Civil Society Organisations, Governance and the Caribbean Community

By Kristina Hinds

This book offers a unique analysis of the participatory spaces available for civil society organisations (CSOs) in Caribbean governance. It reveals the myriad ways in which the region’s CSOs have contributed to enriching Caribbean societies and to scaffolding Caribbean regionalism, and also uncovers that despite their contributions, Caribbean CSOs (and civil society more broadly) have found limited space for involvement in governance. The author peers into Caribbean state-civil society participatory dynamics using in-depth country case studies (Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago), mini-case studies and evaluations of the approaches to inclusion within the regional institutions of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). This novel contribution to the Caribbean civil society literature uses these assessments to make a case for regularising state-civil society collaborative practices to enhance the quality of democracy in the region. 

• Language: English
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Release date: Dec 14, 2018
• ISBN: 9783030043964

Book preview

© The Author(s) 2019

Kristina HindsCivil Society Organisations, Governance and the Caribbean CommunityNon-Governmental Public Actionhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04396-4_1

1. Introduction

Kristina Hinds¹  

(1)

University of the West Indies, Bridgetown, Barbados

Kristina Hinds

Email: [e-mail]

Keywords

CaribbeanCaribbean Community (CARICOM)Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)Civil societyCivil society organisationsDemocracyGovernance

One of the stories often left untold about survival in the states that comprise the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the story of civil society and civil society organisations (CSOs). If one considers discussions of governance particularly within the field of politics, the known stories relate to the role of political parties, race , class , institutions, economic/financial stewardship and the role of external forces on these small, predominantly microstates. The members of CARICOM are most popularly known for sun, sea, sand, Bob Marley, Rihanna, Usain Bolt, cricket, carnival, and food. Yet, the resilience of Caribbean people and the somewhat unlikely viability of the states they occupy has been supported in no small part by myriad organisations that fill social, economic, and political gaps that have been left vacant by formal politics and the state apparatus. This element of Caribbean resilience seems to be overlooked in scholarly evaluations of the region. Also overlooked are the contributions that Caribbean civil societies and CSOs have played in integrating the region. Instead, Caribbean regional integration narratives seem to favour placing emphasis on formal regional structures and formal political processes. This book places civil society and CSOs in focus for their roles in helping to sustain the region and to scaffold regional integration in the Caribbean. It asserts that based on these contributions, civil society/CSOs should have space for inclusion in governance processes. Consequently, the central focus of this book is straightforward: it investigates the spaces that exist and that are absent for CSO participation in governance in the CARICOM region by examining both domestic and regional governance arrangements.

The domestic and regional contexts in this Caribbean region are not easy to comprehend independently of each other. Decisions made at the domestic level of individual states can affect the operation of the regional bodies in the Caribbean, especially since decision-making power in CARICOM and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) rests in the hands of heads of governments. Yet, decisions made by the collective of states at regional levels also have some influence on policymaking and legislative arrangements within domestic spaces. Therefore, examining both the domestic and regional avenues for civil society and CSO insertion in policy processes can add to an understanding of how civil society and CSOs are able (or are not able) to be involved in Caribbean processes of governance.

Since Caribbean states do not operate in a vacuum, particularly in light of their smallness and the ways in which size makes them highly porous to occurrences outside of the region, one cannot ignore the external context in understanding Caribbean governance processes at both domestic and regional levels. Hence, the influence of the international/global level on both regional and domestic occurrences in the Caribbean adds further complexity to this picture. However, one should emphasise that the Caribbean is not passively influenced by external forces. Even before the emergence of globalisation, the Caribbean has affected and been affected by complex external occurrences. Caribbean territories were affected by occurrences external to the region because of their placement as colonies within imperial folds. This point notwithstanding, the Caribbean region also affected the international system through the historical contributions that the territories of this region made to building European empires during colonisation. Such matters could be discussed much further, but the point here is simply to acknowledge the importance of international or global context for understanding occurrences in the Caribbean, while still recognising that Caribbean states possess agency. So, although this book concentrates mostly on the domestic and the regional spaces in connection to cultures and practices surrounding civil society and CSOs in governance, it also prefaces shifts in governance practices in the direction of more openness to civil society/CSOs on global shifts towards neo-liberal globalisation and towards good governance narratives that emerged following the end of the Cold War. I will say more about this emphasis on the regional and domestic spaces and the global context a bit later, for now let us examine the focus on the CARICOM and the OECS cases as well as on civil society and CSOs.

