WHY THE FRENCH AIR FORCE FAILED IN 1940

THE GERMAN ATTACK ON FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS IN MAY 1940 HAS GONE DOWN AS THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF BLITZKRIEG (LIGHTNING WAR).

The ignominious collapse of the French army in June occurred despite the fact that it possessed more tanks and better anti-tank guns than the Wehrmacht. Where the French were weak was in combat aircraft, though the deficiency in numbers was perhaps less significant than sometimes claimed. Yet many histories cite the poor performance of the French air force, the Armée de l’air, as a major reason for France’s defeat. Was it as bad as we’ve been led to believe?

For their western campaign the Germans had available about 1,000 Messerschmitt Me-109E single-engine and 250 Me-110C twin-engine fighters, compared to a total of fewer than 800 modern French, British, Belgian and Dutch single-engine and 120 Dutch and (mainly) French twin-engine fighters. During the first few days, in the expectation of a very rapid conquest of the Netherlands, the Luftwaffe concentrated 180 Me-109Es and 62 Me-110Cs against 29 Fokker D.XXIs and 23 Fokker G.Is of the Dutch army aviation brigade. With reinforcements of British Hawker Hurricanes arriving within hours of the opening of the German offensive and the Me-110 proving less effective than expected, the Germans had almost no numerical advantage in fighters on the French and Belgian fronts.

All the Allied fighters were slower than the Me-109E, but they were also more maneuverable. The most numerous fighter type on the French side was the Morane-Saulnier MS.406. It was regarded as obsolescent and three (fighter groups) were in the process of changing over to newer types during the May-June campaign. Nevertheless, the MS.406 was by no means ineffective in combat. Robert Williame of GC I/2 was flying one when he shot down three Me-109Es on the morning