The Confucian Tradition: Between Religion and Humanism

By Guoxiang Peng

The author reviews the Confucian tradition through the two concepts, religion and humanities. Chinese scholars always adopt Zongjiao and Renwen from the ancient Chinese documents as the Chinese translation of religion and humanities. In respect of their own contexts of culture, the Chinese words and the English words share some similarities in meaning, but also have some vital differences. This book covers the major phases of the development of Confucianism, which have a wide historical span from the Pre-Qin period to the contemporary era with a focus on Confucianism in Song and Ming dynasties. Relevant ideas of modern Western disciplines such as philosophy of religion, religious studies and theology are employed by the author as references, not criteria, to illuminate key ideas in Confucian tradition and highlight the features of Confucianism as a religious or spiritual humanism. In some chapters, the author compares the eastern thinkers and theories with those western ones.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Bridge 21 Publications
• Release date: May 5, 2023
• ISBN: 9781626430792

Guoxiang Peng

Guoxiang Peng is one of the leading scholars in Chinese philosophy, intellectual history, and religions. He has been teaching at top universities in China including Peking University, Tisnghua University, and Zhejiang University and visiting professor, visiting scholar and research fellow at various prestigious universities and institutions around the world such as Harvard University, University of Hawaii, University of Frankfurt am Main, Ruhr-University Bochum, National University of Singapore, Chinese University of Hong Kong, National Taiwan University, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, and Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity. He was the 2016 Kluge Chair in Countries and Cultures of the North and the 2009 Awardee of the Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award. He has published nine books and numerous articles.

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Introduction

1. An Interpretation of Humanism

2. An Explanation of Religion

3. The Confucian Tradition: Between Humanism and Religion

4. Method and Significance

At least in the Chinese world, it is commonplace in academic circles that the Confucian tradition has been defined as a kind of humanism. Until recently, there has been no controversy about this. By contrast, if Confucianism can be regarded as a religion, or a way to understand the religiousness in Confucian tradition, it has remained debatable since the late nineteenth century. No unanimous conclusions in this regard have been drawn, even at present. But in fact, if we return to the original context, the Chinese language, we will find that the word zongjiao ( 宗教 ), which is used to translate religion, has its own origin in Chinese and was not necessarily a new word coined for the translation, not to mention that the Chinese word renwen ( 人文 ), which is used to translate humanism, has been frequently used in Chinese to describe Confucianism. On the other hand, if we are fully aware that many terms in modern Chinese have Western backgrounds and origins, when people unconsciously use renwen zhuyi ( 人文主义 ) as the Chinese translation for humanism, defining the basic characteristics of the Confucian tradition as renwen zhuyi can cause unintended consequences of understanding. As for understanding Confucianism as a zongjiao, endless confusion would be caused by analogical interpretation.

Of course, language can be said to have its own life. Otherwise, it would be like the Buddhist saying that people would only be turned by the Lotus Sutra, and could not turn the Lotus Sutra, meaning that people could creatively interpret the Lotus Sutra. The translation of a word or term into any language can generate its own meaning immediately after it enters the context of the target language, and its meaning is not necessarily confined to the meaning of the word or term in the source language. Therefore, if we can understand the basic meanings of humanism and religion in the original language and, at the same time, are fully aware of the original basic meanings of renwen and zongjiao, then, as long as we focus on interlinking commonalities between renwen zhuyi and humanism, and between zongjiao and religion, rather than seeking one-sided similarities, it can be legitimate to define Confucian tradition using the terms humanism and religion, and will not limit Confucianism to either humanism or religion exclusively.

1. An Interpretation of Humanism

The word renwen has been used in the Chinese language since ancient times. It can be traced back earliest to the saying in the "Summary Interpretation of the Hexagram Bi" in the Book of Changes ( 《周易 • 贲卦》 〈彖辞〉 ): People observe the texture of the heavens to perceive changes of the times; people observe the texture of the man to civilize the world ( 观乎天文，以察时变；观乎人文，以化成天下 ). However, renwen zhuyi as a proper name only appears as the Chinese translation of the English word humanism in the modern Chinese language. Therefore, in order to precisely define the original referent of renwen zhuyi in modern Chinese, we need to first understand the meaning of the term humanism.

The origin of the word humanism can probably be traced back earliest to the Latin word humanitas, used by Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C.–43 B.C.). However, as to the practical meaning of the word, the more mature form of humanism emerged during the Renaissance Period, and was used to refer to the study and teaching of Greek and Latin classics, particularly the study of the five subjects of grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy. But it needs to be pointed out that we do not find the word humanism at all during the Renaissance. There was only the Latin phrase studia humanitatis, literally meaning studies of humanity, namely the humanities as we refer to them today. The English word was originally coined by the educator F. J. Niethammer, from the German word humanismus. In 1859, this newly coined neologism was officially used to describe the new popular culture characterized by the individualism of the Renaissance Period in the book The Revival of Classical Antiquity or the First Century of Humanism, written by German historian George Voigt. Thus, the word was gradually brought into the language.¹ Such cultural orientation, which centered around man as an individual, was further strengthened in the Enlightenment period and became the mainstream of Western culture in modern and contemporary times.

