The Invasion of the Crimea: Vol. IV [Sixth Edition]: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress Down to the Death of Lord Raglan

By Alexander W. Kinglake

This is the sixth edition of the fourth volume in a series of nine that was originally published in 1877, and which together provide a thoroughly comprehensive operational history of the Crimean War to June 1855, including all the early battles and the first attack on the Redan.

Alexander William Kinglake (1809-1891) visited the Crimea in 1854 as a civilian and was present at the battle of the Alma (20 Sep 1854). The British Commander-in-Charge, Lord Raglan, suggested to Kinglake that he write a history of the Crimean War and made available all his private papers. The result is this monumental and elaborate piece of work, which tells the story of the war from its very origins right through to the death of Raglan on 28 June 1855, at which point the conflict still had another eight months to run until its conclusion at the Treaty of Paris on 28 February 1856…

This FOURTH volume takes a detailed look at SEBASTOPOL AT BAY.

Richly illustrated throughout with useful maps and diagrams.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Normanby Press
• Release date: Jan 23, 2017
• ISBN: 9781787203457

Alexander W. Kinglake

Alexander William Kinglake (5 August 1809 - 2 January 1891) was an English travel writer and historian. He was born near Taunton, Somerset and educated at Eton College and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was called to the Bar in 1837, and built up a thriving legal practice, which in 1856 he abandoned in order to devote himself to literature and public life. His first literary venture had been Eothen; or Traces of Travel Brought Home from the East (1844), a very popular work of Eastern travel, apparently first published anonymously, in which he described a journey he made about ten years earlier in Syria, Palestine and Egypt, together with his Eton contemporary Lord Pollington. Elliot Warburton said it evoked “the East itself in vital actual reality” and it was instantly successful. However, his magnum opus was THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan, in 8 volumes, published from 1863 to 1887, one of the most effective works of its class. The town of Kinglake in Victoria, Australia, and the adjacent national park are named after him. A Whig, Kinglake was elected at the 1857 general election as one of the two Members of Parliament (MP) for Bridgwater, having unsuccessfully contested the seat in 1852. He was returned at next two general elections, but the result of the 1868 general election in Bridgwater was voided on petition on 26 February 1869. No by-election was held, and after a Royal Commission found that there had been extensive corruption, the town was disenfranchised in 1870. Kinglake passed away in 1891 at the age of 81.

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Text originally published in 1877 under the same title.

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Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA:

ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN

BY

A. W. KINGLAKE

SIXTH EDITION

VOL. IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 3

AUTHOR’S NOTE. 12

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. IV. 13

SEBASTOPOL AT BAY. 17

CHAPTER I. 17

Critical position of the Allies,—Cause of their imperilled state,—False alarm in the night,—Virulence of the cholera. 17

CHAPTER II. 19

I. — St. Arnaud’s bodily state,—Lord Raglan’s dispositions for the flank march,—Commencement of the march,—The cavalry striking into a wrong path,—March of the infantry,—Lord Raglan in person effecting a separate reconnaissance,—His return into the line of march,—By striking into the lane shown on the Maps,—And riding on without any of his troops in front of him,—Cause of this,—Lord Raglan almost in contact with a Russian force,—Which proves to be the rearguard of Prince Mentschikoff’s army,—The surprise mutual,—Lord Raglan’s presence of mind,—His orders,—An interval,—The Russians losing their opportunity,—The English cavalry coming up,—Lord Raglan’s words to Lord Lucan,—Retreat of the Russian battalion,—Pursuit,—Prisoners and booty taken,—Lord Raglan’s words to Lord Cardigan,—Mackenzie’s Farm,—Heavy bodies of Russian troops seen marching off towards the north,—The coincidence which brought about the collision,—The extent and real import of the Russian movement not—apprehended,—State of the officer taken prisoner,—Lord. Raglan pained and revolted,—The import of the Russian march still unapprehended,—Lord Raglan’s march resumed,—The Mackenzie Heights,—Our army reaching the Tchernaya,—March of the French,—Cathcart’s duties on the Belbec,—Lord Raglan on the Tchernaya,—His communication with Cathcart and the admirals,—The march resumed on the 26th,—Lord Raglan before Balaclava,—Fire opened from one of the old castles,—Lord Raglan’s measures,—Ships’ guns heard,—Surrender of Balaclava,—Commandant’s reason for not surrendering at once,—Lord Raglan entering Balaclava,—Demeanour of the inhabitants,—Lord Raglan riding towards the water’s edge,—And an English vessel of war coming in,—Lord Raglan’s first words,—The little harbour and town quickly filled. 19

II. — Remonstrance on the part of the French,—Their forbearance,—The choice offered to Lord Raglan,—His decision,—26th to 29th Sept. The Allies taking up their ground in front of Sebastopol,—Cathcart’s operations,—‘The flank march’ successfully achieved,—This no sufficing test of its prudence,—Good effect resulting from a temporary concentration of power. 31

III. — General Canrobert,—The dormant commission entrusted to him,—Marshal St. Arnaud’s weak state,—Interposition of Colonel Trochu,—The command handed over to Canrobert,—The Marshal’s condition,—Lord Raglan’s last visit to him,—Lord Raglan’s expression of feeling,—The troubles Marshal St. Arnaud had occasioned to Lord Raglan,—The close of St. Arnaud’s life. 34

