German Battlecruisers of World War One: Their Design, Construction and Operations

By Gary Staff and Marsden Samuel

This is the most comprehensive, English-language study of the German Imperial Navy’s battlecruisers that served in the First World War. Known as Panzerkreuzer, literally “armored cruiser,” the eight ships of the class were to be involved in several early North Sea skirmishes before the great pitched battle of Jutland where they inflicted devastating damage on the Royal Navy’s battlecruiser fleet. This book details their design and construction, and traces the full service history of each ship, recounting their actions, drawing largely from first-hand German sources and official documents, many previously unpublished in English.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press
• Release date: Dec 15, 2014
• ISBN: 9781612519661

Gary Staff

Gary Staff is a former airline pilot but he has been fascinated with naval history, and specifically with the Imperial German Navy (Kaiserlischmarine) for decades. He has visited archives in Britain, Germany and elsewhere to study, and often translate for the first time, official documents relating to this subject. His previous books for Pen & Sword are The Battle for the Baltic Islands 1917; Battle on the Seven Seas and German Battlecruisers of World War One. He lives in Australia.

Book preview

PREFACE

The German battlecruisers of World War One are probably the most popular ships of the period, excluding the U-boats. Although the battlecruisers numbered only seven ships, they briefly traversed the oceans of the world before the war and then served in the North Sea, Baltic Sea, Mediterranean and Black Seas, exerting a disproportionate influence on naval operations. All of the ships, with the exception of Hindenburg, saw action and had eventful careers.

When the British Royal Navy, and for that matter the Japanese Navy, introduced the new battlecruiser type Germany had to follow suit; however, the German ships were based on a different conceptual model to contemporary navies, with different design criteria. The German designers realised their navy would always be numerically inferior to the British and therefore their ships were designed not only for reconnaissance and combat with other battlecruisers, but also to be able to join the battle line as ‘gap fillers’ and fight against enemy battleships. Of course there was much discussion and debate about what form the designs should take.

The result was an excellent line of warships that were the equal of any afloat, and their influence continued on into the designs of the later Scharnhorst and Bismarck. Nevertheless, despite the popularity of the German battle-cruisers, there is surprisingly little written in English on the subject. John Campbell’s Warship Special 1: Battle Cruisers is an excellent, if brief, work, but much new information has become available since this was first published in 1978. In German there are only a few more works. In 1996 Axel Greißmer produced an extensive book on the design and development of German battle-cruisers in his work Große Kreuzer der Kaiserliche Marine 1906–1918. This wonderful book covers the design phase of the ships. Gerhard Koop and Klaus-Peter Schmolke produced Die Großen Kreuzer von der Tann bis Hindenburg in 1998. This is a comprehensive work with much detailed information and excellent drawings. In Russian, V.B. Muzhenikov produced a great book entitled German Battlecruisers in 1998. Apart from these few titles there is not much available exclusively about the German battlecruisers.

Most of the material used in the preparation of this book is original source material from the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA), the Federal Archive, in Freiburg.

All the remaining files about the design meetings and discussions are held there and most are available. The ships’ war diaries, the so-called Kriegstagebuch (KTB), are also held in the BA-MA, and it is these two sources of documents that I have used primarily in writing this book. Whilst I have attempted to correct any obvious errors, in many instances – for example, combat reports – the report is produced verbatim and the errors are left so as to give a sense of the impressions of the time. Without doubt I have included mistakes of my own, even though every effort has been made for accuracy. If information was in doubt I omitted it rather than include something I was uncertain of.

When I first saw a 3D render of SMS von der Tann on the Internet I was very excited and I am very pleased indeed to be able to include the renders of Marsden Samuel in this book. Marsden’s renders are made from original drawings and detailed photographs and are very accurate. His meticulous approach has produced illustrations of outstanding quality, which give the impression of actually being aboard the ship.

As well as giving my heartfelt thanks to Marsden there are many others to whom I must give thanks for their help during the preparation of this book. I wish to thank Herr Wolfgang Bohlayer for writing a wonderful foreword. When he agreed to write a foreword I was thrilled because of his link with Blohm & Voss, the builders of many of the battlecruisers. I would like to thank the BA-MA staff for their help and assistance, in particular Frau Weibel and Frau Meier. The BA-MA is the repository for many files and records of Germany’s Imperial Navy and they have been very helpful to me over an extended period.

Unfortunately I live a long way from the BA-MA and therefore one person in particular has been of great assistance to me by researching many files and supplying many references. I speak of Sebastian Remus, a person who knows the BA-MA’s files thoroughly. Another friend who has always been willing to help is Darren Brown, an expert on British submarines who has made his research available to me, in answer to many questions I had about the arch foe of the German battlecruisers, the British Submarine Service. Herr Carsten Steinhorst has once again been of great help to me with this book, and although his main interest is the Offiziere (officers) and men of the Imperial Navy he has been more than generous with his helpful opinions and information about the Panzerkreuzer. Another friend who has given me help is Herr Norbert Schülzke. Fregattenkapitän a.D. Vangerow of the Marine Offizier Vereinigung has given me valuable assistance over a long period of time. Likewise in the early years Mr Stuart Haller helped with information about SMS Seydlitz.