Of course, if the interpretation is not limited to etymology, humanism is a concept that has a long history and different levels of meaning in the history and culture of the West – it is almost impossible to give a basic definition of this concept. But, unless pointed out in the particular, humanism has mostly been used to refer to a world outlook which views all with the subjective experience of man at the center, established in the Renaissance and through early modern times, and in the modern Western context since the nineteenth century. British scholar Alan Bullock once specifically examined the evolution of humanism as a tradition across different historical stages of Western society. While explaining the complexity of the implications of humanism, he also pointed out that the keynote of humanism in modern discourse is a human-centered world outlook². If it can be said that the medieval world outlook in the West was an interpretation of the world with God as the center (before the Renaissance and the Enlightenment), then the emergence of humanism turned the god-oriented world outlook around, replacing it with a human-oriented world outlook. In this sense, it might be more accurate to translate humanism³ as renben zhuyi ( 人本主义 ).

From the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the word humanism generally connoted meanings at the following levels: a) an educational program based on the learning of the classics; b) a belief in the perspective and interest of mankind and its central status in the universe; c) a belief in reason and autonomy as fundamental to the existence of mankind; d) a belief that reason, skepticism, and the scientific method are the only proper instruments for the discovery of truth and building human community; e) a belief that the foundation of ethics and society should be acquired through autonomy and an ethical equality.⁴ Obviously, except that the first point is directly related to the Renaissance, the other four are the embodiment of the spirit and ethos of the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Although humanism has seen diversified development in the West since the twentieth century, a humanism that takes the human-centered world outlook as its keynote still forms the mainstream humanist tradition, and is in tension with the religious tradition of the Middle Ages. For example, J. A. C. Fagginger Auer, of Harvard University, and Robert Calhon and Julian Hartt, of Yale University, held a debate in the early 1950s. They represented, respectively, humanism and the Christian tradition.⁵ Although there have been attempts to combine humanism and religion through so-called Christian humanism,⁶ it is very obvious that the basic characteristic of the mainstream of humanism in the twentieth century was challenging the sanctity of the Western religious tradition, and representing the opposite view. If we did not recognize this fundamental boundary between humanism and religion, then, just as John Luick has said, almost everybody was a humanist.⁷ Besides, by aligning with modern science, humanism increasingly emphasizes its orientation toward atheism and secularization. There is even a tendency for it to replace traditional religion and become a new object of belief.⁸ In this sense, the mainstream humanism of the modern West can be said to be a kind of secular humanism. The most fundamental characteristic of such a secular humanism is to take man as the standard of value, and refuse to admit the existence of anything beyond human experience and reality. Man is the measure of all things, an axiom of Ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras (circa 481 B.C.–411 B.C.), can be taken as the epitome of such a secular humanism.

2. An Explanation of Religion

It is usually considered, in academic circles, that the word zongjiao originally did not exist in the Chinese language, and that zongjiao was a product of the Japanese translation of the English word religion, introduced into the Chinese language, at the earliest, in the Annals of Japan ( 《日本国志》 ), completed by Huang Zunxian ( 黄遵宪, 1848– 1905) in 1887 and published in 1895. There, Huang Zunxian did use the word zongjiao, directly using the Chinese characters borrowed in Japanese for the word – but that was not necessarily a translation of the English word religion. More importantly, the theory that there was originally no combination of the characters zong ( 宗 ) and jiao ( 教 ) in the Chinese language has turned out to be an unexamined assumption. But the assumption has been so widespread that it is often taken as a truth that many scholars simply accept. Such a situation is indicative that they were regrettably unfamiliar with traditional Chinese classics. In fact, not only are zong and jiao commonly used in ancient Chinese, but also the use of zongjiao as a single word can be traced back to ancient Chinese history. The word is absolutely not an imported Japanese product, from the end of the Qing Dynasty. This case is quite different from the word zhexue ( 哲 学 ), meaning philosophy.

Before zongjiao, as a translation of the English word religion, was introduced into China, it was already a whole word in the traditional literature of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism.⁹ Generally, the word first appeared extensively in Buddhist literature and then it was accepted by Taoism and Confucianism successively. During the period from the Six Dynasties (229 A.D.–589 A.D.) to the Tang and Song dynasties, zongjiao was found almost everywhere in Buddhist literature. For example, Yuan Ang ( 袁昂, 459 A.D.–540 A.D.) in the Liang Dynasty said that, "When we look in the classics of the sages, they expressly indicate that the spirit is not non-existent. But the teaching of every sect [zongjiao] concludes that it exists" ( 仰寻圣典，既显言不无，但应宗教，归依 其有 )¹⁰ when he participated in the Debate on The Theory of Spiritual Perishability ( 《神灭论》 ).

