Skagerrak: The Battle of Jutland Through German Eyes

By Gary Staff

In January 1916 Vizeadmiral Scheer took command of the High Sea Fleet. This aggressive and pugnacious leader embarked upon a vigorous offensive program which culminated in the greatest clash between dreadnought capital ships the world had seen. Although outnumbered almost two to one, Vizeadmiral Scheer conducted a provocative operation on 31 May 1916. Who would prevail: the massive preponderance of British heavy calibre cannon, or the aggressive tactics of the street fighter Scheer? Manning the ships of both sides were the technically skilled and talented seamen who were prepared to carry out their duties loyally and courageously until the very end. Over 8,500 men perished in less than 10 hours of fighting, a horrendous loss, even by World War One standards. This book gives voice to many of the German Navy participants, from a German perspective, on this tumultuous battle fought over 100 years ago. These men gave their all and are gone now, but not forgotten.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: May 4, 2016
• ISBN: 9781473880986

Gary Staff

Gary Staff is a former airline pilot but he has been fascinated with naval history, and specifically with the Imperial German Navy (Kaiserlischmarine) for decades. He has visited archives in Britain, Germany and elsewhere to study, and often translate for the first time, official documents relating to this subject. His previous books for Pen & Sword are The Battle for the Baltic Islands 1917; Battle on the Seven Seas and German Battlecruisers of World War One. He lives in Australia.

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Chapter 1

The War Year 1916

On 8 January 1916 the hitherto Chief of the German High Sea Fleet, Admiral Hugo von Pohl, was taken seriously ill and was transferred to a hospital ship, and from there he was taken to Berlin for an operation. Unfortunately, Admiral von Pohl had been afflicted with cancer and he never recovered, passing away after a brief time on February 23. His temporary replacement was the Commander of the III Squadron, Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer, and his appointment began a chain of events that would culminate in what to that date was the greatest sea battle in history, to the Germans the Skagerrak Battle, and to the British the Battle of Jutland.

In the Fleet there were fears that Vizeadmiral Scheer would not succeed Admiral von Pohl as Fleet Chief, and Vizeadmiral Hipper, the Commander of Reconnaissance Ships or B.d.A., set out his thoughts in his Nachlaß, his diary or bequest:

January 9. Our Fleet Commander, Admiral von Pohl, is ill – a stomach ailment. It appears that he will take a long recovery time and therefore a new Fleet Commander must be appointed. Hopefully Scheer.

January 10. Vizeadmiral Scheer tentatively assumes command of the High Sea Fleet, in place of the ill Fleet Chief.

January 11. Heavy north storm, so that on the evening traffic with ashore is impossible. And so it goes day after day.

January 12. The risk that Admiral von Holtzendorff will get the Fleet, as I greatly feared, appears ended. Everything indicates that Scheer will take over. There are however, further changes in command necessary in the fleet, and from my cruiser commanders I will lose one or another.¹

Vizeadmiral Scheer was appointed Chief of the High Sea Fleet on 18 January 1916, and held this post until August 1918. He was born on 30 September 1863 in Obernkirchen, Lower Saxony, and entered the navy on 22 April 1879, undertaking normal cadet training, the final year of which included a world trip aboard the training ship Hertha, which travelled to Melbourne Australia, Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki in Japan, and Shanghai in China. From 1884 to 1886 he served in East Africa where he became friends with the later Admiral Holtzendorff. After his return to Germany he served in various positions, including two periods at the RMA (Imperial Navy Office), and as commander of the battleship Elsass from 1907 to 1909. When Vizeadmiral von Holtzendorff became Chief of the High Sea Fleet in 1909 Kapitän zur See Scheer was appointed his Chief of Staff. Promoted Kontreadmiral on 27 January 1910, Scheer took over as Director of the General Navy Department of the RMA in September 1911. In February 1913 he was appointed commander of the II Squadron and was promoted Vizeadmiral on 9 December 1913. Vizeadmiral Scheer took command of the III Squadron in December 1914 and held this post until assuming command of the Fleet.

