Battleships of the Scharnhorst Class: The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau: The Backbone of the German Surface Forces at the Outbreak of War

By Gerhard Koop and Klaus-Peter Schmolke

In this WWII naval history, an expert in German warship design examines the legendary battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

This concise yet authoritative summary of Scharnhorst class vessels covers the design history and careers of these WWII-era warships. Much like its companion volume, Battleships of the Bismark Class, it offers a detailed description of both ships with full technical details. The author also provides an outline of their combat service, heavily illustrated with plans, battle maps, and a substantial collection of photographs.

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were the product of a long and complicated design process. Combining speed and power, these two battleships took part in a number of major operations, including the infamous ‘Channel Dash’.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jul 22, 2014
• ISBN: 9781473849341

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Development and Construction

From inception the design, planning and building of the Scharnhorst class battleships were subject to a number of limitations. First and foremost among these were the provisions and restrictions of the Versailles Treaty as it related to Germany. This agreement permitted the building of new ships up to a displacement of 10,000 tonnes, but only to replace existing ships and no more than six (plus two in reserve). The same restriction also applied to smaller warships. U-boats and aircraft were completely forbidden. Even manpower levels were precisely laid down. The mass scuttling of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow on 21 June 1919 was punished by the surrender of further parts of the Fleet to the victorious powers. This left the Reichsmarine with only the remnants of what had once been: a fleet reduced to six obsolete pre-dreadnought battleships (plus two in reserve), six dilapidated light cruisers (plus two in reserve) and a number of old torpedo-boats amounted to no more than a coastal force of questionable strength.

It was only natural that Germany’s new naval leaders should wish to have this situation improved at the earliest opportunity, and in the early 1920s the first thoughts were given to replacing the pre-dreadnoughts and old cruisers with new construction. However, proposals were not so easily put into practice. The Weimar Republic was politically unstable and its continual changes of government—between the end of 1918 and 30 January 1933 there were twenty Cabinets with twelve different Reich Chancellors—allowed for little continuity of purpose. Germany was in desperate straits financially, for the reparations to the victorious Powers had virtually ruined the economy of the Reich. Then came hyperinflation. Not until the late 1920s, when the position began to stabilise, did the government begin to look kindly upon the requirements of the Navy.

The first new replacement for a pre-dreadnought was armoured cruiser ‘A’, launched as Deutschland. This revolutionary type of ship was a hybrid within the specifications of the 1922 Washington Agreement because Deutschland was a capital ship in terms of the calibre of her main armament but a Type A cruiser according to her relatively light displacement.¹ Five ships of the armoured cruiser type were planned. Whereas the German Navy adhered strictly to the permitted displacement of 10,000 tonnes for Deutschland, the later sister ships Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee were heavier. As is now known, this was because of an increase in armour and thus the purpose was exclusively to improve their defensive capabilities.

The preliminary designs for the capital ships were dated 1928. By then the Navy—with the knowledge, connivance and approval of the Reich Government—had made its case for a increase in size to 17,500 tons standard displacement, 19,192 tons ‘construction displacement’ and 21,000 tons ‘battle displacement’. The ships’ dimensions would be 206 × 25 × 7.8m (676 × 82 × 25ft approx.) and their armament 30.5cm (12in), 15cm (5.9in) and 8.8cm (3.5in) guns.

In 1930 the Reich Government agreed to the introduction of the so-called ‘Ship Replacement Building Plan’, due to complete in 1938, and from this there emerged in 1933 the ‘Rebuilding Plan’, which embodied the policy of having in commission six pre-dreadnoughts or armoured cruisers, one aircraft carrier, six cruisers, six destroyer or torpedo-boat half-flotillas, three minesweeping half-flotillas, three E-boat half-flotillas, three U-boat half-flotillas, one sail training ship and one minelaying group. In addition, the creation of a naval air arm was predicted, consisting of nine small squadrons and more besides. This plan came into effect in November 1932 under the overall control of the Reich Defence Minister von Schleicher and in response to the doomed Geneva Disarmament Conference, from which Germany took her leave on 14 October 1933.