When Shi Fajing ( 释法经, circa 594 A.D.), submitted a memorial to Emperor Wendi of the Sui Dynasty, he stated that the Buddhist classics that he revised "all praise and interpret the authentic scriptures, although they are different from those written in the Western Regions. But they can carry forward the teaching of the zongjiao, bring glory to their predecessors, and help enlighten worshippers of later generations" ( 虽不 类西域所制，莫非赞正经。发明宗教，光辉前绪，开进后学 ).¹¹ Shi Huihong ( 释惠洪, 1071–1128), of the Song Dynasty, once praised the one who "undertakes the teaching of zongjiao as his responsibility" ( 自以宗教为 己任 ).¹² Shi Puji ( 释普济, 1179-1253) recorded in The Compendium of Five Lamps《五灯会元》 ) that Zen master Wei Shan Ling You ( 沩山灵祐, 771 A.D.–853 A.D.) "carried forward the teaching of the zongjiao for over forty years. Countless numbers of people were enlightened" ( 敷扬宗 教，凡四十余年，达者不可胜数 ).¹³ Later on, many in the Taoist and Confucian traditions also used the word zongjiao. For example, Ren Shilin ( 任士林, 1225–1309), courtesy name Shushi ( 叔实 ), born in Fenghua, Zhejiang, of the Yuan Dynasty, said in his essay, A Speech in Celebration of the Birthday of the Celestial Master on Behalf of the Department of Taoist Records ( 代道录司贺天师寿 ), that when the Celestial Master "teaches and carries forward the teaching of the zongjiao as the leader of the Tranquil Complexes on twenty-four mountains, he receives praise from the other side of the Weak Water River three hundred thousand miles away ( 二十四岩清垣之尊，诞扬宗教；三十万里弱水之隔，遥 彻颂声 ).¹⁴ Qian Dehong ( 钱德洪， 1497–1574), an important disciple of Wang Yangming ( 王阳明, 1472–1529), in the Ming Dynasty, said in his essay, An Account of the Academy of Two Worthies ( 二贤书院记 ), that the descendant of the Cheng family in Poyang ( 鄱阳 ) who came to ask him for instruction, heard about the teachings of the master’s school and enlightened himself as to the study of Zhu Hui’an, hence returning to develop the teachings of his ancestors" ( 因闻师门宗教，以 悟晦庵之学，归而寻绎其祖训 ).¹⁵

In addition, zongjiao, as a whole word, also referred to an official position in ancient China, the abbreviation for instructor of the Hostel for Imperial Kinsmen ( 敦宗院教授 ).¹⁶ Lü Zuqian ( 吕祖谦, 1137–1181), a renowned Confucian scholar-official in the Southern Song Dynasty, once took this position. For example, it was recorded in the Biographies of the Confucians ( 儒林传 ), volume 547 in The Addendum to A Universal Compilation of Historical Biographies Compiled and Published by Imperial Order ( 《钦定续通志》 ), published during the Qianlong ( 乾隆 ) Reign, that in the beginning Lü Zuqian became an official because of his family’s previous service in the government. Later, he passed the national examination and became a Jinshi Imperial Scholar. He also passed the examination for the Department of Extensive Learning and Magnificent Rhetoric and was transferred to become the instructor of the Southern External Hostel for Imperial Kinsmen ( 初以荫入官，后举进士，复中 博学宏词科，调南外宗教 ).

However, the meaning of the word zongjiao at the time was not equivalent to the word religion in English – even if it had existed in the Chinese language since ancient times. After debating the religions of the West, at the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China, the word zongjiao practically became the Chinese equivalent for the English word religion in the context of modern Chinese. People have forgotten the history of its original use, referring to Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism.

Just like humanism, religion emerged in the nineteenth century in the English language. According to the entry on religion, written by H. J. Rose in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, there is no counterpart for the English words religion and religious in ancient Greek or Latin.¹⁷ W. C. Smith once made a relatively detailed examination of the emergence and development of the term religion in the West. ¹⁸ Based on that, he made a very important point: Christianity had almost become synonymous with religion by the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁹

Perhaps it is a bit extreme to take Christianity as the religion of the West in early modern times, because Judaism, which preceded Christianity, and Islam, which came after it, have both exerted crucial influence over the emergence of the concept religion in the West. It might be more accurate to put it this way: the concept of religion in the West since early modern times basically takes the monotheism of western Asia – the Abrahamic traditions, which include Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – as its model. These three religious traditions all originated in western Asia and share three basic characteristics: a) all worship an external, personal god, which exists beyond the human world and decides its order; b) all have special organizations (i.e., the church) and special clergy; c) all have a single scripture as the linguistic medium of the object of their worship. These three characteristics represent the three basic conditions for the concept of religion in the Western tradition. Beginning with the period of the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China, the understanding of the majority of the Chinese people as to zongjiao departed from the original meaning of the term in the Chinese tradition, taking only the monotheistic model of western Asia as the standard model for zongjiao.

However, the concept of religion has expanded since the middle of the twentieth century in the area of religious studies in the West. Because of contact with other civilizations in the world, people do not take the basic characteristics of the monotheism of western Asia as the standard for measuring whether or not a belief is a religion. For example, Paul Tillich defines religion as ultimate concern, saying: It [religion] is at home everywhere, namely, in the depth of all functions of man’s spiritual life. Religion is the dimension of depth in all of them. Religion is the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit... What does the metaphor of depth mean? It means that the religious aspect points to that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional in [humankind’s] spiritual life. Religion, in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ultimate concern.²⁰ Mircea Eliade believed that the greatest purpose of religion was to provide people with meaning: it is an inner need of man that propels him into the future, and is not limited to certain organizational forms. He proposed the concept of homo religiosus.²¹ John Hick defines religion as human responses to the transcendent.²² Frederick Streng defines religion as the way of ultimate transformation.²³ On the basis of his meticulous examination of the concept of religion, W. C. Smith believed that the literal sense of religion should not refer to the religious outlook dating from the Enlightenment to the early modern period in the West. He even held that the term religion itself, which is western Asian monotheism represented by Christianity, should be abandoned fundamentally and replaced by the concept of religiousness.²⁴ All such ideas are modifications and expansions of a religious outlook based on the model of western Asian monotheism in the early modern period of the West. And according to this understanding of the nature of religion, it seems that we can rightfully call Confucianism a religion or claim it has religiousness. As a matter of fact, Confucianism is indeed regarded as one of the main religious traditions of the world in the works of these scholars. Through contact and dialogue with many non-Western civilizations, including Chinese civilization, such an expanded outlook on religion has come into being. As for Tu Weiming’s interpretation of the religiousness of Confucianism as implied in The Doctrine of the Mean ( 《中 庸》 ), as the way of ultimate self-transformation, it exactly represents a further development of the religious outlook of the West, which is not limited to the monotheism.²⁵

