Dividing Lines

By K.N. Raghavan

The chessboard of Sino-Indian relations, fraught with emotion, diplomatic strategy, military stand-offs and global ambitions, will perhaps be the most keenly watched during the 21st century; certain to send ripples across the world, influence markets and international policy. So where do the fault lines lie in this contest between the two Asian giants, poised on either side of the Himalayas?

India and China, inheritors of two of the world’s most ancient civilisations have had aeons of neighbourly bonds, cemented by Buddhism and the bridgebuilding missions of Fa Hien, Huen Tsang and Kotnis. No strife was witnessed till the fateful autumn of 1962, when the two countries fought a short and bitter war on the desolate Himalayan heights. Ever since, mutual suspicion, sporadic face-offs and a spirit of competitive nationalism have bedeviled relations between them, even as unsettled borders possess the ability to trigger
further conflict.

In a cogent and comprehensive analysis, the author traces the origins of the discord to the flawed legacy of imperial Britain’s unilateral border delineation and the ebb and flow of Chinese activism in Tibet. The gripping narrative carries the reader from the post-1947 Panchsheel bonhomie to years of mutual distrust, aggravated, among other causes, by Chinese paranoia over Tibet, and Indian public opinion. India’s cataclysmic defeat in the 1962 war, which remains a young nation’s humiliation, is attributed to the ill-advised Forward Policy and failure of the politico-military leadership of the time.

In this revised and updated edition, the author chronicles the events after the 1962 war and the changes in the relationship subsequent to the evolution of China into a economic and military superpower. The impact of China’s special relationship with Pakistan, their apprehensions about the Dalai Lama, the role of USA, and the recurring incidents at the border, including Doklam, are analysed lucidly as are the challenges faced by Indian military and diplomatic establishment in tackling the threat from across the Himalayas.

• Language: English
• Publisher: One Point Six Technologies Pvt Ltd
• Release date: Feb 18, 2018
• ISBN: 9789352010301

K.N. Raghavan

K N RAGHAVAN was born in Kochi, Kerala, where he had his schooling. Having completed an MBBS degree from Government Medical College, Kozhikode, he was doing post-graduate studies in Physical Medicine andRehabilitation at Thiruvananthapuram when he decided to sit for the Public Services Examination and joined the Indian Revenue Service (Customs and Excise). In the course of his career, Raghavan has worked in places as varied as Hosur, Coimbatore, Kozhikode, Kochi, Mumbai and Singapore. He was Commissioner of Customs at Kochi from 2012 to 2017, and is presently Chief Executive Officer, Norka Roots, Thiruvananthapuram.Like most Indians, Raghavan is passionate about cricket. A BCCI accredited umpire, he has umpired One Day Internationals. He has also authored two other books – The World Cup Chronicle and VanishingShangri La: History of Tibet and Dalai Lamas in 20th Century. Married to an ENT surgeon; they have one daughter.Contacts: [e-mail] / www.knraghavan.com

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INTRODUCTION

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE is an offshoot of the ‘Great Game’ – the name given euphemistically to the policy followed by Great Britain to thwart Russian (Tsarist and later Communist) territorial ambitions in Central Asia. To the British, then basking in the glory of their worldwide empire, it indeed was a game – one that involved the formation of strategic alliances that could be dismantled at their whim and pleasure; occasional rapid military thrusts; shifting of national borders by unilaterally effecting cartographic changes to frontiers as suited their convenience; and, on occasions, by resorting to diplomatic pressure and even subterfuge, to bring within their control territories they considered to be vital to their interests or to prevent a possible adversary from laying a claim to them. To an imperialist power administering their territories from faraway London, such games were part of a chessboard-like strategy to protect the limits of their empire and to checkmate the expansion of rival powers. But they left behind sinister portents to haunt the newly independent nations of Asia that came into existence in the aftermath of the World War II.