The journey to this book began over thirty years ago, but its publication does not mean the end of work on the Panzerkreuzer; rather, it is just another piece of a complicated picture that deserves more research and recognition.

Gary Staff

June 2014

INTRODUCTION

The term Panzerkreuzer literally means ‘armoured cruiser’. The term battlecruiser was not used in Germany until after World War One. In Germany the battlecruiser type were referred to in official documents as Große Kreuzer, or ‘large cruisers’, but the men of the Imperial Navy usually referred to them as ‘Panzerkreuzer’, and this is how Kontreadmiral¹/Vizeadmiral Hipper referred to the ships of his I Aufklärungsgruppe (AG), or Reconnaissance Group, in his official reports.

Kontreadmiral was the usual spelling until after WWI when Konteradmiral was adopted.

As with all other navies which developed the battle-cruiser type during this period the roots of the German battlecruisers lay in the old armoured cruiser type. In contrast to the battleship type, the development of the armoured cruiser type was less well defined.

The large protected cruisers, which were not actually well protected in the vital parts, such as the Royal Navy’s Challenger class, gradually disappeared from the building programmes of the largest navies, leaving only the armoured cruiser type. The main criteria for these types were sufficient range, a certain amount of combat power and a good highest speed, combined with good maximum continuous speed. In France emphasis was placed on a type that could successfully conduct warfare against British trade routes. The French types combined very great endurance – Ernest Renan, for example, having a range of 10,000nm at 10kts – with a powerful armament (four 19.4cm guns and twelve 16.4cm guns), and their displacements approached that of contemporary battleships. Edgar Quinet of 1905 displaced 14,100 tonnes, compared to the 1905 battleship Vérité with a displacement of 14,635 tonnes. The British armoured cruisers sought to match the French effort with ships that were superior in the three basic criteria, but especially combat strength, such as the Cressy and Drake classes. However, in the Monmouth and Devonshire classes the British became more detached from the French model and speed became more important than combat strength. The weaker naval powers – the United States of America (USA), Germany, Japan, Italy and Austria – had to make greater use of combat strength as they could not produce cruisers in comparable numbers. The armoured cruiser therefore had its genesis in a smaller, weaker armoured ship as a competition between speed and armour began. However, there was also a pursuit of battleship qualities, which had as its basis the battle between artillery and armour. Just as the battleships began to mount an intermediate gun calibre so too did the armoured cruisers, such as the Warrior class with 9.2in and 7.5in guns.

In the January 1904 edition of the naval magazine Marine-Rundschau, Kaiser Wilhelm II, under the pseudonym ‘L’, wrote an article about the armoured cruiser type. The monarch’s naval interests were not confined to doodling ship designs on the backs of telegrams. The main critique of his article was that the displacement of the cruisers was approaching that of the battleships and if this path continued it would be to the detriment of the battleship type. The Kaiser warned that the armoured cruiser was only a ‘necessary accessory’. He wrote that armoured cruisers were becoming so large and expensive that soon, in France for example, the cost would exceed that of a battleship, and therefore why not simply build battleships? The Kaiser was an advocate of the ‘fast battleship’ concept, a fusing of the two types of warship. However, his concept of a ‘real battlecruiser’ was that it would not exceed the cost of a battleship, it would have a speed of three to four knots in excess of contemporary battleships, have sufficient coal supply and that after completing its primary reconnaissance role could join the battle line. Therefore the cruiser’s armament should consist of a 24cm or 21cm gun, together with a 15cm gun as a secondary battery, and armour to protect the ship’s vitals from the same. Nevertheless, a fast battleship embodying these characteristics, but with heavy artillery, would probably exceed 30,000 tonnes and was rejected in a memorandum by Großadmiral von Tirpitz, the state secretary of the Reichs-Marine-Amt (RMA, or Imperial Navy Office), on technical and financial grounds.

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, the Japanese had designed a new type of armoured cruiser with a main armament of four 12in guns and protected by 7in thick armour. The first two ships were Tsukuba and Ikoma, followed closely by Ibuki and Kurama, and despite a relatively low speed – when compared to later battle-cruisers – of 20½–23kts they were the first battlecruisers in the modern sense of the word and were re-rated as such in 1912 when the term was introduced in the Royal Navy. The successful use of the Japanese armoured cruisers in the battle line in the decisive Battle of Tsushima in May 1905 confirmed to the Japanese that their design philosophy was correct.

In June 1897 Kontreadmiral Alfred von Tirpitz was appointed state secretary of the RMA. Admiral Tirpitz was a strong proponent of the navy and by late 1897 he was already framing the Flottengesetze, or Fleet Law, which would make his and the Kaiser’s naval ambitions a legally binding state policy. Tirpitz’s gift was that he could balance the wishes of the navy in regard to technical requirements with the financial and budget requirements of the Reichstag. The First Fleet Law was passed on 28 March 1898 and consisted of a six-year plan to build a battle fleet of two squadrons of eight battleships, a fleet flagship, and two reserve battleships, eight armoured coastal defence ships, twelve large cruisers and thirty small cruisers.

With the Second Fleet Law, passed on 26 June 1900, the battle fleet was doubled in size. It would now consist of thirty-eight battleships, fourteen large cruisers and thirty-eight small cruisers. However, six large cruisers originally included were deleted from the plan in order to obtain the approval of the Reichstag. This law secured a building tempo of three capital ships per year.