Sadly, a large number of scholars in the Chinese world have already forgotten the original meaning of the term zongjiao in the Chinese language, which had emerged in ancient times. They also fail to see the expanded outlook of religion in the area of religious studies in the West. Their understanding of religion still stays with the narrow concept of religion of the nineteenth century, which takes monotheism in western Asia as its model. Some people who treat Marxism and Leninism as dogma take religion to be a completely negative term, or even see it as equal to superstition. Because these people are biased, as well as accustomed to such an outlook on religion, they are not aware of their error. Those among them who sympathize with Confucianism are determined to draw a clear line between the Confucian tradition and religion, and those who criticize Confucianism would definitely criticize the Confucian tradition as a religion. As they lack proper understanding of the meaning of religion, it is inevitable that they fall into constant confusion and have difficulty coming to a proper conclusion.

3. The Confucian Tradition: Between Humanism and Religion

Ouyang Jingwu ( 欧阳竟无, 1871–1943), an accomplished Buddhist scholar in modern China, once said, the Buddha-dharma is neither religion nor philosophy,²⁶ while Fang Dongmei (Thomé H. Fang 方 东美, 1899–1977), an established modern Chinese philosopher, believed that the Buddha-dharma is both religion and philosophy. These two statements seem rather contradictory when put together and sound like a Zen Buddhist paradox. However, it is easy to understand. In my view, the key to understanding these two statements is that Buddhism should not be confined to either religion or philosophy if the definitions of early modern religion and philosophy are used as standards; meanwhile it has the qualities of both religion and philosophy. In other words, there are components of Buddhism that belong to both religion and philosophy, the two categories established in the West in early modern times. Yet, neither of these two categories are able to fully reveal the teaching of Buddhism.

The Confucian tradition faces a similar situation. Although Confucianism belongs to a branch of the history of Chinese philosophy and thus is placed under the discipline of philosophy at universities and institutions in modern mainland China, philosophy does not reveal the total implications of Confucianism if observed only from the perspective of rationalist philosophy, the mainstream standard since early modern times in the West.²⁷ Tu Weiming uses the word religiophilosophy to define Confucianism in his English writings.²⁸ This shows his painstaking effort in conveying the concept, but it also betrays he has no choice other than coining a term.

When people observe the Confucian tradition as both humanism and religion, the situation is the same. If our understanding is confined to humanism and religion as two categories established in the West in early modern times, then the Confucian tradition is neither humanism nor religion. However, there are three situations that provide us with reasons to believe that the Confucian tradition retains the name of humanism and religion simultaneously.

First, if we consider the original meanings of renwen and zongjiao in the context of the Chinese language, then there is nothing wrong when we say Confucianism is a kind of humanism and an embodiment of the humanistic spirit. We can also say that Confucianism is a kind of religion, as it was undoubtedly understood historically, together with Buddhism and Taoism. Second, even if we take the terms renwen zhuyi and zongjiao as the equivalents of humanism and religion in the West when we use them, as long as our understanding is not limited to mainstream secular humanism, as in the West since early modern times, and consider religion with the sole model of western Asian monotheism in mind, then we can take the Confucian tradition as both a kind of humanism and as a kind of religion. Third, even if we use renwen zhuyi and zongjiao, respectively, as strict counterparts to secular humanism in the West and religion as the sole model of western Asian monotheism, as long as we do not simply classify Confucianism exclusively into either of the two categories, then we can still see that there are elements of both humanism and religion in the Confucian tradition and can still describe certain characteristics of the Confucian tradition with reference to these two dimensions. In other words, if we employ the method of two-way interpretation rather than one-way analogical interpretation, and focus on the interconnections between the Confucian tradition and humanism and religion rather than attempting to reduce the Confucian tradition to either of the categories, then there is nothing wrong with using humanism and religion as the conceptual framework with which to grasp basic characteristics of the Confucian tradition.

Therefore, we can borrow the words of Ouyang Jingwu and Fang Dongmei and combine them: Confucianism is neither humanism nor religion, and it is also both humanism and religion. The title of this book, The Confucian Tradition: Between Religion and Humanism, also intends to reveal this. When we explain this with heaven and human (two core concepts in Confucianism and the entirety of traditional Chinese culture) – with heaven symbolizing religiousness and human humaneness – we see that the most fundamental characteristic of the Confucian tradition is that the boundary between heaven and human does not establish an exclusive and dualistic antithesis, like that between religion and humanism in mainstream Western thought since early modern times.²⁹ On the contrary, Confucianism admits a real tension between heaven and human under the premise of affirming the ontological consistency of them, as described by the unity of heaven and human – and hence always seeks to find a dynamic balance. In this sense, both the title, Between Religion and Humanism, and the term religious humanism, that are used to describe the Confucian tradition in this book, are employed for the purpose of highlighting both the religious and the humanist characteristics that the Confucian tradition possesses. In other words, when observed with reference to humanism and religion, the Confucian tradition exhibits in-between or in-the-middle features, making it neither this nor that and also both this and that. Some might object that such an approach lacks conceptual clarity. However, if people stick to the accuracy of each concept as it exists in its own original system, then all conceptual systems are incommensurable. When concepts across different systems are incomparable, comparative study becomes impossible and it is also impossible to carry out practical dialogue between civilizations. Even within the same cultural system – the tradition of thought in the West, for example – the connotations of a concept are constantly developing and changing. Even the same thinker may have different prescriptive properties for a concept that he or she uses in different periods. In this sense, creative vagueness is more effective in theory and more real in history than narrower claims to accuracy.