India and China are home to two of the most ancient civilisations known to mankind. The two countries share a 3325 km-long border stretching from the snow-clad peaks of the Himalayas in the west, to the dense tropical forests of Burma (present-day Myanmar), in the east. But in their millennial history of neighbourly co-existence, they had not fought a war against each other till the fateful autumn of 1962. All invasions of India had taken place through the north-west and the Himalayan mountain ranges acted both as a natural boundary as well as a physical barrier separating her from China. Travel and trade between the two countries had flourished from time immemorial. There also had been rulers and dynasties known for aggressive empire building on both sides; however, they were prudent enough to recognise the futility of sending their armies across the Himalayas and the impossibility of sustaining a successful armed campaign.

The story of how these two countries that had never had any territorial ambitions on each other, could be provoked to fight a war within a decade and half of becoming independent, is indeed a fascinating one. World history is replete with stories of wars of varied kinds – wars instigated by aggressive and maniacal empire builders, wars fought over belief and ideology, wars triggered by rival claims over valuable and enticingly fertile stretches of territory, and so on. The India-China war does not fit into any of these categories. Neither Chairman Mao of China nor Prime Minister Nehru of India, belonged to the breed of empire- builders interested in annexing the territory of the other. There were differences in the ideologies that guided the governments in Peking (present-day Beijing), and Delhi, but these were not serious enough to lead to a full-fledged war. The two nations shared a friendly relationship till 1959, and India was amongst the first nations to recognise the People’s Republic of China after it came into existence in October 1949. Finally, the tract of land at the centre of the dispute could hardly be termed as either valuable or fertile – it was a desolate plateau located at a height of 19,000 feet, which was totally uninhabitable and supported no vegetation.

The manner in which historians of both countries have treated the war is also interesting. For India, the armed conflict ended in abject humiliation, whereas China, unquestionably victorious in the battlefield, declared a unilateral cease-fire and showed to the world something akin to the Churchillian ‘magnanimity in victory’, by withdrawing their troops from where they had reached in one of the two sectors where the war was fought. Chroniclers of Indian history have continued to describe the war as a debacle that caused deep wounds on the Indian psyche and this episode is invariably placed among the major disasters to have struck the nation during its sixty-odd years since independence. However, there has not been any gloating on this matter from the Chinese side. The war with India finds only a small mention even in the most authoritative history of modern China written by Jonathan Fenby, The Penguin History of Modern China, The Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1850-2009. The reference to the 1962 war in this book is even smaller than the mentions made about the other armed conflicts waged by China which were not so overtly successful.

The Sino-Indian boundary has traditionally been divided into three sectors – the western sector extending from the Mustagh-Karakorum ranges in the Himalayas to the river Sutlej; the central sector stretching from the Sutlej to the border of the two countries with Nepal; and the eastern sector covering the stretch from China-India-Bhutan trijunction to the China-India-Burma tri-junction. Geographically also, the three sectors are vastly different from each other. The western sector is constituted by the Kashmir Himalayas, a region that is completely snowbound, barren and almost totally devoid of human and animal habitation. The central sector, in contrast, has been inhabited by civilisations and over the years the frontiers, though not demarcated, had come to be recognised and identified by prolonged usage. The thick jungles of the Assam Himalayas constitute the eastern sector, and these forests are home to various tribes.

The Sino-Indian war of 1962, was fought primarily in the eastern and western sectors and since the disputes over the borders in the two sectors have different origins, they need to be considered separately. The story of the McMahon line in the eastern sector is quite different from and independent of the history of the Kashmir border in the west. The two came to be linked only after 1947, after the imperialist players of the ‘great game’ had left the stage, leaving the baggage of potential discord to bedevil future relations between the two Asian giants.