A 1906 amendment reinstated the six large cruisers in the form of the Große Kreuzer, the later battlecruisers. A further amendment in 1908 revised the replacement time of the ships from twenty-five years down to twenty, and therefore allowed earlier replacement of obsolete ships. The final amendment came in 1912 and the battle fleet strength was increased to forty-one battleships, twenty large cruisers and forty small cruisers.

The first German armoured cruisers basically followed the British model, but there was continuing discussion as to which direction further development should take. The ‘fast battleship’ concept was rejected because of doubts about the technical feasibility and the expected cost. However, the need for a Große Kreuzer type was seen as real. There was also discussion about the nomenclature of the type. The term Große Kreuzer was used in preference to Panzerkreuzer, and this was how the type was described in the Fleet Laws. Nevertheless, in Britain the role of the armoured cruiser was changing and moving away from trade protection, and the British ships of the Duke of Edinburgh, Warrior and Minotaur classes were intended to act in co-operation with the fleet in squadron strength as a fast wing. The tasks for the German armoured cruisers were seen by von Tirpitz to be reconnaissance, defeating the enemy’s reconnaissance cruisers, protecting their own lighter forces and pursuing damaged enemy ships. The Kaiser also wanted them to have the capability of fighting in the battle line, to have ‘line capability’. State Secretary von Tirpitz was against this line capability. However, German armoured cruisers at the time suffered from the handicap that their lengths were limited by the size of the Wilhelmshaven locks, and therefore their maximum speeds were in the order of 21–21½kts. Compared to this the British armoured cruisers had speeds of up to 23kts. The large III Entrance at Wilhelmshaven only opened in 1910.

At a meeting in May 1904 the Allgemeines Marinedepartment, or (A), meaning General Navy Department, demanded that the next Große Kreuzer, the ships D (Scharnhorst) and C (Gneisenau), ‘should be able to enter a gap in the line for a damaged battleship’. They also wanted an increase in armament to eight 21cm guns. Tirpitz countered by saying that such a capability would come at a disproportionate cost. In the end C and D received eight 21cm SK,² but they were not ready to take their places in the battle line.

Schnellfeuerkanone, ‘quick-firing gun’.

The first amendment to the Second Fleet Law was the legal basis for the building of the Große Kreuzer E to K, when the total number was increased by six ships. Therefore, for the budget year of 1906 two battleships and one large cruiser would be built. The cost respectively was fixed at 32 million and 24 million marks, which meant that Kreuzer E – Blücher – would not significantly increase in price over Scharnhorst.

On 4 March 1905 the construction department, or (K), of the RMA was requested to prepare two designs for the 1906 new cruiser. Project A had an armament similar to Scharnhorst, but project B had twelve 21cm guns mounted in six double turrets, laid out in a hexagonal arrangement. Both designs were roughly the same dimensions as Scharnhorst, although slightly faster. It can be seen that with design E2/B the final layout of Blücher had already been reached, although the final design for Blücher was slightly enlarged in displacement and the four funnels were trunked into two. Nevertheless, many more projects were developed and considered before the final decision was undertaken.

GERMAN FLEET LAW AND AMENDMENTS

1898 Fleet Law. Future Fleet strength nineteen battleships, eight armoured coastal defence ships, twelve large cruisers, thirty small cruisers.

1900 Fleet Law. Strength increased to thirty-eight battleships, fourteen large cruisers, thirty-eight small cruisers.

1906 amendment. Number of large cruisers increased to twenty.

1908 amendment. Replacement time reduced from twenty-five years to twenty years.

1912 amendment. Strength increased to forty-one battleships, twenty large cruisers, forty small cruisers.

Großen Kreuzer E, Blücher

Project E2

A view from...

A further project, E3, received the temporary approval of the Kaiser in March. Whilst E3 had reverted to having the majority of the 21cm guns in a casemate, the new E5 project again had a hexagonal arrangement for the six turrets; now, however, the wing turrets were just single mounts.

Whilst the design for the large cruisers was progressing the jump was being made in battleship construction to an ‘all big-gun’ type. On 18 March 1905 the battleship project C was approved by the Kaiser, with an armament of eight 28cm guns mounted in two twin and four single turrets. After this project an intermediate calibre armament was never again considered in Germany and the decision was made to construct an ‘all big-gun’ capital ship.

In April 1905 the Kaiser returned from a visit to Italy, during which he had been a guest aboard the Italian flagship, the battleship Sardegna. The commander of Sardegna assured the monarch that the new class of Italian battleships (Regina Elena) could run at 22kts and this thoroughly impressed Wilhelm II. It rekindled his desire for a uniform type of fast battleship and none of the designs submitted for a large cruiser on 18 March could compete with this type of ship. The state secretary tried to talk the Kaiser out of this concept but nevertheless on 13 May he was instructed to prepare a design study for a fast battleship. State Secretary Tirpitz was fundamentally opposed to the large cruisers having the capability to fight in the battle line because of the financial, political and technical consequences. A cruiser with such capabilities would lead more towards a standard type. However, his General Navy Department found this line capability acceptable, with the cruisers as a ‘gap-filler’. During that summer of 1905 rumours began circulating about an increase in the size of British battleships. Therefore on 19 August von Tirpitz asked the central department, or (M), of the RMA if the battleship displacement should be increased to 16,000 tonnes, with which Kapitän zur See Scheer was in absolute agreement, and that restrictions such as the size of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal should not enter into the question. However, although the state secretary wanted an increase in battleship, and to a lesser extent cruiser, displacements he also wanted them to remain less than contemporary British and French designs as he did not wish to appear to be the driver of the standard.