4. Method and Significance

This book examines the Confucian tradition with reference to renwen zhuyi and zongjiao, two concepts that have almost become translations of Western terms in the modern Chinese language. Of course, this has the consequence of bringing attention to characteristics of the Confucian tradition that are connected to humanism and religion but not unidirectionally identical. The author takes great efforts to include the main stages of Confucian tradition and its historical periods, covered in each chapter from before the Qin Dynasty to contemporary times. A large part of the discussion relates to Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. When exploring relevant questions, the author also cites in each chapter relevant theories and discussions in philosophy proper, religious philosophy, religious studies, and even Western theology, either as reference for comparison and analysis or as assistant to interpretation. The discussion develops like beads running on a plate ( 丸之走盘 ),³⁰ going in all directions but never leaving the plane. Arguments in each chapter center around the religiousness and humaneness of the Confucian tradition with emphasis on revealing characteristics and implications of various relevant questions.

The author points out that it is impossible that the development of China’s intellectual tradition from the present and into the future can develop in isolation from Western intellectual traditions, or even other intellectual traditions in the East – for example in India – whether such developments are constructive or interpretive. To follow the Occident in everything makes it hard to establish the subjectivity of the intellectual tradition in China. But it is also unhealthy, and impossible, to avoid Western intellectual traditions and remove any elements of Western learning from the modern Chinese academic tradition, established at the beginning of the twentieth century, and return to traditional forms of old learning. Such a practice can only end up in terminating academic exchange, cutting off port and river communication ( 断港绝河 ).³¹ The ethos of China’s intellectual tradition represented by the Confucian tradition can and must follow the changes by adding and subtracting ( 因革损益 ) during the process of self-renewal. As is said in The Great Learning ( 《大学》 ): If I can improve myself on a single day, I can improve myself every day and keep on improving ( 苟日新，日日新，又日新 ), and should not be confined to particular forms. In the words of the Huayan School of Buddhism ( 华严宗 ), it is like not changing while following nidanas ( 不变随缘 ) and following nidanas without change ( 随缘不变 ).

As a matter of fact, the history of the development of the Confucian tradition before the establishment of modern academic studies has already proven this. For example, li ( 理，principle/pattern/coherence) did not become an important concept in Confucianism prior to the Qin Dynasty. However, li became the key concept in Neo-Confucianism during the Song and Ming dynasties, and continued that way for several centuries. Confucianism originally did not have any concepts borrowed from Buddhism, but later some Buddhist concepts became important components of the Confucian tradition. Therefore, we should not take Western learning as the standard for the development of the Confucian tradition or the entirety of traditional Chinese culture. But we must take it as a reference point, for there is no way around it. Only by taking the Other as a reference point and engaging in deep interaction with that Other can a culture obtain clearer self-awareness, and continue to expand and deepen its own self-identity. This seems to have been the inevitable but royal road for every civilization and cultural tradition in the contemporary world, including Western civilization.

In the past, people paid too much attention to the humanistic dimension of the Confucian tradition in relation to ethics, society, and politics – and have not given proper attention to the characteristic of religious humanism in the Confucian tradition or to, in other words, its unique religiousness. In particular, in mainland China, it is extremely difficult to understand the religiousness of Confucianism because the understanding of religion is still confined to the narrow model of the monotheism of western Asia as well as negative perceptions toward religion persisting since 1949. As stated above, although those who affirm and criticize Confucianism may appear to have completely irreconcilable perspectives, their shared outlook on religion is consistent, and unexamined. Under these circumstances, this book highlights the religiousness of the Confucian tradition in positive and affirmative ways.

In addition to what it means for academic studies, it is also meaningful and significant to explore deeply the spiritual resources of religious humanism in the Confucian tradition for reference to how to refine the heart of the people ( 收拾人心 ) and rebuild the value system of the Chinese nation during the current crisis of belief. The reason why the Confucian tradition could have the function of comprehensively arranging the order of the human world ( 全面安排人间秩序 ), as Yu Ying-shih ( 余英时, 1930–2021) put it, in Chinese history for several millennia is, first of all, because it is a complete value system of values – and that plays the role of rectifying people’s hearts and unifying customs ( 正人心、齐风俗 ). Regrettably, the crisis of Chinese culture, including the Confucian tradition, has been worsening since the middle of the nineteenth century. From Down with the Confucian clan ( 打倒孔 家店 ) a blank between to and Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius ( 批 林批孔 ), a blank between from and Destroy the four olds ( 破四旧 ) to River Elegy ( 河殇 ), it can be said that an anti-traditional mentality has taken shape in the land of the Chinese people, and that the ethos of Confucianism has almost been swept away entirely. Besides, it seems that we have failed to retrieve the real scripture from the Western world, so as to reshape the spiritual world of the Chinese people as a replacement value system.

