The Zeebrugge Raid 1918: A Story of Courage and Sacrifice Told Through Newspaper Reports, Official Documents and the Accounts of Those Who Were There

By Paul Kendall

Approximately a third of all Allied merchant vessels sunk during the First World War were by German boats and submarines based at Bruge-Zeebrugge on the coast of Belgium. By 1918 it was feared that Britain would be starved into surrender unless the enemy raiders could be stopped. A daring plan was therefore devised to sail directly into the heavily defended port of Zeebrugge and then to sink three obsolete cruisers in the harbour in the hope they would block German vessels from reaching the English Channel. The cruisers were also to be accompanied by two old submarines, which were filled with explosives to blow up the viaduct connecting the mole to the shore, whilst 200 Marines were to be landed to destroy German gun positions at the entrance to the Bruges Canal.On 23 April the most ambitious amphibious raid of the First World War was carried out, told here through a huge collection of personal accounts and official reports on the bitter fighting which saw more than 500 British casualties from the 1,700 men who took part, and saw the awarding of eight Victoria Crosses.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jun 30, 2016
• ISBN: 9781473876736

Paul Kendall

Educated at Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, where he also served as an Honorary Midshipman with the University of London Royal Naval Unit, Paul Kendall is a military historian and author from Kent specializing in the First World War.

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Chapter 1

The Plan to Block Zeebrugge

During January 1917, plans to block the German naval base at Bruges were considered by Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt, commander of the Harwich Naval Force. Tyrwhitt duly submitted a proposal to destroy the lock gates at Zeebrugge, in an attack that would be covered by a bombardment, to Vice-Admiral Reginald Bacon, commander of the Dover Patrol. This plan was rejected in favour of Bacon’s own plan to use coastal motor boats to fire torpedoes at the lock gates. However, this operation, in turn, was never implemented and the plans were locked away in a safe within the Admiralty until 1919.

Tyrwhitt, however, submitted another suggestion on 7 May 1917. This time it was a scheme to capture the Zeebrugge Mole and the lock gates. Much grander in scale, this assault would then lead to the port being used as a launch pad for an attack against Antwerp, an offensive which would threaten the German northern flank on the Western Front. As with those that went before it, this was also a plan that would never be implemented.

In Decemebr 1917, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss was appointed First Sea Lord. He encouraged Vice-Admiral Roger Keyes, Director of the Plans Division at the Admiralty, to reconsider the possibility of blocking the access points for those U-boats of the Flanders Flotilla using the naval base at Bruges. Keyes recalled:

On the 3rd December, the Staff appreciation and an outline of the plan was completed. It was believed that 18 destroyers and torpedo-boats, and 38 submarines, were based on Bruges, Zeebrugge and Ostend, and could pass between those ports, by way of the inland canals via Bruges. Thus there were was a good case for blocking the entrances to the Bruges Canal at Zeebrugge and Ostend.

It was thought that the small submarines could be transported to Antwerp on barges, via the canals through Bruges and Ghent, but if the suggested blocking operation was to be carried out, a number of valuable vessels would be lost to the enemy, so long as the harbours remained closed. The destroyers based on Bruges and Zeebrugge were a continual menace to our shipping in the Downs, and our patrol craft in the Dover Straits. The removal of this menace would release many of our destroyers at Dover which would then be able to take a more active part in anti-submarine work.¹

Keyes discussed his idea of a direct attempt to stop German U-boats from entering or leaving the Flanders naval base at Bruges with Captain Alfred Pound². As the pair was aware of the formidable artillery batteries that defended both Zeebrugge and Ostend, and of the possibility of many, if not all, of the participating vessels being sunk before they reached the Belgian coast, they therefore reviewed the use of smoke screens to conceal the approach of a raiding fleet. Keyes wrote:

Pound and I had again studied the plans of the defences of Zeebrugge and Ostend, with a view to blocking the Bruges Canal at Zeebrugge, and the entrance to Ostend harbour. I must confess that I thought the approach would be rather a formidable proposition, through waters commanded by over 20 heavy guns. However, he suggested that the use of smoke had been developed to such an extent, that the operation might be carried out under the cover of the smoke-screens.³

On 3 December 1917, Keyes submitted a plan to Vice-Admiral Bacon, but Bacon never forwarded it to Admiral Wemyss. Bacon had not successfully implemented an operation to block the Bruges base and maybe he did not want others to succeed in such a venture. When Keyes and Wemyss discovered that the plan was missing they were furious. Keyes was confident that the Admiralty Board would frown upon Bacon’s conduct, for he wrote to Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, on 5 December 1918:

I do think Bacon has been delivered into the hands of the Board. They have ample grounds for kicking him out – on his own showing.⁴

Keyes went on to inform Beatty of the obstructions caused by Bacon and of his own plans to stop the Flanders Flotilla from menacing Allied ships in the Dover Strait:

Our interim report is a very strong indictment of Bacon and all his works. We will make Dover Strait unhealthy for submarines, but Bacon’s presence adds to our difficulties – and I am afraid the Board won’t kick him out. He was all over us when we went to Dover and apparently all out to help – but not really. However he is badly rattled and making an ass of himself. It will take time to do it thoroughly and in the meantime I want to block Ostend and Zeebrugge. It can be done. Salvage people say the possibility of removing blockships quickly – the excuse given always – is much exaggerated – and in the meantime 25% of our losses continue to be caused by Flanders submarines, to say nothing of the nasty threat of large destroyer flotilla on the flank of our communications.⁵

Towards the end of 1917 German submarines were entering the Dover Strait at a worrying rate. On 13 December 1918 Keyes recorded:

During the period 1 November to 9 December … 35 submarines have passed through the Straits and, from the evidence in our possession, it is more than probable that 15 other submarines have made the passage.⁶

The responsibility of blocking the passage of the U-boats fell upon the Royal Navy, which, in turn, appeared happy to consider any means to stop them. Wemyss wrote to Admiral Beatty of his desperation at achieving that objective:

At this stage of the war one feels inclined, like a drowning man, to clutch at any and every proposal that holds out the slightest chance of being successful.⁷

The primary priority for Wemyss was to restrict the enemy’s ability to use the Dover Strait and part of that objective was a plan that was being currently conceived by Vice-Admiral Roger Keyes. As mentioned, Keyes had been working on various plans to prevent German submarines and vessels from operating in the English Channel and North Sea during his time as Director of the Plans Division at the Admiralty. However, on 1 January 1918, he was appointed commander of the Dover Patrol and was given complete authority to create a plan to block the U-boats and destroyers of the Flanders Flotilla based at Bruges. In his memoir, Wemyss recalled the measures that Keyes implemented in this new role:

If only we could make the Straits impassable for the enemy our difficulties would be well on the way of being solved. Admiral Keyes with Commodore A. Boyle had built up an admirable staff organisation, where each man had his work to do and did it admirably.

Mines were poured into Dover and were laid with the idea of hermetically sealing the Straits. I must confess I never felt sure of our ability to do this. But I was determined to try and in the end we did succeed, for we had ample proof that the enemy got shyer and shyer of attempting to force the passage, and eventually gave it up altogether.

The blocking of Zeebrugge and Ostend was but a part of the whole scheme. The idea was not new and had often been mooted; indeed, Sir R. Bacon has said in his memoirs that he turned his plans over to Admiral Keyes. I gave Admiral Keyes a free hand and he went on with his preparations and plans, and eventually laid them before me.

There now arose one of those questions of constitutional authority which must arise when there exists a Board in lieu of a single man.

There had been much complaint on the part of some former members of the Board as to the manner in which they had been kept in entire ignorance of the proposals for the Gallipoli campaign, claiming that as members of a corporate body they shared the responsibility for the Naval part of that – and other – operations. This question of responsibility had been the subject of ‘much discussion between the First Lord and myself, and he laid down the principle for day-to-day operations at any rate, the Staff Lords only should be responsible, a procedure in which all the Naval members of the Board had acquiesced and which had temporarily at any rate satisfied me. But the question of an attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend was not a day-to-day operation, and moreover was one which if not successful would bring a great deal of criticism on to the Admiralty. I accordingly made up my mind to let my colleagues into the secret which I was trying to keep hard from everyone.⁸

As Keyes was planning for the Zeebrugge operation, Dover was attacked by a German destroyer on the night of 14/15 February 1918. The raid was the result of the enemy’s increasing frustration at attempts by the Dover Patrol to block the entrance into the English Channel through the creation of the Dover Barrage. This was a series of defences which included minefields of varying depths and deep barrage nets across the Strait of Dover from Folkestone to Cap Gris Nez.