France, from time immemorial Germany’s principal potential enemy, reacted promptly to the appearance of Deutschland and the proposed construction of her two sisters by placing orders for two larger battleships, Dunkerque and Strasbourg. These displaced 26,000 tons, were armed with 33cm (12in) guns in quadruple turrets and could make 30kt. Dunkerque was launched on 2 October 1935 and Strasbourg on 12 December 1936. Other naval powers had undoubtedly noted what was going on in German shipyards but looked on with less alarm. The building of the two French battleships had been closely watched by the Germans and prompted a review of their naval planning.

On 30 January 1933 Reich President Hindenburg entrusted Hitler with the formation of a new government, and with the support of his large party organisation the latter soon succeeded in eliminating opposition, so clearing the way for his objectives. Although initially hesitant, by March 1935 Hitler had declared Germany’s sovereignty in defence matters and stepped up rearmament. It is fairly certain that the foundations for this were laid in April 1934 during Deutschland’s Norwegian cruise, when Hitler was aboard her in the company of the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Raeder, Reich War Minister Generaloberst von Blomberg, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General von Fritsch.

The building contracts approved for the two armoured ships ‘D’ and ‘E’ had meanwhile been placed. As a response to the French Dunkerque class they were larger than their three forerunners (of which only Deutschland was as yet in commission), displacing some 20 ,000 tonnes with dimensions of 230 × 25.5 8.5m (approximately 754 × 84 × 28ft). Emphasis had been laid on an improved protection scheme, with belt armour of 220mm, citadel 50mm, upper deck 80mm and the control tower 300mm. The main armament had been set at 28cm (11in). Some thought had been given to having eight rather than six main barrels, arranged in two quadruple turrets as aboard the French ships, but this would have required a completely new design. The traditional 15cm calibre was retained for the medium guns, together with 10.5cm, 3.7cm and 2cm flak. The installation of torpedo tubes was envisaged.

Lengthy discussions were subsequently held concerning the desirability of matching the 33cm main armament of the French ships. Consideration was given to 33cm, 35cm and 38cm guns, but, as had been the case with the quadruple turret idea, a completely new design would have been required in order to carry them. Furthermore, Hitler would not have given his approval, since for some time he had been making overtures to Great Britain. It is reasonably certain that Hitler—at least at that time—was anxious for a reconciliation with the world’s leading naval power, and opting for a calibre greater than 28cm would have jeopardised the negotiations. The two keels ‘D’ and ‘E’ were scrapped on the stocks in the summer of 1934 and the naval architects started work on new plans based on the principles of the former design. The following year the keels of the two battleships ‘D’ and ‘E’, to be named Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, were laid again.¹

The size of these two ships was now officially 26,000 tonnes and the armament had been increased from six to nine 28cm barrels disposed in three triple turrets. Thicker armour afforded resistance to 33cm shells, and an effort was made to provide the best possible protection against bombs and torpedoes. Owing to a shortage of space amidships only single-barrel 15cm gunhouses were sited there, although elsewhere the medium-calibre armament was paired in twin turrets.

Difficulties existed in the choice of main plant, and the controversy gave rise to lively discussions between the architects and the naval engineers’ branch. Once the various departments concerned in naval shipbuilding were brought together under a single controlling authority, steam turbine drive was decreed. This did not resolve the argument, but any further delay was unjustifiable. That the final decision favoured the steam turbine was due principally to the fact that the equivalent diesel plant was not available because the remaining problems had not been addressed at the proper time. Furthermore, a euphoric atmosphere surrounded the newly introduced high-pressure hot steam plant being used by merchant vessels and in shore installations, and many believed it to be the last word in marine drive.