With an increase in displacement, twelve 21cm guns and thicker armour could be incorporated into the large cruiser design and a speed of 23½kts could be maintained. These improvements were manifested in designs E9 to E11 from September 1905. Experience from the Russo-Japanese War had shown the susceptibility of large warships to mines and torpedoes, and in view of this the design E11 had an armoured torpedo bulkhead of at least 30mm thickness and increased cell divisions. This led to a displacement of 15,000 tonnes; however, with a cost of 26.2 million marks, E11 still fitted within the financial budget of 27.5 million marks. At an RMA conference on 22 September 1905 the uncertainty regarding the type question was finally brought to an end. The battleship project was to be a ship of 18,000 tonnes with twelve 28cm guns in six double turrets and the design E11 was to form the basis of the cruiser design. Less than a week later Baurat (construction officer, sometimes translated as naval architect) Bürkner submitted further improvements for E11 and the resulting project, E15, was approved by the Kaiser on 4 October, with further improvements to be left to the construction department.

It should not be forgotten that the Panzerkreuzers Fürst Bismarck and Prinz Heinrich had mounted 24cm guns and at the conference of 4 October State Secretary von Tirpitz elaborated on oral instructions given to (K) on 27 September to make a parallel study for an E15 design with 24cm guns. This resulted in design studies E17 to E23, each mounting six to eight 24cm L/45 quick-firing guns arranged in various turret configurations. E21 and E23 had the 15cm secondary armament also mounted in turrets. The speed remained at 23½kts for each design and the displacements grew to 15,900 tonnes. It is uncertain why the designs with 24cm guns were rejected, but it was probably on the grounds of their greater cost, up to 28.83 million marks.

On 7 May 1906 the chief of the construction department, Vizeadmiral von Eickstedt, submitted a revised-design E15, project 16B. The design carried several improvements, including an increased length, allowing a speed of 24kts; an increased beam, allowing greater space between the hull side and the torpedo bulkhead; and a greater length armoured belt. However, the installation of turbine propulsion was rejected because redesign work for this would take approximately three months. At a meeting on 22 May for the final decisions on cruiser E (the design for Blücher) the construction department finally had the freedom to determine the exterior appearance of the ship. Therewith the number of funnels was reduced to two. On 21 June the Kaiser signed the building order for the Großer Kreuzer 1906/E.

Just nine days after the meeting for final decisions about cruiser E, on 31 May 1906 the naval attaché in London reported that the new British battlecruiser Invincible would mount a main armament of 12in guns. This news came at the worst conceivable moment for the Imperial Navy. The jump to the ‘all big-gun’ battleship had meant an enormous cost increase and State Secretary von Tirpitz was still endeavouring to incorporate this cost increase into the estimates. Now it appeared likely that this process would be repeated for the cruisers. Only a few days previously, on 26 May, the Reichstag had approved the naval estimates for 1906, and this only contained the means for a 15,500-tonne cruiser. The cruiser E had reached the limit of its budget. Then on 12 July the attaché confirmed the news and the RMA was forced to consider the future of cruiser E. An increase in gun calibre to 24cm had already been studied in designs E17 to E23, and had been found to be outside the budget for E. Likewise the armour would have to be improved to resist 12in shells. The only alternative appeared to be constructing cruiser E as it had been designed. In any case the building materials and armament had already been ordered and assembled, and on 21 February 1907 the keel of E, the later Blücher, was laid in the imperial dockyard at Kiel. The next Großer Kreuzer, F, would have to be designed and built in response to the newly evolved British ‘battlecruisers’.

The final design of Panzerkreuzer E, Blücher

The funnels, superstructure...

Chapter 1

THE LARGE CRUISER OF 1907

‘F’

VON DER TANN

Design

On 17 May 1906, two weeks before the first report from the London naval attaché about the British Invincible, the Kaiser launched a competition between the German shipyards for a ‘fast battleship’ type. This new type crystallised the Kaiser’s ideas regarding the new direction in warship construction, that these ships should form a division for special purposes, and also serve as reconnaissance cruisers. Therefore, compared to foreign contemporary battleships, they should have a speed advantage of 3kts and should mount at least four 28cm guns so they could fight in the line. The new battleships of the Ersatz Bayern/Nassau class should form the basis of the new type.

State Secretary von Tirpitz was against this competition because he feared the possible political and financial consequences of a new conceptual type, and the development of a new type would place great burdens on the already overworked staff in the imperial dockyards at Kiel, Wilhelmshaven and Danzig. Likewise, the General Navy Department, or (A), and the construction department, or (K), were fully employed in work for the battleships of the Ersatz Bayern class and preparations for the new cruiser of 1907. Nevertheless, the competition showed a remarkable farsightedness by the Kaiser and he was clearly ahead of his time in regard to type development.

