Burma: The Turning Point

By Ian Lyall Grant

The turning point of the war in Burma was the Imphal/Kohima campaign of 1944. For four months there was intense and savage fighting. The Japanese plan was to encircle and destroy the British and Indian positions before bursting into the plain and seizing Imphal. They failed in their first aim but the Japanese 15th Army prepared a final all-out thrust for Imphal. However, the British 4th Corps struck first and, after three weeks, the Japanese were virtually annihilated. This graphic account expertly analyses the campaign.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jul 22, 2003
• ISBN: 9781473812901

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INTRODUCTION

Burma was the western bastion of the empire or ‘co-prosperity sphere’ planned by the Japanese for South-East Asia. In 1942 they captured it with ease and held it with equal ease throughout 1943. In 1944 and 1945 they suffered the greatest land defeat in their history and lost all that they had gained. This book describes the cause of this remarkable reversal.

On the Indo-Burmese frontier there were three major military ‘fronts’, separated from each other by hundreds of miles of forest-covered mountains. The Northern Front was American; its aim was to cover the construction of a road and pipeline across the northern tip of Burma to China. The Southern Front in the Arakan was British. It had the limited aim of capturing the small port of Akyab and establishing an airbase there. The Central Front was also British. It covered the only practicable route into central Burma. It was on the fighting on this front that the fate of Burma depended.

The Japanese recognised the importance of this sector and decided to capture the Central Front’s forward base at Imphal in early 1944, thus preventing any British invasion. They planned to isolate Imphal by cutting its only supply line at Kohima and keeping the road there blocked.

Imphal itself was to be attacked from both the north and south but the southern attack was to be the main one. For this they allotted their best division, all their armour and medium and heavy field artillery. An essential preliminary was to cut off and destroy one of the British divisions which was isolated, 170 miles south of Imphal, at the end of a long mountain road (the Tiddim Road). In spite of a British blunder, which gave them a good chance, they failed to do this. Indeed the British division not only withdrew to join the Imphal garrison as planned but also gave them a bloody nose into the bargain. This reaction convinced the Japanese divisional commander concerned that the offensive should be abandoned. The British had proved to be much tougher than expected and with the addition of this division the British garrison in Imphal would be too strong to be defeated.

General Mutaguchi, the Japanese army commander, thought differently. Summoning all his reserves, he launched an all-out attack on Imphal along the Tiddim Road. When it failed, after two desperate battles in which the Japanese forces were almost annihilated, he finally acknowledged defeat. This was the final turning point. The Japanese could now no longer avoid a disastrous retreat which was to continue until the war ended.

The full story of these battles on the Tiddim Road has never before been told. Moreover much of what has been written is inaccurate; some of it is simply untrue. There are several reasons for this but a major one is the complexity of the struggle. In four months of almost continual fighting many violent clashes with the enemy took place over a wide area. It is only now when Japanese sources have become available that the pattern has emerged and the critical, and indeed highly dramatic, nature of these battles has become apparent. While it is now clear that the battles on the Tiddim Road described in this book were the critical ones, that does not diminish the significance of the epic defence of Kohima and its relief, the stubborn defence of the Shenam Pass and the heroic stand at Sangshak. These were all essential factors which helped to ensure victory and to turn the Japanese defeat into a disaster.

Nor does this account in any way belittle the tough and skilful operations on the Arakan Front, where the Japanese were defeated for the first time, and the daring exploits of the Chindits in support of the Northern Front. But it was the Japanese disaster on the Central Front in 1944 which opened the flood-gates through which the British/Indian army was to pour into Burma in 1945. And at the heart of this Japanese disaster were the seven battles on the Tiddim Road.

CHAPTER ONE

The Reason Why

‘For the tenth time at least I must write down that the Japanese infantry consist of superb material Guileless as children, brave as lions, their constant ruling thought is to do their duty by their ancestors and by the Emperor.’

Lt Gen Sir Ian Hamilton, Russo-Japanese War, 1904.

The great battle of Imphal/Kohima in March to July of 1944 was the turning point of the war in Burma. It raged for four months over a huge area of forest-covered mountains and, although the forces involved were relatively small, the fighting was of an intensity and ferocity that have seldom been surpassed. The Japanese refusal to acknowledge defeat in the face of staggering losses led to a disaster from which they were never to recover.