1.1 The Choice of CARICOM, the OECS, Civil Society, and CSOs

The Caribbean is a diverse region, encompassing small-island territories scattered across the Caribbean Sea. Some of the Caribbean territories are independent, sovereign states and others, such as Martinique, Puerto Rico, and the British Virgin Islands, exist as overseas territories of France, the USA, and the UK respectively, as relics of the colonial history of the region. The region can also be conceptualised to include states, such as Guyana , Belize, and Suriname that are geographically located in South America. Further, the Caribbean encompasses varied languages, dialects, cultures, and political systems.¹ Notwithstanding the multiple definitions of the region, this work concentrates on CARICOM and the sub-region of the OECS, and specifically the independent English-speaking² states within these groupings.

Although the emphasis on the English-speaking CARICOM and the OECS members provides limited treatment of the region’s civil society, CSOs, and of the Caribbean region itself, this concentration allows one to consider the relationships between domestic and regional occurrences within Caribbean regional integration ventures. As CARICOM and the OECS are the two best developed regional integration initiatives that exist in the region, a focus on these integration initiatives is relatively straightforward. Less straightforward though, may be the choice to focus on civil society and CSOs within these arrangements. So here it may be useful to answer the following question: What is civil society and what are CSOs?

In some ways this question is an easy one to answer: civil society is the independent public; it is a society that can act outside the control of the state and the market. CSOs are the varied groups that represent interests or concerns expressed within this type of society and are generally associations and groups that operate on a non-profit basis. Some examples of CSOs are youth groups, community groups, trade unions , business representative organisations, professional associations, environmental groups, charitable organisations, and sports clubs. However, one must note that this type of explanation is a simplification that hides some of the overlaps between civil society, the state, and the market in practice. The concept of civil society is also more complex than it may be portrayed because it is riddled with Western-centric exclusions that are inherent in the description of society as civil. The requirement of civility and the notion that only certain ways of being and organising can be viewed as civil, raises uncomfortable discussions when applied to Caribbean contexts. These matters pertaining to the complexities of civil society are presented more fully in Chapter 2 of this book, but, the simplified view of civil society can suffice for this introduction.

Apart from questions about the meaning of civil society, one may ask about the existence of CSOs in the Caribbean region, or about their real roles in the Caribbean. Serious examination of CSOs reveals that although CSOs in the region may have their weaknesses and may at times be politically invisible, such organisations are very much alive and in service of important day-to-day functions across the region. Bowen, for instance, has attempted to document some of these CSO contributions and in doing so has assessed that CSOs in the region generally conduct day-to-day work in (1) the delivery of social services, to provide some social safety for impoverished or vulnerable groups; (2) in community building, which also helps to provide a social safety net and allows for the provision of information, programmes, and activities to edify and empower communities; (3) in local economic development; and (4) in promoting and advancing sustainable development (Bowen 2013, 89–91). Additionally, CSOs and CSO networks have been constructed beyond national territorial boundaries and in doing so have fostered webs of connections among people and groups from across the region. Thus, CSOs and CSO networks have played critical roles in connecting or integrating the region without official sanction of or orchestration from political directorates of the region. Regional CSOs, regional CSO umbrella groups, and regional CSO networks have provided for a level of regionalism outside of the state initiated and driven regional integration institutions of CARICOM and the OECS (Hinds Harrison 2013; Hinds 2007). One noteworthy example of the long history of such regional CSOs can be found in the British Guiana and West Indies Labour Congress that was established in 1926 and which evolved to become the Caribbean Labour Congress by 1945 (CLC). The CLC was important in advancing the regional agenda of independence as a West Indies Federation during the early 1950s (Bolland 2001, 506–507; Lewis 1977, 42). This is one example that illustrates that CSOs have helped to build Caribbean regionalism even though they are not often given credit for their contributions to Caribbean regionalism.

Despite these CSO contributions at domestic and regional levels, CSOs continue to be relatively invisible when one peruses political appraisals of the region and its development. The invisibility of these groups in such analyses may perhaps be more connected to analysts’ preferences for concentrating on formalised or elite structures in assessing Caribbean politics and development than it has to do with the significance or insignificance of CSOs. In other words, when one uses a lens that views politics and development as determined by formal political structures and formally recognised political and economic actors, it may be easy to miss the contributions of CSOs. This book highlights the ways in which CSO have helped to sustain Caribbean communities, their contributions to development in the region, and their place in bolstering Caribbean regionalism. As we look for new modalities to offer stronger governmental structures at the local and regional level, this book also asserts that, based on their contributions, CSOs should have opportunities to participate in processes of governance.