After taking command as Chief of the High Sea Fleet, Vizeadmiral Scheer applied for, and was granted, the transfer of two of his trusted colleagues and friends to his Staff. Kapitän zur See von Trotha, formerly commander of SMS Kaiser, was appointed Chief of Staff, and Kapitän zur See von Levetzow was appointed Chief of the Operations Department. Vizeadmiral Hipper wrote:

January 23–26. Meanwhile, one of my best commanders, Kapitän zur See von Levetzow of Moltke, was replaced as he was assigned to the Fleet Staff; replacement Kapitän zur See von Karpf. I entirely agree, although a new commander in the Unit must naturally first familiarise himself with the ship. Also the Commander of von der Tann, Hahn, was exchanged as an especially good artillerist is needed for the new dreadnought ship Bayern, which would enter service on 1 March.²

The triumvirate of Scheer-Trotha-Levetzow brought with it a new offensive spirit and work on new operations for the Fleet in an offensive direction began immediately. Early in February Vizeadmiral Scheer went to a conference in Berlin where he set out his program. Nevertheless, the very first point acknowledged one of the realities of the current situation. ‘The currently existing balance of forces initially forbids us to seek a decisive battle against the assembled English Fleet. Our sea war Leadership must also prevent this decisive battle being forced upon us by the enemy.’³ However, the program continued:

Through planned, continuous exposure to the enemy we can force him from his waiting position to advance against us with certain forces which we can attack with favourable opportunities; but on the other hand we must avoid giving rise to a feeling of superiority by the enemy, whereby he would not be afraid to give us battle.

The shallowness of our opponent offers us the advantage that our inferior force can always act as the aggressor.

To achieve this aim, Vizeadmiral Scheer proposed merchant warfare with U-Bootes, the mine war, merchant warfare to the north, the aerial war and lively activity by advancing the High Sea Fleet. He also saw U-Boot warfare as the quickest method of dissuading Britain from continuing the war. He wrote ‘That might be expected if success could be achieved either by a blow at her sea power centred on her Navy, or at her financial life, preferably both.’ And:

The then prevailing conditions of strength kept us from seeking a decisive battle with the enemy. Our conduct of the naval war was rather aimed at preventing a decisive battle being forced on us by the enemy. This might perhaps occur if our tactics began to be troublesome to him that he would try at all costs to get rid of the German Fleet. It might, for instance, become necessary, if the U-Boot war succeeded again in seriously threatening English economic life.⁴

The interesting part of what Admiral Scheer said was that the U-Boot war was primarily aimed at damaging Britain’s economic strength, not mounting a ‘hunger blockade’ as the British had done to Germany. In this the U-Bootes succeeded.

On 8 February 1916 the German Government announced that merchant ships carrying guns would be attacked without warning. Vizeadmiral Scheer objected to this half measure and went to Berlin on 16–17 February to make his disagreement known. Later that month, on 23 February, the Kaiser, his brother Großadmiral Prinz Heinrich, State Secretary Admiral von Tirpitz and Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral von Holtzendorff, visited the Fleet at Wilhelmshaven. At the Offizieres Club the Kaiser agreed to Vizeadmiral Scheer’s program. Only the date for the commencement of the unrestricted U-Boot campaign remained to be fixed. Nevertheless, not all those present were convinced. Vizeadmiral Hipper wrote:

23 February. His Majesty was here, and held in the Offizieres club an address to the Offizier Corps and then distributed a number of Iron Crosses, which looked very well and there was an excited mood.