The destroyer that attacked Dover belonged to a flotilla which, commanded by Captain Heinecke, had been deployed by the High Seas Fleet to attack ships of the Dover Patrol. Heinecke was also tasked with destroying the flare barrier which, also part of the Dover Barrage, was literally turning night into day and making it difficult for German warships and U-boats to pass undetected.

The destroyer’s crew was unaware of the numerous sea mines laid below the surface and the fact that the barrier was actually fourteen miles further west down the Strait, and much more heavily defended, than had been the case during October 1916 when a similar raid had taken place. Despite these difficulties, Heinecke’s men were able to sink one trawler, seven drifters and caused damage to several other vessels as well as causing casualties amongst their crews. Keyes recalled:

During the small hours of the morning, information came slowly in which showed that the enemy destroyer had inflicted considerable loss on the auxiliary vessels of the patrol, and had escaped without being brought to action by the monitor or the destroyers on the barrage patrol. The casualties amounted to a trawler and seven drifters sunk, and the paddle minesweeper Newbury and three drifters very severely and two slightly damaged, with 76 officers and men killed and 13 wounded.⁹

At midnight on 15/16 February 1918, Dover was subjected to another attack, this time a bombardment launched from a German submarine in the Dover Strait. Keyes again wrote:

About midnight a submarine lay off Dover and fired 22 shells into the town; the Swift, which was on the W. Barrage Patrol, was soon on the spot, but the submarine had disappeared, leaving some mines near the east entrance, which were evidently intended to catch destroyers coming out of the harbour to drive her off. But as all the destroyers were at sea, and the mines, which had been laid shallow, were awash in the morning, they were swept up and did no damage. The shells killed a child and wounded 5 people.¹⁰

This attack demonstrated that German U-boats were not only a danger to Allied ships and sailors, but also posed a threat to civilians living along the British coastline. An account of what happened subsequently appeared in the Dover Express:

After Friday morning’s experience of the German destroyer raid, and the subsequent scenes, Dover with its experiences of the past was not altogether unprepared for a sequel, so that when at ten minutes after midnight on Saturday morning, loud reports of gunfire startled the town it did not come altogether with that shock that the unexpected causes. The bangs and crashes, accompanied by the noise of falling bricks and slates and louder bangs close by, continued for hardly three minutes and by 12.15 was once more still. For the moment many hardly knew what had occurred.

Was it an air raid or a bombardment? Why had the returned gunfire ceased so suddenly, and why had there followed no sounds of a naval action, such as would inevitably occur if naval forces were attacking the town? Soon the news went round that a submarine had been firing at the town, and various shells, some sixteen or seventeen, had struck houses and buildings in the town with both light casualties and damage.

The shells had hit parts of buildings that did not matter or buildings that no one lived in. At one house alone were the casualties serious. This was a house occupied by a family named Boorman. The shell struck the top bedroom, and the four children who slept at the top of the house were coming down stairs. The shell seems to have gone through the next house and burst in the children’s room, so that all the four children were hurt. Their names were William Boorman, aged 15, Gertrude Boorman, aged 13, Amelia Boorman, aged 11 and Sidney Boorman, aged 9, they were all taken to the hospital by the police. The little girl Gertrude being seriously injured that she passed away soon after arriving. The boy William was injured seriously, but has not, as has reported in the London Press, had to have his leg amputated. He has a shell splinter in his body, and is going on now as well as can be expected. The other children are progressing favourably. A neighbour, Mr. C. Shovelier, was also slightly injured, but he did not require hospital treatment.

A shell which struck the roof of a building also injured an inmate very slightly, although seeing that it burst immediately over her, she was very fortunate in escaping. At another building outside Dover two men were struck and one had his foot badly injured. A shell burst on the top of a house in the box-room. The damage it did was not so very serious, but it caused great inconvenience by cutting open the cistern and flooding the house.

Close by, the chimney stack of Miss Turner’s house was hit, the bricks being scattered all over the roadway, and a piece of the roof torn off. Another house was struck and the chimney stack of a house was carried away. Two shells fell at the back of a street, but only knocked down sheds, while another penetrated a workshop and apparently, without exploding drove into a rag store. Another store was hit, and a hole in the wall was made that would be very aptly pictured by one of the Bairnsfather cartoons. A shell went through the apex of a slate roof and buried itself in the bank behind. Another fell in a garden and knocked down a garden wall; whilst another hit a wall, and although the flying fragments struck houses and penetrated bedroom windows etc., no one was hurt. At a house a shell hit a building just above the ground level and burst in the kitchen. The cliff bears the scars of two shells that burst against it, the others fell in the open.¹¹