As may be clear by this point, this book is normative in its assertion that CSO involvement in governance is desirable. Following this assertion, this work examines the extent to which there have been opportunities for such participation in governance processes within individual Caribbean states and within the regional integration initiatives of CARICOM and the OECS. Further, this work contends that wider civil society should also be incorporated in processes that seek to govern people’s lives. CSOs can function as convenient aggregators of concerns or interests but are also limited in their abilities to speak for people. So, both wider civil society and CSOs should find participatory space in governance processes. More normative still is the book’s contention that the inclusion of civil society and CSOs in governance should occur in order to enhance the quality of democracy . As such, participation should go beyond its role in enhancing the effectiveness of governance by serving the higher purpose of deepening and enhancing people’s access to democracy . The following section provides a more detailed discussion of what this book sets out to accomplish.

1.2 Purpose and Analytical Approach

As previously stated, this work presents civil society and CSOs as important to the Caribbean by documenting some of the contributions that CSOs have made to Caribbean regionalism, and to the survival of Caribbean states. The work also discusses the application and salience of the terms civil society and CSOs that are employed throughout where other analysts might prefer terms such as non-state actors (NSAs) or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Hinds Harrison 2013). Although shining light on the role of CSOs in the region and on the applicability of the concept of civil society to the Caribbean are important tasks in their own rights, these discussions are presented in this book to lay the ground for appraising the role of such actors in governance practices in the region. This brings us back to the principal task, which is, to examine spaces that are available to civil society in the processes of governance across individual Caribbean states as well as at the region level. Leaders across the region may speak the language of civil society inclusion and participatory governance , particularly in the post-Cold War era of good governance, but, to what extent have practices within the region given life to such invocations? This is one of the questions that this book probes. To do so, I focus on the institutions and processes set in motion by governments and regional organisations that have made space for civil society and CSOs in the work of governance.

One of the main claims that I make in this book is that, while closure persists in Caribbean processes of governance, participatory spaces do exist and increasingly so. It is true that Caribbean states have progressively created institutional mechanisms, legislation, and practices that have widened access to processes of governance. However, inclusive spaces and practices may tend towards serving strategic purposes and may privilege more dominant interest groups as well as less threatening types of actors, activities, and perspectives within civil society. This privileging of strategic relationships (i.e. those relationships which serve state objectives) and the preference for some elements of civil society over others, places limits on the inclusiveness in governance within both domestic and regional spaces. Moreover, the instrumental nature of such interactions indicates an emphasis on governing effectively rather than on governing democratically. Although inclusion for effectiveness is worthwhile, so too is inclusion for the deeper purpose of improving the quality of democracy so that democracy both serves people and empowers people. Inclusion and participation can bring effectiveness, but beyond this instrumental concern, inclusion can also help to close the gap between the governed and those who govern. Again, this assertion illustrates this book’s normative concern for the quality of democracy and of governance in the Caribbean.

Now let us move on to consider my decision to focus the analysis in this book on both the regional and domestic levels.

1.2.1 Two Levels of Analysis: Domestic and the Regional

To reiterate, this book assesses civil society and CSOs at both the domestic and the regional levels, while also recognising that a third level (the international/global) is of salience in shaping and framing the policy trajectories and actions of CARICOM and individual CARICOM, the OECS and their individual member states. The reason for examining these two levels (domestic and regional) is that instead of being viewed as separate and distinct, the domestic and regional levels can be conceived as co-constitutive. Put differently, domestic occurrences and procedures within CARICOM and OECS member states influence regional dynamics. Meanwhile, regional level factors also influence occurrences within CARICOM and OECS member states. To illustrate this claim about the co-constitutive nature of the domestic and regional levels, let us consider the example of a case brought before the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) CARICOM’s regional court. Let us use the ruling of the CCJ in the 2012 case brought by Shanique Myrie against the Government of Barbados as a starting point. Although this example does not address the topic of CSOs, it does show how occurrences at the domestic level can affect those at the regional level and, also, how those at the regional level can lead to alterations in practices across Caribbean domestic spaces.