The U-Boot War should now be pursued with all possible ruthlessness. Only the commencement date was to be decided but there was some ambiguity. I am not quite sure yet if at the last moment the Reich Chancellery Group will win and pull back.⁵

The first operation of the offensive campaign was to be an advance by torpedobootes, supported by airships. On 6 February the torpedobootes put to sea, however the airships were unable to ascend due to poor weather, as it had been since January. The torpedobootes could only proceed at slow speed, with look out from the crow’s nests proving impossible and under these conditions, with a strong SW wind, the advance was broken off and the torpedobootes returned to Schillig Roads. On 10 February the torpedobootes, the II Flottille, VI Flottille and IX Flottille, once again put to sea, but as the moon was in its first quarter airship attacks were no longer possible. At dusk the Flottilles were 10nm north of Ameland and would advance into the area between Dogger Bank and the Swarte Bank mine fields. They were to perform reconnaissance and attack any enemy vessels encountered. The torpedobootes were escorted by a single small cruiser, SMS Pillau, with the I FdT (I Leader of Torpedobootes) Kommodore Hartog aboard.

At 2208hrs that evening the three Flottilles formed into a broad reconnaissance line approximately 25nm wide and steered to the west, whilst Pillau and two boats, G42 and G85, followed about 20nm behind. Visibility to the west was 2000 to 3000 metres, but was less to the east. Meanwhile, the newly formed British 10 Sloop Flotilla (minesweeping sloops Buttercup, Arabis, Alyssum and Poppy) had been minesweeping in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank and because of strict wireless silence was not recalled when the British Admiralty detected increased German wireless activity, indicating some kind of operation. During the night Arabis stood near a light buoy which marked the sweep, whilst the other sloops cruised up and down nearby. Towards 2310hrs the right wing of the German reconnaissance line sighted a light ahead to port. Soon after, a second light was discerned and a large, darkened vessel could be made out. Further behind three more darkened vessels could be made out on a WNW course. Nevertheless, the German Half-Flottille Chief hesitated until at 2330hrs he thought he recognised the vessels as cruisers of the British Arethusa type. Thereon the attack signal was given and between 2330 and 2342hrs G101 and G102 launched three torpedoes at the line of three ships and then, together with G104, a further seven torpedoes at the individual ship near the light buoy. The group of three turned away, whilst the individual ship disappeared in smoke. The Germans gave chase to the line and at 2353hrs G104 fired another two torpedoes at them but again the British turned away and the torpedoes missed. Only now did the Half-Flottille Chief give a wireless contact report as he renewed his attack on the single vessel, which in fact was Arabis. G101 and G102 each launched a further torpedo but Arabis again turned away, however at the same time the German torpedobootes switched on their searchlights and opened artillery fire. Arabis was hit in the forecastle and amidships, had a steam pipe shot through and her wireless disabled, but by 0020hrs the Germans had ceased fire, still believing that their opponent was a light cruiser of the Arethusa class.

After receiving the contact report the neighbouring torpedoboot group, B97, B111 and B112, turned towards the reported position. About a quarter of an hour later they sighted three vessels to port, apparently light cruisers of the Arethusa type. A further vessel of this type could be made out in the distance behind this group. B97 fired two torpedoes, both of which missed, and then the British turned away so that contact was lost.

Meanwhile, the adjacent torpedoboot groups, B109, B110 and G103, and the VI Flottille Group G41, V44, V43 and S49, had also noticed the gunfire but because of the confusing wireless message did not make contact with the enemy.

Towards 0100hrs the three Groups of the II Flottille assembled in Grid Square 080 delta and at 0110hrs the Flottille advanced to the NW at a speed of 25 knots. Soon after, at 0116hrs, a group of darkened vessels came in sight, but it was the VI Flottille. About 0148hrs the Flottille Chief, Korvettenkapitän Schuur aboard B97, recognized a clear light off the port bow. It was the previously observed light buoy, and nearby a darkened vessel with two funnels could be discerned, which soon turned away to the NE. B97 closed to make a torpedo attack but the torpedo misfired and B97 closed to just 400 metres and opened artillery fire. B111 and B112 also opened fire and several hits were observed resulting in smoke and steam emanating from the enemy ship. Arabis replied with four salvos, which passed over the bridge and bow gun of B97. Then B111 launched a torpedo that struck the British minesweeper amidships and after that she lay stopped and unmanoeuvrable. Finally, at 0221hrs B112 fired a further two torpedoes, which both hit Arabis, and she finally sank. Now the German torpedobootes launched boats to rescue the survivors. A total of three officers, including the commander and ship’s doctor, three NCOs and 27 men were rescued from the cold waters. However, the doctor and four men perished from heart failure on the return trip. The Germans swept the entire area with searchlights for three-quarters of an hour before breaking off rescue operations.