CHAPTER III. 37

I. — Singular absence of interdependence in the plans and movements of the hostile armies,—Effect of this upon the structure of the narrative,—The undertaking to defend Sebastopol,—The roadstead of Sebastopol,—State of the land defences on the North Side,—The plateau on the South Side, called the Chersonese,—The Man-of-war Harbour,—Position of Sebastopol,—The streets,—The Naval Library,—Population of the place,—The sea defences,—The sea-forts,—The boom,—The fleet,—Security of the roadstead,—And its bearing upon the land defence,—The ground on the south side of Sebastopol. 37

II. — 1853—Sebastopol then open on South Side,—Works afterwards commenced,—Their state on the 3rd of February 1854,—On the 14th Sept. 1854,—The armament of the works. 43

III. — Strength and disposition of the Russian forces in the Crimea at the time of the landing,—Prince Mentschikoff’s double command,—The two Vice-Admirals under him,—Workmen,—Russian strength in the Crimea on the 14th of Sept.,—Abundance of warlike stores,—Immense engineering resources,—Ammunition,—Store of provisions,—13th Sept. The armada seen from Sebastopol,—Measures thereupon taken,—14th Sept. Sebastopol apprised that the landing was going on,—Abandonment of any intention of attacking the armada,—Men and guns withdrawn from the fleet,—The land defences,—Their state on the 20th Sept.,—Distribution of authority at Sebastopol after the 18th Sept.,—Strength of the garrison left in Sebastopol. 46

CHAPTER IV. 52

I. — Sebastopol on the day of the Alma,—Korniloff’s ride with Todleben towards the field of battle,—Their meeting with Prince Mentschikoff,—Prince Mentschikoff’s order to Korniloff,—Korniloff’s reception of the order,—Prince Mentschikoff renouncing the idea of a stand on the Katcha,—And giving instructions to Todleben,—The sounds of the battle at. Sebastopol,—Bearing of the inhabitants,—Prince Mentschikoff’s return to Sebastopol,—Wounded soldiery brought in during the night. 52

II. — 21st Sept. Council of admirals and naval captains,—Korniloff’s proposal,—Its reception by the council,—Captain Zorin’s counter-proposal,—The grief with which it is heard,—Loud speaking,—Korniloff’s order to the members of the council,—His altercation with Mentschikoff,—Peremptory orders to close the harbour by sinking ships,—Korniloff’s fruitless resistance,—The orders given,—21st Sept. Removal of stores from the North Side,—Todleben’s report of his survey,—Mentschikoff ‘s reception of the Report,—Continued retreat of his field army. 54

III. — The doomed ships,—Farther effort of Korniloff to save the ships,—Its failure,—The doomed ships scuttled,—Morning of the 23rd,—The sinking ships,—Ended career of the Black Sea fleet,—Fall sustained by a Russian seaman when converted into a land-service man,—The policy of sinking the ships. 58

CHAPTER V. 62

Prince Mentschikoff‘s idea of a flank march,—His plan,—Its advantages,—His pretext for the abandonment of Sebastopol,—Korniloff ‘s vain remonstrance against the plan,—The condition put forward to justify it,—Preliminary operation entrusted to Kiriakoff,—The army marching out of Sebastopol,—Prince Mentschikoff and his army on the 25th,—The opportunity then offered him, Prince Mentschikoff unacquainted with the movements of the Allies,—Completion of his flank march,—His state of seclusion on the Katcha. 62

CHAPTER VI. 68

I. — The vicegerents left in Sebastopol,—General Miller,—Admiral Nachimoff,—Vice-Admiral Korniloff,—Colonel de Todleben,—Perfect accord between Korniloff and Todleben,—The force exerted by their conjoint powers. 68

II. — Korniloff commanding on the North Side,—Duties undertaken by Todleben,—Forces moved to the North Side,—Strength there on the 25th Sept—Korniloff’s despair of being able to defend the North Side,—The spirit in which he prepared for the expected conflict,—The morning of the 25th,—The sight accidentally observed from the Naval Library,—The danger thus seen shifting from the North Side to the South. 75

III. — Scantiness of the forces then ready for the defence of the South Side,—Nachimoff’s despair,—His address to the seamen. 76

IV. — Korniloff tied by his orders to the North Side,—His resolve to break away from them,—-His removal to the South Side,—With eleven battalions of seamen,—Meeting at his rooms,—Measures there taken,—Korniloff by common accord invested with the supreme command. 77

V. — Korniloff’s use and extension of his power,—Nachimoff prevented from sinking his ships. 78

VI. — Korniloff and Todleben devoting themselves to the defence of the South Side,—The slight changes that had there been effected since the landing,—Weak state of the defences,—Numerical strength,—Composition of the force,—Hopelessness of any resistance to a prompt and determined attack,—26th Sept. 79

VII. — Morning of the 27th. Sebastopol at the mercy of the Allies,—Solemnity enacted on the lines of defence,—Enthusiasm excited by Korniloff,—His harangues,—The effect they produced. 80

VIII. — Todleben’s opinion and plan,—Korniloff and Todleben taking upon themselves to dismantle the fleet,—And apply all its resources to the defence,—The principle of Todleben’s plan,—The two ways in which he might produce a result,—By meeting an assault with mitrail,—Or by inducing the Allies to delay their attack,—In either aspect, the work to be done was the same,—Nature of the work required,—Small guns meanwhile placed in battery,—These a snare to the Allies,—Todleben’s way of adjusting the labour to both proximate and—more remote objects. 83

IX. — All resources in men and things brought to bear upon the business of the defences,—The exceeding alacrity with which the work was carried on,—Todleben’s habit of directing the works in person. 86

