The Trailing Ghost

By Roberto de Haro

THE TRAILING GHOST is a detective/mystery story about cybercrime, spying in Washington, DC, and international intrigue. Dale Lipinski, the novel's main character, is a former special ops soldier who leaves the army and joins the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department. He uses unorthodox methods to solve crimes, completes law school and passes the California Bar. He leaves the Sheriff's Department and becomes a special investigator in the office of the California Attorney General. In this novel, Lipinski has left the AG's office and is working as a security consultant and bodyguard. Through friends he learns that US covert assignments have been compromised and American government operatives have disappeared or been badly injured during failed operations. Lipinski has associates that are computer experts and hackers, intelligence gathering specialists, surveillance device designers, and trained assassins. He works closely with a friend in the Israeli Mossad, and does special "jobs" for the Mossad. When Lipinski learns about the espionage in Washington, he develops a plan to find the spies and the people responsible. He quickly learns about a sinister international cabal that setup the spy network, and sells information gathered to criminal and nefarious foreign governments around the world. The syndicate is a powerful organization that engages in the sale of weapons, drugs, human slave trafficking, extortion, and killings. Lipinski is secretly hired by an FBI leader to find the spies. The story is filled with dangerous activities that take Lipinski to places like Hawaii, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Greece and Canada. The story is fast paced, has intriguing characters, and dangerous situations. Lipinski identifies the cabal and attacks it in ways that will engage and fascinate the reader.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Gatekeeper Press
• Release date: Nov 30, 2021
• ISBN: 9781662917394

Book preview

Chapter 1

THE DANGERS OF SPYING

In secret kept, in silence sealed.

—Charlotte Brontë, Evening Solace [1846], st. 1

The encroaching evening revealed a darkening sky filled with billions of stars that spread dots of light over the dark forest landscape of a remote part of New Hampshire. Beneath the celestial panorama, two hidden figures, dressed in camouflage, focused their attention on a lodge set in a clearing of evergreens. They were FBI agents on a special mission to gather information about the participants and their plans for opioid distribution in the US. The agents were trespassing on private property, using sophisticated night surveillance equipment and cameras to record the visitors to the lodge. The FBI agents were part of a joint task force that included the US Drug Enforcement Administration, Homeland Security, and the Justice Department. The task force was charged with gathering information about the manufacturing, entry, distribution and sale of opioids in the US. The Treasury Department told the head of the task force that it had credible intelligence that American financial institutions might be funding part of the trafficking, and that Panamanian and Cayman Islands banks were laundering the profits.

America was grappling with a major opioid drug crisis. More than eight hundred people a week died from opioid-related overdoses. The crisis had reached such proportions that it was a drag on the economy and a threat to national security. The problem with opioids started with the over prescription of legal pain medications like oxycodone and intensified with an influx of cheap heroin and synthetic opioids, like fentanyl, supplied by foreign drug cartels. Many of the illegal drugs were manufactured in India, China, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and even Canada. The joint task force suspected that large quantities of illegal opioids entered the northeastern US through Canada. An informant told the task force that two large drug cartels with US bank representatives, domestic distributors and government operatives would convene in New Hampshire. Once the task force learned about the meeting, two FBI agents were assigned to eavesdrop on the gathering and photograph those in attendance.

The FBI agents prepared for the stakeout by using aerial surveillance of the lodge. They procured assistance from the US Department of the Interior and the local sheriff to gather as much intelligence as possible about the property. With these and other sources of information they learned about the security measures the property owners had installed to guard against unwanted visitors.

