Challenging nuclearism: A humanitarian approach to reshape the global nuclear order

By Marianne Hanson

Challenging nuclearism explores how a deliberate ‘normalisation’ of nuclear weapons has been constructed, why it has prevailed in international politics for over seventy years and why it is only now being questioned seriously. The book identifies how certain practices have enabled a small group of states to hold vast arsenals of these weapons of mass destruction and how the close control over nuclear decisions by a select group has meant that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been disregarded for decades.

The recent UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will not bring about quick disarmament. It has been decried by the nuclear weapon states. But by rejecting nuclearism and providing a clear denunciation of nuclear weapons, it will challenge nuclear states in a way that has until now not been possible. Challenging nuclearism analyses the origins and repercussions of this pivotal moment in nuclear politics.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Release date: May 31, 2022
• ISBN: 9781526165084

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Challenging nuclearism

Challenging nuclearism

A humanitarian approach to reshape the global nuclear order

Marianne Hanson

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © Marianne Hanson 2022

The right of Marianne Hanson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Published by Manchester University Press

Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL

www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 1 5261 6509 1 hardback

First published 2022

The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Cover credit: David Yu / Pexels

Typeset by Newgen Publishing UK

In memory of

Yolande Mary Pamela Roberts Lacey

3 November 1922–25 February 2021

Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgements

List of abbreviations

Introduction

Part I: The dominance of nuclearism

1Identifying the elements of nuclearism: the traditional framings that normalized nuclear weapons

2Nuclearism today: modernization, the persistence of deterrence, and ongoing dangers

3Pushing for disarmament: a fruitless exercise

Part II: The transition – from the Humanitarian Initiative to the prohibition treaty

4The humanitarian context: drawing lessons from earlier disarmament campaigns

5Creating the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Part III: Rejecting nuclearism

6Rejecting nuclearism I: changing the discourse; bringing humanitarianism back; empowering new voices and actors; challenging material spending

7Rejecting nuclearism II: disrupting the nuclear order

Part IV: Ending nuclearism?

8Challenges to and likely impacts of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Conclusion

References

Index

Foreword

This book explores the origins and the potential impact of the recent process to make nuclear weapons unequivocally illegal and illegitimate. It examines how the achievement of a treaty banning these weapons, for all states, has come to pose a substantial challenge to the prevailing global nuclear order. This order had been constructed and sustained by a select handful of states over several decades, enabled by a process of what came to be called ‘nuclearism’. While nuclearism has been, so far, impossible to dislodge, it is now under an extraordinary level of scrutiny, and is being, I argue, rejected by a growing number of states.

Numerous non-nuclear states and civil society actors have been involved in challenging the global nuclear order established by these powerful states, and their sense of injustice against the nuclear weapon states has been rising for years. In 2017, their grievances were channelled into the creation, at the United Nations, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This treaty, which entered into force on 22 January 2021, delegitimizes the possession, manufacture, deployment, transfer, or use of nuclear weapons, for all states. Together with the processes that created it, and the actions which will follow it, the treaty refutes the elements of nuclearism which have enabled the untrammelled dominance of the nuclear weapon states for over seven decades.

The puzzling question is how and why a group of relatively weak actors in international politics have been able to achieve the formal prohibition of a weapon which is deemed central to the security doctrines of powerful states, and how they have been able, with this new treaty, to challenge the traditional nuclear order by using humanitarian arguments. In many ways, it seems an unlikely feat that small and middle-sized states, together with non-governmental organizations, have been able to defy the wishes of the great powers and act against them by delegitimizing a weapon that the nuclear weapon states see as essential to maintaining their security, prestige, and power.

The new treaty, of course, faces several obstacles. It has been denigrated by leaders of the nuclear weapon states, who argue that it is disruptive (which it is) and that it will not lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons (which is also correct: it will not, at least not by itself). But it is a significant normative development nonetheless, and is one which is likely, I argue, to have several important consequences in the medium to long term.

It is necessary for me to note at the outset of this work that I believe that eliminating nuclear weapons will be a positive and useful step in international security, and that despite the challenges of doing so, aiming for a de-nuclearized world is a preferable strategy to persisting with the status quo, where the world is threatened by the continued existence of over 13,000 nuclear weapons, many of these hundreds of times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. Readers should not be surprised to find that I am deeply critical of the way that nuclear policy has been developed and implemented over the decades, and that I make a clear call for phased, mutual, monitored, and verified disarmament.

