the USI.

And last, I gratefully acknowledge the patience, advice and assistance received from Madhulika my wife, Kalika, our daughter and Mrs Urmila Bhalla, the elder in our family who inspired me whenever I wavered.

This book is written not so much for officers who are already senior, as it is for officers who will rise to senior ranks in future and who are convinced that Indian Generalship needs to be better, and it can be improved. It is also written for the policy makers in the service HQs, in the MOD, other civil servants, analysts in the academic field, and the Media because their understanding of defence affairs will benefit the Services tremendously.

Though the book focusses on the Army, the principles apply equally to all the Services i.e. the Navy, IAF, civil services, the police forces, and the corporate world.

Lt Gen KK Khanna. PVSM, AVSM**

Veteran of the Indian Army

INTRODUCTION

Few people outside the Armed Forces realise that it is India’s good fortune that the Indian Army has produced so many great Generals in its short history of 67 years. From the disorganised forces that India inherited in August 1947 the Indian Generals raised a completely professional and patriotic Army for the newly emerged Nation, despite indifferent political leadership. Even before the armed forces could be fully organised, equipped, and trained, the Army and the IAF had to fight the first war to defeat Pakistani aggression in J&K, and to help consolidate the Indian Union.

Under the colonial hangover, the Government appointed British officers as Commanders in Chief of the Indian Army and of the three regional commands that existed at the time. Within a few months the C in C’s loyalty was doubted and he was replaced by another British officer. In one year thereafter the Government realised its folly and decided to appoint an Indian as the Commander in Chief. The Indian Army then produced some outstanding Generals such as Cariappa, Thimayya, Sam Manekshaw, PS Bhagat, Inder Gill, Sagat Singh, and many others who organised, and trained the Army despite severe constraints imposed by the Government. Some other Generals whose names are taken with reverence are Harbaksh, Bakshi Joginder Singh, ML Chibber, Hanut Singh, Nanavatty, and Mohinder Puri. Naval officers admire Admiral Pereira.

When Mr Krishna Menon was appointed the Defence Minister, many mediocre officers were promoted to high positions, and good officers sidelined. Though the India-China confrontation was completely a Government bungle, and no amount of military advice would have changed the minds of the National leaders of that time, better Generals would have refused to deploy in penny packets, as Gen Thimayya had refused, and would not have accepted impossible tasks such as capture of the Thagla Ridge, as Gen Umrao had wisely done. Had their successors had such moral courage, it is doubtful if there would have been any clash of arms with China at all. That is what the Government, the bureaucrats, and intellectuals must realise. By removing professional Generals and bringing up compliant followers the Government of India brought upon itself and on the Nation, the greatest debacle India has had to face to date.

Recovery is always slow with the result that excellent opportunities were lost in later conflicts, to teach memorable lessons to aggressors.

In 1965 when 3 JAT, an infantry battalion, crossed the Ichhugil Canal and reached Batapore on the outskirts of Lahore without any Air or artillery support, instead of exploiting the bold crossing they were asked to fall back. In Punjab the Indian Army had seven armoured regiments and the IAF had plenty of combat aircraft. Yet the Generals failed to utilise the combined combat power to completely annihilate all aggressors east of the Ichhugil Canal. In 1971 they repeated the mistake of ending the war in the West with Pakistan holding some Indian territory even when we had more than adequate force and time, to not only dislodge the aggressors but to annihilate them. Why did we fail to utilise all our combat power? Because we didn’t have Generals like Rommel, Guderian or Manstein says the Deputy Director of the USI.

How true! It is easy to raise huge armies but difficult to train good Generals to lead them. Without good Generals even the strongest forces, with all modern weapons fail to achieve the National war aims, whereas under bold, dynamic, and professional Generals far smaller forces win spectacular victories.

This problem is not peculiar to the Indian Army. In 1984, a publication ‘America’s First Battles’ revealed that the US Army had performed poorly in the opening battles of all wars because of incompetence of senior leaders to handle large forces. In his book ‘The Generals’, Thomas Ricks concludes that in all American wars the junior leaders and the men knew their tasks better than the Generals knew theirs. Accountability for a private losing a rifle was greater than a US General losing a War.