1. MCMAHON’S RED LINE

Reclusive Tibet

The splendid isolation that Tibet chose for itself till the end of the 19th century had, while weaving a web of mystery around it, also spawned ignorance about its history and the culture of its people. The exact nature of the relationship between China and Tibet has intrigued many observers and historians. Tibetans were ethnically different from the Han Chinese and followed beliefs, traditions and customs influenced by Lamaist Buddhism. The Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political Head of the Tibetans, had shared a special relationship with the Chinese Emperor, ‘more intimate and more equal than the relation between the Emperor and the rulers of Korea and Vietnam’ (two kingdoms that owed allegiance to Peking populated by non-Han Chinese)(¹).

Chinese armies entered Tibet to quell an invasion by Dzungar tribesmen in 1717, and after defeating the invaders in 1720, a military garrison of 2,000 troops under a Military Governor was retained by Peking in Lhasa. The 18th century, which saw China intervening militarily in Tibet three more times, was also the period during which the Chinese emperor started the practice of posting two Commissioners (named ‘Ambans’), to Lhasa for the purpose of ‘ensuring respect to his position’(²). China did not attempt to make Tibet into one of its provinces but the presence of the Ambans with their military escort, ensured that Tibet was not fully independent either. Tibetans did not make any attempts to engage with the rest of the world and those who did, did not meet with much success. China also discouraged direct interactions between Tibetans and foreigners and Tibet remained in this self-imposed isolation till the end of the 19th century.

Assertive Dalai Lama plays the Russia card (1898-1901)

The history of modern Tibet commenced in 1895, when Thubton Gyatso, the 13th Dalai Lama, attained maturity and took charge as the spiritual and political Head of Tibet. This was a significant event as it brought to an end the rule by Regents, which had lasted for almost a century on account of the sudden deaths in mysterious circumstances, of the previous four Dalai Lamas before they had attained maturity.

Tibetan society was in turmoil during this period due to the widespread discontent against the Regents as well as the manner in which Britain had concluded the treaty in 1890, with China defining the Sikkim-Tibet border without involving Tibetans in the negotiations. The Tibetans showed their protest by tearing out the border markers that the British planted, claiming that China and Britain alone could not negotiate the border treaty(³). Tibetan fury was further provoked three years later when Britain and China concluded a convention where it was agreed to permit movement of goods from India to Tibet without any duty for five years and for the establishment of the Trade Mart at

Yating, in Chumbi Valley. Attempts by Britain to persuade China to bring the Tibetans into line did not succeed as China baulked at doing so(⁴). The 13th Dalai Lama realized that Tibet was sandwiched between two great powers, China and Britain, and hence needed support from a third power to break free from their machinations and enjoy real autonomy. He did not have to look afar in this regard, as his teacher and spiritual advisor from his days in the monastery, hailed from Russia, another great power with ambitions in this region.

Agven Dorjiev was a Buddhist monk of Mongol descent, who hailed from the Buriat region of Siberia. He attended the Drepeng monastery in Tibet and in the mid 1880’s was assigned to the 13th Dalai Lama, then still a minor, as his teacher. It was believed that Dorjiev had played an important role in ensuring that the 13th Dalai Lama did not meet the fate of his four immediate predecessors. Dorjiev continued to function as advisor to the Dalai Lama after he attained maturity and took over the reins of power.

In 1898, Dorjiev met Tsar Nicolas II, while on a tour of Europe and in 1900, he led a team of representatives of the Dalai Lama, who called on the Tsar in his Lividia palace and returned with gifts for the Dalai Lama. The visit was repeated in 1901. The news of frequent visits to Russia by the Dalai Lama’s guide and advisor, the warmth with which he was received there, and the importance accorded to the delegations from Tibet by the Tsar himself, created alarm in London and Peking and set in motion a series of events that were to have long-lasting consequences.