In the late afternoon before the meeting, the FBI agents drove to within two miles of the lodge on a seldom used dirt lane. They parked their SUV away from the road and concealed it. The two agents walked carefully through the woods to avoid the security system, then took a position that offered them cover while allowing them to look directly in the window of the conference room in the lodge where the meeting was scheduled. They waited as personnel from a security firm swept the lodge to identify and eliminate any surveillance devices. Once the electronic sweep was conducted and the security personnel left, the agents started up a small, sophisticated, silent drone. Before the visitors arrived at the lodge, one of the investigators directed the small, matte black drone, slightly larger than a coffee coaster, to the outside window of the large conference room. The drone was remotely maneuvered to attach itself to a corner of the window where it could avoid detection. The miniature high-tech drone had a small HD camera and listening device that could record images and conversations within a thirty-foot radius. Then they waited for the visitors to arrive.

That’s Lloyd Keyes, a big shot with the Texas International Bank of Commerce, one of the agents whispered to her partner as he began to take pictures.

Yeah, and the guy in the fancy hunting jacket is an exec at Kemper-Gerstle drugs, whispered the FBI agent as she made a notation in her computer.

While the two agents photographed the participants and recorded the conversations, they were unaware that a government mole in Washington was learning about the team and its mission. The mole alerted a contact for a group that sold classified government intelligence to a drug cartel representative. The cartel representative contacted a security firm that used mercenaries and alerted them to the suspected intrusion. The mercs immediately sent a helicopter to do an aerial sweep, using infrared and metal detector devices, and sound baffles to muffle the noise of its rotors. The chopper passed over the lodge and expanded its search outward in a gradually increasing circle until the SUV appeared on their tracking devices. A signal was sent to a heavily armed group that stealthily proceeded to the location of the hidden SUV. The group leader, a big, muscular man and a former Navy SEAL, broke into the vehicle after disarming its alarm and examined its interior. He whispered to the others that it was a federal vehicle, likely the one used by the government agents sent to spy on the meeting. He called a number on a secure phone and waited.

What’ve you got? the voice on the encrypted phone asked. The SEAL mentioned the SUV and said it was a type of vehicle used by federal agents. There was a brief pause before the voice on the phone said, Find ‘em and get rid of ‘em.

With extreme prejudice? asked the big man. The response was affirmative. Okay, said the SEAL as he signed off, turned to his men and gave them instructions.

The team’s trackers examined the ground and brush for any tracks or signs left by the federal team. After a few minutes, they detected tracks left by the federal agents and the direction they went. Turning to the SEAL in charge, the lead tracker said, One’s a big guy, probably six feet and around two hundred pounds, while the other tracker nodded. The other is smaller, probably a woman, maybe one-forty.

Track ‘em, said the SEAL. I’ll call and have our people power down the motion and heat detection stuff. The trackers carefully searched for and found other signs left by the FBI agents, and moved in their direction. Forty minutes later, one of the trackers signaled a halt and pointed to where the two agents were hiding. The leader told his men to make certain how many federal agents were there. After the trackers scouted the area, the head scout gave a hand signal that there were two only. The SEAL in charge nodded and used hand signals to position his men into a semi-circle behind the agents. When his men were in place, he signaled for two marksmen to fire. The shooters used high powered rifles with flash and noise suppressors. Both federal agents were killed.

After stripping the dead FBI agents of their weapons and equipment, the SEAL called his contact. The targets have been eliminated, he said on the phone. The contact told him to make the bodies disappear. Will do, said the SEAL and signed off. The dead agents’ bodies were burned, and their remains buried in a subterranean cave several hours away from the lodge. The SUV used by the federal agents was cleaned and pushed into a deep lake. No trace of the two agents would ever be found.

Chapter 2

NEW DIRECTIONS

Every body continues in its state of rest, or of

uniform motion in a right line, unless it is

compelled to change that state by forces

impressed upon it.

—Sir Isaac Newton, Principia Mathematica. Laws of Motion, II

Underneath an azure sky, Montreal basked in the warm sunlight of a splendid day in mid-September. At an outdoor table of a trendy café in Old Montreal’s Place Jacques-Cartier, a couple sat enjoying the pleasant weather and each other’s company. The brunette wore a pale green dress with a handkerchief hemline that accentuated her long, well-proportioned legs. Her face was hidden behind large sunglasses and a broadbrimmed sun hat. She watched her companion across the table sipping wine, who was attired in dusky, pleated pants, a light blue broadcloth shirt, and a colorful scarf. The companion was slender and wore dark sunglasses and a chic fedora.