X. — Korniloff’s real impressions at this time. 87

XI. — 28th Sept. Sebastopol still unattacked, and—Communication at last from Prince Mentschikoff,—Korniloff’s way of dealing with this,—.Mentschikoff’s determination to take up a position on the Belbec,—The import of such a resolve,—Korniloff’s private reflections. 88

XII. — 29th Sept. The Allies still refraining from an attack,—Spectacle of the works by that time achieved,—Changes that had been wrought in the defences since the evening of the 25th,—The general result that had been attained. 89

XIII. — What the garrison now had was a hastily entrenched position,—But as yet no army to man it,—Mentschikoff still clinging to his design of withholding succour,—Evening of 29th Sept. Communication from the field army received by Korniloff,—Its painful significance. 91

XIV. — Morning of the 30th. The Allies still abstaining from the attack,—The advanced-guard of the Russian army on the North Side,—Prince Mentschikoff there in person,—His interview with Korniloff,—Ills tacit assent to Korniloff’s assumption of the command,—His intention of still keeping the army aloof,—Korniloff’s remonstrance,—Its effect. 92

XV. — Todleben’s explanation of Prince Mentschikoff’s course of action,—Inquiry as to its validity,—Surmise tending to account for Prince Mentschikoff.’s conduct. 93

XVI. — The glory justly attaching to the defence of Sebastopol during the six last days. 95

CHAPTER VII. 97

27th Sept. The Allies reconnoitring,—The question really needing solution,—The counsel of Sir Edmund Lyons,—27th Sept. The suggestion for an assault,—Canrobert’s disapproval,—27th Sept. Determination to land the siege-trains,—September (apparently the 28th). Sir George Cathcart’s suggestion,—Renewed counsels from Lyons,—Lord Raglan,—Opinion of the French,—Of Burgoyne,—The argument against assaulting,—Without first using the siege-trains,—Argument in favour of assaulting at once,—29th Sept. Second consideration of the plan for assaulting Sebastopol,—30th Sept. Its definitive rejection,—Lord Raglan’s negative of a proposal for recording his conferences with the French,—The speech of Canrobert,—The expediency of veiling differences between the French and the English commanders,—Lord Raglan’s way of submitting the question of assaulting,—His success in warding off the appearance of differences between Canrobert and himself,—Tendency of divided counsels to end in the rejection of vigorous measures,—The great weight of authority by which Lord Raglan’s wish was opposed,—Lord Raglan’s course of action when he found his wishes overruled—His reserve on the subject,—Probable clue,—4th Oct. General Airey’s letter to Lord Hardinge,—The gradual process by which the Allies brought themselves to—their conclusion,—The error ascribed by Todleben to those of the Allies who—opposed the assault,—The real purport of their determination,—Its conformity with the enemy’s wishes,—The third of the lost occasions. 97

CHAPTER VIII. 118

The fleets,—Extent of their power to aid attack of South Side,—The Russians now secure on the North Side,—And on their whole sea front,—No investment practicable,—The lost opportunity of isolating Sebastopol,—Other evils now resulting to the Allies from their ‘flank march,’—The enemy now able to concentrate his efforts upon a small space of ground,—The predicament into which the Allies had brought themselves. 118

CHAPTER IX. 125

Disposition of the Allied armies,—Its twofold purpose,—Forces charged with siege duty,—French,—English,—Defensive arrangements of the Allies,—Duty attaching upon Bosquet’s forces,—Double task undertaken by the English,—Works of circumvallation on the Sapounè Ridge,—Mount Inkerman,—Sir John Burgoyne’s vain representations,—Distinct system of defence required for Balaclava—The means adopted for strengthening it,—Sir Colin Campbell,—The French and the English Headquarters. 125

CHAPTER X. 130

Preparations of the Allies,—Aid given by the Allied fleets,—Distinguishing characteristics of the sailor as compared with the soldier,—7th Oct. Signs of change in the attitude of Mentschikoff’s field army,—Its resumed dominion of the Mackenzie heights,—With horsemen and guns thrown forward into the plains of the Tchernaya,—The garrison daily becoming more bold,—The Sebastopol ‘front for attack,’—The plan of attack adopted by the Allies,—Proposal for placing the infantry on ground more near to Sebastopol,—7th Oct. Lord Raglan assembling his Divisional Generals of Infantry,—Their resistance to the proposed changes,—Its effect,—8th Oct. Burgoyne’s then stated opinion,—This a surprise upon Lord Raglan,—His communication to the French,—Two long-range batteries commenced by the English,—The French occupying more advanced positions,—And breaking ground on the night of the 9th Oct.,—Progress of their works,—The enemy’s sallies and cannonades,—Further progress of the French works,—Hindrances encountered by the English,—Their modified plan,—Nights of the 10th and 11th Oct., the English opening their trenches,—The appearance of desolation now caused by pulling down roofs. 130

CHAPTER XI. 139

Desire that the fleets should aid in the attack upon Sebastopol,—Question as to the part-they might take,—The French Admiral under the orders of General Canrobert,—Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas,—Lord Raglan’s letter to Dundas,—The English seamen,—Their angry impatience,—Feeling and attitude of Lyons towards his chief,—His resistance to Dundas encouraged by a Secretary of State,—Difficulty of resisting Lord Raglan’s appeal,—Dundas’s consent,—15th Oct. Naval conference,—Its first resolution,—Opinion of the English ship captains,—Concurred in (the next day) by Lyons,—What the English ship captains desired,—Second resolution of the Naval Conference,—Decision of Canrobert and Lord Raglan upon the choice offered them,—Their joint letter to the Admirals,—The ill prospect this measure offered to the Naval forces. 139