A key part of this struggle was the series of battles on the Tiddim Road between the 17th Indian Light Division (17 Division) and the Japanese 33rd Infantry Division (33 Division). 33 Division was widely considered by the British to be the best of the Japanese divisions in Burma (Slim (1), p 357, Evans, p 59). 17 Division (like several other divisions) never doubted for one moment that it was the best of the British divisions; certainly it had more experience than any other of fighting the Japanese. These two divisions had clashed before in 1942 during the retreat from Burma. Then the hastily assembled 17 Division, inexperienced and only half trained, had been the losers. Now this tough division had a new organisation, had trained hard for two years and had no doubt that it could avenge its earlier defeat. The two divisions were reinforced by other first-class formations during the battle but basically it was a fight to the death between the two of them. This book tells for the first time the full story of this epic struggle.

Since the British lived on islands off the coast of Europe six thousand miles to the west and the Japanese on similar islands off the coast of Asia several thousand miles to the east, a clash in the remote area of the Indo-Burmese border may seem a strange confrontation. A brief explanation is required. In the 1920s Japan had been faced with the problem of how to feed and meet the aspirations of an energetic and rapidly increasing population. Japan is a country of steep hills and forests and only about a quarter of its area is suitable for agriculture. Moreover few minerals are to be found there. The population was frugal, able and very hard-working but the standard of living of all classes was much lower than in the West. Japan’s leaders therefore decided that further expansion was necessary. After the Russo-Japanese war, in which victory had given them a rather unrealistic conception of their military strength, they had acquired Taiwan. Now they invaded and took control of Korea and Manchuria. Even these did not provide all the raw materials needed and Japan, now operating an expanding war economy, started edging forward into North China. For the Chinese, who had been prepared to ignore the loss of Manchuria, this was too much and opposition began to build up. In 1937 there occurred the ‘China Incident’ and Japan took the fatal step of launching a full-scale invasion of China itself.

Throughout this period there had been, in the two main factions guiding Japan, many who were in favour of expansion into South-East Asia. The military party, known to some as the ‘lions’, thought this could best be achieved by military action, while the civilian party, or ‘foxes’, favoured trade and diplomacy. Such a drive would produce not only the vital oil which the Japanese lacked (the Dutch East Indies was then the fifth largest producer in the world) but also rubber, tin, and many other valuable raw materials. The Japanese, as a growing Asiatic power, felt that they had a better claim to this storehouse than the Europeans whose grip seemed to be weakening. Talk in Japan about a possible drive to the south, however, was regarded by Westerners as mere sabre-rattling. Surely the presence of the mighty British and US Pacific fleets, based on Singapore and Pearl Harbour in the Hawaii Islands, ruled out the possibility of any such move?

Now a curious feature of the Japanese constitution was that the ministers for the Navy and the Army had to be regular serving officers. If the two Services objected to the prime minister or other proposed members of the cabinet no officers would be nominated and a government could not be formed (Chamberlin, p 16). This gave great political power to the military faction and the two Services used this power to build up their equipment and the industrial base needed to support it. So successful were they that by 1937 half the national budget was allotted to defence (Chamberlin, p 275). Those who preached moderation and attempted to curb this expenditure, which was driving Japan ever deeper into debt, were not infrequently assassinated. In 1940/41 the collapse of the European colonial powers, with the exception of Britain, and the apparent likelihood of Germany defeating Russia and winning the war, persuaded the Japanese ‘lions’ that they had an exceptional opportunity. Moreover their attempts to bring the Chinese war to a conclusion were being frustrated by the Americans who were supplying China with vital equipment. In July 1941 the USA went further and imposed a ban on the supply of oil to Japan. This was critical as Japan had only enough oil to last another six months. From this moment the ‘lions’ had their way and the die was cast.

Using the political slogan of ‘Asia for the Asians’ the Japanese determined to replace the Europeans in their colonies in South-East Asia. The capture of Burma had been included in the plan primarily in order to close the last American supply line to China (through Rangoon). There were other advantages. The mountains and forests of Burma’s north-west frontier formed a natural barrier to any British intervention from India. The oil and rice of Burma would greatly simplify the provisioning of an occupying army. Moreover there was reason to believe that in the central part of the country the population would befriend rather than oppose an invader.