What is good Generalship? Generalship is not mere planning and issue of orders followed by monitoring of situation reports. It involves inspiring the Command to achieve what the Generals desire, and much more. Outstanding Generals are seen where decisive actions are being fought. Fortunes of war follow them. History is full of examples of battles won against heavy odds due to sheer presence of outstanding Generals. Some of these bold Generals are killed in combat, but the forces they lead are always victorious. One may recall brave Indian Generals like Hari Singh Nalwa and Zorawar Singh died heroic deaths with lances through their chests as they led their men against their foes.

To produce Generals of such calibre it is essential to first read about outstanding Generals. To facilitate study, the achievements of some famous Generals are described in the Book before it examines Generalship in Indian wars fought till date, highlighting both achievements and opportunities missed.

Could we have produced better Generals and equivalent in the past? Of course we could, and we should have; had we realised the need. Why didn’t we, and what is wrong with the present leadership, is of academic interest. What should concern the Higher Defence Management today is how we can produce better Generals and equivalent in future. Young officers must realise how they can develop into outstanding leaders of tomorrow and groom even better leaders for the day after tomorrow.

Senior officers in all three Services must understand the importance of political control and role of bureaucrats in India. They must be clear about future challenges both external and internal over the entire spectrum of conflict from Low Intensity, to the use of Strategic Weapons. They must appreciate the need for synergy to fight one war for the Nation, instead of each service fighting a different war. In the interest of the Nation they must try and educate the political leaders and the bureaucrats about the positive role they can play in building synergy in the Armed Forces and building the most cost effective Armed Forces to meet India’s future needs.

Having done that, they must initiate steps to produce outstanding leaders who would go on to become outstanding Generals, admirals, and air marshals.

A General is the product of training and experience of his complete service which can stretch from 20 to 40 years. Inputs are essential from the earliest stages when the officers enter service at their most impressionable age. Thereafter checks and inputs are required throughout the service to develop desired skills. Officers need combat experience at an early age to avoid becoming ‘paper tigers’. Training with all arms and Air is essential for the officers to gain experience in handling large forces, in particular armour formations.

Character development is most important and must receive greater attention from pre-commission training itself. This is not developed through lectures or reading books. For this senior officers must try to be role models for their subordinates to emulate. Those who cannot, must be removed. Also, officers who fail to assess the subordinates objectively must be weeded out. For accurate assessment of officers, feedback is essential from peers and subordinates to check on character and leadership qualities.

In short, even though the Armed Forces have produced excellent officers in the past, correctives are necessary to ensure we produce even better Generals and equivalent in future. What correctives? Explaining that is the purpose of this book.

Our civilian friends will find this book useful for their organisations as well. All organisations, without exception, can benefit by improving top level leadership. High grade leadership can neither develop on its own, no matter how much one pays, nor can it be imported. It has to be developed by measures outlined in the book, intelligently modified for civil application.

PART 1 - SOME FAMOUS GENERALS

THE GERMANS

General Model

On 12 January 1942 a prong of the Soviet Winter Offensive threatened the entire Ninth German Army in the Central Army Group. Soviet tanks rumbled past the HQ of the Army and the Front was only half a mile away. In the map room of the HQ at Sychevka were present the chief of operations with the General commanding 1 Panzer Division and some other officers. The chief of operations acquainted those present with what he called a ‘bloody mess’. The Russians had broken through their 23 Corps. At the same time they had attacked 6 Corps. Since 11 January there had been attacks from the northwest towards Sychevka. Those present grasped the desperate situation, but were surprised at the absence of the C in C and the Chief of Staff. The chief of operations explained they were expecting their new C in C, General Model.

Three months earlier Model had been GOC 3 Panzer Division, part of Guderian’s Panzer Army. Model was a short wiry man born in 1891. He was known throughout Army Group Centre and was popular with the troops. Everyone knew where Model was, good fortune of war was present. Lt Col Blaurock explained the situation had become really critical in the last 48 hours. Two soviet armies had been pouring in through a gap, with armour, infantry, and columns of sledges. Nine Russian divisions had already got through. German 23 Corps had been encircled. The Russians were about to cut the railway line to Rzhev. They had entered the railway yards but were busy looting.

Just then an orderly announced General Model.

The new C in C stepped into the room. The man radiated energy and fearlessness. He stepped to the map and studied the latest entries. Rather a mess he said. Blaurock said that he had informed those present about the situation and plans to stabilise the situation.