CHAPTER XII. 148

Mentschikoff’s continued wish to withhold the aid of his field army,—The remonstrance prepared by Korniloff,—Mentschikoff suddenly yielding,—Reinforcements,—Admiral Istomin’s stratagem,—Its success,—Strength of the garrison on the 9th Oct.,—Increased hopefulness of the endeavour to defend Sebastopol,—Increased strength of Mentschikoff’s field army,—Its changed attitude,—The Allies now outnumbered,—What was still the main hope of the garrison,—Morning of 10th Oct. The garrison perceiving that the French—had broken ground,—The joy this occasioned in Sebastopol,—Todleben’s idea of the conjuncture,—His measures,—Effects of the respite granted to Sebastopol,—A sortie,—Petty ventures against the besiegers,—Their good effect,—The respite needed,—And granted,—Strength given in twenty days to the land defences,—Summary of what the defenders had gained in the interval,—Evening of the 16th Oct—the garrison expectant. 148

CHAPTER XIII. 157

I. — Sources of the confidence felt by the Allies—Their batteries,—Those of the Russians,—Their great artillery resources,—Distribution of their batteries,—The time fixed for the opening of the land cannonade,—The dawn of the 17th Oct.,—Opening of the fire,—Cannonading in salvoes,—The cause of this,—The seamen,—The fighting maintained in the batteries,—Admiral Korniloff,—His movements,—And returns to his quarters,—His letter and message to his wife,—His survey from the house-top,—His despondency,—The state of the conflict at this time,—State and temper of the infantry detained under fire,—Their firmness shaken,—Measures adopted in consequence,—Brief period of weakness,—Effect of Todleben’s dispositions against the works on Mount Rodolph,—Explosion of a French magazine,—Physical effects of the explosion,—Its effect upon the spirit of the French troops,—Second explosion in the French lines,—Mount Rodolph silenced,—Messages from Canrobert to Lord Raglan,—The opportunity not seized,—10.30 A.M., the English alone now engaged,—Prince Mentschikoff,—His presence for a time in Sebastopol,—His conversation with Korniloff,—His departure,—Between 10 and 10.30 A.M.,—Korniloff’s movements,—The directions he gave,—The meeting of Korniloff and Todleben at the Péressip,—Korniloff moving up to the Redan,—State of things he there found,—His departure for the Malakoff Hill,—His presence there,—The wound he received—His death,—The heroic quality of his nature,—Sebastopol now left under divided command,—Endeavours to conceal his death,—Grief of his people. 157

II. — Time originally fixed for the opening of the naval attack,—Postponement at the instance of the French Admiral—7 o’clock A.M., 17th Oct., a new plan of attack suddenly insisted upon by the French,—Particulars of the new plan of attack,—Plan insisted upon by the French as an ultimatum,—Dilemma in which Dundas was placed,—Dundas’s reluctant acceptance of the new plan,—His declared reason for accepting it,—Dundas’s conference with his ships’ captains,—The French plan unanimously condemned,—English compliancy,—Nature of the service Dundas was now undertaking,—The place he chose for the Britannia,—The main division,—The in-shore squadron,—Steamships kept under way,—The three great outer sea-forts,—Forts Constantine and Alexander,—Fort Constantine,—Fort Alexander,—The one definite purpose of the French plan,—The Quarantine Sea-fort,—10.30 A.M. Provoking coincidence,—The fleets advancing from the roads of the Katcha,—The steam-power of the Allies,—Mode of applying it to the sailing ships,—1 P.M. Fire opened by the Russian forts,—Calm silence on board the French fleet,—Its array,—Admiral Hamelin’s signal to his fleet,—The French fleet opening fire,—Dundas’s orders to three of his steamers,—Guns opposed to the French fleet,—Engagement of French ships with the Quarantine Sea-fort,—With Fort Alexander,—General result of the conflicts undertaken by the French fleet,—The cause of its failure,—Works to be assailed by the in-shore English squadron,—The Wasp,—The Telegraph Battery,—Fort Constantine,—The weak angle of the fort,—The shoal protecting Fort Constantine,—Point at which a ship of the line could approach to within 800 yards of the fort,—Tasks assigned to the in-shore squadron,—Its advantage over the main division,—Advance of the in-shore squadron,—The paper of instructions issued by Dundas,—Signal from the Britannia,—The Agamemnon passing the Sanspareil,—Shots exchanged with the cliff batteries,—Service rendered by Mr. Ball to the Agamemnon,—The Agamemnon anchoring and engaging Fort Constantine,—Her advantageous position,—Position taken up by the Sanspareil,—By the London,—Except for Agamemnon, no good berth over the reef,—The steamships kept under way,—Explosion on Fort Constantine,—Havoc wrought amongst the upper-tier batteries of Fort Constantine,—These abandoned by the Russians,—Limit of the power that ships had over Fort Constantine,—Arethusa and Albion engaged with the cliff batteries,—Line now formed by the in-shore squadron,—The main division,—Combined array formed by the French and English fleets,—The aspect of the Allied line of battle,—Place of the Britannia in the Allied line of battle,—Part taken by the main division,—Nearly the whole of the Allied fleet now engaged,—The great cannonade it delivered,—With but few guns opposed to it,—But still proving almost in vain,—Ships of the main division,—Continuation of the engagement commenced by the in-shore squadron,—Ships combating with the Telegraph Battery and the Wasp Tower—The Arethusa—The Albion,—Disabled state of Arethusa and Albion,—Engagement of the London with the Telegraph Battery,—Its result,—The Sanspareil,—Her losses,—Comparative impunity enjoyed for a time by the Agamemnon,—Subsequent change in this respect,—Persistence of Lyons,—His measures for obtaining reinforcements,—The effect of his measures,—Reinforcements from quarters not specially appealed to by Lyons,—The Bellerophon. Lord George Paulet,—The Queen,—The Rodney,—The Rodney aground,—The position of the Rodney,—Her engagement with Fort Constantine,—The Agamemnon, Sanspareil, and London now hauling off,—Summary of what had been effected by Lyons with his in-shore squadron,—Resistless power of the cliff batteries as against ships,—The Rodney left alone on the shoal,—The temper and spirit of her men,—Fire concentrated upon her—Its effect,—The fleets hauling off,—The Rodney still aground on the shoal,—Measures taken for moving her,—And at length with success,—The steadiness of her crew from first to last,—Havoc done on board her,—The results of this. naval attack on. Sebastopol,—And causes of its failure,—Admiral Hamelin not responsible,—Admiral Dundas,—Sir Edmund Lyons,—The praises showered upon him at the time,—The credit really due to him,—Lessons taught by this naval attack. 176