In brief, the Myrie vs. Barbados case was about a Jamaican citizen being denied entry by air into Barbados and also alleging that she was physically violated during a search of her person by State officials in Barbados. The CCJ ruled in favour of Ms. Myrie and ruled that she be awarded damages by the Government of Barbados. Particularly noteworthy was the ruling that CARICOM nationals should be granted six months automatic entry into all member states (CCJ 2013). This case illustrates that actions taken at the domestic level (denying Ms. Myrie entry into Barbados and the circumstances of her body search) could trigger responses at the regional level, in this instance the initiation of legal proceedings before the CCJ . Further the CCJ’s ruling at the regional level has led states in the region to re-evaluate the practices of immigration officers to ensure that they seek to treat CARICOM nationals in ways consistent with regional obligations.

Since the 1990s, multilevel governance literature on the EU has addressed these sorts of multiple influences deriving from national, sub-national, and regional spaces. This literature is rich in assessing the supranational, national, and sub-regional influences on regional processes (see Jordan 2001; Nadalutti 2013; Marks et al. 1996). However, in CARICOM the flow of influences tends to be less fluid than what pertains in the EU. CARICOM and the OECS differ from the EU in that there are fewer institutions with supranational powers within these regional schemes than within the EU. The CCJ is the sole institution within CARICOM with some supranational abilities. On the other hand, OECS members have progressively been moving in the direction of providing even more of the OECS sub-region’s institutions with supranational powers. This point notwithstanding, the OECS is still some way off from the EU in respect of supranationalism. Another notable difference between these Caribbean regional schemes and the EU is that, although the levels of political interaction (domestic, sub-regional, and regional) are interconnected, in the Caribbean initiatives the levels of interaction tend to be interconnected in ways that are nested, and state-driven. Interconnectivity in Caribbean regionalism tends to flow directly through the state. Instead of leap-frogging states and seeking to make direct use of the regional level institutions as can occur in the EU context, Caribbean NSAs must generally channel efforts that are directed at regional mechanisms through states so that states can act as gatekeepers. The CCJ is the only real exception here as it is the sole institution within CARICOM that allows actors to bypass States regarding the implementation or interpretation of CARICOM rules.

Since Heads of Government are the primary decision-makers in CARICOM, it is the individual CARICOM member states that created the parameters for the movement of people in the region and that codified these in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas on which the CCJ ruled in the Myrie case. These rules and procedures did not emanate from a supranational authority, instead they were formulated and agreed on by the governments of member states. However, the agreed rules still seem to have been incongruent with domestic immigration practices in the region. This gap between state-created regional obligations and domestic implementation by these same states is what is often called in CARICOM policy spheres the CARICOM implementation deficit. Most notably, the CARICOM initiated West Indies Commission of 1992 assessed that implementation was CARICOM’s Achilles Heel. Despite substantial changes having been made to CARICOM since 1993 though, implementation continues to lag behind decision-making in the region (West Indian Commission, CARICOM 1993, 462). Clearly then, CARICOM differs from the EU in ways that make literature on multilevel governance from the EU context useful only as a reference point.

When one looks at participation in governance, at the domestic level across the CARICOM region, one sees a picture of both progress and of unevenness. At the regional level, there are treaty obligations within the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas that aim to advance citizen participation within individual states as well as at the regional level of CARICOM. It would be simple to assert that deficits in participatory governance approaches at the domestic level lead to deficits at the region level, as this absence domestically would make attaining inclusive processes more difficult at the region level. However, what we see from the example of the Shanique Myrie case is that occurrences at the regional level can begin to shift practices at the domestic level. Hence, the direction of causality is neither clear nor linear but can instead be messy and a bit circular.

Let us consider some other examples to illustrate the circular relationships between domestic and regional spaces. The area of education policy is a useful reference. Here we can see implementation success stories rather than implementation deficits at the region level. For instance, CARICOM members established the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) to develop regional certification systems. CXC is a clear case of implementation. There has been a movement within the region towards the use of more Caribbean relevant curricula and assessment practices and away from a focus on extra-regional or domestic certification and examination systems for both primary and secondary level education. The University of the West Indies, which provides tertiary education for the region using three physical and one ‘virtual’ campus, is another example of successful regional cooperation in education. Similarly, in the area of health policy, a regional approach to immunisation has facilitated the eradication of measles and there is a coordinated approach to addressing HIV/AIDS via the Pan-Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS (PANCAP) (Alleyne 2008, 22–23). These two policy areas illustrate the importance in CARICOM of what has been termed functional cooperation.

Functional cooperation occurs on matters of health care, education, human resource development, and common service provision among others. These are the somewhat less politically contentious areas of cooperation