Attempts to locate the other British vessels failed and at about 0300hrs Kommodore Hartog ordered his forces to a rendezvous 30nm north of Terschelling. Meanwhile, Vizeadmiral Hipper had put to sea with his I AG after receiving a report at 0115hrs and 20 minutes later the Panzerkreuzer were followed by the 1 Division of the I Squadron, which was on picket duty. The battleships on Wilhelmshaven Roads, Westfalen, Kaiser, König Albert and Markgraf, also followed. The II AG followed at 0230hrs. After a fruitless advance the I AG anchored on the Jade at 1335hrs.

Although the sinking of Arabis was no great loss to the Royal Navy they suffered another more serious loss on 11 February when the flagship of the Harwich forces, the light cruiser Arethusa, was lost on the return journey to Harwich. Near North Cutler Buoy Arethusa struck a mine laid by UC7 on the night of 9/10 February 1916 and after several failed towing attempts the cruiser was driven onto Cutler Reef and broke in two. All salvage attempts failed and the wreck was overtaken by her destiny.

As a result of the German torpedoboot advance on 10/11 February it was learnt that they required further training in tactics and manoeuvring together. Although the gunnery had been excellent the torpedo arm had not performed well. Of 19 torpedoes launched only three, or perhaps four, had hit. Whilst material failures contributed to this poor result, it was thought that the shallow draught of Arabis had also contributed. Nevertheless, on 12 February the I FdT and the VI and IX Flottilles departed for training in the Baltic, followed by the II Flottille on 14 February after they had completed boiler cleaning.

Part of the German operational plan was to continue the activity of merchant raiders, with the so-called Auxiliary Cruisers. The Auxiliary Cruiser Möve had put to sea in late 1915 and had laid mines off the Scottish coast, which had claimed the British battleship King Edward VII, but her return date remained unknown. In the meantime the Auxiliary Cruiser Greif put to sea on 27 February 1916 for a mission into the Atlantic. However, British Naval Intelligence, Room 40, was able to intercept and decipher German wireless signals, mainly because in 1914 the Russians had captured and passed on a copy of the German Naval Code book. With the help of this priceless aid, and the fact that German wireless discipline was lax, Room 40 was able to provide the British Admiralty and Admirals with advance knowledge of impending German operations. So it was when Greif put to sea, and several groups of British cruisers were sent to intercept the German cruiser. Greif was intercepted by the Auxiliary Cruiser Alcantara on 29 February and after a fierce fight both Greif and Alcantara sank, Greif after British reinforcements in the form of the auxiliary cruiser Andes and light cruiser Comus arrived and joined the battle.

On 3 March a wireless message arrived from Möve indicating she would arrive off Horns Reef the following morning. This message came as a complete surprise, however the available picket forces, the 2 Division of the I Squadron, von der Tann, the IV AG and V TBF immediately put to sea to welcome the raider home. They were followed by the II Flottille, Seydlitz, Moltke and Derfflinger, and the 1 Division of the I Squadron. Because of fog the following morning Möve was only found by von der Tann towards 0700hrs, but was then lost again. At 1700hrs Möve arrived safely in Wilhelmshaven.

The next offensive advance by the High Sea Fleet coincided with an airship attack on Britain. British light forces had frequently been reported in the Hoofden, the sea area between Holland and the Norfolk coast, and at 2030hrs on 5 March, in accordance with Operational Order 1180/0, the I AG ran out with Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger and von der Tann, followed by the I and III Squadrons, with a total of 20 capital ships (Rheinland was in dockyard hands, Bayern and Lützow had yet to join the Fleet) to sweep through the Hoofden and surprise any British forces found there. The night was very dark with a light WNW wind and soon after the Fleet put to sea there was a snowstorm. During the morning the I and II AG continued south into the Hoofden, followed approximately 60nm behind by the Main Body. Vizeadmiral Hipper wrote:

5 March. 2030 in the evening I run out with the I AG. The weather was still and clear. During the night nothing occurred. Only a few fishing vessels were met. On investigation they were neutral. On 6 March the Panzerkreuzers and the light forces advanced deep in the Hoofden as far as the minefields known to us would allow. Of the enemy nothing was heard. In contrast during the morning a lively wireless traffic came in, whereby all enemy light forces were quickly called back into harbour. The English also followed the principle that when their forces were not greatly superior in strength on the spot, then all were called back into harbour. During the night 3 airships which had ascended from the Hage, Tondern and Nordholz, had made attack on Hull and the surrounding area with good results. On the return journey they served as reconnaissance. Of the enemy forces nothing was seen.

About 10am at the latitude of Ijmuiden I made a turn and moved back on my Main Body, which stood north of Terschelling and I reached them about 2pm.

Then I received orders that during the night the three Flottilles II, VI and IX, under the II FdT, ⁶ should set in the direction of the Firth of Forth. The weather remained clear and still. About 4pm I detached the Flottilles and for the night went back to the German Bight, where the Main Body had marched about 2pm. The II AG should follow one hour later. During the rearmarch many drifting mines were sighted, which continually had to be avoided. Some were shot at. During the night I cruised in the inner German Bight and about 3.30am would run into the Jade when the torpedobootes were no longer in danger.⁷

During the evening the I AG cruised in the German Bight at a speed of 15 knots and sighted numerous drifting mines. The weather deteriorated and there was driving snow and a rough swell, strength 5. On the following morning, 7 March, at 0910hrs an enemy submarine was sighted from Seydlitz off the island of Juist. Seydlitz’s war diary reported: ‘9.10am. Grid Square 109ε. Submarine to port 500m. Ship turns away to starboard at 18 knots (a part of the darkly painted conning tower and the periscope were clearly made out).’⁸ It was the British submarine E5, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Edwards. The escorting German torpedobootes of the 9 Half-Flottille carried out an attack on the boat with depth charges but E5 probably survived as at 1130hrs a submarine was sighted by the small cruiser Regensburg. Nevertheless, E5 did not return from this patrol and was lost.

Vizeadmiral Hipper summed up what was a difficult day:

7 March. Already on the evening there was a strong east wind with partly snow squalls, which increased and on the morning the wind strength reached 6–8 with strong driving snow. The torpedobootes suffered heavily and could not steam with the ordered speed against the sea. Several had damage. With dawn they were still not off the Ems and for security I went with the I and II AG to a reception position off the Ems. During the course of the morning the torpedobootes gradually came in.

After the boats were safe I went back to the Jade. Suddenly to port near Seydlitz an enemy submarine dived and made an attack. With a hard turn away and an increase in speed we avoided the danger. In the driving snow and rough seas perhaps the submarine could not come to a shot quickly enough. Nevertheless it was a devilish situation.

In the afternoon we were again in the Jade. Stressful day.⁹

On 15 December 1915 the Russian observer and representative with the Grand Fleet, Captain 1 Rank Schoultz, drafted a memorandum to the British Admiralty in which, on behalf of the Russian Government and Navy, he requested that the Royal Navy penetrate the Baltic to open a supply route to Saint Petersburg, and Russia. Sea mastery of the Baltic would also allow a Russian advance on land to be secured on its vulnerable flank. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Balfour, met with Captain 1 Rank Schoultz in late January 1916 and advised him that no assistance could be offered along these lines until the German High Sea Fleet had been decisively beaten. Nevertheless, spring 1916 did herald a new wave of British offensive activity.