Heard from our mutual friend in the attorney general’s office in California? asked the brunette.

Her companion slowly sipped the sauvignon blanc, gazed languidly at the passing tourists, and in a low European accented woman’s voice replied, I am not certain. He seems to be drifting.

The brunette, Corinne Nevers, dipped her sunglasses slightly and peered over them, a move that signaled curiosity and more communication.

I have not seen him since we met in Dubai a few months ago, replied her companion, Katla Oesterhalle, a fair-skinned slender woman with blue eyes. Corinne stared at her until Katla continued, After the attorney general went to Washington, Lipinski resigned and is doing odd jobs.

Like what? asked Corinne while casually stirring her gimlet.

Legal things, personal security, some consulting.

A bodyguard, proffered Corinne. Katla nodded and sipped more wine while gazing aimlessly at the passersby and thinking about Dale Lipinski.

Well, he called me a couple of times for help, said Corinne, but never mentioned that he was a bodyguard.

What did he want?

Corinne sipped her gimlet, then replied that he’d wanted information on government contracts for weapons development firms. He said he’d contact me if he needed more info, she told Katla. But something has come up that might be of interest to you, and maybe Lipinski.

Katla leaned forward, expectant. In the next few minutes, Corinne, a senior level analyst with top-secret clearance at the National Security Agency in Maryland, mentioned an increase in the disappearance and death of covert personnel working for the Department of Defense, the FBI and CIA.

Are these foreign or domestic incidents? pressed Katla.

Mainly domestic, but a few have been outside the US.

So? pushed Katla, their lunch officially arriving. Over the next few minutes, Corinne mentioned a highly classified intelligence memorandum about Homeland Security, the FBI and CIA that cited seventeen skilled operatives, mostly contractual, missing or found dead in the last few years.

After considering Corinne’s comments, Katla asked what kinds of missions were involved. Carefully scanning the immediate area to ensure that they were not under surveillance, Corinne whispered the objectives of all the teams. Two were Homeland Security teams observing paramilitary groups, and three were FBI undercover teams eavesdropping and taking photos of suspected domestic drug dealers and terrorists. The CIA had retained three covert operatives to investigate and gather intelligence on the sale of intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of carrying highly lethal gas and nuclear warheads. All the CIA contractual operators had been terminated. She paused for a moment to eat her salad.

Katla raised an eyebrow before asking, How did you find out about this? Corinne said that an analyst at the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) had done a retrospective investigation and analysis to piece together data on personnel killed and missing teams over a five-year period. The number of dead or unaccounted for had increased during the five years. Corinne accessed the top-secret report, read it, and was careful to ensure that no one knew she’d seen it.

So, what happens now? asked Katla.

Well, the top brass at JSOC has developed a group called Special Operations Action and Control, or SOAC, to include DOD, Justice, Homeland Security, FBI and CIA, to study the matter and take measures to protect future covert activities. Guess who’s heading the group? Katla frowned and shook her head. Jeff Hallquist.

Katla knew Hallquist and his name triggered unpleasant memories. Katla had been born in Holland, the daughter of a brilliant engineer. She had been a computer whiz before she turned seventeen and had befriended several of the best hackers in Europe. Bored, she dropped out of a prestigious Swiss technology institute and joined an infamous British computer genius who quickly used her increasing talents to commit cybercrimes. Katla became adept at intercepting and purloining wire transfers, money laundering, penetrating highly protected databases, and eavesdropping on confidential communications between government agencies and international corporations, banks and drug cartels. She recalled, with a slight shiver, stealing funds via wire transfers and her capture by a ruthless group. The hackers in Katla’s network were captured, tortured and killed by the group. She was tortured with electricity and nearly killed before being sold into slavery and bought by a brutal Mexican drug cartel enforcer. Twice Lipinski had risked his life to save hers. And Lipinski was responsible for negotiating with Hallquist for her release from the forced custody of the American government.

