Battlefield Zojila - 1948

By Dr. Sudhir S. Bloeria

During the First Indo—Pak War of 1947, many important battles were fought in Kashmir, which has become part of Indian military folklore. Amongst these, the Battles of Zojila hold pride of place. Our breakthrough at Zojila ensured the security of Ladakh which was gravely threatened by the hostiles at that time.
During this period of armed conflict with Pakistan, some heroic battles were fought. In defensive operations, the garrisons of Skardu and Punch withstood long sieges against very heavy odds and a much larger enemy force. Their performance could do proud of any army. Of the offensive actions launched by the Indian forces, the breakthrough at Zojila would probably rank amongst the three most important battles of the J&K Operations.
The author has covered the account of the battles with due authentication and interviews with people who were part of the operations.

• Language: English
• Publisher: VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd
• Release date: Mar 1, 2021
• ISBN: 9789388161145

Dr. Sudhir S. Bloeria

Dr. Sudhir S. B1oeria, lAS (J&K- 1968) is an ex-Army Officer having served in the Infantry, The Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, from 1966 to1972. He took part in the 1971 war with Pakistan, in the Fazilka sector. An alumnus of the Scindia School Gwalior, he is a science graduate, also holds a Masters Degree in History, and acquired the Ph.D Degree for his thesis on "The Battles of Zojila-1948". A graduate of the National Defence College, New Delhi, he takes keen interest in military history and national security matters. Dr. Bloeria was posted as Special Commissioner, Rajouri and Poonch districts during 1990-1992. He remained Home Secretary to the State Government in 1995 and 1996 when Parliament and Assembly

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BATTLEFIELD ZOJILA

1948

BATTLEFIELD ZOJILA

1948

Dr. Sudhir S. Bloeria

Vij Books India Pvt Ltd

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Copyright © 2021, Sudhir S. Bloeria

ISBN: 978-93-88161-13-8 (Hardback)

ISBN: 978-93-88161-14-5 (ebook)

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No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Application for such permission should be addressed to the publisher.

The views expressed in this book are of the author in his personal capacity.

Contents

Foreword

Preface

List of Abbreviations

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 Overall Situation

Chapter 3 Zojila—The Indian Response

Chapter 4 Abortive Attempts of the Indian Army

Chapter 5 Planning and Preparations for Zojila Operations

Chapter 6 Capture of Zojila and Advance to Kargil

Chapter 7 Post Link-Up Assessment

Chapter 8 Role of Air Force

Chapter 9 Conclusion

Bibliography

Index

Appendices

Appendix-A Distance and Heights Chart

Appendix-B 1 Patiala Defences in Zojila Area on 7 July 1948

Appendix C List of Gallantry Awards

Maps

1. Jammu and Kahmir: A sketch Map

2. Map of Zojila Sector

3. 1 Patiala Defences on Zojila- 07 Jul 1948

4. Push to Dras – 14-15 Nov 1948

5. Zojila Sector- Abortive Attemps 5-14 Sep 1948

6. Zojila Breakthrogh–1-2 Nov 1948

Foreword

During the First Indo—Pak War of 1947, many important battles were fought in Kashmir, which have become part of Indian military folklore. Amongst these, the Battles of Zojila hold pride of place. Our breakthrough at Zojila ensured the security of Ladakh which was gravely threatened by the hostiles at that time. The battle was a memorable display of courage, determination and ingenuity fought by the Indian Army against a determined foe in hostile high-altitude terrain and adverse weather conditions.

These initial military operations by the Indian Army in 1947/48, in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere to preserve and protect the newly independent Union of India have not received due attention from our military historians. In the present study, the author has examined questions of strategy and tactics in a succinct, readable style with insight and imagination and, also thrown light on an hitherto unexplored subject based on primary sources.

The book deserves to be widely read by the general public as well as specialists of Indian military history in the post-Independence period. The author, Dr. SS Bloeria, Additional Chief Secretary, Govt of Jammu and Kashmir has served in the Indian Army as an officer in the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles. To him the book has been both an academic achievement, and his own personal tribute to that remarkable individual—the Indian Soldier.

