The Vistula-Oder Offensive: The Soviet Destruction of German Army Group A, 1945

By Ian Baxter

A fully illustrated account of the Soviet offensive from the River Vistula towards Berlin.

The Vistula-Oder offensive was a massive Soviet Army operation on the Eastern Front which was launched on 12 January 1945 and paved the way for the Battle of Berlin. Its main objective was a major advance from the River Vistula to the River Oder, bringing Soviet forces within fifty miles of the gates of Berlin. The offensive faced a German defensive line east of Warsaw. These 450,000 German troops were outmatched three to one by the Soviet forces. The Red Army assault began what would be a devastating three weeks for the German forces of Army Group A.

German attempts to hold their lines and avoid being sucked into a maelstrom of destruction were unsuccessful. Army Group A would collapse almost all the way back to Berlin, ending the Third Reich’s desperate efforts to cling onto land captured in Poland five years earlier, and stem enemy forces spilling over into Germany and threatening Berlin. The battle saw some 295,000 soldiers killed and 147,000 captured, as well as thousands of tanks, artillery, and machine guns destroyed. Within two months of the offensive the battle of Berlin was launched.

This fully illustrated book relates this story of defeat and survival, offering a detailed visual record of Nazi Germany’s demise between two main rivers in Poland and Germany.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Casemate
• Release date: Jan 4, 2024
• ISBN: 9781636243603

Ian Baxter

Ian Baxter is a military historian who specialises in German twentieth-century military history. He has written more than fifty books. He has also reviewed numerous military studies for publication, supplied thousands of photographs and important documents to various publishers and film production companies worldwide, and lectures to various schools, colleges and universities throughout the United Kingdom and Southern Ireland.

Book preview

Introduction

The Vistula–Oder Offensive was the Red Army codename for a series of offensive operations that culminated in major advances into German-held territory, capturing the major cities of Krakow, Warsaw, and Poznan. To reach and secure bridgeheads across the Vistula and Oder Rivers, the Soviets launched three major offensive operations over six months, beginning in June 1944: the Stanislav and Lvov, Sandomierz, and finally the Vistula–Oder Offensive. Facing the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, German Army Group A, outnumbered five to one, was compelled to defend a vast tract of territory between the two rivers.

This account is a unique insight into one of the greatest military defeats ever experienced by the Wehrmacht during World War II, with the complete destruction of Army Group A. Drawing on rare and unpublished photographs with in-depth captions, the book describes how the German forces of Army Group A endured the massive Soviet offensive that forced some 450,000 German soldiers to withdraw across the Vistula in a fight to the death. Along the river German units resisted until eventually they were sent reeling across a scarred and devastated battlefield through Western Poland and into Germany.

Repeatedly, German troops in various fortified positions and festungen attempted to counter the overwhelming Soviet attacks but were ultimately isolated, trapped, and annihilated. Army Group A continued to fight a grim and bitter defense until the final Soviet offensive from the Vistula to the Oder was launched in January 1945. In two weeks the Soviets advanced some 300 miles and were only 43 miles from Berlin. Preparations for the defense of the Oder were haphazard as the Red Army soon saw its forces rip open and encircle many precious German panzer and infantry divisions. In the end, the Vistula–Oder Offensive cost the Germans more than 295,000 killed.

This was a shattering defeat for the German forces defending the Vistula and then the Oder as the Soviet forces prepared for one last push against Berlin. The destruction of Army Group A and then Army Group Vistula is a story that has been overshadowed by the successful Soviet Bagration offensive launched against Army Group Center in June 1944. The Vistula–Oder Offensive was a more catastrophic blow than anything else on the Eastern Front, yet little is known of it. This account outlines this massive operation and shows how the Red Army fought and destroyed the Germans between the two major rivers.