A paranoid Curzon stirs Britain to action (1904)

Lord George Nathaniel Curzon had replaced Lord Elgin as the Viceroy to India in 1899. An imperialist of the old school and a confirmed Russophobe, he had travelled extensively through areas in Central Asia that were later annexed by Russia and had his own fears about the machinations of the Russian empire. The reports from St. Petersburg about the frequent visits of Agvan Dorjiev and other lieutenants of the Dalai Lama, worried him as did the possibility of a secret treaty being signed between Russia and Tibet. The situation was made worse for the British by the stubborn determination of the Dalai Lama to cold shoulder all advances made by them to establish contact with him, to the extent that letters addressed to the Dalai Lama from the Viceroy were returned unopened(⁵). So, in a move intended to send a message to the Tibetans as well as to forestall the Russians, Lord Curzon decided to send a Mission, led by Captain Francis Younghusband, to Lhasa, ostensibly to demand proper implementation of the Trade agreement of 1893.

The British Government in London was not very keen on this mission, which they feared might hurt the sensitivities of both Russia and China. However, they agreed to it on condition that it would proceed only up to Khamba Jong. The refusal of the Tibetans to negotiate and the absence of the Chinese, who claimed to have been prevented from reaching there by the Tibetans, prevented any talks at Khamba Jong. These developments forced London to permit the Mission to march further to Gyantse. Though the Mission faced Tibetan resistance at Phari and later at Gyantse, the superior military strength of the British troops ensured that the battles invariably ended in the massacre of the poorly armed Tibetans. The stubborn resistance of the Tibetans to agree to talks even after this, finally led to the Mission being granted permission to enter Lhasa, which it did on 2 August 1904(⁶).

The Dalai Lama flees and Britain dictates treaty

The Dalai Lama and Dorjiev had fled Lhasa prior to the Mission reaching there. British troops could not find any evidence of the activities of the Russians, as they had been led to believe, and they returned to India after getting a treaty signed by the Regent. Having been drafted unilaterally by the conquering Mission, this treaty was heavily loaded in favour of Britain. Tibet was forced to agree to the opening of trade marts and posting of British agents in southern Tibet and it also re-affirmed the Tibet-Sikkim border as fixed by the 1890 treaty. Further, the treaty barred Tibet from entering into any relations with any other country, including China, without the prior approval of Britain(⁷).

China exploits British ambivalence and Russian preoccupation (1905-1907)

However, the blow-hot-blow-cold approach that had characterised British frontier policy, came to the fore again on conclusion of the treaty and the return of the Mission to India. Britain did not make any effort to establish its presence in Tibet, nor did it try to convert Tibet into a protectorate like Sikkim. Instead, they started to promote the concept of Chinese suzerainty, which effectively implied ‘a low level of Chinese administrative and military presence and a high level of Tibetan autonomy and British-Indian influence on Tibet’(⁸). This gave the opportunity to China, who had been observing the developments with alarm, to re-establish their pre-eminent position in Tibet. China also capitalised on British efforts to win their approval for the Lhasa Convention of 1904, by starting negotiations with them and concluding an Anglo-Chinese Convention in 1906. Britain agreed, in the said Convention, not to annex any Tibetan territory, nor to interfere in the administration of Tibet, while China committed that they would not permit any other country to interfere with the territory or administration of Tibet(⁹).

The Russians had protested against the British Mission’s march to Lhasa initially, but their defeat in the Russo- Japanese war and the revolution in 1905, diverted their active attention from Tibet. The Dalai Lama did send a message to the Tsar through Dorjiev from his exile in Mongolia, seeking protection for his return to Lhasa, but this elicited nothing more than a polite answer as Tsarist Russia ‘was not interested in getting entangled in the Tibetan situation’(¹⁰). The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, followed, wherein it was agreed that ‘neither side would enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of Chinese government(¹¹).

The return of the British and flight of the Dalai Lama with his advisors, left the Tibetan population at the mercy of the Ambans, who started making changes in the administration and increasing Chinese presence. The Convention of 1906 emboldened them further and they took further steps to ‘Sinicize’ the state by secularising the administration, planning new roads and telegraph lines and opening Chinese schools and a military college(¹²). The two

Conventions of 1906 and 1907, in effect, amounted to acceptance by Russia and Britain of the supremacy of China in all matters relating to Tibet. Bolstered by this, Peking became bolder and pressed ahead to wrest greater control over the administration of Tibet and the territories to the east. The veteran General Chao Erh Fang, who was deputed from Peking, incorporated eastern and central Tibet under direct Chinese control. In 1910, he sent his forces to Lhasa and took over the administration of Tibet as well. The Dalai Lama, who had returned to Lhasa in December 1909, fled again, this time to India(¹³).