III. — Continued action of the English land-batteries,—Their effect,—The Redan,—Great explosion,—Its effect,—Retreat of the Russian infantry,—Defenceless condition of the Redan,—The opportunity there was for assaulting it,—Why not seized by the Allies,—The enemy not quickly enlightened by the silence of the French—batteries,—Conclusion of the cannonade for the day,—Its results,—The consequence of not storming before nightfall,—The Allies hampered by their duality,—The course taken by Canrobert,—Concurrent opinions upon the expediency of an assault,—Another lost occasion. 217

CHAPTER XIV. 227

Change of plan,—More time required by the French,—Morning of the 13th. Changed state of the defences,—The English cannonade, 18th of October,—Death of Colonel Hood,—Feat of Captain Peel’s,—Cannonade of the 19th October,—The six successive days of cannonade which followed the 19th October,—Measures for counteracting the French approaches. 227

CHAPTER XV. 231

Mr. Calvert’s warning,—Lord Raglan’s reception of the warning,—Steps taken by Lord Raglan,—His letter to the Home Government,—In prospect of the approaching winter,—Re-appearance of the enemy’s field army. 231

APPENDIX. 234

NOTE I. — EXTRACT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION HELD WITH SIR EDMUND LYONS, WHICH WAS MADE BY MR. GEORGE LOCH (LATELY MEMBER FOR SUTHERLANDSHIRE), FEBRUARY 10, 1856, AND APPROVED AS ACCURATE ON THE SAME DAY BY SIR EDMUND. 234

NOTE II. — STATEMENT (DATED 24TH Nov. 1867) BY SIR EDWARD WETHERALL RESPECTING THE FLANK MARCH. 236

NOTE III. — THE FLANK MARCH. THE ORDER GIVEN TO LORD LUCAN. 237

NOTE IV. — LETTER PRINTED IN ‘L’EXPEDITION DE CRIMÉE’ OF A FRENCH DIVISIONAL GENERAL WHOSE NAME IS NOT GIVEN BY M. DE BAZANCOURT. 238

NOTE V. — EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS OF LORD RAGLAN TENDING TO SHOW HIS OPINION AS TO TILE POLICY OF STORMING THE PLACE AT FIRST. 239

NOTE VI. — ADVERSE LETTERS FROM SIR JOHN BURGOYNE, WITH SOME COMMENTS BY THE AUTHOR. 241

NOTE VII. — EXTRACTS SHOWING THAT IN NOVEMBER 1854, BOTH THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH ENGINEERS CAME BACK, AFTER ALL, TO ‘ENTERPRISE’ AS OFFERING THE BEST MEANS OF EXTRICATION. 255

NOTE VIII. — EXTRACT OF RETURN TO THE ADMIRALTY SHOWING THE NUMBER OF MEN AND THE QUANTITY OF MATERIAL LANDED FROM THE ENGLISH FLEET TO AID THE LAND FORCES IN THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL DOWN TO 28TH OF OCTOBER. 256

NOTE IX. — GENERAL DE TODLEBEN’S EXPLANATIONS OF PRINCE MENTSCHKOFF’S REASONS FOR HIS FLANS MARCH. 257

NOTE X. — PROTEST OF VICE-ADMIRAL KORNILOFF AGAINST PRINCE MENTSCHIKOFF’S PLAN OF STILL KEEPING THE ARMY ALOOF FROM SEBASTOPOL. 259

NOTE XI. — STRENGTH OF THE ALLIES ON THE 17TH OF OCTOBER. 260

NOTE XII. — GROUNDS OF STATEMENT AS TO STRENGTH OF THE GARRISON ON THE 6TH AND 9TH OF OCTOBER 1854. 261

NOTE XIII. — THE FRENCH SIEGE BATTERIES, 17TH OF OCTOBER. 262

NOTE XIV. — THE ENGLISH SIEGE BATTERIES, 17TH OF OCTOBER 263

NOTE XV.—ARMAMENT OF THESE RUSSIAN BATTERIES WHICH WERE OPPOSED TO THE BATTERIES OF THE BESIEGERS ON THE 17TH OF OCTOBER 266

NOTE XVI — STRENGTH AND ARMAMENT OF THE THREE RUSSIAN SEA-FORT BATTERIES WHICH WERE ENGAGED BY THE ALLIED FLEETS. 267

NOTE XVII. — MEMORANDUM ON THE CLIMATE OF THE CRIMEA BY MR. CATTLEY, WHICH WAS SENT BY LORD RAGLAN TO THE HOME GOVERNMENT ON THE 23rd OF OCTOBER 1854. 268

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER. 269

AUTHOR’S NOTE.