I can also say that I am in good company. A number of strategic experts and political leaders have examined this issue and have concluded, especially since the ending of the Cold War, that retaining nuclear weapons is a dangerous and unnecessary practice. Among those who have drawn attention to the urgent need to reduce and then eliminate them are Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, and William Perry, former Secretaries of Defense in the United States, General Lee Butler, former Head of US Strategic Command, General Colin Powell, former US Secretary of State, and Australian Professor Robert O’Neill (former Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford University, whose careful thinking on this subject has come to influence my own position).

Unsurprisingly, some consider it ‘unrealistic’ to adopt the view that nuclear weapons should be eliminated, and are convinced that the global nuclear order should remain unchanged. They dismiss calls for disarmament as Utopian or destabilizing, supported only by those who apparently know little about realpolitik or the putative benefits of nuclear deterrence. I do not deny that there is a strong belief and faith in the idea of nuclear deterrence and that this fuels the retention of nuclear weapons. But with a background in strategic studies, three decades of researching these issues and working with several diplomats and political leaders, I believe that this faith in nuclear deterrence is misplaced, and that change is long overdue. For those who believe that nuclear restraint can always be counted on to avert catastrophe, that nuclear deterrence has kept the peace, and that it will continue to keep the peace – all debatable assumptions – and that disarmament is therefore not necessary, there is still the awful spectre of accidental or inadvertent use, together with the possibility that these weapons might come into the hands of terrorist or other sub-state groups. We have come perilously close to accidents in the past, and our luck will not hold indefinitely. A continuing faith in nuclear weapons may therefore itself be unrealistic: to think that we can continue to have many thousands of nuclear weapons in existence without them ever being used again reflects a degree of hubris and short-sightedness, the consequences of which could lead to disaster. Certainly the military and political strategists I mention above have stressed these dangers.

Thus I cannot claim to be ‘objective’ in this debate, or at least any more objective than those who are in favour of retaining nuclear weapons are seen as ‘objective’. As the editor of the respected journal, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, noted in its issue offering practical advice on nuclear matters to the incoming US president in 2016, ‘The Bulletin is non-partisan, but it does have an unapologetic bias toward science, expertise, and the long-term preservation of humanity’ (Mecklin 2016). So too is this book non-partisan, but biased towards science, expertise, and the preservation of humanity.

I thus remain confident of my claims. I know that achieving a world without nuclear weapons will require a substantial rethinking of current policies, a great deal of political good-will, the sustained building of trust between nuclear adversaries, and judicious management of regional security fears during any process of de-nuclearization. It will need to be carefully balanced and phased, and occur in a strictly monitored and verified manner. As I and many others argue, all of these things are feasible.

I thus do not succumb to a view that nothing can be changed. Military conflict might never be eliminated from international politics, but pursuing a security order where the option of global or even regional nuclear annihilation is removed is an urgent necessity. As such, I offer these chapters in a spirit of humility, but with some confidence also, and with a wish that they might persuade readers to re-examine the entrenched doctrines within nuclear policies, and to seek answers to global insecurities which do not rely on this most destructive weapon of mass destruction.

This book therefore explores how and why we have got to the stage where, seventy-seven years after their invention, nuclear weapons have come to be prohibited under international law, regardless of the views of the nuclear weapon states and regardless of their existing military doctrines. I hope to do justice to this important achievement by telling this story. At the same time, there is a real need to consider what the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can and cannot do. In addition to examining the intriguing origins of this new treaty, then, exploring its implications and outlining its potential impact is therefore also a goal of this book.

Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude to numerous colleagues who have helped to shape my thinking on international security issues over the years. In Oxford, Andrew Hurrell, Robert O’Neill, Adam Roberts, William Wallace, Geoff Wiseman, the late Geoffrey Best, and the late R. John Vincent, were all invaluable mentors. At the University of Queensland, Chris Reus-Smit and Roland Bleiker have been unfailingly supportive and generous with their time, and I am very much in their debt. They, together with Stephen Bell, Alex Bellamy, Ian Clark, Richard Devetak, Dan Druckman, Tim Dunne, Sebastian Kaempf, Matt McDonald, Jacinta O’Hagan, Andrew Phillips, Heather Rae, Richard Shapcott, and others have all proved to be wonderful colleagues and friends. In other forums, Ken Booth, Anthony Burke, Andy Butfoy, Joseph Camilleri, Gareth Evans, Trine Flockhart, Michael de Hamel, Jenny Neilson, Tanya Ogilvie-White, Nick Ritchie, Maria Rost Rublee, Richard Tanter, Nicholas A.J. Taylor, Ramesh Thakur, and Nicholas Wheeler have been influential and important collaborators on issues of global security.