The Dover Express’ coverage of the attack concluded by quoting a communiqué which had been issued by the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces:

Fire was opened upon Dover by an enemy submarine about 12.10 this morning, and continued for three or four minutes. The shore batteries replied, and the enemy ceased fire after discharging 30 rounds. The following casualties are reported: Killed, one child; injured, three men, one woman, three children. Slight damage was caused to house property.¹²

Perhaps emboldened by the attack upon Dover, within days, in fact on 24 February 1918, Keyes presented his plans to block Zeebrugge to the Admiralty. Wemyss recalled:

At a meeting of the Naval Lords in my room I put forward to them what it was proposed to do, and Admiral Keyes unfolded his detailed plan. Luckily there was no dissentient voice and I therefore was spared the difficulty of carrying out this operation against their wishes which I had made up my mind to do in case of their disapproval.¹³

The plan was for three obsolete Royal Navy cruisers to block the entrance to the Bruges Canal. One of the three blockships would ram the lock gate at Zeebrugge, while two others would be sunk in a V-shape across the mouth of the canal entrance, completely blocking the U-boat and destroyer entrance to the Bruges Canal. Before the blockships arrived smoke screens would be launched from coastal motor boats, whilst a diversionary assault would be carried out on the Mole at Zeebrugge by Royal Marines and Royal Navy landing parties carried aboard assault ships. The men would be ordered to destroy the Mole battery and damage any vessels berthed alongside. To prevent reinforcements from reaching the Mole, a submarine filled with explosives would be rammed into the viaduct that connected it to the shore. Once the blockships had been scuttled, the assault force would be evacuated.

While preparations were being made for the assault on Zeebrugge, the Germans launched the Kaiserschlacht (Kaiser’s Battle) – also known as the Spring Offensive or Ludendorff Offensive – on 21 March 1918. As German forces penetrated further into the Allied lines, marking the deepest advances by either side since 1914, initially threatening the collapse of the entire Allied line, there were calls to reduce the UK’s Home Defence forces to send troops to the Western Front in an attempt to hold back the enemy. There was also a demand for Royal Marines at shore bases in Britain and on ships at sea to be redeployed to France to bolster the Allied lines. This proposed measure would have a detrimental effect upon Keyes’ plans to block Zeebrugge. In a letter to Admiral Beatty, Wemyss wrote:

I had a regular stand-up fight against politicians and the Army at the War cabinet yesterday – they actually suggested – they almost demanded – that the ships of the Grand Fleet should be reduced in the number of Marines, in order to strengthen some of the battalions abroad. I flatly refused to countenance any such suggestion, and I think they were rather surprised and even hurt at the non possumus attitude which I took up. The soldiers actually put on a sort of aggrieved air as though we were not playing the game!¹⁴

In this same letter, Wemyss went on to reveal how he persuaded General Henry Wilson, the then Chief of the Imperial General Staff (the professional head of the Army), not to take such steps in respect of the Royal Marines:

To deprive a ship of any percentage, however small, of her highly trained men – which is what all the Marines are – decreases her efficiency to a very high degree, to a degree which I, responsible as I am for the efficiency of the Fleet, cannot under any circumstances be justified in doing.¹⁵

Consequently, Wemyss was able to reassure Admiral Beatty that the Army would not interfere in the affairs of the Royal Navy. There would be no direct impact upon plans for the Zeebrugge raid:

We shall have no more attacks from the soldiers; though with the politicians and their ignorance of affairs Naval and their short-sightedness as to the events of the future, one never can tell what they may do … It is a subject on which I will hear nothing more and should they – which of course they cannot – insist on, they will have to do it without me.¹⁶

Chapter 2

Assembling the Crews

Having been conceived by the Royal Navy, it was only natural that the attack on Zeebrugge would be an almost entirely naval affair, one conducted by personnel from within the Senior Service alone. An appeal was therefore made throughout the Royal Navy for volunteers, with eighty-six officers and 1,698 men, including 718 Royal Marines, being required for the operation. Vice-Admiral Roger Keyes wrote:

In order that all parts of the Naval Service might share in the expedition, representative bodies of men were drawn from the Grand Fleet, the three Home Depots, the Royal Marine Artillery and Light Infantry. The ships and torpedo craft were furnished from the Dover Patrol, which was reinforced by vessels from the Harwich Force and the French Navy. The Royal Australian and Canadian Navies, and the Admiralty Experimental Stations at Stratford and Dover were also represented.¹

The interviews of those officers who had volunteered took place aboard the battleship HMS Hindustan, which was moored at Chatham Dockyard. Keyes took an active role in recruiting senior naval officers for the operation. Those officers who were married were weeded out from the volunteers, whilst to the others Keyes was completely frank regarding the dangers that involvement in the raid would bring.

