Marine Corps Tanks and Ontos in Vietnam: Book Two – 1967 and 1968

By LtCol Ray Stewart USMC

Book Two, the second of a three-book series, continues from 1966 in Book One, to cover the action of Marine Corps Tankers and Ontos crewmen fighting the locally-grown Viet Cong, the better armed, trained, organized, and equipped Viet Cong Main Forces, and the North Vietnamese Army Regulars from 1967 thru 1968 in I Corps, South Vietnam. As in Book One, and to continue in Book Three, it features hundreds of personal stories, on-the-spot in real time, interviews of Marines just returning from their fight – all which is framed within the official unit command chronologies and after action reports, including documented “lessons learned”. The maps, personal pictures, organizational charts, and the citing of each Marine who gave his life are, also linked to the Vietnam Wall and to the Foundation’s web site, with volumes of additional information about the Marines who left their sweat and blood in Vietnam battling their communist enemy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Oct 3, 2019
• ISBN: 9781796054057

LtCol Ray Stewart USMC

Lieutenant Colonel Ray Stewart, USMC (Ret.), enlisted in 1955. He graduated from University of Idaho. He was commissioned as second lieutenant in 1964 and served two tours in Vietnam as a Tanker (1st and 3d Tanks), a Grunt (2/4), and the OpsO (S-3) of the Da Nang Defense Battalion. He was the CO of H&S Company, 2d Radio Battalion with a tour in Morocco. He was an instructor at Amphibious Warfare School (AWS). He served with the Jordan Arab Army in M48A3 tanks and later the PlnsO (N-5) with Navy’s Middle East Force, Bahrain. He was the first us Defense Attaché in Oman, where he introduced the M-60 tank to its armored regiment. He is an Arabic linguist, retiring after thirty years as an Arabian Peninsula intelligence officer (J-2), usCENTCOM. He is the founder and president of the Marine Corps Vietnam Tankers Historical Foundation. This book is the third in a three-book series.

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Copyright © 2019 by LtCol Ray Stewart, USMC (Ret).

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Rev. date: 10/02/2019

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CONTENTS

Foreword

Preface

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Tiger Doctor

It Was That Kind of War

Seven of the Best Called to Heaven

The Extra’s We Had on Our Tank

H&S Company, First Tanks: A Recollection

Broken Down at Night and Not an ARVN in Sight

Battle for Dong Ha

Tanks on the DMZ, 1967

Tanks on the DMZ, 1967

Operation HICKORY

Operation BUFFALO … and I Still Remember

Tanks on the DMZ, 1967

Operation KINGFISHER: A Show of Force, July 28–30 1967

The Four Gates to Hell

Flame Tank F23 in Ambush Valley

3d Tank Battalion, Reactionary Rifle Platoon: 16 August 1967

How the Washout Got Its Name

Time in the Barrel at Con Thien

Double Ambush on Route 9: 7 September 1967

Jim Coan Gets an Answer

A Load of Plywood

Ontos at Con Thien and Khe Sanh

Maps and Diagrams

Five provinces of South Vietnam’s I Corps

Five provinces of I Corps tactical zones, map sheets

Two northern provinces comprising 3d Marine Divisions’ TAORs

Da Nang area: location of tank and antitank (Ontos) battalion HQs

Da Nang area: location of 1st Tanks and H&S CO HQ

HQ 1st Antitank (Ontos) Bn (VTHF by Lloyd Reynolds)

HQ 3d Tank Battalion (VTHF by Lloyd Reynolds)

Operation STONE

Site of action

Leatherneck Square and Trace

2/9 action on 29–30 July along Route 606

Operation HICKORY: Hand-drawn sketch from 2/9’s July C/C

Operations HICKORY, LAM SON 54, BELT TIGHT, and BEAU CHARGER

Operation BUFFALO

Operation KINGFISHER, 29 July ambush

Operation SWIFT, 6 September

ANNEXES

General www.mcvthf.org

G-1—Sources Citing and Attribution Convention

G-2—Sources: Foundation Archives—Books, CDs, Interviews, E-books, Others

G-3—Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Slang

G-4—A Brief History of the Three Marines’ Armored Fighting Vehicles

G-5—Politics and War: Twelve Fatal Decisions

G-6—Marine Prayers

G-7—Operation MIX MASTER

G-8—Book Review Steel and Blood

G-9—1965 Evolution of Amphibious Operations Doctrine (

G-10—Marine Corps History Division–Provided Oral Histories and One-on-One Personal Interviews

Volume 3—1967

3-1—Khe Sanh O/B: 1967

3-2—2/9 Article

3-3—Operations

3-4—Review of Hammel’s Book

3-5—Tank and Ontos Company COs

3-6—Silver Star Recipients

3-7—An Hoa Ch. 7 Year of the Ram by Alan Waugh

3-8—A Recollection by Stephen Falk, Sergeant, USMC

3-9—Purple Heart Recipients

3-10—1967 Significant Events

3-11—Oral History Interview

Foreword

Book 2—comprising this, the third (1967), and the following fourth (1968) volumes—is the second in the planned three-book, by-year, six-volume series detailing the operational and chronological participation of the Marine Corps’ tank and antitank organizations in the Vietnam War.