Numerous other analysts and scholars have also shaped my thinking and assisted me in this book. I am grateful for interviews and discussions with John Borrie, John Burroughs, Tim Caughley, Thomas Doyle, Trevor Findlay, the late Malcolm Fraser, Paul Ingram, Rebecca Johnson, Hans Kristensen, Richard Lennane, Patricia Lewis, Benoit Pelopidas, Matthew Rowland, Randy Rydell, Tom Spies, Alyn Ware, and Ward Wilson. Margie Beavis, Dimity Hawkins, Daryl Le Cornu, Ruth Mitchell, Gem Romuld, Tilman Ruff, Jemila Rushton, Dave Sweeney, Sue Wareham, Tim Wright, and others from the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) Australia have been very helpful and kind, as have Annette Brownlie, Del Cuddihy, Wendy Flannery, Chris Henderson, Valerie Joy, Norma Forrest, and many others in Brisbane. In New Zealand, those who have influenced my thinking greatly – although I did not appreciate it fully at the time – included the late Harold Evans, and the late Bridget Farrell.

All of the above deserve credit and grateful thanks for their insights and experience, upon which I have called many times. None bear any responsibility for any flaws or shortcomings that might be present in this book.

The editorial team at Manchester University Press have been immensely helpful, and I am very grateful for their guidance and help. This work on the subject of eliminating nuclear weapons would not have been possible without the generous assistance of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its grants programme supporting research on disarmament. I was privileged to receive funding for hosting a conference in Brisbane, for travel to conduct interviews and research, and for a one-year post-doctoral assistant. Tor Martin Moller, Adviser, Section for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, together with his colleagues, worked with me for several years as I completed this book, and I remain very grateful for their assistance. In a world where many nation-states declare themselves to be supporters of peace and justice, Norway stands out as one country which takes these responsibilities seriously and which makes an enormous contribution to a better world. By enabling scholars to conduct and share their research on nuclear politics, the government of Norway demonstrates its serious commitment to addressing some of the most pressing issues in global politics today. For their excellent work – in development assistance, with landmine-clearing activities, diplomatic endeavours to promote conflict resolution, among other things – Norway and its people remain a beacon of hope in a troubled world. For their commitment to a nuclear-free world, and their generous funding of the research for this book, I note here my deep and humble thanks. I look forward to the day that Oslo will join the TPNW.

The late Kenneth and Joyce Hanson always encouraged me, and for this I remain truly grateful. My father Frank and my siblings (Tim, Tony, and especially Julie, Pamela, and thoughts of Lisa) have kept me grounded and supported. Last, I wish to note the loving support of my mother, Yolande Lacey, and my dear children, Lorraine and Christopher Hanson.

List of abbreviations

Introduction

The history of nuclear weapons has been a strange one: these weapons have been both revered and feared, desired and shunned, proliferated and renounced. They have conferred status, at different times both prestige and pariah. Perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of their existence is that they were acquired and have come to constitute the core of security strategies for a small group of states, yet remained – realistically speaking – impossible to use. At the same time that vast resources have been spent on developing and modernizing nuclear weapons, on refining and targeting them for war planning, it was implicitly understood that these weapons should not be used. The nature of nuclear deterrence demanded that one had to promise to use nuclear weapons, and to be completely convincing in threatening unparalleled devastation against an opponent, but at the same time understand that such weapons should never be launched. Nuclear weapons have been the subject of intense ethical concern, yet they continue to be fixed firmly in national and international security policies. Their use would clearly violate international humanitarian law, but for over seventy years there was no explicit legal prohibition against them. At the same time that they have been shown to be almost worthless as military instruments, they remain the core element around which certain states have built their military doctrines. Their holders have promised publicly and unequivocally to eliminate them, but privately retain an unyielding determination to keep them. Nuclear weapons have been presented as very normal elements of politics and security at the same time that they represent one of the most abnormal undertakings in human history.