A memorandum from the General Navy Department to the state secretary on 29/30 June 1906 on the ‘Großen Kreuzer 1907 and following years’ gave the opinion that the Imperial Navy was only forced to build such a type because of their numerical inferiority to the British in large cruisers, and it was anticipated that the British would also have a greater building capacity. With the attaché’s report that Invincible would mount eight 12in guns, and taking account of the Japanese Tsukuba, the General Navy Department considered that ‘we must build our Großen Kreuzer as fast battleships’. The General Navy Department foresaw that for years the large cruiser of the Imperial Navy had no possibility of ‘strategic reconnaissance and escort on a large scale’, or ‘independent cruiser warfare (and) merchant protection’, and this would conflict with the operational objectives of the ships. The principal purpose for the ships, for now, was purely participation in decisive battles as a fast wing. This task required the displacement of a contemporary battleship and an armament that must be effective against battleships, as a confrontation between the two types was inevitable; the General Navy Department was convinced about this. Therefore there was a fundamental disagreement between the General Navy Department and the state secretary in the question of operational employment. Admiral von Tirpitz saw the opponents of the large cruisers only as other cruisers. The General Navy Department had also shown remarkable insight, which was proved correct in every way. The final specific proposal from the General Navy Department for the cruiser project was for: ‘6-8x28cm SK¹ L/45 in double turrets or 2 double and 4 single turrets; 8x15cm SK L/45 in either casemate positions or 4 twin turrets; 20x8.8cm SK L/35 or 45; 4x8mm machine guns; 4 torpedo tubes; Armouring: (forward) conning tower 400 or at least 300mm, aft 200mm. In the remaining, approximately 10-20% weaker than the battleship (for Ersatz Bayern); construction coal provisions = 6% of the displacement; speed approximately 23 kts.’

In July 1906 a member of the information bureau, or (N), of the RMA, Korvettenkapitän Vollerthun, wrote an article in that month’s issue of the magazine Marine-Rundschau titled ‘The Panzerkreuzer as a Fleet Type’. This article was seen as a kind of response by the RMA to the Kaiser’s prize competition. In the article Vollerthun firstly presented a brief description of the historical development of the armoured cruiser type, before saying of the newest cruiser-building: ‘The modern English armoured cruiser is a cruiser of high combat value, but it does not possess the values required to resist a contemporary battleship in combat in a decisive battle.’ He went on to say that the cruiser type had not made the jump necessary to indicate transition to a common type, which had been discussed in trade papers and in parliaments. Paradoxically, he said it was an illusion to believe one could combine strength and speed in a common type, a deception that would be to the detriment of the type construction. ‘The impossibility to do so therefore requires a clear distinction between the duties of the battleship and the armoured cruiser, and limiting what one expects of the latter tactically. Never should the armoured cruiser be considered as a legitimate link in the line, and therefore should never be allowed to want to fight with the line.’ In conclusion, Vollerthun stated that the cruiser type was incapable of developing its combat power, and the battleship of increasing its speed, to a point where a common type could emerge. If we accept that the article was written on a semi-official basis, then we are forced to the conclusion that either the information bureau was firmly in the Tirpitz camp, or else the bureau was practising disinformation, aimed at convincing the British they were going down the correct path in their cruiser and battlecruiser development. The views expressed in the article were at odds with opinion in the General Navy Department and their views on the ‘fast battleship’ concept; however, Korvettenkapitän Vollerthun would soon join their number.

During the summer of 1906, as the reports about Invincible were received from the London naval attaché, Admiral von Tirpitz was coming to the realisation that something had to be done. On 18 July, from his holiday home at St Blasien, he wrote to his deputy in Berlin, von Trotha, that: ‘It has recently come to my knowledge that the English have increased the type size and calibre, which will make it necessary for us to proceed with a further type increase in the budget of 1907.’ He also instructed departments (A) and (K) to prepare designs for the battleship and large cruiser as soon as possible. The battleship was to have twelve 30.5cm guns, whilst the cruiser should have eight 30.5cm pieces. The cruiser, when compared to cruiser E/Blücher, represented a huge increase in combat capabilities. The choice of 30.5cm guns for the battleship was obvious, whilst the cruiser maintained parity with the reported armament of Invincible, and for that matter Tsukuba. With this proposal von Tirpitz was making a compromise between financial considerations, public opinion and military requirements. Nevertheless, the cruiser project was soon abandoned, on financial grounds, whilst the battleship project came to fruition a year later.

Shortly after, on 4 September, the state secretary sent a request to (A), (K) and the weapons department, or (W), of the RMA, stating the following:

I request the accelerated working through of this project for a Großen Kreuzer to the following criteria:

a. Heavy artillery 8–28cm (4 in double – 4 in single [turrets])

b. Medium artillery 8 to 10–15cm.

c. Light artillery as in the Großen Kreuzer E.

d. The displacement should not exceed that of the battleship Ersatz Bayern.²

2. Nassau.

e. The price should be below that of Ersatz Bayern.

f. Speed is approximately as that of Großen Kreuzer

E.

g. Compared to Großen Kreuzer E the armour should be strengthened with all means.

h. If possible turbines.

I expect the presentation of the result with project sketches by mid September.

With this Tirpitz had committed to the conceptual proposal of (A) and its inevitable consequences, such as greater cost and defensive qualities, as the new cruiser would have to resist 12in gunfire. Without doubt the large cruiser was moving towards the battleship type in displacement, cost and offensive and defensive capabilities.