Britain seeks cartographic remedy

The sudden activism of Chinese forces in Tibet alarmed Britain. In 1903, they had been worried about a possible Russian annexation of Tibet, but seven years later, they were confronted with a real and aggressive Chinese presence, immediately across their border. Reports about China getting ready to commence work on the construction of roads linking Tibet to Assam and increased Chinese activity in the region of the Lohit valley, as reported by tribesmen and villagers residing there, added to their anxieties. To appreciate the nature and gravity of the dilemma Britain faced, some understanding of the structure of the administration run by them in the north-eastern region of India is required.

Assam had become a part of the British Empire in India after the first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-1826). The first batch of Europeans who settled in this area cleared the forests and set up tea plantations on the hill slopes. The temptation to extend the area under cultivation was high, especially as it involved additional revenue from the sale of timber as well. However, this also brought the settlers into confrontation with the various tribes, the original inhabitants of the land, who viewed the settlers as aliens trying to usurp their traditional homes and livelihood. The numerous clashes between the two groups prompted the Government of India to move in and draw an ‘Inner Line’ in 1873, individuals being expressly prohibited from moving beyond the line without specific permission(¹⁴). This Inner Line was drawn around the northern boundaries of Darrang and Lakhimpur districts and the Lieutenant Governor of Assam had the discretion to make minor alterations in its alignments. Within the Inner Line, all normal administrative work of the government was carried out and only those persons who were issued special passes could go beyond this line. The ‘Outer Line’ represented the outer limit of the British Empire in India and ran along the foothills of the Himalayas. The distance between the Inner and Outer Lines varied and in some places the territory between the two lines was up to ten miles wide(¹⁵).

The area between the Inner and Outer Lines was the home of the tribes Mishmis (living along the Lohit valley); Abors (along the banks of Dihong); Akaf, Daphlas and Miris (all hills people); and Monpas (in Tawang area). The administration of the British in the tribal areas was a loose one and taxes were not collected there. The Government of India also concluded agreements with the major tribes, winning acknowledgement of its supremacy in the territories as well as arranging protection for trade convoys passing through these areas. There were two established trade routes running through these areas from Assam to

Tibet – the first one ran through the Lohit valley leading to Rima, and the other passed through the Sela and Tawang tracts on to Lhasa.

Lord Hardinge’s frontier headache

Even as they were worried about the active presence of China in the area immediately outside the Outer Line, the British Government was loath to take any action that would bring them into hostilities with the tribes in the area, as previous experiences, especially in the North-West Frontier, had taught them that it was difficult to extricate themselves from such a conflict without heavy losses of men and materials. The predicament that Britain found itself in was summed up by the Viceroy Lord Hardinge in his cable addressed to the Earl of Crewe, the then Secretary of State for India: There is the danger on the one hand that, if the Chinese were permitted to advance to the foot of the hills bordering on the Brahmaputra, serious administrative inconveniences might result. On the other hand it is felt that an extension of our territory right up to the Tibetan frontier might entail collision with the hostile tribes and involve us in obligations which would be inconvenient to assume(¹⁶).

Within the British Administration also, there were two schools of thought as to the strategy to be adopted to meet the challenge posed by China across the frontier. The officials and personnel located nearer the border favoured a more active and aggressive approach, while those further away (Calcutta, Delhi and London), preferred not to make any precipitate moves. The reaction of Lord Hardinge that ‘Chinese aggression would be met, not in the tribal territory bordering Assam but by attack on the coast of China’(¹⁷), was characteristic of the attitude of administrators eho were far removed from the frontiers.