*** THE foregoing title-page has been kept in conformity with those prefixed to the earlier portions of the work; and it therefore may be right to say that the narrative contained in this volume is—not in its Sixth, but—only in its Fourth Edition.

A. W. K.

April 1877.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. IV.

PLATE I.—SEBASTOPOL FROM THE SEA

PLATE II.—THE FLANK MARCH,

PLATE III.—DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATIVE OF DESCRIPTIONS

PLATE IV.—SEBASTOPOL, 24TH APRIL 1853,

PLATE V.—SEBASTOPOL, 14TH SEPTEMBER 1854,

PLATE VI.—DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATIVE OF ASSAILABLE POINTS,

PLATE VII.—SEBASTOPOL, 17TH OCTOBER 1854,

PLATE VIII.—NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 17TH OCT

PLATE IX.—NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 17TH OCT

PLATE X.—NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 17TH OCT

SEBASTOPOL AT BAY.

CHAPTER I.

Critical position of the Allies,—Cause of their imperilled state,—False alarm in the night,—Virulence of the cholera.

THE night they lay on the Belbec, the Allies were still in blank ignorance of the enemy’s plans; and although they supposed that the Russian army must be almost, as it were, in their presence, they did not know where it was posted. Of course, this still undispersed darkness in regard to the enemy’s counsels and movements was of itself a source of grave danger; and unless they were largely reckoning upon the despondency or the unskilfulness of the enemy, the Allies might well believe that the circumstances in which they stood were critical even to jeopardy. Hitherto, each day’s march had ended by relinking the (temporarily) abandoned communication between the land and the sea forces of the Allies; but now that the invaders had made up their minds to leave the mouth of the river on which they were bivouacked to the undisturbed control of the enemy, it resulted that, except by a retrograde march to the Katcha, or by an adventure across the country to the southern coast of the peninsula, they could no longer gain access to their shipping. On their right, there was the sea-shore, controlled by the enemy, and not approached by the succouring fleets. Before them, they had that Severnaya or north side of Sebastopol, which, since they had determined not to attack it, was as hampering to them as if it had been really impregnable. On their left, the Allies had a wooded and broken country, to them quite strange, though of course well-known to the enemy; and the condition of things was such that it was competent to the Russian Commander, without hazard (and even without being seen till the work should be nearly done), to move his army at pleasure to any part of the Belbec which was far enough above the English lines to be clear of their outlying picket.{1}

If it could have been taken for granted that the troops which retreated from the Alma were still a coherent army, there would have been no reason why the morrow’s dawn should not show Prince Mentschikoff coming down in force upon the left flank of the Allies, and threatening to roll up their line. In that case the Allies—first the English and then the French—would have had to change their front, and to range themselves as best they could, with the north side of Sebastopol on their right, and, at their backs, a sea and seashore no longer friendly to them, but controlled by the enemy’s guns. The cause of their being in this plight was Marshal St. Arnaud’s refusal to attack the Work at the mouth of the Belbec; for if that had been taken or silenced, the attendant fleets would have approached, and the Allies, as before, would have been in communication with the shipping. This not being done, the fate with which the principles of the art of war seemed to threaten the Allies was—not mere discomfiture, but ruin. If two strategists for pastime, or for love of their art, were to wage a mimic war upon a map with pins and counters, the one who might find himself brought to the condition in which the Allies now lay would have to confess himself vanquished, and this notwithstanding that his counters might show him to be much the grosser in numbers. It was with better fortune that the Allies were destined to rise from their bivouac on the Belbec, for they had strength of a kind which the pins and counters of the strategist could hardly symbolise; they were still under the shelter of their Wednesday’s victory, and were favoured beyond common measure by the unskilfulness of the Russian Commander.

About two hours after midnight, there was a good deal of musketry firing in a part of the Allied line; and when this came to be followed by the sustained roar of field-artillery, it was hard for young soldiers to avoid believing that a somewhat hot combat must be going on. Lord Raglan was not awakened.{2} It was said that the false alarm which brought about all this firing arose in the Turkish lines.

When morning dawned upon the invaders there was no sign that the enemy was hovering upon their left flank; and although, as was afterwards known, the army of the Allies and the Russian field army were drinking that morning of the same stream, there was between them a distance not hitherto pierced by the reports of scouts or deserters, and great enough to prevent their being seen the one by the other.

During the hours of this bivouac on the Belbec the cholera raged. In the morning, great numbers of the soldiers thus torn from the strength of the English regiments were laid in ranks parallel with the road. The sufferers all lay strangely silent.

CHAPTER II.