What are you thinking? asked Corinne, noticing Katla was momentarily lost in thought.

Katla let out a sigh and said, Just things I cannot get out of my mind.

Lipinski? pressed Corinne. Katla nodded and suppressed the memories and considered what her companion had shared. So? pressed Corinne.

I’ll need information about SOAC and how covert American teams are constituted, and what protection they may have.

Well, they must not have much back-up if they’re being eliminated so often, Corinne expressed cynically.

Can you find out who establishes the covert teams for the agencies involved? Is there is a central control group to monitor them and make decisions about back-up?

Corinne pouted and said it would be difficult to gather that type of intelligence. She told Katla that SOAC would be a key player. She thought, then said, All right, I’ll look into it. But, she warned, it’ll take time, and we must be very careful.

Katla smiled. The challenge was a powerful motivator, and the possibility of developing something that might interest Lipinski enticed her. She reached across the table and touched Corinne’s hand in a suggestive way. That evening after they shared a joint, she was particularly inventive in her lovemaking with Corinne.

* * *

At a posh reception in Silicon Valley for senior US military personnel, Dale Lipinski scanned the crowded room, and the movement of Royce Sperling, a wealthy, inventive head of a high-tech company. He carefully noted the positions and behavior of Sperling’s security personnel. Sperling was a brilliant engineer who’d graduated from Cal Tech at twenty, received his Ph.D. at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology four years later, patented several laser sighting identification systems for low level cruise missiles operating below radar tracking capabilities, and for techniques to scramble guidance programs for air-to-air missiles. By the age of thirty, he was heading a mega-million-dollar corporation with numerous Department of Defense contracts. Lipinski’s assignment was to analyze and recommend enhanced personal security for Sperling. The brilliant engineer had almost been abducted in Hawaii after demonstrating a new stealth torpedo design that could evade even the most sophisticated sonar equipment. In the attempted abduction, two of his security team had been gravely wounded and his driver killed. Had it not been for a passing SEAL team—the US Navy’s elite, primary special operations force, part of the Naval Special Warfare Command—on its way to a demonstration, Sperling would have been snatched.

The attempted kidnapping convinced Sperling that he needed improved security. He contacted several executive protection services and was told to consider hiring Dale Lipinski to conduct a security audit. When he read Lipinski’s dossier that excluded some classified information, Sperling was impressed. Lipinski was over six feet tall, muscular, trim, and a former US Army Special Forces noncom with service on Delta Force and Black Ops teams. Sperling learned that participation in Black Ops teams was by invitation only, an indication that Lipinski was a highly selective trained operative and killer. After leaving the Army, Lipinski joined the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s department and became a lieutenant in the detective’s division with an impressive arrest record. Lipinski earned his B.A. at Cal State Northridge, completed an evening law program, and passed the California state bar on his first attempt. He was highly recommended by the former California attorney general, now a US congressman. It took considerable persuasion and financial incentives before Lipinski accepted Sperling’s offer to review and analyze the executive’s different security systems and personnel. After a few weeks of intensive research and analysis, Lipinski observed the behavior of the high-tech executive at different functions. It was an important way to discover the high-tech executive’s vulnerability, and weaknesses in his security programs and personnel.

At one of Sperling’s restricted social functions, Lipinski watched him sip expensive champagne and use cocaine, but only if it was of the highest quality. Moreover, Sperling, while always surrounded by attractive women, was more interested in young men. Dale knew that the use of wine, drugs and a sexual appetite for good-looking men could be used to blackmail Sperling, or by kidnappers to snatch him.

When Lipinski met with Sperling at his office just north of Silicon Valley to discuss his final report, he was surprised by the executive’s reaction to it.