Britain wrests initiative – the Dalai Lama returns (1912)

Two events that took place in the first two years of the second decade of the 20th century, propelled Britain to arrive at a solution to the dilemma faced by them. The first was the murder of Noel Williamson, a British officer, and his armed escorts, by the Abors in March 1911. Williamson had a record of successful expeditions in this part of the country and had moved outside the Outer Line in the past as well, but on this occasion his activities invited retribution from the Abors, leading to the massacre of his entire team. British retaliation was prompt; however, revenge was not the only goal for the punitive expedition team, who were also directed to ‘take the opportunity provided to carry out such survey and exploration as possible, to obtain knowledge requisite for the suitable boundary between India and China in this locality’(¹⁸). In other words, the expedition was to conduct a detailed survey to understand the topography of the territory and provide inputs for deciding on a new Sino- Indian boundary, which would serve the requirement of forestalling any Chinese aggression.

The other event that decisively tilted the advantage in favour of Britain, was the fall of the Qing dynasty in Peking and its replacement by a Republican Government. The sudden weakening of central power was felt in the far-flung provinces, especially Tibet, as the murder of General Chao Erh Fang and the mutiny of Chinese troops, led to the collapse of the military-led administration in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama, who had fled to India in 1910, had moved closer to Britain, in particular developing a close rapport and friendship with Charles Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim. The fall of the Qing emperor prompted the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet in 1912.

Weakened China cajoled into negotiation

The stage was now set for Britain to bring pressure to bear on the weak government in Peking through regular diplomatic channels, to attain their twin objectives of converting Tibet into a buffer state between India and China and pushing the India-Tibet border forward from the foothills to the crest of the Assam Himalayas. British intentions in this regard were detailed in the Foreign Office Memorandum that stated: Tibet, while nominally retaining her position as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, should in reality be placed in a position of absolute dependence on the Indian Government, and ... there should be set up an effective machinery for keeping out the Chinese on the one hand and the Russians on the other...(¹⁹)

To achieve these goals, Britain started exerting pressure on China and complaining about alleged violations of the provisions of the Sino-British convention of 1906. Sir John Jordan, the British Minister in Peking, sent a memorandum dated 17 August 1912, alleging that Chinese officers had assumed all administrative powers in Tibet in accordance with the doctrine propounded in the Presidential Order of 21 April 1912, that Tibet was to be regarded on equal footing with the provinces of China proper. The memorandum stated that while the British Government formally recognised the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, they were not prepared to recognise the rights of China to intervene actively in the internal affairs of Tibet. The Chinese Republic was warned against repetition of the conduct of Chinese officers in assuming all administrative powers in Tibet. China was informed that all communication with Tibet through India would be closed and they were directed to remove their troops stationed in Tibet, except the escort for the envoy.

The memorandum also informed China of Britain’s desire to have a mutual agreement with them, which was also a ‘condition precedent’ for recognition of the Chinese Republic(²⁰). This in effect amounted to China being asked at gunpoint to conclude a fresh agreement with Britain on Tibet, the very recognition of their Government being put on hold to force them to the negotiating table. British efforts finally paid off as China informed them in February 1913, of their willingness to conduct negotiations with Britain as demanded in the memorandum.

The British Foreign Office issued invitations to China and Tibet on 23 May 1913, to take part in the joint conference ‘with a view to settling the Tibetan question by means of a tripartite agreement’. This was a shrewd move as it amounted to giving Tibet a status equal to that of the other two participating countries. As could be expected, China voiced their protest about Tibet being given equal status, but finally succumbed to sustained pressure and issued a Presidential Order appointing Chen-I-Fen (Ivan Chen), as the Chinese plenipotentiary for the tripartite conference. The Dalai Lama also issued a similar order appointing Lonchen Shatra, his Chief Minister, as Tibetan plenipotentiary, authorising him to ‘decide all questions which may benefit Tibet and to seal all documents relating thereto’(²¹).