Model nodded and then the first thing to do will be to close the gap up here he ran his hand at red arrows west of Rzhev, we’ve got to turn off the supply tap of the Russian divisions which have broken through. And from down here - Model put his hand at Sychevka - we shall then strike at the Russian flank and catch them in a stranglehold".

The officers were amazed at such optimism. Blaurock summed up their astonishment in the cautious question: and what, Herr General, have you brought us for this operation?

Model calmly regarded his chief of operations and then said, Myself and burst out laughing.

With a great sense of relief they all joined in the laughter. It was the first time in many days that loud and happy laughter was heard in the map room of the Ninth Army. A new spirit had moved in.

Map 20.At the beginning of January 1942 the Soviets broke through the front of the Ninth Army and drove deep into the rear of Army Group Centre. A most critical situation had arisen.

It was a strange thing but the moment Model took over the regiments seemed to gain strength. It was not only the crisp precision of the new C in C’s orders - but he also turned up everywhere in person. While his chief of staff looked after staff affairs, Model was at the front.

He would suddenly jump out of the command jeep outside a battalion HQ, appear on horseback in snow in the foremost line, encouraging, commending, criticizing, and occasionally even charging against enemy penetrations at the head of a battalion, pistol in hand. This live wire general was everywhere. And even where he was not his presence was felt.

In daytime Model would spend one hour with his maps and 10 hours with the troops. Wherever he appeared he had the effect of a battery recharging the spent energies of the unit commanders.

It was largely this presence which decided the battle. Mere defence in the areas held did not lead anywhere, Attack! Regain the initiative! Impose your will on the enemy. That was Model’s recipe.

Where they were short of tanks, the tank crews transformed into infantrymen on skis. By 21 January Ninth Army’s second phase of operations had commenced in 45 degrees below zero. Regimental and division commanders had asked Model to postpone the attack because of the frightful cold. Why, gentlemen? Tomorrow or the day after won’t be any warmer. The Russians aren’t stopping their operations.

Attack - that was Model’s element. His great achievement in January 1942 was leading Ninth Army from a hopeless situation of desperate all round defence, into a liberating counter offensive with clearly defined centres of gravity.

By 23 January the spearheads of the cut off 23 Corps and 6 Corps shook hands cutting off the corps of 29th and 39th Soviet armies. It was the great hour for Model.

5,000 Russians were taken prisoner, 27,000 lay dead. Six rifle divisions had bled to death, four had been smashed, and nine more as well as five armoured brigades had suffered heavy casualties. German casualties too had been heavy. Model had turned the tide of battles on the Central front. On 01 February Model was promoted Colonel General.¹

General Heinz Guderian

In 1939 - 40 Germany’s forces were numerically insufficient to overcome any major power. Her spectacular victories in the first few years of the War were made possible only due to the panzer forces that Guderian had created, trained, and audaciously led. Guderian’s break through at Sedan and lightning drive to the English Channel virtually decided the Battle of France. In the words of Manstein apart from the energetic leadership of Colonel General v Rundstedt, this success was primarily due to the tremendous verve with which General Guderian translated the Army Group’s operational principles into action².

Guderian commanded 19 Panzer Corps which had three panzer divisions and one infantry regiment besides artillery, AD and other troops, part of von Kleist’s Panzer Group under the Twelfth Army (General List) of Army Group B. Guderian advanced with all three panzer divisions up. The advance through Ardennes commenced on 10 May. On the 13th they crossed the Meuse River and continued the advance despite frequent orders to halt, by von Kleist.

On the 17th Guderian once again objected to the order to halt. After a heated argument with von Kleist Guderian offered to resign sending the information to the Army Group. Rundstedt sent General List to clear up the matter. General List clarified the order had come from the German High Command. Guderian convinced the General of the need to maintain the momentum of advance. They agreed to allow the panzers to advance as ‘Recce in Force’ keeping the Corps HQ static. Guderian functioned from an Advance HQ. To avoid passing orders on radio a line was laid from the Corps HQ to the Advance HQ. This was to prevent the German High Command monitoring his radio transmissions. The panzer divisions continued advance under a newly coined term ‘Recce in Force’.

The aggressive spirit of Guderian’s soldiers is shown by an incident on 20th May. A battalion holding a bridgehead across a water obstacle left the bridgehead without handing over to the following troops, so as not to be late for the attack on Amiens. The infantry battalion commander, who had to take over, fumed at the ‘casual behaviour’ of the panzers division’s battalion commander. He was infuriated to be told, If it is lost, you can capture it again. I captured it in the first place didn’t I? For the battalion commander capture of Amiens was more important than simply holding a bridgehead!