The protocol of the next meeting, on 15 September 1906, reveals some interesting information, as well as the presentation by (K) of their newest design studies. In his introduction State Secretary von Tirpitz noted that until recently he had been against trying to catch up with the English (that is, the British) in the budget year of 1906 because of financial reasons, but that this was no longer the case. He said that if the size of Invincible had been known, then Germany should have had the same. The decision to follow the English must now be taken. Then the chief of the construction department, Vizeadmiral von Eickstedt, spoke out in favour of maintaining the Blücher type for the new build of 1907, listing the following reasons:

1. The results of the explosive trials were pending, and if they called for a redesign and enlargement then two increases would quickly follow one another. This would cause further delay.

2. The turbine question was unresolved.

Admiral von Tirpitz stressed that political considerations must be taken into account, and these spoke for an immediate increase in displacement. He added that there was currently much goodwill towards naval requirements. In view of this Kontreadmiral von Heeringen was for an immediate displacement increase.

A gun calibre of 28cm was recommended, as this was suitable for fighting against the enemy battle line. However, von Tirpitz saw the opponents of the large cruisers as other cruisers and therefore thought the calibre question was debatable. Then he continued that one of the grounds for a displacement increase was a calibre increase, and on this basis he granted the 28cm gun.

After some further discussion about the underwater protection the state secretary announced he had decided for an increase in the large cruiser type. With that the construction department presented their design studies 1, 2, 3, 4 and 4b. Studies 3, 4 and 4b were rejected because of the positioning of their 15cm medium-calibre battery, with the eight 15cm guns arranged in four twin turrets. Therefore only projects I and II were considered. Their main points were as follows:

Project I: 23 (23½) kts, 19,500 tonnes, eight 28cm SK (four in two double turrets fore and aft and four in single turrets on the sides).

Project II: 23½ (24) kts, 19,350 tonnes, eight 28cm SK in double turrets, including on both sides.

Of these, project I had the advantage of better positioning of the heavy artillery, project II the advantage of higher speed. Vizeadmiral von Eickstedt suggested positioning only six 28cm SK in three double turrets, just as with the old Brandenburg-class battleships. Thereby 800 tonnes in weight could be saved. The state secretary acknowledged that this had certain military advantages, but for political reasons the eight guns of Invincible should be met with an eight-gun ship. On the same grounds a suggestion from (W) for 24cm guns went no further. Kontreadmiral von Heeringen suggested the two single turrets per side of design 1 should be brought together as a double turret.

Finally State Secretary von Tirpitz announced a decision:

1. A temporary project with the gun positioning as proposed by (A) (von Heeringen).

2. Displacement and cost of this new project will not exceed the data specified in project I. The speed should total 23½ (24) kts (project II) by a corresponding reduction in armour.

(A) and (W) are invited to support the working through of the project of (K) so that it could be finished in the shortest possible time.

The projected cost for design F1 was about 35.1 million marks, whilst the other projects varied between 35.65 and 35.4 million marks. None exceeded the cost of Nassau at 36.5 million marks, but the effect of inflation was not taken into account. With design F2 the four single turrets were replaced by two double turrets adjacent to one another and this reduced the cost by approximately half a million marks.

Two days after the meeting the new design F5 appeared. The construction department reported that the design could not be brought below 19,000 tonnes and the estimated cost was 35.3 million marks. Because of the extremely short preparation time many details of the design were reserved, such as number of funnels, training arcs of the turrets and final interior arrangements regarding boilers, machinery and magazines. Towing tests were incomplete, as were estimates for stability. Design F5 had three double turrets on the centreline, arranged as the battleship Brandenburg, and two single 28cm turrets in the forward wing positions. Baurat Bürkner took the design to the state secretary on 24 September, and Tirpitz took the opportunity to order a modified design F2 and F5/5a to be available on 26 September.

On 28 September Tirpitz took the three latest designs of 1a, F2a and F5/5a to the Kaiser and he gave his approval to project 2a, which was the cheapest alternative. This also met with the approval of the front-line navy because of the resemblance to the fast battleship perception.

So far the development of the first German ‘battle-cruiser’, the large cruiser F, had occurred in a remarkably short space of time. Not even a month had passed since the state secretary had first instructed the construction department to implement a design utilising 28cm guns and the latest design variants had been created within a week. The state secretary was showing a real sense of urgency and this was confirmed in his letter dated 2 October 1906, in which he wrote: ‘I urge the participating drafting groups to support (K), so that the completion of the project suffers no delay, and allows the building task to begin with the new budget.’

Großer Kreuzer with 28cm Armament (September 1906)

Design 1

Großer Kreuzer with 28cm Armament (September 1906)

Design 2

On 14 October a report arrived that the Invincible class mounted their eight 12in guns en échelon, so that an eight-gun broadside was possible; however, the Germans did not know that this was over a very limited arc. The state secretary had directed (K) not to work on such a project, especially as at the 19 September conference such an arrangement proposed by the weapons department had been rejected as ‘impracticable on construction grounds’. The construction department replied the following day that such a design, 2b, had been considered just a week before.