GENERAL S. ROYCHOWDHURY

Chief of the Army Staff

Preface

Zojila, I heard this name for the first time in July 1965 while undergoing pre-commission training in the Officers Training School Madras. We cadets were grouped in four companies, each named after a famous battle. Mine was Zojila Company. Our Company Commander belonged to 4th RAJPUT, one of the battalions which had taken part in the famous operations in that area in November 1948. He gave us a talk on those operations, but being raw soldiers we understood very little of it.

Seven years later, I left the army and joined the civil service, and got my first posting as Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kargil. Before taking up the new assignment, I read a number of books on Ladakh which provided sufficient information about the region, including the campaigns of Zorawar Singh and the battles fought in that area during 1947-48. My first journey over Zojila, on the way to Kargil, was memorable. Awe-inspiring massive cliffs rising sharply on both sides of the defile almost cast a spell on the travellers passing through the Zojila. Over the years, I have had the experience of traversing over this fabled pass in different modes of transport and also on foot; in extremely pleasant weather and under very difficult conditions of snow blizzards and howling winds. Each visit to that area renewed admiration for the courage and fortitude of the soldiers who fought and won under extreme climatic conditions and adverse tactical situation during 1948. This study is a modest tribute to their hard struggle and indomitable spirit.

The Ladakh and Gilgit areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, generally referred to as the Northern Sector, are of great strategic importance due to their geographic location touching the borders of a number of countries. The British, as long as they remained in India, realized its significance, and ensured their control over the region through various stratagems. With the independence of India, creation of Pakistan and inability of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to make up his mind regarding accession of the State to either of the two Dominions, the stage was set for turbulence in the region. Tribal raiders, hostiles and personnel of Pakistan Army clashed with the State Force and elements of the Indian Army for over a year, starting from the middle of 1947 till the UN sponsored cease-fire on 1 January, 1949.

During this period of armed conflict, some heroic battles were fought. In defensive operations, the garrisons of Skardu and Punch withstood long sieges against very heavy odds and a much larger enemy force. Their performance could do proud to any army. Of the offensive actions launched by the Indian forces, the breakthrough at Zojila would probably rank amongst the three most important battles of the J&K Operations. The battle of Shaltang resulted in stemming the advance of the tribal raiders, and pushing them back from the very outskirts of Srinagar city to Uri and beyond. The battle of Jhangar resulted in the re-capture of an important military objective and securing the lines of communication of the Indians in that sector, further paving the way for the liberation of Rajouri, leading to the breaking of the siege of Punch. The third crucial engagement pertains to the breakthrough at Zojila. The struggle for the Himalayan heights there was not only the most difficult; the stakes were also extremely high. Failure at Zojila would have meant the loss of the entire Ladakh region of strategic importance, deprivation of the only Buddhist population and a constant threat to the Kashmir valley from the east. It is to the great credit of the Indian Army, its officers and Jawans, that a catastrophe of such magnitudes was averted.

Even almost after half a century, not enough has been written on the Operations of 1947-48. The official version was published, by the Ministry of Defence, only in 1987. This, along with a very limited number of books mostly written by the officers who took part in the war, do not throw sufficient light on the important battles of the period. Most of these accounts, being in the form of memoirs or regimental histories, suffer from the inherent element of subjectivity. It is in this context that the present study has been undertaken; with a view to bring out a detailed and objective account of the battles of Zojila. The sequence of incidents has been pieced together in the background of events then taking place in the J&K State in general and the Northern Sector in particular. Attempt has been made to present in greater details the valiant efforts of Indian soldiers who overcame the harsh elements of nature and a determined adversary to register probably the most important success of the 194748 Operations. These events need to be studied carefully also because J&K is still an unfinished agenda.

As mentioned earlier, not much recorded material is available on the subject. Therefore, most of the information had to be collected from primary sources. This was, no doubt, more laborious process but it has enhanced the authenticity and the credibility of the facts recorded. A few years ago, the records of the Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, pertaining to the 1947-48 Operations were made accessible for research purposes. These include War Diaries, Reports, Policy Directives and routine papers. Unfortunately, not many of the units and headquarters had taken sufficient care to record details of the incidents taking place and their reports are very brief and sketchy. Some of the units, on the other hand, do make up for this deficiency by comprehensive recording of the events. In this context a mention may be made of 1 Patiala. Their War Diaries are a delight to any reader, for these not only provide detailed account of day to day happenings but also include collateral information and documents.

