The Rise of The Nazi Party How Hitler Used The Power of Propaganda And Mass Communication to Rise to Power

By Davis Truman

The Nazi party's rise to power in Germany during the 1930s is widely attributed to its leaders' strategic use of propaganda, most notably Adolf Hitler. Propaganda played a significant role in shaping public opinion and manipulating the masses to support the Nazi party's extremist ideologies, ultimately leading to one of the most catastrophic events in human history - World War II. This rise to power was not a sudden occurrence but a gradual process involving an extensive and sophisticated propaganda campaign targeting various aspects of German society. In this book, we will explore how propaganda was used to fuel the Nazi party's rise and examine how it gained support from the German people, including through symbols, slogans, and persuasive rhetoric. The consequences of this propaganda-driven rise to power continue to profoundly impact modern-day politics and how we perceive the power of propaganda in shaping public opinion.

• Language: English
• Publisher: vincenzo nappi
• Release date: Mar 14, 2023
• ISBN: 9798215052020

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INTRODUCTION

When Adolf Hitler joined the German Workers' Party in September of 1919, he was attached to a struggling, obscure group whose goals were uncertain and whose membership was small. Yet, by the spring of 1921, Hitler managed to recruit thousands of new members, attract more thousands to the weekly meetings, and even raise enough money for the publication of the party paper, the Volkische Beobachter. Despite periods of uneven growth, the National Socialists' German Workers' Party finally attained its goal when, on November 12, 1933, it received 95.2 % of all votes cast in the Reichstag elections and prepared to assume power over Germany. How were these results achieved? Hitler had appealed to the masses, to be sure, but the decisive factor was his skillful use of propaganda. Through the artful use of agitation, Hitler made the masses aware of his party and even convinced them that the NSDAP alone could save Germany. From the beginning, Hitler scorned traditional methods of political agitation to which his competitors were addicted.

Glaring posters announced meetings; trucks distributed propaganda materials; distinctive uniforms and badges made the citizens take notice; parades and street demonstrations were organized. Possessing an uncanny consciousness of publicity value, he made the opposition notice, turn around, and fight in the press and at meetings. Meetings were purposefully held in socialist-controlled districts, and the meetings of foes were disrupted, by a monopolizing of the discussion or even the use of force, if necessary. And this was only the beginning. Yet what of the party itself? What was so special about this group of political agitators? What was the appeal to the masses? An intellectual ideology was almost non-existent, yet it was precisely this that the public seemed to appreciate. The NSDAP aimed at the commoner's emotions, striking heavily but effectively. The blunt, unadorned words of the speakers seemed to favor their interests, and pointed the way fearless, uncompromising action.

The most significant concern of Adolf Hitler was not ideology; his ideology was little more than a series of slogans, but the party's success, its organization, and its varied activities. His conception of ideology was nothing more than cliches; his genuine interest was in questions about effectiveness, timeliness, psychological tactics, organization, and propaganda., In Mein Kampf, he admitted that the NSDAP was a promotion program- he stressed party promotion over most other party concerns. This neglect of party concerns is most evident in his party speeches, which contain no arguments in favor of the party and no explanations of the party program. The rise to power of the NSDAP resulted from a complex set of social, historical, and psychological factors, perhaps the major factor being the impact of the defeat Germany suffered in WWI. The whole world of bourgeois morality, along with its established institutions, broke down, resulting in the exposure of greed, class exploitation, and prejudice. Adolf Hitler utilized these weaknesses in the social system with extraordinary skill, resulting in an internal crisis for most citizens. Confused, angry, and lost, the German people reached hungrily for the world that Hitler and the NSDAP promised them—but only after a long, carefully calculated program of political and social agitation.

Chapter 2

BEGINNINGS OF THE MOVEMENT (1919-1923)

1919 -1923 saw the NSDAP rise from relatively obscure origins into an agitative movement which, while still not a major party and a real threat to the existing government, would soon begin to grow and start the fight for its members in the streets. The first period of growth is essential for two main developments that characterized that growth until 1924: Hitler's ascendancy to leadership within the local party and nationalistic circles in Bavaria and the abortive cou d'etat, the Putsch of November 9, 1923. Before examining the actual growth of the NSDAP, it would be wise to look briefly at the social-political milieu in which the movement would rise. Understanding why the NSDAP finally attained such great power and why the people of Germany accepted Hitler's leadership is possible only if one considers Germany's situation. To many, the fact that a party whose very platform was based on racialism, mediocrity, emotionalism, and brutality could find such wide support in a contemporary nation is unfathomable.

In Germany, the war ended a stable, authoritarian, hierarchical society that had been epitomized by the royal and imperial dynasties. Although the democratic Weimar Republic may have been a better form of government, for most (and later for many) Germans, it was not an acceptable substitute for Wilhelminian authoritarianism. The new Republic had become increasingly associated with defeat, inflation, and political debate in the eyes of the Germans, who had initially supported it when it brought peace in 1918. Even immediately after the peace conference in Paris, the provisional government had to cope with revolutionary outbreaks and the problem of forming a new constitution. The new democracy was burdened with the hated Versailles Peace Treaty, so defeat and democracy became closely associated in the minds of most Germans. The terms of the peace treaty, which was signed on June 28, 1919, devastated the German people politically and psychologically. Germany lost land, including territories and colonies; her armed forces were radically reduced, her fleet handed over to the League of Nations, and the Rhineland permanently demilitarised and occupied by allies for years; part of her merchant fleet was given up; and most importantly reparations of unfixed amount were to be paid to the allies. These reparations muddled German foreign relations for years and embittered the German people, who responded with anger, disillusionment, and genuine outrage.

The new German Social Democracy was forced, therefore, to deal with the repercussions of this treaty on social, political, and economic levels. Most of the Social Democrats were nationalists and were sincere in their attempts to recover the order of the old Germany. But these attempts were challenged by the extreme Left-Independent Socialists and the Spartacus group (later the Communists), who aimed to make Germany, backed by Russia, a spearhead of world revolution. To keep these revolutionaries under control (there were several bloody clashes), the Social Democrat leaders had to work closely with the military authorities and use the volunteer groups, consisting of ex-soldiers, to subdue mobs. Determined to prevent a revolution like Russia's, the provisional government was ultimately successful. But success meant retaining the conservative ideas of the old Germany; the strong influence of the old guard—the imperial civil service, the generals, the industrialists, and great landlords, was still influential in post-war Germany. Thus Germany was changed politically, but there