The next meeting to consider the design alternatives occurred on 7 November 1906. Vizeadmiral von Eickstedt reported that three designs now came into the question: Project 2a, as approved by the Kaiser with eight 28cm guns in double turrets, with the wing turrets arranged in parallel; design 2b, with the midship turrets arranged diagonally; and design 5, with three double turrets on the centreline and two single turrets on the wings. The increase in weight of two single turrets was 240 tonnes compared to 2a and 2b.

Großer Kreuzer with 28cm Armament (September 1906)

Design 4

Großer Kreuzer with 28cm Armament (September 1906)

Design 5

Original sketch of...

Original sketch of three projects presented to conference on 7 November 1906.

Meanwhile (K) had determined from towing tests that projects 2a and 2b could obtain a half a knot increase in speed simply by altering the hull form. The General Navy Department preferred project 5, saying that the turret model arranged near the ship’s side, the 06 model turret, was limited to two shots per minute, whereas the centreline turrets of project 5 could fire three shots per minute, because of the better shell-hoist arrangements. It was also doubtful if 2b could fire its guns athwartships without damaging boats and other equipment. Thereon the state secretary imparted that the displacement increase required to give project 5 the same speed as 2b was not desired, and that the latter was more in character as a cruiser. Vizeadmiral von Eickstedt declared he was not opposed to 2b and the state secretary also declared himself for 2b, because ‘it highlighted the character of the ship as a cruiser’. Therefore design 2b was made the basis for further design work.

A further memorandum of 7 November from the construction department outlined some further developments. The most important was the mention of turbine propulsion for the first time. The bow armour was increased in its extent, and after towing tests the length and beam were altered. The new version was named 2b1, which was sent for the Kaiser’s approval together with 2b.

On 31 January 1907 (K) produced a document detailing the design features of design 2b1. Accurate dimensions would come after the conclusion of towing tests, whilst the displacement had climbed to 19,200 tonnes. Turbines of the Parsons type were to be fitted with four shafts for 36,000 shaft horsepower (shp) for the six-hour forced trip, and 40,000shp for the measured mile. The centreline turrets were to have a revolving shaft, whilst the wing turrets would have a fixed shaft, just as the wing turrets of Ersatz Sachsen. There were four below-water torpedo tubes. Bunker capacity would be 3,000 tonnes.

Further improvements followed on 16 February 1907. The torpedo bulkhead was moved inboard in the area of the boiler rooms. The wing turrets were likewise moved inboard about 2m, allowing them to have rotating elevators connected to the gun mountings, therefore allowing a higher rate of fire. The new C/07 turret had a co-rotating working chamber and munitions elevator, and had only been planned for the centreline turrets previously. With the inclusion of the new turret, one of the objections raised by (A) against design 2b was resolved. The citadel was increased in length and the munitions provisions were increased. The improved project was termed 2c1.

On 22 June 1907 Kaiser Wilhelm II signed the building order for cruiser F aboard the small cruiser München and tenders could be invited. A series of tests for lattice masts remained reserved. Nevertheless, before the contract was signed on 26 September the construction department detailed further improvements in a memorandum of 17 September. Savings in weight now allowed the armoured belt to be a uniform 250mm and likewise the casemate armour was increased to 150mm. The torpedo bulkhead would extend to the height of the upper platform deck and the sloping armour (Böschung) was increased to 25mm thickness.

Meanwhile on 27 March 1907 the winner of the fast battleship competition was announced. The winner was given the working title ‘Polemos’, and was the product of the A.G. Weser dockyard, Bremen. The winning entry showed remarkable similarities to the final design of cruiser F. ‘Polemos’ displaced 19,100 tonnes, whilst design 2c1 displaced 19,200 tonnes. The weight distributions for armour, armament, machinery and hull were almost identical percentages. The armaments were the same, but ‘Polemos’ had the same arrangement as F2. The belt armour of the A.G. Weser ship was 270mm, compared to 250mm for project F2c, whilst both had 200mm citadel armour. The major difference was that ‘Polemos’ had reciprocating engines whereas F2c had turbines, but nevertheless both ships were designed for around 24½kts. Naturally the Kaiser was delighted with the result.

Since the original memorandum of the General Navy Department about the Große Kreuzer of 1907, the state secretary had gradually brought his own views into line with those of the department. Whilst it would be an oversimplification to say that von der Tann was a faster version of the Ersatz Bayern/Nassau class, with the weight saved from the two deleted turrets put into machinery to achieve a greater speed, it can be seen that the broadside of von der Tann equalled that of the battleship, albeit without the ‘lee reserve’. The armour of the cruiser was just 20mm thinner than the 270mm belt of the first battleship of this class, whilst the speed met the criteria for cruisers, being about four knots faster. The cruiser of 1907, F –von der Tann, was a striking design and an excellent combat vessel.

Construction

On 26 September 1907 the contract to construct cruiser F, the future von der Tann, was signed with the Blohm & Voss Dockyard, Hamburg. Previously Blohm & Voss had constructed the battleship Kaiser Karl der Grosse in 1898, and more recently the large cruisers Friedrich Carl, Yorck and Scharnhorst.