In 1942 Japanese military equipment was simple but well-tested and effective. Their aeroplanes and artillery, but not their tanks, were as good or better than all but the latest Western models. By far their greatest strength, however, lay in the toughness and dedication of their soldiers, sailors and airmen. Conscription was selective. In the army the infantry was the most highly regarded arm and the most favoured recruit was the agricultural peasant. This was not only because many of the officers were small farmers but because a life of unceasing toil and hardship made the peasant a very tough character indeed. Moreover since every large village had its own school he was by no means uneducated. From the beginning this education included a strong patriotic and martial indoctrination as well as instilling the virtues of obedience and frugality. Deeply instilled was the semi-mystic belief that the highest honour any soldier could achieve was to give his life for the Emperor.

This devotion to the Emperor was a unifying tie between all ranks. Another was that, hard as it is now to believe, nearly all Japanese were poor. The top rate of pay for government servants, including cabinet ministers, admirals and generals, was then less than the equivalent of £400 a year (Chamberlin p 181). Ostentation was considered scandalous and such rich men as there were dressed simply. Rich men’s houses and gardens were of very modest size though often beautifully built. It was considered a disgrace to be fat unless, of course, you were a Sumo wrestler. Simplicity and frugality were regarded as essential virtues.

Among the hardiest of all Japanese were the peasants from the north of the main island of Honshu where the climate was harsher than further south. Most peasants had to work very hard just to stay alive and so life in the army had considerable appeal. It was from the mountains on the southern fringe of this area that 33 Division was recruited.

33 Division was organised on much the same lines as a British infantry division but with fewer frills (see Appendix 5). There were three infantry brigades, or infantry regiments as the Japanese termed them, numbered 213, 214, and 215 Regiments. As in the rest of the Japanese Army, each regiment had three battalions, numbered 1, 2, and 3. There were four rifle companies and a medium machine gun company in each battalion. Divisional supporting arms included a reconnaissance battalion, three artillery battalions and an engineer battalion. 33 Division was known as the ‘Bow’ Division and 214 Regiment as the ‘White Tiger’ Regiment. This latter name referred to a heroic legend in the area from which 214 Regiment was recruited and every member of the regiment wore a cap badge depicting the head of a white tiger. The Division was mobilised in March 1939 and the following month left Japan to fight in Central China. In late 1941 it moved to Thailand, by now an experienced and battle-hardened division, commanded by the highly esteemed Lieutenant General Sakurai.

Before 1942 no-one in India ever dreamed that serious fighting would take place on India’s north-east frontier. The barren, stony hills of the north-west frontier were a different matter. There for many years a state of semi-war had existed. Strategic railways, military roads and forts of various sizes had been constructed and the army in India was well versed in the tactics required for fighting in that rocky terrain. But to the north-east there seemed to be no sign of a serious enemy and no preparations were made nor training done for war in this very different environment. No road led to the frontier, the nearest railway was two hundred miles away and the nearest airfield further still. Not only was Burma safely under British administration but it was divided from India by a series of steep mountain ranges. These were covered by what the map surveyors described as ‘dense mixed forest’ and this was deemed a more than adequate defensive barrier.

Until 1937 Burma, which is geographically a part of South-East Asia, was administered as a province of India. The Burmese, with a different religion and ethnically quite different from the Indians, naturally disliked this arrangement and in 1937 they were given a separate constitution and administered directly from London. Thereafter, ludicrous as it may seem, all official communications between India and Burma had to be relayed through their respective offices in Whitehall. In September 1941 the far-seeing General Wavell, then Commander-in-Chief in India, saw that the Japanese threat was increasing and pressed for GHQ India to be given responsibility for the defence of Burma (Kirby Vol 2, p 7). India, he pointed out, was the only place from which help could reach Burma in time if she were to be attacked. The War Cabinet did not agree and the defence of Burma remained the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of Far East Command at Singapore. It was not a wise decision.

Having acquired French Indo-China by political means in July 1941 the Japanese had opened the war against the British in Malaya in December by launching a combined operation across the Gulf of Siam. This operation, which included a four day crossing from Hainan and Saigon to the beaches of Thailand and Kota Bahru, had been brilliantly successful. There could have been no clearer demonstration of the efficiency of the Japanese forces, nor indeed of their determination, for success at Kota Bahru had been achieved in the face of heavy losses, bad weather and formidable obstacles. Their land-based air force then quickly defeated the inadequate British naval and air forces in the Far East and their army delivered a sustained attack on Malaya and Singapore. This attack was conducted with such speed and drive that the defenders were never able to recover their balance. It was a true blitz-krieg.