Despite the very real risks, Keyes later recalled the fervent attitude of the officers that he interviewed:

It was very interesting to watch their reactions of the various officers – whom I interviewed singly – when I told them that the enterprise would be hazardous, and finally said that the best chance of escape I could offer them after it, was a German prison until the end of the war.

With one exception only, they appeared to be simply delighted and most grateful for the honour I had done them in offering them such a wonderful prospect! Then I got them an outline of the plan, and said that although I would make every endeavour to save them after they had sunk the ships, I felt that it was a very forlorn hope. They took everything for granted, asked few questions, if any, and went away apparently full of joy and gratitude.²

One of the many who, on hearing the news of the request from Keyes for volunteers, immediately stepped forward was Captain Henry Halahan. In his response to Keyes, Halahan, who would become the bluejackets’ commander (i.e. in charge of the seamen’s storming party), wrote:

May I say that if the operation for which you said you might want some of my men is eventually undertaken, I should very much like to take part in it. I would willingly accept the same conditions … that I should not expect to come back.³

After being assigned by Keyes as one of the officers selected for the assault upon the Zeebrugge Mole, Commander Patrick Edwards wrote of his elation towards the impending operation:

When I arrived back in Chatham I was full of it. I thought it was quite hopeless, but, oh my goodness, it was quite gloriously hopeless. It was desperate; but I realized our position and the frightful losses the U-boats were inflicting on our shipping were also desperate. The boats engaged were of no great fighting value; the officers and men? Ah! That was another matter. I went off to my cabin that night, but I could not sleep. How lucky I was to be in it.⁴

Once Keyes had chosen the senior naval officers, one of the responsibilities of those men was to select junior officers, NCOs and ratings for the operation from volunteers across all branches of the Royal Navy.

Leading Stoker Norbert McCrory was serving aboard the Indefatigable-class battlecruiser HMAS Australia when he heard that volunteers were required. He recalled:

On 23rd Feb 1918, the Grand Fleet returned to Rosyth, Scotland, after forty-eight hours convoying from Bergen to Aberdeen etc. We were a coaling ship, taking in about 2000 tons of provisions etc. We, HMAS Australia, being the Flagship of the Second Battle-Cruiser Squadron, received a wireless asking for volunteers to the number of eleven men, for special service.

On receiving the message, Seamen and Stokers were asked to volunteer. Soon it was seen all who wished to go could not be accepted, much to their disappointment. Only eleven were chosen.⁵

The eleven Australian men who were chosen for the Zeebrugge Raid included Warrant Officer Artificer Engineer William Edgar (who was assigned to Iris), Leading Seamen George Bush and Dalmorton Rudd, Able Seamen Harry Gillard, Leopold Newland and George Staples (who formed part of the Royal Naval Landing Party), and Stokers William Bourke, Reginald Hopkins, Godfrey Lockard, Norbert McCrory and James Strong (who were to become the designated stokers for the blockship HMS Thetis).

Many officers had no difficulty in searching for volunteers, for some sailors the opportunity to take part in such an adventurous, but risky enterprise, was appealing in comparison to the tedious routines of convoy work. Harry Adams was one of the volunteers from the Revenge-class, battleship HMS Royal Sovereign. He volunteered because he ‘had nearly four years of War and was ready for all that was going – to hasten its end.’⁶

In time, Adams gave precise details about the selection process for the operation aboard Royal Sovereign for which there was no shortage of volunteers:

Personally, I was one of the ‘Grand Fleet’ contingent and this is how we of the Royal Sovereign volunteered. Quite a number of us (about forty), were detailed to muster at the ‘sick bay’ to pass the Doctor – late one night. Ten of us passed a very stiff medical examination, and we were bundled off to the Commander’s Cabin.

He gave us to understand that some volunteers were required – he couldn’t tell us any more, (he didn’t know), but he said more or less these words.

‘Any of you who are fed up with being stationed with the Grand Fleet (and some of us had had almost four years of it), and want Action, Medals, etc., now is your chance.’