Since the 1990s, globalization has brought about integration at the physical and even institutional levels. At the same time, that makes issues of cultural identity and awareness of heritage increasingly prominent. The question of Who Am I? compels each nation or even each individual to go deeply into their own cultural tradition to know thyself rather than to resort to purely external culture to establish a sense of self-ness.³² It has already been shown that such a mindset, as described in these lines from Wang Yangming, will not work at all: Abandoning an infinite mass of treasure in his home/He begs with a bowl along the street like a poor man ( 抛却自家无尽藏，沿门托钵效贫儿 ).

Of course, no culture stays fixed and unchanged as it upgrades, and development requires culture to constantly absorb external resources. The introduction of Buddhism into China is a good example of this point. Nonetheless, the success of any culture in absorbing new, transformative elements depends on the premise that it takes its existing tradition as a foundation. Otherwise, it will become a river without source or a tree without root.³³ This is correct because people need, first of all, to achieve in-depth understanding of the spiritual values of the Confucian tradition so as to rebuild belief in the value system of the Chinese people, and thus eliminate the various social problems that arise through anti-traditional stances. Only on the basis of possessing the complete right knowledge ( 具足正知识 ), as it is said in Buddhism, can we achieve profound experience and understanding and put such knowledge into practice – avoiding practicing the Great Way in the dark or even deviating and becoming lost in evil power.

However, the author needs to explain, in the end, that the research undertaken for this book definitely does not imply that the Confucian tradition has only one spiritual dimension. It does not mean that only the dimension of religious humanism in Confucianism is relevant to modern society. Since Confucianism is a tradition that covers multiple dimensions – such as politics, society, and ethics – the author believes it should be able to provide various intellectual and practical resources, in addition to spiritual resources, to modern society following a certain transformation. Even at the level of institutional construction, the Confucian tradition is not an exhibit in a museum that represents all in the past. It also contains many rich aspects that can be used today as an inheritance from ancient times. The problem is that, even if people have already become aware of it, just like many who have already become detached from the religious humanism in the Confucian tradition, how many now can achieve deep understanding of the various institutions in traditional Chinese society over several millennia, and clearly discern their losses and gains?³⁴

In fact, if people cannot understand both the inside and outside of the various dimensions of Confucianism (philosophical, spiritual, political, etc.), any concern or advocacy unavoidably becomes as superficial as those slogans of shallow critique. In that case, the real interpretation and reconstruction of Confucian tradition is impossible. So, for scholars, first of all, it is more feasible to collaboratively probe various dimensions of Confucian tradition for further creative transformation and integration, rather than trying to put forward a few slogans and establish new theories. As Zhu Xi ( 朱熹, 1130–1200) put it, Old learning will become more precise and refined through discussion. New knowledge will be transformed into profound learning after cultivation ( 旧学商量加邃密，新知培养 转深沉 ). People should reflect on teachings such as this more often. And if this book can make any contribution to the exploration, interpretation, and reconstruction of the spiritual level of the Confucian tradition, and lay the foundation for further work, then the author’s work will not have been in vain.

Chapter 1: An Interpretation of All Things Are Complete in Me

1. Introduction

2. An Interpretation of I, Things, and Completeness

3. An Interpretation of Introspecting and Seeing Sincerity and Compelling Oneself to Follow the Great Way of Forgiveness

4. Conclusion

1. Introduction

There is a chapter in Part I of The Mencius [7A.4] that reads: Mencius said, ‘All things are complete in me. When one introspects and sees sincerity, it gives the greatest happiness. When one compels himself to follow the Great Way of forgiveness, it is the closest path to achieving benevolence [or humanity/humaneness]’ ( 孟子曰：万物皆备于我矣。 反身而诚，乐莫大焉。强恕而行，求仁莫近焉 ). There are several important concepts for Confucian thought in these short sentences: sincerity ( 诚 ), happiness ( 乐 ), forgiveness ( 恕 ), and benevolence ( 仁 ). And this chapter carries more subtle philosophical connotations and implications. This chapter aims to explore and interpret this chapter of The Mencius in order to reveal the deep structure of its philosophical connotations and implications. Because a work of interpretation is a two-way merging of interpreter and the text, it is inevitable that the results contain prejudices or Vorurteil, as Hans-Georg Gadamer put it. But interpretation must be based on a resonance in understanding, achieved by relating to ancient intellectuals and their texts in ways that allow the interpreter can go deep into the classics and discover their true implications. Therefore, interpretation never only means to have Vorurteil or added opinion. If we want to be certain about interpretation from a hermeneutic perspective, the interpretation of this All things are complete in me chapter belongs to the levels of implied words ( 蕴谓 ) and should-be-said words ( 当谓 ) as seen in the philosophy of the late Fu Wei-xun (Charles Wei-Hsun Fu, 1933-1996).¹

It can be said that Mencius’ affirmation that all things are complete in me opened up a crucial philosophical orientation for the Confucianism of later ages, especially Neo-Confucianism. The arguments of different Neo-Confucians, such as Cheng Hao ( 程颢, 1032–1085), Lu Jiuyuan ( 陆九渊, 1139–1193), Yang Jian ( 杨简, 1141–1226), Chen Xianzhang ( 陈献章, 1428–1500), and Wang Yangming all have origins that can be traced back to this affirmation.²

The affirmation of Mencius was, of course, personal. The conclusions of different Confucians in later ages were also based on their own respective experiences. Such words as personal and experience seem to imply a certain sense of being subjective. But as different persons and different experiences pointed to forms that shared certain similarities, it is undoubted that such a situation communicates a message regarding an objective thing. Therefore, people should never regard the affirmation of Mencius as a simple statement, and simply set it aside. As this seemingly subjective proposition reveals a certain objectivity, we should look further into it to find its source and origins, as much as possible. It is obvious that all things are complete in me represents an understanding and apprehension of the relationship between I and the Thing. However, in the end, in what sense are all things complete in me? In the state of all things are complete in me, what do all things mean? What does I (me) mean? And what does complete mean? All these need to be fathomed.