When they saw that the Malayan campaign was likely to end successfully, the Japanese launched their attack on Burma. Defending Burma’s eastern frontier, some 1200 miles long, were the 1st Burma Division and 17 Division. The former was weak in strength and became weaker as many of its Burmese troops deserted. The latter was composed of hastily assembled and only partially trained troops recently arrived from India.

In December 1941 Wavell dispatched his deputy, Lieutenant General Hutton, to take over the Burma command. Hutton found himself in the position of Chief of the General Staff, Army Commander and Corps Commander. Burma was completely unprepared for war. The British were making their main effort in the Middle East, they were defending the UK and they were sending 200 planes and 250 tanks to Russia every month (Kennedy, p 204). There was nothing to spare for the Far East, let alone the backwater of Burma. As a result the Japanese had at first some easy successes. Readers must now bear with me if I give a short account of the 1942 campaign in Burma for it was to have a big influence on the battles in 1944. Moreover in this campaign a number of severe battles were fought between the two divisions with which this story is mainly concerned, 17 Division and the Japanese 33 Division. Briefly, this is what happened.

The Japanese invaded Burma in late January 1942 with two divisions, 33 Division from Thailand and the 55th Infantry Division (55 Division) from Malaya. After some early clashes 17 Division, commanded by Major General Smyth VC, held up these two divisions for four days at the Bilin River, an indifferent obstacle, before falling back to the River Sittang which was intended to be the main position covering Rangoon. Across this wide and fast-flowing river was a single long, narrow railway bridge. This bridge had only been decked to take vehicles on the day that the withdrawal from the Bilin started. The distance was only thirty miles between the two rivers but the road was no more than a dusty cart-track through the forest and was congested with vehicles. The exhausted marching troops were slowed down by ambushes and by repeated air attacks not only by Japanese planes but also, through an unfortunate error, by the RAF. The Japanese had appreciated the importance of the bottleneck caused by the bridge and Lieutenant General Sakurai sent 215 Regiment along a footpath through the forest to capture it. The bridge was only weakly defended and although the garrison held out long enough for about half of 17 Division to get across, it appeared before dawn on 23 February that it was about to be captured. There was no sign of the troops still east of the river and there was a belief that they had been cut off and overrun. Smyth, who was sick, had crossed the bridge and was bivouacking some miles west of it. On being told the situation he gave the order for it to be demolished although two brigades, 16 and 46, were still on the wrong side. After hard fighting most of these two unfortunate brigades reached the river only to find that the bridge had been blown. All local boats had been deliberately destroyed and only about half the men managed to get across by swimming or on improvised rafts.

To defend the line of the Sittang was no longer possible and 17 Division fell back to regroup and rearm at Pegu under a new commander, Major General ‘Punch’ Cowan. It says much for their resilience that ten days later they were holding Pegu against attacks from 55 Division. On the decision being taken to abandon Rangoon (which as a city was indefensible) 17 Division, reinforced by the newly arrived 7th Armoured Brigade and 63 Indian Infantry Brigade (63 Brigade), was ordered, together with the Rangoon garrison and Burma Army Headquarters, to march north to Prome. This turned out to be more easily said than done. 33 Division, unaware that the city had been evacuated, had been ordered to attack Rangoon from the north-west while 55 Division attacked it from the east. As flank protection they placed a road-block across the Prome road twenty-three miles north of Rangoon to cover their move across it. Initial attempts to break through this block having failed, General Alexander, who had been flown in forty-eight hours previously to take command, gave orders for a final attempt on the morning of 8th March. If this failed units were ordered to break up into small parties and make their way to India, 600 miles away, as best they could. It was very nearly game, set and match to 33 Division.

Fortunately the Japanese, not realising the situation, withdrew the block when they had crossed the road and the two divisions did not clash again seriously for another three weeks. Singapore having fallen General Wavell had returned from Java where he had been sent on a wild goose chase to try and co-ordinate the defence of South East Asia. He could now give his full attention to Burma and he was determined to take aggressive action. At long last a Corps Commander was appointed. Had this appointment been made earlier, as General Hutton had requested, the Sittang disaster might never have occurred. Nevertheless, belated though it was, it was to prove a very significant move for the new commander was Lieutenant General William Slim.