‘However if any of you ten don’t care about it, say so.’

Well, ‘Two’ preferred to remain in the ship leaving eight of us. The Commander needed only six; (it seemed six, from each ship was the required number). He proceeded to arrange us according to our height; Yours truly, came sixth and just caught the boat, leaving the remaining two, to fill our places if we fell out, or fell sick. He told us, that whatever it was, we should have at least a fighting chance – an even chance, but personally, I don’t think anyone of the whole outfit had even a ‘Dog’s’ chance.⁷

On 12 February 1918, whilst serving aboard the battleship HMS Neptune, Leading Seaman W.W. Childs soon received his opportunity to break the tedium of life in the Grand Fleet when he was summoned to Lieutenant Arthur Chamberlain’s cabin, though this offer was dependent upon him being not married or having any dependents and whether he was prepared to embark upon a risky adventure where the prospects of returning home alive was pretty marginal, Child’s recalled:

One of our officers [Lieutenant Chamberlain] sent for me. I went to his cabin, and he asked me if I would like to go with him on a secret ‘stunt’. Before asking me, he wished to know if I was married, engaged, or if there was anyone dependent on me.

To these I replied in the negative (not having contemplated ‘suicide’ just then). Of course, naturally I questioned him closely as to what kind of ‘stunt’ we were to be involved in, but being sworn to secrecy he could give me no information at all, except that if we came back alive, we should be pretty lucky. (Very cheerful.) After careful thought, and with visions in my mind of ‘convoys’ (how I was beginning to dread them), I consented to go.⁸

Some of the volunteers had already experienced action in the field. Leading Stoker Henry Baker, a veteran of the Gallipoli campaign, was a willing volunteer. Baker told a reporter after the Zeebrugge operation:

Well, when we were asked to volunteer we were informed it was a hazardous job that we were to undertake. Well, with three experiences of landing in the face of hostile fire at the Dardanelles I thought it could not be worse than those and I volunteered.⁹

Some individuals were told that many of those taking part in the operation would not be coming back and that in effect this was a suicide mission. Despite being told this, Air Mechanic Second Class Sidney Hesse from the Royal Naval Air Service, still volunteered for the operation. He recalled:

We were all volunteers for that job. They told us beforehand that a lot of us wouldn’t come back. They said that if we hadn’t given our parents a photo, then we should get one because we probably wouldn’t get another chance! At the last minute they gave us a chance to pull out but I said, ‘No, I’m not pulling out; I volunteered so I’ll go.’ I’m not sorry I went, although I didn’t like it at the time!¹⁰

Not all officers, however, found ready volunteers, some sailors having to be persuaded to step forward. Lieutenant Commander Ronald Boddie recalls how he had to encourage stokers to volunteer:

In February 1918, the Admiralty called for a limited number of volunteers, for ‘a dangerous venture’ from the Grand Fleet. The volunteers were to be unmarried, and of V.G. [very good] character, and the engine room quota for the 4th Battle Squadron, was to be 6 stokers from each ship, and one Lieut. Commander. No other particulars were given. The other squadrons except the Americans were to contribute equally.

To my astonishment, the secret nature of the venture discouraged the men from volunteering, and I had great difficulty in persuading and cajoling 6 eligible but rather indifferent men to accompany me.¹¹

Petty Officer William O’Hara, a Jutland veteran who was serving aboard the battleship HMS Conqueror, indicated in his account, which was written in December 1931, that he was selected for the operation and was not a volunteer, although he was keen to take part. O’Hara wrote:

Service in the Grand Fleet during the war was dull, I was young and wanted to see something of the war; therefore, when I was sent for in Feb 1918 and told I was selected for special service I was very pleased indeed.¹²

Some of the Motor Launch crews did not have the option to volunteer but were simply detailed for the operation. A journalist from the Burnley Express interviewed Leading Deckhand James Smith in 1940, and reported:

In April 1918, he was serving as Leading Deckhand on Motor Launch 262, very small and fast vessels used for all kinds of purposes, including mine-laying and mine-sweeping. The crew was informed that they had been detailed to take part in a special mission – a particularly hazardous affair in which it was expected that 75 per cent of ships and men would be lost.¹³

The 4th Battalion, Royal Marine Light Infantry, supported by a detachment from the Royal Marine Artillery, was designated to carry out the diversionary element of the operation and assault Zeebrugge’s Mole (see the plan before Chapter 1). Lieutenant Colonel Bertram Elliot DSO was appointed commanding officer, together with Major Alexander Cordner as his second-in-command. Captain Arthur Chater, who was appointed as the battalion’s Adjutant, played an important role in preparing the men for the operation right from the very beginning. Chater recalled:

On 8th February 1918, I was at the RM Barracks, Chatham. That day orders were received from London to form the 4th Battalion Royal Marines, and put it under training forthwith. The battalion was formed of ‘A’ Company from Chatham, ‘B’ Company from Portsmouth, ‘C’ Company from Plymouth, a MG section of RMLI, and Trench Mortar and pom-pom section of RMA. Major B.N. Elliot was appointed CO, Major Cordner second-in-command, and myself Adjutant. Battalion Headquarters was formed from ranks of all Divisions. When the details of the operation we were to carry out were explained to me, I was thrilled by having been selected to take part in it.¹⁴

Some Royal Marines were eager to volunteer for this perilous operation. One young Royal Marine, possibly Private William Hopewell, sought vengeance for the loss of brothers who had been killed on the Western Front. He told a journalist after the operation:

I volunteered for this particular job because I lost two brothers at the front in six months and I wanted to get my own back.¹⁵

Chapter 3

Assembling the Raiding Fleet

The assault upon the Mole to create a diversion was a fundamental part of the operation. The intention was to assist the blockships in their efforts to enter the harbour at Zeebrugge and reach the entrance to the canal, where they were to be scuttled. However, in order to land troops onto the Mole meant berthing assault ships on the seaward side – and this was not suitable for securing vessels. A monitor¹ was planned to have been used to land troops on the Mole, but after Keyes was appointed Vice-Admiral Dover Patrol, he abandoned the idea of using a vessel of this type. He later wrote:

Plans Division made efforts to find me a fast hardy merchant man (passenger vessel with high free board), designed to go alongside jetties, for a boarding vessel. I also sent an officer on my staff to Liverpool to inspect ferry steamers which he suggested would be admirably suited for carrying large bodies of men owing to the shallow draft, double hulls, hardiness, etc. Finally no suitable merchantman being available, I decided to use ‘Vindictive’ which had been destined to block Ostend, as the main boarding vessel, and Liverpool ferry steamers as tenders as their shallow draft would take them over mine fields at high water.²

HMS Vindictive was an old 6-inch gun Arrogant-class cruiser. She had been built in Chatham Dockyard during 1899, in the same dock where HMS Victory was built 140 years earlier. Vindictive displaced 5,750 tons and prior to the raid had been considered obsolete with an uncertain future. Despite this, in August 1914 Vindictive had been assigned to the 9th Cruiser Squadron and participated in the capture of the German merchantmen Schlesien and Slawentzitz on 7 August and 8 September respectively. In 1915 she was stationed on the southeast coast of South America. From 1916 to late 1917 she served in the White Sea.

Captain Alfred Carpenter was duly appointed commander of HMS Vindictive, though Captain Henry Halahan, who had been appointed commanding officer of the Royal Navy Landing Party on Vindictive, was more senior to Carpenter in rank. Keyes had a dilemma regarding the chain of command, for under Royal Naval regulations the senior officer was meant to be in command of a vessel, but he had promised command to Carpenter. Keyes was sensitive to Carpenter’s likely disappointment if overall command was given to Halahan, so he made the irregular move to allow Carpenter to command Vindictive, under the provision that the senior officer, Halahan was in command of the naval assault team. These areas of responsibility were clearly defined before the operation. Carpenter was responsible for navigating the vessel to Zeebrugge, while Halahan had overall control of the assault operation from the time Vindictive berthed alongside the Mole.

Five other obsolete cruisers were chosen for the operations to block the submarine entrances at Zeebrugge and Ostend. HM Ships Thetis, Intrepid and Iphigenia were selected for Zeebrugge, whilst HM Ships Brilliant and Sirius were chosen to be deployed at Ostend. These vessels would be filled with concrete and scuttled at the entrances leading to the German submarine base at Bruges.

Keyes was confident both in the navigational skills of his officers and in their ability to get the fleet to Zeebrugge at night. However, there were dangers from German minefields and U-boats that could hinder the operation if Vindictive was sunk before she reached the Mole. It was necessary to find suitable, sturdy, robust vessels that would be able to cross the English Channel and the North Sea to Zeebrugge which would also be capable of pushing and securing Vindictive upon the Mole. If the elderly cruiser was sunk during the attack