I. — St. Arnaud’s bodily state,—Lord Raglan’s dispositions for the flank march,—Commencement of the march,—The cavalry striking into a wrong path,—March of the infantry,—Lord Raglan in person effecting a separate reconnaissance,—His return into the line of march,—By striking into the lane shown on the Maps,—And riding on without any of his troops in front of him,—Cause of this,—Lord Raglan almost in contact with a Russian force,—Which proves to be the rearguard of Prince Mentschikoff’s army,—The surprise mutual,—Lord Raglan’s presence of mind,—His orders,—An interval,—The Russians losing their opportunity,—The English cavalry coming up,—Lord Raglan’s words to Lord Lucan,—Retreat of the Russian battalion,—Pursuit,—Prisoners and booty taken,—Lord Raglan’s words to Lord Cardigan,—Mackenzie’s Farm,—Heavy bodies of Russian troops seen marching off towards the north,—The coincidence which brought about the collision,—The extent and real import of the Russian movement not—apprehended,—State of the officer taken prisoner,—Lord. Raglan pained and revolted,—The import of the Russian march still unapprehended,—Lord Raglan’s march resumed,—The Mackenzie Heights,—Our army reaching the Tchernaya,—March of the French,—Cathcart’s duties on the Belbec,—Lord Raglan on the Tchernaya,—His communication with Cathcart and the admirals,—The march resumed on the 26th,—Lord Raglan before Balaclava,—Fire opened from one of the old castles,—Lord Raglan’s measures,—Ships’ guns heard,—Surrender of Balaclava,—Commandant’s reason for not surrendering at once,—Lord Raglan entering Balaclava,—Demeanour of the inhabitants,—Lord Raglan riding towards the water’s edge,—And an English vessel of war coming in,—Lord Raglan’s first words,—The little harbour and town quickly filled.

BEFORE he moved forward on the morning of the 25th, Lord Raglan saw Marshal St. Arnaud, but found him in a state of bodily suffering too acute to allow of his taking part in business.

The resolve of the foregoing night was to be executed in the following way:—Leaving General Cathcart with the 4th Division and the 4th Light Dragoons on the Belbec, in order that, for a while, he might there maintain the communication with the Katcha, and be able to send the sick thither, Lord Raglan determined that the rest of his army, avoiding the marsh in front which Lord Cardigan had reconnoitred, and bending at once to its left, should move straight up to the ground overhanging the head of the Sebastopol bay, and try to keep such a direction as to be able to strike the highroad between Sebastopol and Baktchi Seräi at a spot described in the maps by the name of ‘Mackenzie’s Farm.’ In that direction, accordingly, Lord Lucan was to proceed on reconnaissance with the cavalry division; and, the ground being woodland, he was to be supported by a battalion of the Rifles, under Colonel Lawrence. Upon reaching Mackenzie’s Farm, Lord Lucan was to abstain from moving troops into the great road; but his instructions enjoined him to watch it both ways—that is, in the direction of Sebastopol on one side, and Baktchi Seräi on the other. He was to report to Lord Raglan the result of his observations.{3}

According to an indication given by the maps, there was a narrow lane or woodland road which led to Mackenzie’s Farm; and in order to leave that route clear for the cavalry and artillery, our infantry were to make their way through the forest by following, as ships do at sea, the guidance of the mariner’s compass. The direction in which they were to move was south-south-east from the point where the compass would first be needed.

Lord Raglan in person proposed to move forward in the general line of march until he should find himself on the commanding heights which overhang the head of the Sebastopol roadstead; but then, taking with him his escort—a troop of light-horse—he intended to reconnoitre the ground, and to determine with his own eyes whether there was anything in the nature of the country, or in the visible preparations of the enemy, which might make it expedient to withdraw from the undertaking of the flank march, or to alter the way of effecting it. If he should judge that there was nothing which ought to hinder his enterprise, the advance of his whole army to Mackenzie’s Farm, and thence to the Tchernaya and the south coast, was to go on. In that case, and as soon as the English cavalry, artillery, and waggon-trains should have so far defiled through the forest as to leave the road clear for other troops, the French army was to follow in the same direction. Accordingly, it may be said that, during the first hours of the march, the advance was a ‘reconnaissance in force,’ but a reconnaissance so arranged that Lord Raglan, by a word, could convert it into a definitive movement of the whole Allied army, which would be carried on to the top of the Mackenzie Heights, thence down to the Tractir bridge on the Tchernaya, and at last to the port of Balaclava.{4}

At about half-past eight on the morning of the 25th of September the flank march began. From the first, Lord Lucan’s reconnoitring column was but little in advance of the main body of the English army for which it had to feel the way.{5} Lord Lucan’s order of march was this: at the head of his column there moved a troop of hussars with which he was present in person. Half the companies of the Rifle battalion were placed in advance, and the other half in the rear of the main body of the cavalry, each regiment of which was covered by flankers of its own.

After marching some miles in the right direction, this reconnoitring column of Lord Lucan’s (though its route had been chosen for it by an officer of the Quartermaster-General’s department, who rode with the force for the purpose) was led into a path which turned out to be a byroad diverging from the true line of march—a byroad degenerating, after a time, to a mere track, and at last disappearing altogether.{6} The troops, were able, however, to make some way through the forest in the manner that had been prescribed to the infantry, by taking the compass for their guide, and moving, as nearly as they could, in a. south-south-easterly course. Since Lord Lucan had a battalion of Rifles joined to his cavalry, and understood that he ought to keep his whole force together, he was unable, of course, to allow to himself and his horsemen a greater degree of speed than the foot-soldiers with him could reach. Upon the whole, it resulted that, after a while, the reconnoitring column was not (as Lord Raglan had of course supposed it would be) at the head of the advancing army.