The frequent air raids by German airships had been causing consternation in Britain and it was determined to attack the airships in their hangars with bomb laden seaplanes. Intelligence suggested the airship hangars were at Hoyer, but in reality they were at Tondern, a short distance away. The five seaplanes would be carried within range by the aircraft tender Vindex, which would be escorted by the Harwich Force, whilst the Battle Cruiser Fleet would act in support. Commodore Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force consisted of the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron: Cleopatra, Penelope and Conquest; two flotilla cruisers, Aurora and Undaunted; two flotilla leaders, Nimrod and Lightfoot; two divisions of the 10 Flotilla, Meteor, Mastiff, Minos, Manly, Medusa, Murray, Mansfield and Morris; and two of the 9 Flotilla, Laforey, Liberty, Llewellyn, Laurel, Laertes, Lassoo, Laverock and Linnet. Commodore Tyrwhitt and his forces set off at daybreak on 24 March and early on the morning of the following day were in the sea area off Vyl light vessel. The weather was very poor with frequent snow squalls. At 0530hrs Vindex was detached and proceeded closer towards Graa Deep light vessel. Soon afterwards a torpedo, which must have been launched by mistake by the British submarine H7, narrowly missed Tyrwhitt’s flagship, Cleopatra. By 0630hrs Vindex had launched her floatplanes and began the wait until they returned. The first two aircraft returned about 0800hrs but had to report there were no airship hangars at Hoyer, but their base was further inland at Tondern. Of the other aircraft nothing could be found and they were lost, their crews being taken prisoner.

Meanwhile, the Germans had been planning an operation of their own. It had been planned that for the evening of 26 March the High Sea Forces would advance to the line Farn Island-Skagerrak and on the following night the II, VI and IX Flottilles would conduct merchant warfare west of the Dogger Bank mine field. Nevertheless, whilst preparations were underway for this operation, at 0945hrs on 25 March the FT Station at List reported: ‘Vamdrup bombed by enemy aircraft in the early morning. Enemy aircraft drifts south of Hörnum.’ At the same time the picket trawler Braunschweig reported enemy destroyers in sight. Commodore Tyrwhitt had ordered the Flotilla Leaders Lightfoot and Nimrod to take eight destroyers and sweep to the southward, whilst he himself would search for his missing aircraft. At 0938hrs the destroyer group was sighted from the Naval Intelligence Station at List, on the island of Sylt, which gave out a warning. This warning came too late for the picket trawlers Braunschweig and Otto Rudolf, which were attacked by the British destroyers and were quickly sunk. The destroyers saved most of the crews.

Whilst this battle was still underway the German aircraft 505, 541 and 291 took off for an attack and climbed above the clouds. Soon after 1000hrs approximately 15nm abeam of Rote Kliff aircraft 505 sighted the enemy from an altitude of 4000 feet. Descending to 2500 feet, the German aircraft sighted three large ships, which were thought to be light cruisers but were probably the destroyer leaders. About 1020hrs aircraft 505 attacked one of the larger ships with three bombs, and then bombed another destroyer with a further three bombs. Twenty to thirty minutes later aircraft 541 and 291 arrived and although 291 was hit on a float it dropped bombs and it was observed that two destroyers had to stop, whilst the others disappeared in a NW direction. What had occurred was that whilst taking evasive action the destroyer Medusa had been rammed by Laverock. The damage was so severe that Medusa could make no more than six knots. Lightfoot took Medusa in tow and the destroyers Laertes and Lasso remained with the tow unit as escort, as it slowly made its way to the west.

Also at around 1020hrs the German aircraft 508 and 553 alighted near the British aircraft adrift near Hörnum, and this aircraft, number 8040, was towed to shore by a boat of the Armee coast watch.

When he received news that Medusa had been crippled and the Harwich forces were still spread out in the outer German Bight, Vice Admiral Beatty pushed to the south to give his support and by 1300hrs his battle cruiser force was just 20nm west of Horns Reef. Perhaps Vice Admiral Beatty was hoping to repeat his success of August 1914 when he had trapped German light forces in the Helgoland Bight. In the meantime Commodore Tyrwhitt received an order from the Admiralty to immediately retire, as they had learned that German torpedobootes would attack during the night.