Another notable source has been the survivors of those battles. Fortunately, a number of veterans are alive and have been, almost to the last man, kind enough and willing to share their experience They dug out old diaries and papers, as also from memory provided a fund of information through interviews, personal notes and correspondence. They were extremely cooperative, and, in fact, only too willing to share their experiences and considerable knowledge of not only the events that had taken place in their immediate vicinity, but also the overall background in which these were happening.

I was, however, not so lucky with Maj. Gen. Rajinder Singh Sparrow, MVC and Bar (Retd). I called on him, during the first week of March, 1993, at his residence, in Jalandhar Cantt. He extended all the courtesy and expressed happiness on the project, but refused to grant interview or make available his papers. He said that he was writing a book and would, therefore, not be able to help till it was published. He, however, graciously wrote some times later, offering his support. Next time when you will meet me, he wrote, I will show you the pertinent facets of the ZOJILA operation. To my great regret, when I contacted for the purpose, he was hospitalized with a serious ailment, where he died later. Thus I lost the opportunity of interacting with the man who had planned the crucial tank push during the Zojila breakthrough.

Very few Pakistani books and publications are available regarding these operations. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, not much has been written about the military matters during that period which could throw light on the Pakistani version of the war. Even whatever little material is available, that too lacks credibility requiring thorough evaluation. Two representative samples of their version are as follows:

Since September 1948, only 400 Azad soldiers had foiled two Indian attempts to capture Zojila. and,

The GHQ chronicle says about these operations: The battle of Zojila was one of the most brilliant operations of the Kashmir campaign. A small force of about two companies’ strength of irregular Militia, armed with nothing but their personal weapons, had withstood repeated attacks by some of the best units of the Indian Army for nearly two months and inflicted nearly 1000 casualties on the enemy.

All the same the lack of sufficient and credible material on the 1947-48 Operations, from Pakistan is a handicap which would be felt by anyone attempting to present a complete account of the events that had taken place. Considerable encouragement and contributions have been made available by the surviving veterans of the Zojila Operations, in compilation of this work, most notable amongst them being Brig. Sukhdev Singh, MC, Vr.C., the then Commanding Officer of 1 Patiala. Mention need also to be made, amongst many others who helped, of Dr. U.P. Thapliyal, Director and Shri G.B. Singh, Deputy Director of the Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, for their assistance and cooperation in making available the relevant records and documents. Within the constraints of the organisation, their contribution has been substantial.

Shri S.P. Sahni, a veteran journalist and formerly Director General of Information, J&K Government, has always been helpful and encouraging. A living encyclopaedia of 1947-48 Operations in Kashmir, he was a constant reference point.

Thanks are due to Shri Ashok Magotra who willingly and diligently carried out the laborious typing work; as also to Shri S.K. Sinha who provided expertise in computerizing this document. My wife, Rani, is probably the only lady to have crossed Zojila on foot. She traversed from Captain Morh to Gumri with me braving snow and blizzard on a cold April morning over twenty years ago. Her grit and indomitable spirit has been a constant source of strength and inspiration to me. I owe her a lot. The greatest help has been received from Dr. A.C. Bose, formerly Head of the History Department and Dean of Social Sciences, University of Jammu. His deep knowledge of the modern history, and keen eye for details have immensely helped in converting this work into a finished product.

Sudhir S. Bloeria

List of Abbreviations

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

GEO-POLITICAL CONTOURS

Jammu and Kashmir, the crown of Indian Union, is situated in the north of India. It comprises three divisions, viz. Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. The State of Jammu and Kashmir occupies a pivotal position on the political map of Central Asia. Strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India. India’s only window to the Central Asian Republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (erstwhile USSR) in the north, China and Tibet on the east, and Pakistan and Afghanistan on the west. Indian State of Punjab is located in the south-west. The entire State is hilly excepting the Kashmir Valley and the plains of Jammu and Kathua districts. Kashmir valley is predominantly inhabited by the Muslims. Hindus are dominant in Jammu division whereas Buddhists have a slight edge over Muslims in the Ladakh region.