All types of marine engines have their pros and cons. The diesel motor is instantly ready to provide drive, that is, it can be put at once to maximum output from zero: all that is required is the push of a button. With steam drive, much more time is required. A steam plant has to work up to maximum output because time is needed before the boilers can supply the steam requirement. From cold—that is, when all boilers are shut down and no turbines are pre-heated—the process takes about two hours. The diesel is more economical with fuel. For this reason the armoured cruisers Admiral Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer could operate against enemy shipping as far afield as the Indian Ocean while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau—with steam drive—were confined to the North Atlantic. As regards floor space, the steam plant is more advantageous. The high output required of the diesel system demands several motors which take up a large floor area whereas the turbines of the high-pressure/hot steam installation require less space. Aboard Scharnhorst and Gneisenau the boilers, linked to economisers, were larger and stood higher.

Another reason behind the decision to install steam drive had been the Ship Testing Committee’s criticism of the construction method of the diesel installation in the Deutschland class vessels. This was only partially justified, as lightness of the unit had been a basic contractual specification laid down by the Navy. In order to comply with the condition, the foundations were built lightly and, as was discovered later, weakly. But this was mainly an architectural flaw. Subsequently Deutschland had to ship extra ballast to increase her stability, and if some of this extra weight had been allowed to the diesel manufacturer the problem with the foundations would not have arisen.

From a political perspective the building of battleships ‘D’ and ‘E’ was a clear breach of the Versailles Treaty, as was the declaration of military sovereignty on 16 March 1935. The tonnage of the armoured cruisers ‘B’ and ‘C (Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee) also amounted to an infringement of the Treaty. The decision to build the latter pair was approved by the pre-Hitler Reich Government and the Reichstag, and the culpability for the decision lies with these institutions. The building of the much larger Scharnhorst class was sanctioned retroactively by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935.

It was planned to refit both ships with 38cm (15in) guns, but subsequent events precluded this.

Taken as a whole, the two units of the Scharnhorst class represented a compromise in which political considerations had played the major role. From a purely military/technical point of view, the design had not been thought through with due maturity.

Scharnhorst class: Technical Specifications

GENERAL DETAILS

(Information per Witte; minor variations per Gröner, Evers, Hadeler and Anglo-American sources)

WEIGHT GROUPING

Note: Individual construction groups have an identification letter used initially for calculation purposes in the design stages but ultimately retained throughout the period of the ship’s useful life.

S = Weight of compartmented hull, comprising S I (building materials, e.g. steel ST 52, excluding waterline armour), S II (metal workers), S III (carpenters) and S IV (painters); A (armament and armour with equipment); T (torpedoes with equipment); F (aircraft installation with equipment); Spr (mines with equipment); I (general equipment); Ta (masts and spars); N (nautical gear)

MI = main machinery and connections, condensers, gears, couplings, shaft connections, propellers, auxiliary machinery, conduits and piping used in connection with the operation of the main machinery, exhaust/funnel cap, equipment etc., boilers with armatures, oil and water in the main engine plant

MII = auxiliary boiler plant, ship’s heating system, washing and drinking water desalination plant, laundry, ablutions, kitchen gear etc., ship’s pumps, primary electrical plant, lighting, cables, steering assembly, capstans, boats’ windlasses, room fans, weapon systems, refrigerating plant, searchlights, signalling lamps, command elements, gyro compass, mileage logs, sirens and workshops.

Gneisenau after conversion, 1940

Gneisenau: proposed conversion , 1942

WEIGHT GROUPING BY PROPORTION (TONNES): SCHARNHORST

PLANNED CONVERSION OF GNEISENAU (AS OF 1942)

ARMOUR

The armour plate was principally KC (Krupp Cemented, containing 34% carbon, 3.78% nickel, 0.31% manganese and 2.06% chrome) steel, classified Ww (= Wotan soft) or Wh (= Wotan hard). Wh had an ultimate tensile strength of 85-95 kg/mm²,20% expansion and a yield point of 50-55 kg/mm². Ww had an ultimate tensile strength of 65-70 kg/mm², 25% expansion and a yield point of 38–40 kg/mm².

Arrangement and distribution of armour

ARMOUR STRENGTHS, WEIGHTS AND DISTRIBUTION (TONNES)

WEAPONS

Note: In German naval practice the main turrets are identified alphabetically, i.e. ‘A’ (‘Anton)’, ‘B’ (‘Bruno’), ‘C (‘Caesar’) etc., from forward to aft.