By aid of the compass, and with great toil, our infantry divisions made their difficult way through the forest. The underwood was in some places so thick as to leave but a very narrow choice of path, and in general it was found impracticable for the troops to preserve any kind of formation. The men of each battalion broke through as best they could, passing sometimes over ground where several could be working their way abreast of one another, but at other times compelled to break into Indian file. Still, the plan of marching by compass was successful; and, so far as I have learnt, no body of men fell out of the prescribed line of march in such a way as to become long divided from the rest of the army.

It was a laborious task for troops which were not at the time in the enjoyment of great bodily strength, to have to tear their way through steep forest ground without a road or a path; and at one of the halts which took place with a portion of the Foot regiments already near the summit of the heights, some impatience broke out; for, there being no water, the men felt the torment of thirst. There arose a low, grave, momentous sound—the murmur of angered soldiery. Each man, whilst he sat or lay on the ground, hoarsely groaned out the same intense word. The one utterance heard travelling along the lines was, ‘Water! water! water!’{7}

When Lord Raglan had gained the high ground on the east of Sebastopol, he diverged from the line of march which his army was taking; and having with him his escort, rode on along the shoulder of the hill which there bulges out towards the west. When he stopped, he was at no great distance from the eastermost of those two lighthouses which stand at the head of the bay.{8}

Then the prize, for the winning of which the Allies had come over the seas, lay spread out before him. Of such defences as there might be on the land side of the place he indeed could discern very little; but, the day being bright, and the ground so commanding as to give him full scope for his survey, he looked all the way down the great roadstead from the east to the west, and even could mark where the waves were lapping the booms at its entrance. He saw part of the fleet and the docks, the approaches of the man-of-war harbour, and the long-nurtured malice of the casemated batteries crouching down at the water’s edge. On the upland above the Severnaya or North Side, he saw the Star Fort now left behind and avoided, and on the South, the Kara-bel faubourg, with, beyond, the steep shining streets and the olive-green domes of Sebastopol. So glittered before him what Russians called fondly their Czar’s ‘priceless jewel.’{9} So opened under his gaze the field of a conflict approaching, and not destined to end whilst he lived.

None foresaw, I believe, at the time, that the ground where Lord Raglan was standing would ere long acquire a strange worth in the eyes of the invading nations; yet before the next spring should warm into summer, the dominion of those barren uplands at the head of the Sebastopol bay was about to be accounted so precious that, in order by sheer might to win it, the great Powers of the West would be contemplating another armada, another descent on the coast, another and a greater invasion.{10} But at this time, all was quietness. The Russians showed no troops; and. not only was there no sign of their undertaking to obstruct the flank march, but it even seemed as if hitherto they must either have been blind to the movement, or else so alive to its nature as to be willing to let it proceed, and determined to abide their time.

The survey thus effected by Lord Raglan in person had disclosed nothing that could deter him from converting the reconnaissance into a definitive movement, but no report of the condition of things on the great road had yet come in from the cavalry. He turned his horse’s head, and made for the line of march which his troops were of pursuing, but with the intention of striking it at a point some way in advance.

Led by that instinctive knowledge of country which was one of his natural gifts, and neither having a guide, nor needing any fresh glance at the map, he at once chose his course like a rider who had been familiar with the ground all his days, and soon struck into the lane or woodland road which bends up towards Mackenzie’s Farm. The cavalry, as we saw, was moving through another part of the forest; but Maude’s troop of horse-artillery, though in general commanded by Lord Lucan, did not now form a part of the reconnoitring column; and having avoided the mistake which led the cavalry into a bypath, it was now upon its assigned route, moving steadily along the woodland road. The road was just broad enough to allow the passage of a piece of artillery, with also one horseman alongside it; and at the time of the interruption which will be presently recorded, Lord Raglan, followed by his Staff in single file, was riding abreast of the foremost gun, or perhaps a few paces ahead of it.

Lord Raglan supposed that the reconnoitring column of cavalry and riflemen was in front of him, and from moment to moment, no doubt, he was expecting Lord Lucan’s report.

If the cavalry had been leading the march through this lane, it would have been moving, of course, with the usual precautions, and an advanced-guard preceding the column by a sufficing distance, and perceiving a hostile force in its front, would have been quick to carry back warning to the main body. It chanced, however, as we saw, that our cavalry had missed the lane, and this is why it was that Lord Raglan came to be riding with none of his troops in front of him.

At length Lord Raglan reached a point in the lane where the light some way on could be seen breaking through—breaking through in such way as to show that, a few yards in front, there must be an opening in the forest.{11} Observing this, General Airey asked permission to ride on a little way in advance, in order to see whether the ground was clear: and he moved accordingly; but in a few seconds he stopped; and without speaking held up his hand in a way which instantly showed not only that Lord Raglan and the whole column should instantly halt, but that there was need to be very quiet. Airey had, all at once, come in sight of the great road at the point where it crosses the lane almost close to Mackenzie’s Farm. There, and only a few paces off, there was a Russian waggon-train and a body of Russian infantry. The force, as we now know, was a battalion of foot-Cossacks escorting the: waggon-train, but constituting also the rearguard of Prince Mentschikoff’s field army.{12} The men were halted—but not because they yet stood on the alert; they had halted as troops halt for rest in the midst of a toilsome march, and some of them were strolling along the road. Almost at the moment when they first caught sight of General Airey surveying them from his saddle, they must have heard the rumble of Maude’s horse-artillery, and learnt that an enemy’s force was close upon them.

If two hostile forces thus came, as it were by an accident, to strike, one against the other, in marching, the