Withdrawing into Poland, Summer 1944

By June 1944, German strategy was faced with a full-fledged, two-front war. More than 53 percent of the army was fighting on the Eastern Front, whilst the other 47 percent were in Western Europe trying to stem the Allied invasion along the Normandy coast. In Russia, German Army strength had reached a new low of 2,242,649 against more than six million Soviet troops. The best-equipped and most-effective segment of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS, had achieved a strength of some 400,000 men, but of this total the bulk of the most elite combat formations were fighting in France. In the East the SS were distributed on the northern, central, and southern fronts, intended to act as the backbone of the German fighting machine. However, in front of both the Waffen-SS and Heer stood a vast enemy army whose strength was almost three times their own.

With the prospect on the Eastern Front worsening for the Germans, German intelligence had detected that there was a possibility of an offensive somewhere on the Eastern Front. The Germans appreciated that if the Soviets succeeded in wrenching open the fragile front then it would undoubtedly blow wide open the door to Poland and then to the Reich itself.

Despite being understrength and lacking weapons and equipment, German commanders were still seen to be outwardly confident that they could hold the front together. Since the defeat at Moscow in late 1941 Army Group Center, for instance, had held the front and frequently fought with tenacity in repulsing repeated Soviet attacks. Hitler for one believed if the Red Army were to unleash a large-scale summer offensive, it would probably not be planned against the center, for it had already proven to be well defended. In his view the Red Army would possibly attack Northern Ukraine thus offering Army Group Center the best chance of survival. Not for one moment did Hitler nor his OKH (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht—High Command of the Armed Forces) commanders expect Army Group Center to face the main Red Army push. Already German tactical intelligence, using radio interception and various reconnaissance units, had closely monitored enemy movements in the area and confirmed this opinion. Furthermore, German intelligence had sent Hitler detailed reports in May 1944 that the main Red Army attack would be in the south where they had detected large traffic movements. To substantiate their intelligence summary, they had detected for some time enemy units working on an extensive array of defenses facing Army Group Center positions.

A German MG 42 machine-gun crew preparing to take up a defensive position just prior to the Soviet Bagration offensive. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Waffen-SS soldiers take cover from heavy enemy fire. Hitler was determined to infuse his defensive policy measure into the troops to stop the enemy from securing bridgeheads across the Vistula. (National Archives and Records Administration)

However, despite positive reports on enemy concentrations, German intelligence-gathering by mid-1944 was restricted and somewhat unreliable. Not only was aerial reconnaissance limited due to massive Soviet air superiority, but on the ground too reconnaissance units were unable to collect extensive signal intelligence because of the strict Soviet radio silence. In May 1944, the Red Army had misled German intelligence regarding the presence and disposition of its forces. They had deceived OKH about the aims of the offensive and used a large-scale deception plan, fooling the Germans into believing they were actually going to attack in the south when their main objective was the center.

An ISU-122 advances along to the front. Despite Hitler’s Fortified Area order, Army Group Center could not hold back the Red Army and slowly withdrew across Poland, west toward Kaunas, the Neman River, and Bialystok.

A Soviet forward observation post. By late June 1944, German Army Group Center was in full retreat across a scarred and devastated battlefield, withdrawing toward Warsaw.

Hitler now believed he was one step ahead of his adversary, Stalin. He confidently ordered that vital equipment and resources be stripped from Army Group Center to create a reserve to strike a preemptive blow in Northern Ukraine. As a result, Army Group Center lost most of its panzers, a quarter of its self-propelled guns, half its antitank capability, and over a quarter of its heavy artillery.

With Army Group Center stripped bare, by early June 1944, German intelligence began receiving disturbing reports that Soviet armor was moving north. Days later there were strong indications that infantry divisions and artillery were concentrating opposite Army Group Center. By the end of the first week of June, four Soviet armies had been detected. It was soon apparent that the Red Army was preparing a summer offensive in the central front with the objective of liberating Belarus.

On the morning of June 22, 1944, the third anniversary of the German invasion of Russia, the long-awaited Soviet offensive was launched against Army Group Center. In total the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts hurled more than 2.5 million troops, 4,000 tanks, 25,000 artillery pieces and mortars, and 5,300 aircraft to