These various paradoxes make it difficult to find a way to proceed with the management of nuclear weapons in global politics; indeed they have rendered it almost impossible to dislodge the prevailing global nuclear order established by the nuclear weapon states, and to create a world free of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the calls, especially over the past few decades, for the elimination of nuclear weapons, their very longevity seems to have conferred upon these weapons a sense of permanence and inevitability that persists well beyond their actual utility, and indeed beyond any rational assessment of their purpose.

The juxtaposition of the deep valuing of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and the need to reduce nuclear dangers on the other, provides the context for this book. At its heart, the book explores the following questions: How was ‘nuclearism’ established and how has it been sustained for so long? How, in the face of continued possession of nuclear weapons by a few states, have advocates of disarmament responded? How has the accumulation of seventy-seven years of acceptance and ‘normality’ shaped efforts to prevent nuclear catastrophe? In short, can the traditional casting of nuclear weapons as valuable strategic assets (for some, at least) be countered by arguments that cast them as militarily impractical, inhumane, and illegal?

The fact is that such arguments have not troubled the nuclear weapon states – at least not until recently. The concept and practices of nuclearism remained dominant, and enabled the nuclear weapon states to continue with the status quo, regardless of the fact that the Cold War – ostensibly the very reason these weapons were seen as essential for the largest nuclear weapon states – ended over thirty years ago. The nuclear order has been stunningly resistant to challenge or change.

From 1968 onwards, with the adoption of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, consolidated a nuclear order which privileged their possession, as well as France and China’s possession, of nuclear weapons, on the basis that these five states had tested nuclear weapons prior to January 1967. As the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, or simply, the P5, their use of the NPT has been one of the ways in which they have been able to keep their nuclear arsenals, even though Article VI of the NPT calls clearly for these states to move in good faith towards nuclear disarmament. At the same time, all other states were exhorted not to acquire nuclear weapons, in exchange for assistance with the peaceful use of nuclear materials, and the pledges by the P5 states that they would, eventually, disarm.

The global nuclear order, therefore, is inter alia one where questions about which state may possess nuclear weapons ‘legitimately’, and which states would be considered violators if they dared to proliferate, have been determined by a treaty which the two superpowers and Britain (and later the other P5 members) embraced as a means of solidifying their position as the accepted possessors of nuclear weapons, while at the same time denying any such ‘right’ to all other states.¹ This order has been variously described as inequitable, as a means whereby large and powerful states continue to keep potential proliferators at bay, and as perpetuating a system of ‘nuclear apartheid’.² At the same time, the order implies that these select nuclear weapon states act always in the interests of the world at large, that they are ‘responsible’, trustworthy, nuclear weapon states, and that their management of the global nuclear order is a safe, stable, and unquestionable one.

Since 1991, when the Cold War ended, there have certainly been substantial reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapon states continue to pledge their commitment to eliminate their arsenals. But the pace of reductions has been slow and is now stopped, and advocates of elimination fear that such pledges will never be honoured. Moreover, relations between key nuclear weapon states, especially the United States, Russia, and China, deteriorate, and fears of a regional nuclear conflict – in Europe, in South Asia, or in Northeast Asia – continue to grow.

One of the key factors that has enabled the nuclear weapon states to sustain the global nuclear order and thus their possession of nuclear arsenals has been their success in perpetuating a system of ‘nuclearism’ which firmly embedded nuclear weapons within a ‘strategic imperative’, and which – in the name of security – had defied any serious challenge to its dominance. For this reason, there had never been a clear legal ruling which outlaws the possession and use of nuclear weapons, for all states. The nuclear weapon states, as the chief architects of the prevailing nuclear order, have long been able to sustain their exclusive control over the contours of this order, and have easily resisted any efforts by states and citizens seeking the elimination of these weapons. Especially through their position in the NPT, the great powers – the US, Russia, China, Britain, and France – have successfully deflected any grievances against their privileged place in the global nuclear order.

This has now changed. A formal process began after 2010, with a very deliberate challenge mounted against the nuclear weapon states, aiming to change the discourse surrounding nuclear weapons to one which is fundamentally humanitarian-, rather than security-, oriented. This challenge involved a programme of humanitarian advocacy, the imposition of a process of what is sometimes called ‘humanitarian arms control’, designed to stigmatize and delegitimize particular weapons as a vital step towards their eventual elimination. It was labelled the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’. This development was a significant one, because for the first time, at a widespread and state-driven level, the traditional security-led framing of nuclear weapons was passed over by a large group of countries, who sought to put a new construction in its place. This happened despite the efforts made by the great powers to prevent it.³ The Humanitarian Initiative moved rapidly, and by 2017, 122 non-nuclear weapon states, strongly supported by an extensive civil society network, gathered at the United Nations in New York to adopt the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) (UN 2017), making these weapons unambiguously illegitimate, on the basis of international humanitarian law.