These insinuations that I’m a homosexual are insulting. You have no right…

But Lipinski cut him off with a raised hand and a direct eye contact hard stare. You wanted me to assess your personal security. My concern with your sexual proclivities is just business and strictly confidential. It’s something that can compromise your safety.

Sperling scoffed but was taken aback by the intense way Lipinski looked at him. The executive was accustomed to getting his way with subordinates, and intimidating others with the power that resulted from the enormous resources he controlled. But Lipinski could not be bullied or scared, and something about his demeanor made the executive nervous. After a long pause, Sperling said, All right in a hushed voice and waited for Lipinski to respond.

Dale continued to outline things he found lacking in the executive’s security system. The expensive power systems and links for the surveillance cameras on his various properties were different, and not well coordinated or protected. The communication devices used by his bodyguards could be overridden and jammed. He said the weapons his security people carried could be a problem. Some were armed with .40 or .45 caliber automatics, and others nine-millimeter Glocks. Two carried different machine guns, one with armor piercing rounds and the other without. He mentioned that two of the security team members were overconfident and tended to miss important details that might compromise the executive’s safety. He stressed that the agency that referred personnel for the executive’s business office and social functions needed to be replaced with a more reliable firm. Lipinski noted a couple of additional matters then said, Quite frankly, Mr. Sperling, I’m surprised you haven’t been blackmailed or abducted yet.

Visibly chagrined, the executive said, So what do you propose? Lipinski looked out the window of the executive’s office and said he’d recommend a comprehensive high-level security firm. Is that it? scoffed Sperling. I can get a new security firm anytime I want.

Yes, you can, Mr. Sperling. But the firm I will recommend does not advertise and will not be listed in any directories. Unless I recommend you to them, they will not be interested.

What about you? said Sperling.

Lipinski shook his head and said, Not possible.

I can make it worth your while, pressed Sperling. Name your price.

Dale disliked Sperling. Something about the arrogant prick annoyed him. He’d never work for a supercilious, narcissistic ass like Sperling. However, he could not afford to antagonize the high-tech executive. The son of a bitch was too well connected, and a few negative comments to important friends and government people could compromise Lipinski’s reputation, and maybe his work as a high-end security expert. Instead, Dale said in a matter-of-fact tone that he recommended Sperling consider a specific firm with carefully selected personnel, probably the best in the business.

I’ll call them. They’ll be in touch with you tomorrow. If for any reason you’re not satisfied with the new security firm, let me know and I’ll personally make certain that this firm, or another, keeps you safe. Sperling nodded and was about to say something when Lipinski stood and extended his hand. You’re quite a guy, Mr. Sperling. And you deserve the best security possible. It’s been good working for you. If I can ever be of any service, call me. He shook hands with the executive, nodded and left.

Dale’s tactics were designed to placate the young executive and not make an enemy of him. After his meeting with Sperling, Lipinski called the selective security firm he had in mind on an encrypted phone and spoke with its vice president. He gave her Sperling’s name, background and contact number.

Thanks, said the vice president. Anything we can do for you, Dale?

I appreciate that, said Lipinski. There is something you can do for me. Before asking for a favor, he said, I’ll share a copy of my report on Sperling. But keep it confidential. If he finds out I gave it to you, he’ll be pissed.

He heard the woman laugh before saying, I can hardly wait to read it. Now what can we do for you? In the next few minutes Dale asked for an introduction to the president and head of security at a large weapons development corporation in Alabama. He explained his purpose for meeting the two men. Consider it done, said the VP.

After ending the call, Lipinski sent an encrypted text message to Corinne Nevers using a code asking her to call him. Then, on a secure line, he called Viktor Skovel, a high-tech communications expert. Skovel was a brilliant cyber-information specialist who designed and deployed devices to bypass photographic and recorded conversations without detection. He developed advanced drones for security observations that were practically undetectable. Skovel also designed and sold unique sensing equipment to identify high-tech recording devices. Lipinski had retained Skovel to help him on several projects, always paying him generously in cash.