Guderian’s troops were the first to reach the Atlantic on the 20th. They captured Calais, Boulogne and were about to advance to Dunkirk when on 24 May they received Hitler’s orders to halt and leave the destruction of the withdrawing British Expeditionary Force to the Luftwaffe.

During the lightning advance Guderian drove to the forward troops of each division every day. There was complete trust within his Corps and tremendous spirit which kept his men advancing every day for 15 days from 10 to 24th May 1940, without rest. Once, a division commander indicated inability to move due to shortage of fuel. Guderian refused to accept this excuse and ordered the division commander to recheck the stocks which were found sufficient. He realised ‘shortage of fuel’ was often offered as an excuse by formations which did not want to advance.

For the next phase of the German offensive to capture southern France, Guderian was made a Panzer Group Commander with two army corps with two panzer divisions and a motorized division each. The advance was comparatively easy and Guderian’s leading troops reached the Swiss border in seven days. Guderian then asked his corps to advance NW to trap the French forces. It was then he got the orders to wheel NW. Six years later von Leeb, the neighbouring Army Group commander, asked how he had been able to attack objectives in the NW so quickly. Guderian explained that as Panzer Group Commander he had the same perspective as that of the Army Group and therefore had already taken action even before receipt of orders.

In 1941 Guderian led the Second Panzer Group of three panzer corps to the gates of Moscow. Though they had Panzer IIIs and IVs, the Russians had heavier T 34 tanks which soon appeared on the battlefield and surprised the Germans. Thus the Russians not only enjoyed numerical superiority but even quality. Yet the Germans drove deep into Russia to the very gates of Leningrad and Moscow and nearly captured Stalingrad in the south, due to superior leadership of the Wehrmacht.

Guderian’s offensive commenced with tanks driving 13 feet below the water level of the Bug River, for which they had prepared. During the offensive he visited his advancing troops constantly and often got involved in the firefights. In one such fight when he drove through the surprised Russians the latter announced him killed in action. Over radio he informed them he was still alive.³

During the offensive the panzer groups swung north and south to annihilate the Russian armies near the border following the concept of Op Barbarossa. This had led to debates on whether the armies should thrust deep to capture their terminal objectives in 1941 or to get involved in destruction of the Russian forces. Hitler’s belief that ‘a kick at the door would bring the whole rotten structure down’ proved to be false, hence his opening of the second front in the East proved to be a blunder at the strategic level. Once the Russians recovered, German defeat in the east was certain. Whatever chances had there been of the Russians rising against the Bolsheviks evaporated due to Hitler’s own orders regarding treatment of civilians in Russia.

The brilliance of the German Generals was wasted due to a strategic blunder by Hitler.

General Erwin Rommel in North Africa

To raise the morale of his army Gen Auchinleck had to write the following letter to his formation commanders:-

"There exists a real danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a kind of magician or bogey-man to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able. Even if he were a superman, it would be highly undesirable that our men should credit him with supernatural powers.

Please ensure that this order is put into immediate effect, and impress upon all commanders that, from a psychological point of view, it is a matter of the highest importance."

CJ Auchinleck

General

C in C

Here was a General worthy of study.

A complete rout of the Italians in North Africa forced Hitler to deploy German troops to protect the approach to Tripoli. Rommel was sent with a light armoured division. On 31 March Rommel attacked. British 2 Armoured Division and an infantry division fell back all the way to the Egyptian frontier by 11 April 41. Most of the British force was destroyed. The British continued to hold the port cum supply base of Tobruk.

Had Hitler sent Rommel one German Division before defeat of the Italians in North Africa instead of after, the British would have been driven out of Egypt. An example of a good decision by Hitler, taken four months too late.

On 15 June 41 Wavell launched Op Battle Axe with British 7 Armoured Division. The German 88 mm guns inflicted heavy damage. Rommel counterattacked with a panzer division on 17 June and by evening Wavell reported failure of Battle Axe. Rommel’s victory was on account of better handling of armour. Had the British kept their armour concentrated they could have defeated the Germans. Primarily British Generalship was poor.

During the summer of 1941 the Germans