Hull

The von der Tann was constructed of Siemens–Martin mild steel and the watertight double bottom extended from frames 16 to 123, or 75 per cent of the length. On German ships the frames were numbered beginning from the stern. The ship was constructed of transverse and longitudinal frames and was divided into fifteen watertight compartments. The ship had the following decks: the Stauung or hold, the lower platform deck, the upper platform deck, the Zwischendeck or ’tween deck, the armoured deck, the battery deck, the upper deck and the superstructure deck. The decks were steel plated and covered with linoleum, with the exception of the exposed part of the battery deck, the upper deck and the superstructure deck, which were covered with teak wooden planking with a thickness of 60mm. The deck under the anchor chains was covered with a 60mm-thick planking of Moaholz, or Australian teak, a tough species of eucalyptus. The ship had two docking keels under the torpedo bulkhead from frames 45 to 73. The masts were made from steel with wooden signal yards and likewise wooden wireless yards.

Armour

With German ships the vertical side armour was divided into three distinct categories; the main belt was referred to as the belt, the upper belt was referred to as the citadel, and the uppermost part was referred to as casemate armour. Nevertheless, with von der Tann the demarcation between the belt and citadel was not as evident as with other ships of the Imperial Navy. The armouring of German ships of this period was very extensive and also very thick, when compared to contemporary navies. The belt was formed of hardened nickel steel, sometimes referred to as Krupp armour, and extended from frame -2½ to the stem. The belt at the stern, from frame -2½ to frame 16, was 100mm in thickness, tapering to 80mm at its upper edge. From frames 16 to 105 the thickness was 250mm, tapering to 150mm at the lower edge. From frame 105 to the stem the thickness was 120mm, reducing to 100mm, whilst it tapered to 80mm at the upper edge. The armour was mounted on a backing of 50mm-thick teak. The citadel armour, running from frames 16 to 105 was 200mm thick, but in the area of the wing turret barbettes, frames 46 to 51 to port, and frames 66 to 73 to starboard, this thickness was increased to 225mm. The casemate armour was 150mm thick. The aft transverse bulkhead, at frame -2½, was 100mm thick, the transverse bulkhead at frame 16 was 170mm, and the forward transverse bulkhead, frame 105, was 200mm thick at its thickest, reducing to 170mm outboard.

The armoured deck ran from stem to stern and in the area of the citadel was 875mm above the construction water line (CWL). Aft, from frame -2½ to frame 16 it ran 300mm below the CWL and aft of there sloped downwards to just above the aft torpedo tube. Forward, from frame 107 to the stem, the armoured deck was approximately 1.6m below the CWL, and from frame 107 to frame 105 was sloping. The armoured deck was enclosed by the armoured transverse bulkheads at frame 16 and 105. The thickness of the armoured deck varied: the horizontal part inside the citadel was 25mm thick. The horizontal parts outside the citadel were as follows: from the stern post to frame -2½ was 50mm; from frame -2½ to frame 16 was 80mm; and from frame 105 to the stem was 50mm thick. The Böschung, the sloping horizontal armour, was 50mm thick. The battery deck above the citadel (outside the casemates) was 25mm thick, whilst likewise the upper deck above the casemates was 25mm thick. There were armoured gratings in the funnels, light shafts and ventilation shafts.

Original diagram of...

Original diagram of armour of von der Tann.

Comparison of armour...

Comparison of armour thicknesses of von der Tann, Nassau and Indefatigable.

The casemate armour formed a continuation of the citadel armour up to the upper deck. Two splinter bulkheads ran from frame 41 to 81 on both sides and were 15mm thick. The casemate transverse bulkheads were 20mm thick.

The gun turrets also had nickel steel armour. The turret faces were 230mm thick, the turret sides and backs 180mm. The sloping roof was 90mm thick, and the horizontal roof was 60mm thick. The floor was 100mm. The forward turret barbette had 230mm armour at the front, 200mm on the sides and 170mm at the rear. The aft centre-line turret had 200mm-thick armour aft and to the sides, and was 170mm thick on its forward face. The barbettes of the wing turrets had 200mm armour. The lower barbettes of the centreline turrets, where they were protected by the citadel and belt armour, were reduced in thickness to 30mm, whilst with the wing turrets this armour was 40mm and 80mm thick.

The casemate guns had shields of 80mm thickness, with the top 30mm. The 8.8cm guns on the forward and aft superstructures had 50mm-thick shields, whilst the stern and bow 8.8cm guns had no shields.

The forward conning tower had armour on the front and sides 250mm thick, and the rear was 220mm. The armoured door was 100mm thick and the roof was 80mm thick. The armoured shaft to below, housing all the command elements, was 200mm thick on the front and sides and 150mm aft, down to the battery deck, and then was 120mm thick. The aft conning tower had 200mm armour with a door likewise 100mm thick. The floor and roof were both 50mm. The armoured shaft to below was 150mm thick.

One great advantage that the Panzerkreuzer, and also other German capital ships, had over foreign contemporaries was the design and inclusion of an armoured torpedo bulkhead. This bulkhead stretched from frame 16 aft to the forward armoured transverse bulkhead at frame 105 and had a thickness of 25mm. It was set back a distance of 4m from the outer hull skin. The intervening space was divided into two by a longitudinal wing passage bulkhead, and the inboard space was used to store coal, adding to the protective value.

Armament

The main armament of von der Tann consisted of eight 28cm L/45 SK (quick-firing) guns. These were mounted in Drh L (Drehscheiben-Lafette or ‘turntable gun carriage’) C/1907 dual turrets.