2. An Interpretation of I, Things, and Completeness

I is one of the existences in the world. As long as I exists, I has relations with other inherent existences in the world. Many thinkers indicate with different concepts and ways of expression that man could not be an absolutely isolated individual because he could not exist in the present world in such way. A man living in this world must establish various relations with different kinds of people and things. These relations seem to be diverse and infinite but they are not inapprehensible. According to Martin Buber, there are two kinds of relations between I and other inherent existences in the world: the Ich-Es (I-It) relation and the Ich-Du (I-Thou) relation. Of course, this is Buber’s understanding and way of expression. However, we should make an effort to apprehend and grasp the reality that Buber’s words indicate rather than thinking that a philosophy of relations is just personal words. We should also know that such a reality was not unveiled only through Buber’s words and own ways of expression. If Buber could see such a reality, then why couldn’t people in different times and spaces see the same reality as well? As the Chinese saying goes, meaning grasped words forgotten ( 得 意忘言 ). Why can we not set aside various ways of saying and find the like thoughts of great minds?

I believe that all things are complete in me, as Mencius said, is a revelation about the relationship of Ich-Du, between I and things, from the perspective of I. Of course, the author has no intention to force Buber’s thought into this proposition of Mencius. To be more exact, the author hopes to borrow Buber’s thought on the Ich-Du relation as a resource for hermeneutic work, and use his theory to fully unfold the philosophical connotations and implications in Mencius’ proposition that all things are complete in me. Thus, the best hermeneutic results can be achieved. The interpretive methodology I am using can be conveyed in the Buddhist saying, Follow meaning rather than words and follow dharma rather than master ( 依义不依语，依法不依人 ).

Buber once used the example of I and a tree.³ Although his poetic language makes the several relations between I and the tree less rigorous in terms of classification, Buber did show deep insight: as long as the tree remains the object of the I, and has a spatial position, temporal existence, properties, characteristics, form and structure, the relation between I and the tree is no more than the Ich-Es relation. Objects can be divided into two types: those for observation and thinking, and those for practical use. In the several situations of I and tree that Buber described under the meaning of Ich-Es relations, the tree could always be classified as an object for observation and thinking. But when the I wants to use it for practical needs, for making furniture or for firewood, for example, the tree becomes the object of the I for practical use. However, no matter whether the tree is the object of observation and thinking or for practical use, the relationship between the I and the tree is always an Ich-Es relation. In such a relation, the objectification of it against I is a fundamental characteristic.

What is called objectification means that a thing is an object, and separated from the I. The I forms knowledge about a thing through experience of it and uses it on the basis of such knowledge. Any inherent existence other than I can be objectified and form an Ich-Es relation. Under such a relation, all Es objects are no more than the objects that are experienced and utilized by the I, and thus are instruments to satisfy the interests and needs of the I. Besides, only when all the Es are placed into a temporal-spatial framework and a causal sequence can the I form knowledge about it and make use of it. In this sense, no matter how complicated the relationships between thing and I are in the phenomenal world, they can all be summarized under the Ich-Es relation.

In Kant’s view, as limited rational existences, man can only obtain various knowledge by taking in sense-data filtered by a network of a priori categories within a temporal-spatial framework. Therefore, there can be no relations to other forms and statuses other than the Ich-Es relation, between man and other existences. However, Buber did not believe this, and also uses the relation between the I and the tree to show that. Beyond various situations between the I and the tree, under the Ich-Es relation, Buber pointed out, I can also allow the will and feeling of benevolence that comes from my own heart to dominate me. I observe the tree and enter a relation wherein it and I become one. At the moment, It is not it any more. The great power of exclusiveness has grasped me entirely.⁴ At that moment, the tree has gone beyond the constraints of time and space and the restrictions of cause and effect. As a structure of meaning, the tree becomes one with the existence of the I, as a life. This is the Ich-Du relation.

When D. T. Suzuki compared poems about a flower by Japanese poet Basho and Western poet Tennyson, he in fact revealed these two forms of relation.⁵ As a matter of fact, while Buber’s thought seems to be distinctive and strange to most Western thinkers, it might feel closer to Eastern thought – particularly Chinese philosophy. Kant believed humans cannot have intellectual intuition, which only belongs to God. Unlike Kant, Chinese philosophy does not accept that the world of the Thing-in-itself cannot be understood by humans.⁶ In addition to the phenomenal world in which man busily acts, there is another world of value and meaning. The question implied in the argument of Wang Yangming regarding watching flowers when he visited Nanzhen Town⁷ does not lie in whether the flower exists as a material structure when it is separated from the subject that has consciousness and perception, but indicates the Ich-Du relation between the I and the flower as a structure of meaning.⁸ Of course, when Buber reduces his thought into an eternal Du, his philosophy is still the product of Judeo-Christianity. But by indicating that there is the Ich-Du relation as well as the Ich-Es relation between the Thing and the I, Buber and Chinese philosophy come together. This situation can be taken as evidence in support of Mencius’ proposition that All things are complete in me.