Despite the deteriorating weather Vizeadmiral Scheer ordered a riposte at 1345hrs. The I Squadron, I and IV AG and II FdT with the I, V, VI and VII TBFs were ordered to advance to the north, whilst the II AG and the I FdT with the III and IX TBFs were ordered to advance to the west, to reconnoitre off Terschelling in case a concurrent operation was underway against the airship base at Hage. The III Squadron would support this advance. About this time Seydlitz, Moltke, Lützow and the V TBF passed the outer Jade light vessel, but just as the worsening weather was making it difficult for the Medusa tow unit, the German forces were having a hard time of it. The two cruisers of the IV AG had a highest continuous speed of 20 knots so that the I FdT sent them back to Regensburg. The I Squadron and Derfflinger were further ahead and at 1500hrs were just 18nm behind Regensburg. Nevertheless, with the deteriorating visibility and increasing storm, and as there were no further reports about British movements, the German forces were ordered to turn about, the I Squadron to return to the Jade whilst the I AG would anchor for the night in Schmal Deep, off Amrum Bank. On the other hand there were still prospects of a successful night attack with torpedobootes and these light forces continued their advance.

The torpedobootes advancing to the west were under the command of the I FdT, Kommodore Hartog aboard Rostock, and were only advancing with great effort. At around 2130hrs one of the boats on the right wing, just 100m abeam Rostock, S22, struck a mine and a second detonation followed in quick succession. The forecastle ahead of the bridge was rent off and drifted aft, whilst fuel oil was ignited and apparently caused the second blast. After five minutes the remains of the torpedoboot sank, but the accompanying S18 was able to rescue 16 men from the crew of 93. The commander, Kapitänleutnant Karl Galster, was not among them. However, the advance of the broad reconnaissance line continued to the SW at 12 knots before at 2300hrs a turn was made back to the NE.

Meanwhile, the advance of the I and VI Flottilles to the NW was having no better luck. By 2200hrs the British destroyer Lassoo had skilfully recovered the crew of Medusa, despite the stormy conditions, and she was abandoned at 2230hrs, although left at anchor in spite of orders to scuttle her in the hope of salvaging the destroyer the following morning. Not far away the German boats laboured against the heavy seas with waves breaking over their bridges, making the use of binoculars impossible and the gun and torpedo crews had to seek refuge below decks. The ready munition was washed overboard and the boiler rooms took on water and as it was impossible to clean the boiler fires sparks and flames shot from the funnels at speeds above 20 knots. The senior Flottille Chief, Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz, gave orders to reduce speed to 15 knots and finally at 2210hrs the II FdT, Kommodore Köthner, ordered the advance to be abandoned. However, part of the left wing had turned away to port to investigate trawlers and the following boats, G193 and G194, lost contact with those ahead. When the order came to make a turn these two boats assumed the leading boats had already turned and turned themselves onto a SE course and at 2320hrs when approximately 40nm WNW of Horns Reef light vessel three darkened vessels were sighted ahead, 4 points to starboard. A collision between the leading G193 and the leading vessel was averted with the order: ‘Hard port, Utmost Power ahead.’ The enemy cruiser missed by just 5 to 10 metres; however, G194 was not so fortunate.

Commodore Tyrwhitt’s force was steering north in three groups: ahead went Nimrod and the bulk of the destroyers; in the middle was the 5 Light Cruiser Squadron, the cruisers Cleopatra, Undaunted, Penelope and Conquest; aft at a greater distance were Aurora, Lightfoot and Lassoo. Aboard Cleopatra they recognized flames and sparks from the German torpedoboot funnels and she immediately steered out of line to ram one of them, however missed G193 and then struck hapless G194. The boat was cut into two parts, which quickly sank in the rough seas. Unfortunately, the sudden course alteration brought Cleopatra beam on to the remainder of the line and she was rammed by Undaunted. Damage to Cleopatra was slight, but on Undaunted the bows were completely stove in and water pressure on her collision bulkhead only allowed a speed of just 6 knots. This situation was now worse than before Medusa had been abandoned. Neither was G193 out of danger as she was taken under fire by British destroyers, but was able to escape undamaged. When the II FdT received a report from G193 he ordered the I and VI Flottilles to the last reported position of G193 at 2356hrs. However, because of the heavy seas the Kommodore soon had to abandon this advance.