This book considers why this has come about, and why it came about when it did. What were the factors that allowed for this new recasting of nuclear debates? How were various key actors able to bring this perspective to the table when for so long, the matter of nuclear weapons and their global impact was one overseen by those few states which had possession and which, ipso facto, were the self-appointed custodians of our collective nuclear future? What were the dynamics that allowed the debate to be moved to a level which clearly was unwanted by the nuclear weapon states? In effect, how have the building-blocks of nuclearism been rejected by the new treaty? Have the processes associated with the treaty shaken the elements which have sustained nuclearism for so long?

Moreover, can this shift – a shift which many argue is long overdue – sustain its momentum and assist the move towards a nuclear weapon free world? If there is no participation by the nuclear weapon states, what impact, if any, is the TPNW likely to have? Has nuclearism been seriously weakened? Are the nuclear weapon states losing control of the nuclear weapon debate, and with it their standing within the global nuclear order, and if so, what might this suggest about the new forms of diplomacy and agency in global arms control and disarmament efforts? These questions have only recently come to the fore, and they drive the investigations of this book.

‘Humanitarian advocacy’

Given that the insertion of humanitarianism into the nuclear weapon debate has been so important, it is necessary to note briefly here what is meant by the terms ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘humanitarian advocacy’, in order to understand how these have been applied to weapons control generally and to nuclear weapons specifically. A good starting point in any description of humanitarianism is provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and particularly the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, which embrace four well-established humanitarian principles, namely, those of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and operational independence. (The ICRC also identifies two further tenets, namely voluntary service and universality, to be applied in its daily operations.) The four foundation principles are firmly anchored in international humanitarian law, and all governments have affirmed these principles through their acceptance of United Nations resolutions (notably UN General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 in 1991, and 58/114 in 2004). A short definition of what is meant by each of the four principles is offered by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): First, the principle of humanity means that ‘human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found; the purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings’. Second, neutrality is taken to mean that those engaging in humanitarian work ‘must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature’. Third, impartiality requires that humanitarian action ‘must be carried out on the basis of need, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions’. And finally, operational independence requires that humanitarian action ‘must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented’ (UN 2012). Thus ‘humanitarianism’ has typically come to be associated with the protection of human beings, especially during military conflict, and with responding to the needs of human beings following disasters. Indeed, it is most likely that the layperson would take the term to mean the activities carried out by humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross, particularly in terms of disaster relief. In essence, humanitarianism is about saving lives and alleviating existing suffering.

But if we are seeking to explain more fully what is meant by humanitarianism and humanitarian action, those descriptions are a starting point only, suggesting that humanitarianism is for the most part a reactive process, activated only when crises have already occurred, and marked by strict impartiality. Our present understanding of humanitarianism is broadening considerably, and it is clear that traditional applications – protection in war and responding to crises – are no longer the only goals and activities inherent in a humanitarian approach.⁴ A new, more proactive, understanding has become evident, and it can be conceived of as ‘humanitarian advocacy’. This broadened description sees humanitarianism take various concrete forms. Practical measures include publicizing pain and suffering, initiating legal agreements, lobbying governments to adopt particular courses of action or to comply with various treaties, and campaigning to prevent war and other calamities (rather than merely responding to them). These are all part of a broader involvement of varied actors in international relations, reflecting a more proactive and holistic approach to security, designed to prevent a crisis or other event which would cause widespread suffering and death. The most common labelling of groups advocating at the international level, is of course that given by Keck and Sikkink (1999), who explored the formation and evolution of what are called ‘transnational advocacy networks’.

Essentially, humanitarian advocacy goes beyond what has been typically considered humanitarian work, which, by employing the practices of neutrality and impartiality, implicitly remained more or less outside the political process. Humanitarian advocacy brings into closer alignment political and humanitarian agendas. It respects impartiality but is not averse to politicization; indeed it is very deliberately a proactive process that seeks to engage political players: as Neil MacFarlane (2000: 5) suggests, ‘the humanitarian imperative is best served not by avoiding the political process but by consciously engaging it’.