Buber’s illustration of the relation between the I and the Thing with the relation between man and a tree as an example can help us understand the essence of the proposition that All things are complete in me. In Buber’s description, when the tree turns from It into Thou, the premise for this is a change in the I. When I watch the tree in the role of an observer and thinker or a practical user, and objectify it, the tree is only It. But when I watch the tree with an existence full of benevolence and allowing the unity between the Thing and the I, the tree enters the life existence of I and becomes whole with I as a structure of meaning, thus changing from It into Thou. I has different meanings in the Ich-Es and Ich-Du relationships. Buber did not explain much about the I in the Ich-Du relationship, but he did say that I can also allow the will and feeling of benevolence that comes from my own heart to dominate me. I observe the tree and enter a relation that I and it become one. By saying so he in fact obscurely reveals the rules of the I under such a situation. The fundamental apprehension of Mencius and even the entire Confucian tradition possesses exactly the characteristics of the I under the status of an Ich-Du relation.

Obviously, according to Mencius, what essentially defines the I is the moral noumenon. Such an authentic self takes the infinite enlightened-nourishing ( 觉润 ) of benevolence and sincerity as its fundamental characteristic.⁹ The infinite enlightened-nourishing of the I means that the I projects care and love into the heart of everything and at all times under the mode of standing in no opposition to the Thing ( 与物无对 ). With respect to the I in such a relation, everything in the universe not only has the role as material structure but also opens up the dimension of the meaning and value of the Thing-in-itself. It enters the life existence of the I as a life existence that forms a unified community of meaning together with the I.

It is exactly in this sense that the proposition All things are complete in me reveals the Ich-Du relation between the Thing and the I. In this proposition of Mencius, the I is the moral authentic self. The way with which the I form relations with other existences is not to view the world around it as object or target but to project compassion toward all existences in the world. When submerged within the concern of compassion, everything exceeds the constraints of space and time and of cause and effect, and manifests a unique structure of meaning. Everything becomes everything in the sense stated above. When Everything enters the life of the I and forms a whole with it, the connotation of completeness is thus embodied. Naturally, when everything enters the life existence of the I, it does not mean that this is one-sided entering. While everything enters the life existence of the I, the I also enters the life existence of all things. The Ich-Du relation is the unity formed when the lives of the I and all things penetrate each other. Therefore, the real connotation of completeness is symbiosis or isomorphism. Only Mencius interprets it from the angle of I. So when so many Confucians drew conclusions similar to Mencius’ proposition that All things are complete in me from their own existence, they saw no more than an expression of the Ich-Du relation.

Of course, Mencius cannot deny that there are other dimensions of the I besides the authentic moral self. However, as far as I is under an Ich-Es relation, we find it very hard to interpret how All things are complete in me can also be interpreted as completeness. If the Thing enters the domain of the consciousness of the I as the object of practical thinking, then we can say that when the proposition All things are complete in me is examined in an isolated manner, even though such an interpretation can be viewed as a valid theory, the meaning is nothing other than that everything can be incorporated into the intentional structure of the I. But such an interpretation has no connection with the axiological implications of the two sentences following the proposition: When one introspects and sees sincerity, it gives the greatest happiness. When one compels himself to follow the Great Way of forgiveness, it is the closest path to achieve benevolence ( 反身而诚，乐莫大焉。强恕 而行，求仁莫近焉 ). Such an interpretation is obviously far-fetched.

Thus, the proposition All things are complete in me can be said to be valid only in the sense of the Ich-Du relation. And only on the basis of the above interpretation of the proposition of All things are complete in me can the following two sentences be interpreted in a logical way. With this, people can fully grasp the implications of this section of Mencius.

3. An Interpretation of Introspecting and Seeing Sincerity and Compelling Oneself to Follow the Great Way of Forgiveness

All things are complete in me reveals an Ich-Du existential relation. However, the Thing and the I in the practical world is often not an Ich-Du relationship. In Martin Heidegger’s words, a person is often engaging with average everydayness in concern, or Besorgen – as opposed to the they, or das Man, and in an inauthentic state of fallenness, manifested by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.¹⁰

Of course, not only Western existentialists reached this profound insight. When Cheng Hao wrote, Nothing can be said of the tranquil state that man is born into. The moment people talk about his nature, it is not his nature any more ( 人生而静以上不容说， 才说性时， 便已不是性 ),¹¹ he pointed out that man, as an actual existence in the present world, is not an authentic self in the sense of Mencius’ doctrine of good human nature. Under such circumstances, almost no single kind of daily activity (which humankind engages in) can be done without the objectification or objectivization of things and other people. Therefore, the Ich-Es relation seems to rule the practical world. Indeed, man cannot leave the status of the Ich-Es relation. Otherwise, the progress, or even the existence, of a society might be in trouble. However, the Ich-Es relation cannot form the complete world of man. There is also an authentic existential status in addition to an inauthentic existential status. And in addition to the Ich-Es relation, in which the Thing and the I are separated off from each other, there is also the Ich-Du relation in which the Thing and the I unify, and All things are complete in me. Man will not submit to being in the Ich-Es relation forever, just as Buber