When Dale spoke with Skovel on a secure line he asked if Viktor was free for dinner that evening.

You paying? asked Viktor.

You’re so tight you squeak going around corners, Dale admonished, before saying he’d pay. They agreed to meet at one of Viktor’s favorite restaurants in San Mateo, just south of San Francisco.

Skovel was a nondescript person, slightly overweight, with a fleshy face, deeply set dark eyes that never missed anything, and long, slender fingers. He could be cynical and insolent, but around Lipinski he was always on his guard and circumspect. On three projects with Dale, Viktor watched him kill people coldly without hesitation. They were valuable lessons for Viktor and reinforced his respect for Lipinski, as well as remind him to be careful with what he said and did around him. But despite how dangerous he was, Viktor liked Lipinski.

So, what’s on your mind? asked Skovel as he bit into a Chinese dumpling.

I need surveillance equipment to find a spy stealing research stuff from a weapons contractor in Alabama.

The feds involved? Viktor asked warily. Dale shook his head. Viktor thought for a moment before saying, Tell me more.

In the next few minutes, Lipinski mentioned a large weapons contractor that made critical parts for advanced surface-to-air missiles. The Chinese have picked up part of the guidance design for a new missile.

How’d you find out about this? pressed Viktor. Dale said the Mossad, and indicated the Israelis were concerned that if the Chinese got the complete design, they would sell the military technology to Iran.

Yeah, said Skovel, chewing on a piece of chicken, I could see how that might pose a problem for the Israelis. How reliable is their intel?

Dale looked directly at Viktor and said, Impeccable.

Why aren’t the feds involved?

So far, it’s just a case of industrial espionage, said Lipinski. And the Mossad doesn’t want to get involved with matters in the US. That’s why they called me. Skovel nodded and asked Lipinski about his plans. I need to find the spy, whispered Lipinski, and find out how he’s doing it, and how much he’s given the Chinese.

Skovel asked, So what do you need? Without revealing too much of his plans, Dale said he wanted to determine who had access to the designs and was stealing the secret information, and the method for delivering it to the Chinese. Viktor wiped his mouth with a napkin and asked how much he would be paid. After hearing the large sum, the technician pursed his lips and nodded. Who else is involved?

In a serious voice, Dale told Skovel it was above his pay rating. His focused stare at Viktor and the hardness in his voice sent a strong message that no more would be shared. They talked strategy and finished their meal. Dale paid the tab and told Skovel he’d contact him in a few days.

* * *

Lipinski and the Mossad had a mutually beneficial relationship. The Israelis provided him with valuable intelligence, and he in turn worked for them as a private contractor. He had eliminated several arms dealers selling weapons to anti-Israeli terrorist groups, including Hamas and Hezbollah in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. On two assignments, Lipinski caught and turned over terrorist operatives from Iran to the Mossad. His work for the Israelis resulted in a working relationship with a senior Mossad leader, Ari Isakov. Dale knew it was not his real name, but it was the one Ari used. They met in neutral countries like Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. And once they rendezvoused in Macau where Ari was attacked by Chinese hitmen hired by the Iranians. Ari and Dale had killed the five Chinese assailants. In the shootout, Lipinski saved Ari when one of the assailants wounded the Israeli.

You saved my life, Dale, Ari told him as Lipinski stopped the bleeding, dressed the wound and drove the Mossad leader to safety. I owe you. From that day on, a strong friendship was born.

Whenever Dale came across information about Muslim terrorists that might affect Israel, he called Ari. And on several occasions Dale and Ari met to exchange information about the intelligence activities of the British, the French, the Russians and the Chinese. Ari told Dale that there had been a time when the Mossad and Red Chinese secret operatives had clashed violently. The little-heard-of warfare between the Chinese and Israelis had been vicious and resulted in numerous deaths and maimings. It was the Chinese who finally called a truce, said Ari.