As 33 Division closed in on Prome General Alexander, spurred on by General Wavell, decided to strike down the road against them with a mobile column consisting of four weak British battalions from 17 Division and a regiment from 7th Armoured Brigade. It was a disastrous move and played straight into Japanese hands. The motorised and road-bound column thrust south for some 30 miles as far as the village of Paungde, where they were held up. Meanwhile 215 Regiment, moving off the road, seized the village of Shwedaung behind them and formed a block. The column was recalled but were unable to break back through the village. Although the troops worked their way back through the woods ten tanks and many vehicles were lost.

The next night 33 Division attacked Prome, a sprawling town and difficult to defend. They infiltrated 63 Brigade’s too dispersed position and forced it to fall back to a new one but were beaten off by 48 Indian Infantry Brigade (48 Brigade). Nevertheless fear of a Japanese move through the forest to insert a road block behind 17 Division, together with the news of a Chinese withdrawal in the Sittang valley to the east, convinced Generals Alexander and Slim that another withdrawal was necessary. Together with the weak 1st Burma Division, a position was therefore established covering the Yenanyaung oil-fields some sixty miles further north.

Meanwhile things had not been going well with the other two Services. With the loss of Rangoon the RAF early warning system had been severely curtailed. A successful RAF attack on Japanese aircraft on Mingaladon (Rangoon) airfield in mid-March provoked a fierce response. Repeated heavy raids were made on the main RAF airfield at Magwe in Central Burma and many aircraft were destroyed. Wavell then decided to withdraw the few remaining British aircraft to Akyab and a few days later to India. Events went little better with the Royal Navy. By the end of March a Japanese task force was operating in the Bay of Bengal. In early April Ceylon was attacked and a number of British ships sunk including two heavy cruisers and an aircraft carrier. Whereupon the Far Eastern fleet, no match for the more modern Japanese aircraft carriers, prudently withdrew to the west to ensure protection for the shipping route round the Cape.

The Japanese attack on the oilfields at Yenanyaung by-passed the main part of 17 Division and fell on the 1st Burma Division. However 17 Division’s 48 Brigade, holding an isolated position at Kokkogwa, was attacked for two consecutive nights by 33 Division’s 215 Regiment, who were guarding the enemy flank. Both these attacks were repulsed after severe fighting. Another regiment from 33 Division, however, succeeded in seizing the only ford across a river called the Pin Chaung behind the 1st Burma Division. The 1st Burma Division successfully demolished the oilfield installations but were unable to break back through the block on the Pin Chaung and suffered a severe defeat.

Meanwhile two more Japanese divisions had landed at Rangoon and it was clear that further withdrawal was unavoidable. 48 Brigade was detailed to hold the village of Kyaukse to cover a general withdrawal across the Irrawaddy. Here they were attacked by the newly arrived 18th Division (who had taken part in the capture of Singapore) supported by heavy field artillery. 18 Division’s commander, Lieutenant General Mutaguchi (of whom we shall hear more), was perhaps over-confident and relied on a frontal attack. 48 Brigade inflicted a sharp reverse on the leading regiment and held them up for the necessary thirty-six hours with little loss to themselves.

The final clash of the retreat occurred between 17 and 33 Divisions at Shwegyin. By this time General Alexander had decided to withdraw the British forces to India before the monsoon made the only track through the forest impassable. Unfortunately a major obstacle was the River Chindwin, wide, fast-flowing and unbridged. Moreover Shwegyin, where the forest track reached the east bank, was some six miles downstream of Kalewa, where there was a track on the west bank. Soon after 17 Division, who were covering the retreat, reached Shwegyin they were attacked by 213 Regiment from 33 Division who had come up the river by boat. This, coupled with an air attack, was too much for the local crews of the river steamers who refused to venture south of Kalewa. So, although the attack was held, with the monsoon imminent and the river already beginning to rise, delay would have risked disaster. General Slim therefore gave the order to destroy vehicles and heavy equipment and march through the forest to Kaing opposite Kalewa, where the river steamers were prepared to operate as ferries. There were no further clashes and 17 Division marched out through the hills to India in good order and with all their personal weapons. They crossed the border as the monsoon broke.

In the tropical heat it had been a hard campaign. After the loss of Rangoon there was no resupply and the army had been obliged to exist on the meagre stocks existing in Burma. The administrative staff