McMahon enters the scene

Sir A.H. McMahon, Foreign Secretary of the Government of India and its representative to the tripartite conference, was chosen as the Chairman of the conference. He had vast experience as well as a deep, personal interest in the administration of frontier areas, particularly ‘in delimitation of boundaries’. He had served in the Punjab Commission and on the Commission for demarcation of the Indo-Afghan border (Durand Line). Further, as the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India from 1911 onwards, he had access to the reports of the various expeditions undertaken in the area to the north of the Outer Line in the aftermath of the murder of Noel Williamson, and thus had excellent insight into the topography of the region, that his fellow plenipotentiaries lacked. He was ably assisted by Archibald Rose and Charles Bell, two officials who had a deep understanding of the issues at stake. While Rose had worked in China and had firsthand knowledge of the country and language, Bell was the expert on Tibet, having worked as Political Officer in Sikkim, when he also had the opportunity of spending time with the Dalai Lama, then in exile in India.

An unequal parley

The tripartite conference commenced on 13 October 1913, in Darbhanga Palace, Simla. Lonchen Shatra and Ivan Chen laid down the positions of their respective countries at the very outset. While Lonchen Shatra stressed on Tibet’s autonomy and the extent of their territories as far east as Tachienlu, Ivan Chen asserted China’s sovereignty over Tibet and their right to post Amban with military escort in Lhasa. Further, China also refuted the extent of territory as claimed by Tibet.

It was at this juncture that McMahon unveiled the plan that Britain had been working on assiduously – to divide Tibet into two zones, an Outer Tibet bordering India, that would be independent of Chinese control, and an Inner Tibet, where China would retain their erstwhile administrative powers. Outer Tibet was envisaged by Britain to be a buffer state, totally free of Chinese influence and dependent on Britain for its autonomy. Ivan Chen saw through the intentions of Britain and objected, stating that such designations as Inner and Outer Tibet were not known in any document or record; he also challenged the logic governing the division of territory, claiming that much of the area proposed to be included in Outer Tibet, had been under Chinese administration for long periods.

The counter-proposal made by Ivan Chen, offering that the territory west of the Luchiang (Salween) river be under the Government of Tibet, on condition that Tibet recognised the overall suzerainty of China, was not accepted by Tibet and Britain, as it did not meet their objectives. With the conference heading for a stalemate, McMahon decided to bring in the threat of its cancellation to push things forward. China demurred and said that they were broadly in agreement with the draft convention placed by Britain except the article relating to the boundaries of Inner and Outer Tibet (Article 9). McMahon convinced Lonchen Shatra that it was in Tibet’s interest to make further concessions on the issue of territory so as to bring the conference to a successful culmination. Lonchen Shatra agreed to the exclusion of certain areas around the Kokanwor from inner Tibet for inclusion in China proper. McMahon proceeded to work on Ivan Chen, combining tact and diplomacy laced with subtle threat, and was able to convince him to put his initials on the draft convention and the map on 27 April 1914. However, while doing so, Ivan Chen stated explicitly that he required definite authority from his Government before finally signing the Convention(²²).

Historic Conference at Simla (1914)

It was from this point onwards that a series of actions commenced -actions destined to raise questions over the deliberations of the Simla conference, even after the passing of almost a century. Peking, on its part, refused to accept the agreement but indicated their willingness to continue negotiations; they did not recall Ivan Chen nor did they strip him of his authorities. Peking’s intention was to take the deliberations out of Simla where they had to confront McMahon, who was focused only on the border issue, to the authorities in London who were concerned with the overall international situation and trade relations, and hence could be expected to be less rigid on the issue of Tibetan boundaries.