We don’t much like the Russians and the Chinese, Ari added. When Dale asked him to explain, Ari said the Russians are strong supporters of Iran and Syria and provide both countries with sophisticated weapons systems and poison gas. But he said it is the Chinese who continued to sell cheap explosive devices and light weapons such as copies of the AK-12 and AK-15 (upgraded versions of the AK-47), and knockoffs of small machine guns like the BIZON 9mm and AK-74U to Iran and Syria that end up in the hands of Hamas, Hezbolla, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other radical Islamic groups antagonistic toward Israel. As long as the Chinese continue to provide weapons, ammunition and explosive devices to radical Islamic groups bent on destroying Israel, we will take whatever actions necessary to protect our country and people. Ari’s firm convictions and protective policies for the defense of his people and country impressed Lipinski and convinced him to help Ari whenever he could.

One of the perks Dale received by working with Ari was the chance to fly as a crew member on international air cargo flights. The Mossad had arrangements with several shipping firms to send their operatives to different places and avoid going through the main terminals. On domestic flights and to countries like Canada and Mexico, Lipinski made the same arrangement with a security firm that hired him to do special jobs. The VP for the firm had tried on several occasions to hire Dale. By providing him with a few favors, she thought eventually Lipinski would consider working with them in an adjunct capacity.

* * *

On his way home, Lipinski thought about the new assignment and the assets he’d need to eliminate the spy. One was Corinne Nevers. She could get him important information about the missile development firm and the contracts it had with the US government. Corinne mentioned a possible asset Lipinski might want to consider for future use, Kemena Xeveria. Corinne had developed a file on Xeveria after she’d intercepted confidential memos about her. Kemena was the daughter of Marta Goines, a Cuban athlete and dancer, and Vassily Valeska, a Russian intelligence officer stationed in Cuba. Vassily was a tall, well-built man, fair-skinned and blue-eyed. In addition to his native Russian, he spoke four other languages, including Spanish. While posted in Cuba, Vassily met and had an affair with Marta Goines. In his profession, marriage, especially to a Cuban woman, was not acceptable to his superiors. When the Russians disengaged in Cuba, Vassily arranged for Marta and their daughter to slip into Santo Domingo, and then to Puerto Rico where Marta and Kemena were granted political asylum. Marta changed her last name to Xeveria and raised Kemena by herself. After Vassily left Cuba, he secretly followed Marta and Kemena’s activities and made funds available for them through a numbered Swiss bank account.

Kemena developed into a bright, lovely young woman. She graduated with honors from a private preparatory school in Puerto Rico and attended the University of Florida on a soccer scholarship. Kemena studied abroad in Paris during her junior year, and it was there that Vassily approached her. He’d taken every precaution to avoid any surveillance and swore Kemena to keep their meeting secret. She learned how much he loved Kemena and her mother, and how he had provided funds for their well-being. He would not tell Kemena what he was doing, but she suspected he was part of a private intelligence group. After that meeting, no matter where Kemena went, she sensed that her father knew about her activities.

Kemena graduated from the University of Florida with distinction and moved to Washington, DC. She worked in a congressman’s office for two years before enrolling in the Master of Science/Master of Business Administration program in International Studies at Georgetown University. After earning her Master’s, Kemena was recruited by the FBI and sent to Quantico, VA for training. She was an outstanding trainee and performed very well in hand-to-hand combat and the use of small arms and knives. Because of her linguistic abilities, speaking four languages, she was assigned as an FBI liaison operative with the CIA and the DEA. By the time she was thirty, Kemena was almost five-ten, trim and muscular, and a beautiful and formidable woman. However, during a joint CIA/DEA assignment in Mexico that became compromised, she was wounded and placed on administrative paid leave.