The Vale of Kashmir, approximately in the centre of the State, runs north and south in the valley of the River Jhelum. It is about 130 kilometres long and 50 kilometres wide. The State’s summer capital, Srinagar, is in north-east of the Valley’s centre. The only airport of the valley is situated at Damodar Karewa, near Srinagar. In 1947, the runway was un-metalled and was fit for light aircrafts only and was seldom used. It was meant for the private aeroplanes of the Maharaja. Railways were and still are nonexistent and all movement to the Valley was, therefore, by vehicles and animals.

The approaches to the Valley by road, from Domel and Jammu were through the then western Punjab (now Pakistani Punjab) starting from Rawalpindi and Sialkot, respectively. There was, however, a fair weather 102 kilometres long track from Pathankot to Jammu via Madhopur, Kathua and Samba. This was the only road link with eastern Punjab (now Indian State of Punjab). There were a number of rivers and nullahs on this route without bridges. Unbridged rivers of Ravi, Ujh and Basantar were major obstacles; Ravi being the most formidable. There used to be a motor ferry over Ravi from October to June; it was affordable to motor transport for two to three months only. The Ujh and Basantar rivers could be crossed by motor transport during dry months only. This road was un-metalled and used to be extremely dusty when there were no rains and became marshy even after a slight rain. It was quite a difficult task to take vehicles over this route. Due to bad state of this road, a vehicle normally took upto three days for its trip from Pathankot to Jammu and back. It also ran close and parallel to the border with undivided India and became very vulnerable throughout its length when the State shared that border with Pakistan after the independence.

As opposed to India, which had the Banihal road as the only route for reaching the Valley, that too via the very difficult and hazardous Madhopur route, Pakistan had a much easier roadway access to the State. In the Valley through a good metalled road via Domel; to Mirpur, in the centre, via Jhelum and also to Jammu from Sialkot. Not only the roads connecting western Punjab were fairly good but were also shorter. The only rail link between undivided India and the J&K State was from Sialkot to Jammu; of which a major portion—18 miles out of the total length of 27 miles—was in the western Punjab of the undivided India and only 9 miles in the State territory. The nearest railway station in the then eastern Punjab was Pathankot, and that too through the difficult Jammu-Madhopur route. It was a small station with very limited siding and control facilities, grossly inadequate to be used as a base for handling bulk stores and large bodies of troops in transit. There was an airfield at Satwari, near Jammu, which too was used for the private planes of the Maharaja. The runway of this airfield too was un-metalled and fit for only light aircrafts. This was the status of communications and the various links existing between the State of Jammu and Kashmir—except for Ladakh—Gilgit regions—and the two dominions of India and Pakistan on 15th August 1947. The dice was heavily loaded against India, which advantage was fully exploited by Pakistan in its nefarious designs of annexing Jammu and Kashmir by force.

The third region of the State, Ladakh, had traditionally been under the influence of Tibetan rulers. It was only in 1834, following the successful invasion by Zorawar Singh, that it became a part of Maharaja Gulab Singh’s possessions. After Kashmir came under the control of the Dogra ruler in 1846, with the Treaty of Amritsar, the administrative amalgamation of this region with Jammu and Kashmir became complete. Ladakh, the cold arid desert, is a plateau located between the Kashmir Valley and Tibet in the extreme north-east of the State. The population of the Leh part is predominantly Buddhist while in Kargil, Muslims are in majority. Culturally, it has close links with Tibet. Leh, which is at the height of 11,554 ft. above sea level, is the principal town of Ladakh and used to be an important commercial focal point between India and Central Asia. In the north, eastern side, Ladakh has common borders with China and Tibet. It has always played an important part in the Central Asian affairs. Gilgit is in the north-west part of the State. It has predominantly Muslim population and common borders with China, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