In line with this broadened view then, this book is concerned with how humanitarian advocacy, practised by states, civil society actors, and international organizations, came to outlaw the possession and use of nuclear weapons, and how it retained as its focus the need to protect human life and the environment. In this sense, what has been termed ‘humanitarian arms control’ takes the form of creating new international norms and limitations governing the practice of warfare and proscribing the use of specific weapons. Central to the process of adopting a humanitarian approach to arms control and disarmament, of course, is a recognition of the provisions of international humanitarian law as they apply to weapons, within the context of jus in bello. These include the principles of distinction protecting civilian populations, of proportionality and balancing the needs of military necessity with humanitarian considerations, and the requirement that armed attacks must avoid superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.

This book’s focus on humanitarianism in arms control is also driven by the fact that humanitarian action has had a significant effect on a number of international issues (including the landmines and cluster munitions conventions). In recognition of this new ‘turn’ towards humanitarianism, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) held a special conference in October 2000 on ‘Disarmament as Humanitarian Action’. The conference developed a research project which aimed to ‘reframe multilateral disarmament negotiation processes in humanitarian terms’ and ‘formulate practical proposals to apply humanitarian concepts to assist disarmament negotiators’ (UN 2004; Borrie and Martin Randin 2006). This resulted in a number of publications explicitly linking the problem of restricting or eliminating weapons which raised humanitarian and human security concerns.

Structure of the book

This book is divided into four parts.

Part I, ‘The dominance of nuclearism’, examines the ways that nuclearism has been sustained in world politics, and the efforts made to dislodge it. Chapter 1 examines the traditional global nuclear order, whereby a process of nuclearism has driven an unchanging focus on nuclear weapons as essential for international security. This nuclearism has been characterized, I argue, by five key factors. Chapter 2 canvasses briefly the continuation of nuclearism today, primarily by looking at the current actions of the nuclear weapon states. Chapter 3 examines the attempts made since the end of the Cold War to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, to counter the sense of normality that nuclearism had created, by appealing to the nuclear weapon states to fulfil their disarmament obligations. The chapter looks at the meagre impact that these efforts have had.

Part II, ‘The transition – from the Humanitarian Initiative to the prohibition treaty’, explores the advent of the process of ‘humanitarian arms control’, which has come to influence the creation of the new nuclear prohibition treaty, the TPNW. Chapter 4 addresses the history of ‘humanitarian arms control’, and outlines the processes and actors involved especially in the landmines ban, suggesting that significant lessons from this period were applied to the case of nuclear weapons also. Chapter 5 explores the formation of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and its key provisions.

Part III, ‘Rejecting nuclearism’, assesses how each of the elements of nuclearism explored in Part I has been challenged by the new treaty. Chapter 6 considers how the dominant discourse of security, and the lack of a humanitarian view – what I have called a ‘humanitarian-free zone’ – have been challenged and rejected by the new treaty. This chapter examines the way in which new actors and new processes allowed a wide range of voices into the nuclear debate, voices which are fundamentally different to those drawn from the traditional realms of the national security elite, and which are challenging government decisions and spending on nuclear weapons. Chapter 7 argues that the new treaty, in its challenge to the structures of the prevailing global nuclear order, constitutes an unambiguous rejection of nuclearism.

Part IV of this book, ‘Ending nuclearism?’ considers the extent and potential impact that the rejection of nuclearism is likely to have on the nuclear debate. Chapter 8 considers the problems the new treaty is likely to face, as well as its limitations; it suggests that overall, and despite these challenges, the treaty has already begun to change the dynamics of the global nuclear order. The book’s Conclusion notes that while the treaty has rejected the long-entrenched elements of nuclearism, this alone may not be sufficient to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons; it is, however, the best hope we have of moving in that direction.

Notes

1There have of course been challenges to this order. India, perceiving the inequity of the NPT, refused to join, as did Pakistan. Israel refuses to confirm or deny that it possesses nuclear weapons, and North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and proceeded openly to develop its nuclear arsenal. These states remain firmly outside the NPT, and while they are therefore not seen as ‘recognized’ nuclear weapon states, their proliferation has nevertheless come to be seen as a fait accompli. They do not hold the kind of authority that the P5 states do in the NPT, but they nonetheless have become absorbed into the nuclear club. Certainly they are seen as part of the wider nuclear problem by those advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons. To complicate the unequal nature of this