Kemena had been the FBI liaison on the CIA/DEA team tasked to eliminate a powerful drug cartel leader in Sinaloa, Mexico. One of the team members was recognized by a drug cartel operative who reported it to the cartel’s security officer. The American was followed, and the team’s communications were hacked and the planned attack on the drug cartel boss discovered. The next day the American team was ambushed, and in the resulting shoot-out, all but one CIA operative and Kemena were killed. The body armor Kemena was wearing saved her life, but a round pierced through her left thigh and incapacitated her for several weeks. During her recuperation, Kemena was subjected to an intensive review about the assignment in Mexico. The failure of the team to complete its mission, and the death of all but two of its members, was negatively perceived by her superiors. Even though she was brighter than most FBI agents in her pay grade, there was concern in the bureau because of her family background, especially her father’s role as a Russian intelligence officer. Moreover, there were lingering suspicions about her mother, now an American citizen and owner of a small dance studio and fitness business in Miami. Several people in the bureau questioned Marta’s allegiance to the US, even though she was not politically motivated and led a modest lifestyle. If the bureau knew that Vassily secretly made funds available to Marta, it would be perceived negatively by the FBI and used against Kemena.

Kemena sensed the hesitation and lingering questions about her role as an FBI agent by her peers and superiors. Her direct manner, and ways of challenging procedures and protocols, were not well received by supervisors and team leaders. Even though Kemena was smart, analytical and physically imposing, she was tagged with an unearned reputation for being temperamental, and not a team player. The insinuations and her treatment after the events in Mexico convinced Kemena that her prospects for advancement in the bureau were limited.

While at the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Kemena befriended Angie Carpenter, a trainer and an evaluator. Carpenter was impressed by Kemena and monitored her performance. At the end of the training cycle, Angie, a psychological evaluator, rated Kemena as the top recruit. Before completing the program at Quantico, Kemena met with Angie to discuss possible assignments and duty as a field agent. With Angie’s help, Kemena was assigned as a field agent. They became friends and remained in contact.

Kemena went home to be with her mother in Miami while on administrative leave and recuperating from her wound. Marta could tell from her daughter’s demeanor that something was wrong. She waited until the day before Kemena was scheduled to leave to hug and reassure her. "Dime, mijita (tell me, my daughter), por que tan triste (why so sad). Kemena held Marta for a long time before divulging what happened in Mexico and how the bureau treated her. Marta told her the bureau did not know how valuable Kemena was. No te dejes (don’t give in). Que sepan que vales la pena (let them know you are valuable)." Kemena dried her eyes and told Marta how much she loved her. The next day Kemena left for Washington, unaware that Marta would share her daughter’s frustration with Vassily.

After her return to Washington, Kemena called Angie Carpenter and asked if they could get together. They met for lunch on a weekend at Carlyle, a trendy American brasserie with Art Deco-esque décor in Arlington.

Why the long face? asked Angie as they hugged and pecked each other on the cheek. At first Kemena was evasive, mentioning discomfort from her wound. But Angie, a trained psychologist, knew something else was bothering her friend. Why don’t you tell me what’s really bothering you.

Kemena looked away and shook her head before saying, Things are not going well for me.

Personally, or professionally?

Mustering her resolve, Kemena told Angie of rumors she’d heard about her performance in the FBI. She paused before saying that if the negative perceptions about her performance continued, she would not be offered important assignments or considered for promotion.

Angie looked directly at Kemena, read her body language and momentarily closed her eyes to consider carefully what Kemena shared before responding. Are you sure about these rumors and negative perceptions? she asked. Kemena nodded. I’m not certain what’s out there about you. I can ask a few people to find out how you’re perceived in the bureau. However, asking questions about you may cause a problem. The bureau doesn’t like out-of-school activities.

If you mean getting in trouble over me, forget it!

Angie smiled and said that was not her main concern. When someone starts asking questions about an agent, the bureau will mask its perceptions. However, it’ll trigger preconceived opinions that may exist and add to negative impressions.

Kemena understood Angie’s warning. She thought for a moment, playing with her salad before saying, At this point I’d like to know where I stand in the bureau.

All right, said Angie, I’ll follow up discreetly. They changed the subject. After finishing their lunch, they hugged and wished each other well before going in separate directions.

A few weeks later, Angie