In the meantime Vice Admiral Beatty and the Battle Cruiser Fleet had turned southwards to support the damaged cruiser Undaunted. As the British steamed to the south the I AG weighed anchor at 0115hrs and steered to the north, and would be supported by the III Squadron under Kontreadmiral Behncke, and the VII TBF, which weighed anchor so that they could meet the cruisers at dawn. At 0245hrs Vizeadmiral Scheer weighed anchor and advanced to the north with the I Squadron and Fleet flagship. When British Naval Intelligence learned of the German advance the Admiralty ordered the entire Grand Fleet to sea, but there was no chance of a general fleet action. At 0630hrs the German cruisers reported that the seas were so rough that engagement was impossible and accordingly the advance was given up as chanceless. The British forces retired later that same day for the same reasons.

During the night whilst at anchor some of the I AG had their anti-torpedo nets rent loose by the stormy weather. With the advance to the north, at 0915hrs, Seydlitz sighted an enemy submarine 25nm SW of Horns Reef light vessel at a distance of 800m to port. On the return journey Lützow was attacked by a submarine and the torpedo passed 50–100 metres behind the stern. This was most probably fired by the British submarine E24, which failed to return from this operation. The I AG anchored on Wilhelmshaven Roads at 2040hrs.

The plan of the German Fleet Leadership to conduct an advance to the north to the line Farn Island-Skagerrak with the High Sea Fleet on the evening of 26 March had been completely thwarted by the British seaplane attack.

Prior to this operation, on 20 March, Vizeadmiral Hipper had submitted a request for medical leave on the advice of his physician. Physically he was unwell with sciatica and mentally he was exhausted. After the operation of 25–26 March he was totally spent. He wrote:

26 March. Two terribly exhausting days that have probably finished my terribly weakened body. Shoulder pain. Tomorrow I will get off.

27 March. The Fleet Chief came aboard this morning to see me and speak about my representations and has ruled in my favour. The Leader of the II AG will represent me, and for him the Leader of the IV AG, as I had proposed. At noon I disembark and tomorrow will journey to Bad Nenndorf. Hopefully I will get back in order.¹⁰

Vizeadmiral Hipper remained on sick leave until 13 May.

In April 1916 the British were preparing three offensive plans: a Grand Fleet demonstration in the Kattegat for 21 April to draw attention away from the Russians, who were relaying their Baltic minefields after the spring thaw; an operation by Admiral Bacon from Dover to lay extensive minefields and antisubmarine nets off the Belgium coast on 24 April, and a second attack on the airship base at Tondern on 4 May. German intelligence believed Tondern would be attacked in about mid April and Vizeadmiral Scheer began taking defensive measures on 13 April. On the evening of 20 April a British cruiser force put to sea and proceeded towards the Kattegat with the intention of operating against trade. At dawn on 21 April the IV AG, supported by Moltke and Derfflinger, took station south of Amrum Bank, as an advanced picket. Then at 1600hrs the main deciphering station at Neumünster reported that intercepted wireless messages indicated that British units, including battleships and cruisers, had departed the Firth of Forth on the evening of 20 April and had taken course towards Horns Reef. Vizeadmiral Scheer believed this was the long awaited repeat attack against Tondern and the IAG and II AG, with two fast Flottilles, were dispatched to reconnoitre towards Horns Reef.

From intercepted wireless reports the British learned that the German forces were putting to sea, and the Kattegat operation was immediately cancelled. The entire Grand Fleet was ordered to sea and by early on 22 April the Grand Fleet was 100nm east of Aberdeen with the Battle Cruiser Fleet 40nm ahead. The 3 Battle Squadron and 3 Cruiser Squadron were in support. The Germans remained unaware of these movements.

Meanwhile, the advance of German forces in response to the supposed attack on Tondern was not without events. The flagship of the acting Leader of the II AG, Kommodore von Reuter, ran onto a mine 15nm SW of Amrum Bank. The