Chinese assumptions were not off target as Jordan, in Peking, and Crewe, the Secretary of State for India in London, were more sympathetic to them than was McMahon. However, they had not reckoned with the determination and perseverance of McMahon, who had by then gained the support of the Viceroy in taking the conference forward to attain British objectives. Further proposals made to China, ceding more territory out of the proposed Inner Tibet to China proper, was met with a counter-proposal from China, which did not find acceptance with Tibet and Britain. As the fears of a stalemate increased, McMahon brought out the threat of bilateral agreement with Tibet to force the Chinese hand. The Viceroy, Crewe and Jordan, all supported McMahon in this step, but while Crewe and Jordan saw the threat as an end in itself, McMahon intended to carry out the threat and call China’s bluff. Thus, on 3 July 1914, McMahon and Lonchen Shatra, signed the Convention and the map, with Ivan Chen making known his Government’s decision that they would not recognise any treaty signed between Britain and Tibet(²³).

McMahon’s action in signing the agreement bilaterally with Lonchen Shatra, proved to be controversial. Crewe had sent telegrams to the Viceroy on 1 and 2 July, instructing that negotiations should be terminated if China refused to sign the Convention. Further, Crewe had sent McMahon a telegram on 3 July itself, informing that he was not authorised to sign the document in the event of China not signing the same. However, this message reached McMahon only after the signing took place and he sought approval for his action of signing the Convention on the ground that he had acted judiciously and in good faith; this was granted subsequently(²⁴).

The gist of the articles of the Convention signed by McMahon and Lonchen Shatra, at Simla on 3 July 1914, is summarised below.

•       Britain and China recognised suzerainty of China over Tibet and autonomy of Outer Tibet, and agreed to respect territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from interference in administration of Outer Tibet, including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama (Article2).

•       China was not to send troops to Outer Tibet, nor station civil and military officers there. Britain was also similarly bound except for escorts of Agents (Article 3).

•       Chinese official with suitable escort, not exceeding 300 men, could be stationed at Lhasa (Article 4).

•       China and Tibet were not to negotiate with one another or with any other Power regarding Tibet, except as provided under treaties of 1904 and 1906 (Article 5).

•       Article III of the 1906 treaty (which gave China various concessions) was cancelled; however Chinese interests were protected by the clause that the term ‘foreign power’ did not include China. Britain was to be accorded Most Favoured Nation status and the treatment was not to be less favourable than accorded to China (Article 6).

•       New trade regulations were to be negotiated between Britain and Tibet without delay (Article 7).

•       The British Agent at Gyantse could visit Lhasa with escort for consultations (Article 8).

•       The borders of Tibet and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet would be as shown in red and blue lines respectively on the map attached to the Convention (Article 9).(²⁵)

McMahon’s Red Line Frontier

The real significance of the Simla Conference and the Convention, lay in the map mentioned in Article 9, which changed the India-Tibet border. The red line drawn by McMahon started at a point on the north banks of the Karakash river and continued through the Isu Razi Pass all the way to Bhutan. By doing so, the extent of the territory of the Government of India, moved forward from the foothills to the crest of the Assam Himalayas, to points immediately north of Walong in the east and Tawang in the west, regions which had till then been administered by Tibet. This, in effect, amounted to adding 50,000 odd square miles of territory to the British Empire in India. Though most of the territory was either uninhabited or having solely tribal populations, it also included the Sela Pass and the Tawang tract to the north of it, which fell on the trade route from Assam to Lhasa. The Tawang Monastery was an important centre of learning for Buddhists and ceding this territory, which was important to them both for religious and trade reasons, would not have been easy for the Tibetans.

Negotiations regarding the new India-Tibet boundary had been conducted separately between Charles Bell and Lonchen Shatra, in February 1914. Tibet sought only two conditions in return for this act of magnanimity:

1.       That Tibetan ownership in private estates on the British side not be disturbed; and

2.       If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fell within a day’s march from the frontier, they should be included in Tibetan territory.

McMahon sent a formal note dated 24 March 1914, communicating acceptance of the two conditions and forwarded two copies of the map of India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, to Lonchen Shatra, who signed on them and returned one copy on 25 March(26).

McMahon’s map