There was no network of roads to and within Ladakh and Gilgit. The traffic to and from this area was only on foot or by horse, yak, etc. over bridle tracks which were narrow, rough and hazardous. No wheeled traffic was possible. Gilgit was connected with Ladakh by a mule track which ran over passes 12,000 to 14,000 ft. above sea level, Leh to Gilgit was 480 kms. From Leh, this track went west to Kargil, turned northwards from Kargil to Skardu-Gilgit and then onwards led to Wakhan province of Afghanistan and also to Sinkiang over the Pamirs. This route was followed by Zorawar Singh who conquered Baltistan in 1839-40. Leh was connected with Srinagar, Jammu and Himachal Pradesh by three different routes—Central Asian trade route, southwestern and southern route. The south-western route linked Jammu with Leh via Kishtwar and Zanskar. The total distance of this route was 368 kms. It was primarily a foot track. However, horses or ponies could be used for short stretches. The southern route ran from Leh to Himachal, going east from Leh, it went over Taglang La 17,400 ft. and Bara Lacha La 17,000 ft. through Keylong to Rohtang Pass and then to Kulu. The Central Asian Trade route is an age-old passage connecting Srinagar and Leh. The total distance was 365 kms. (now the road distance is 432 kms)¹. From Leh there are routes to Tibet, Chinese Turkistan, Yarkand and Baltistan. These have been described by Alexander Cunningham as²’:

a. The south-eastern road from Lhasa to Garo and the Indus to Leh. A branch from India, via the Niti pass, joins this road at Garo;

b. The eastern road from Chinese Territory, through Rudok and the valley of Chushul and Sakti to Leh;

c. The northern road from Yarkand and Kotan, over the Karakoram mountains and down the Shyok and Nubra rivers to Leh; and,

d. The north-western road from Balti, via the Shyok and Indus rivers to Leh.

One of the most striking contrasts in nature manifests itself in the valley of Kashmir and Ladakh being set next to each other. The lush green verdant valley, dotted with blue lakes and capped with glacier topped mountains, is adjacent to barren, windswept cold desert highland region of Ladakh. The principal towns of Srinagar and Leh are connected by a traditional trade route running west to east. The most important landmark, on this route, also being the watershed and the dividing line between the two regions, is Zojila. In the native language Zojila means Path of Blizzards, a befitting name for the pass, as would be sufficiently evident after studying its topography. The Zojila is known by other names also, such as Seojila, Baltal Kotal, Dras Pass³, Zogila and Zwaje La, etc.⁴ In the great Himalayan mountain range starting from Mount Everest in the east to Nanga Parbat in the west, Zojila is the lowest depression being 11,578 ft. above sea level. All other passes are over 14,000 ft. Though such a low pass and a simple walk under summer conditions, the Zojila is also one of the most dangerous. It accounts for a large number of animal and human lives, taking its deadly toll by means of sudden avalanches or engulfing its victims in bottomless drifts⁵. For the major part of a year, all these passes including Zojila remain closed due to snow and avalanches.

Zojila, at a distance of 102 kms. east of Srinagar is the gate-way to the Ladakh region. From Srinagar to Sonamarg, a distance of 84 kilometres, a fairly good road existed in 1947; though in parts only one-way traffic was possible. About 14 kms. east of Sonamarg lies Baltal, which was connected by a good, but not motorable track. Baltal⁶, height 9,600 feet, is in the shape of a basin, a large flat ground. It is located on the right bank of the river Sind and enveloped by a stream draining into Sonamarg valley from Zojila; the pass being on the mountain range rising sharply in the east. The route from Baltal to Zojila was just a mule track going up the steep slope of the hill overhanging the gorge of the Sind river and was usable only from May to December. In winter this was impassable and a temporary pathway, rarely traversed, road was used to be made over the snow which filled the gorge below Zojila until the snow melted and the summer route became available. Right from December to June the stretch between Baltal and Gumri was so dangerous and hazardous that any traveller could lose his life and belongings on account of snow storms or avalanches, since there was no place to take shelter in the inhospitable climate. The gradient of this track from Baltal to Zojila was considerable. The ascent from the Kashmir side of the track was the most dangerous part of the pass during winter. The 9 km. section between Baltal and Gumri, devoid of habitation and plantation was too long for the safety of individuals. After the snow had fallen, only the very brave could