Book 1, volume 1 (1965) detailed the initial landing of Marine forces across the beaches of South Vietnam into the three just-established enclaves of Chu Lai, Da Nang, and Hue/Phu Bai and the expansion of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) mission and capability for base defense in employing a balanced strategy of base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. Nineteen sixty-six, as detailed in volume 2, was intended to be a year of consolidation and expansion of those three tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR’s): a reaffirmation of the United States’ determination to assist the South Vietnamese government in defending itself against the increasing Communist military pressure from VC (Viet Cong) forces and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) (GB-65).

The III MAF had nearly doubled its size during 1965 and closed the year with cautious optimism that 1966 would see measurable success in the prosecution of the war against the enemy. The high hopes held by the Marines in 1966 were dampened by the internal politics of the South Vietnamese government crisis in the spring, halting the Marine pacification campaign south of the Da Nang Air Base. In July, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) removed any doubt of its commitment to bolster the VC’s efforts to defeat the existing government of South Vietnam by attacking across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), which caused the Marines to move its forces north to counter the enemy thrust. The Marines were stretched across the 265-mile length of I Corps—too much real estate—do not have enough men (GB-66).

Book 1, volume 2 detailed the buildup of Marine ground forces, in particular tank and antitank units primarily in the upper five provinces of northern South Vietnam—Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai—that comprised I Corps and the accelerated tempo of fighting during the year in what has become known in official documentation as an expanding war (GB-66).

Preface

The six-volume series of Marine Corps Tanks and Ontos in the Vietnam War: 1965–1970 is written largely by, and mostly about, the Tankers and Ontos crewmen who participated in one of the longest and arguably one of the most controversial and nationally divisive wars in the history of the United States. The framework of this series is provided by two primary sources: the previously classified unit command chronologies, which are the detailed by-month chronicling of every battalion-size Marine unit’s activity, and the U.S. Marines in Vietnam series, which we refer to as the Green Books published by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps in the early 1960s and ’70s. The value in this approach is that the reader/researcher can read of the exploits of the subject of this series—Tankers and Ontos crewmen—and follow the links back to the expanded coverage in the U.S. Marines in Vietnam series. And the reverse is also true. Within this structure are more than two hundred personal interviews and stories by Marine veterans who served in Vietnam, as well as the oral histories of as many Marines interviewed in-country, who often lived on the field of battle itself, literally on the heels of a just-completed operation, or of those Marines who just recently returned to CONUS—many via medical facilities—from the Vietnam War’s arena. A plethora of secondary sources, so important in order to present the full story of Tankers and Ontos crewmen, are cited in the Foundation Library annex.

The Marine Corps Vietnam Tankers Historical Foundation, established in 1999, concentrated the efforts of its two-to-three-person staff on developing a viable history-oriented organization during its first few years. That accomplished, the Foundation commenced planning to write the history of Marine tanks in Vietnam. At some point along the evolution, the Foundation’s board of directors agreed to include the antitank community and tell of the exploits of that thing called the Ontos. Since the thrust of the book is about—and most importantly largely by—the Marines who crewed these tracked vehicles, acquiring the by element has proven both challenging and labor-intensive on the one hand while exciting beyond description on the other.

The decision to present the six-volume series in its present form and format was arrived at over many months of asking multiple questions and logging even more opinions. Our efforts to write about Tankers—and later to include Ontos crewmen as well—could have been one of merely gathering and editing for publication hundreds of stories based upon the written articles, previously recorded interviews, and real-time interviews of Vietnam vets unconnected to the context of the Vietnam War itself. This would be of interest primarily to those who related their own personal experiences. Publishing the personal experience stories in chronological order would also offer little added value for the labor-intensive effort of our Foundation’s volunteers. Alternatively, another option was to just stick to the presentation of the impersonal unit command chronology format with little involvement of the personal side of the war. The thinking then—and confirmed time and again subsequently—was that not even the contributors would read the finished product. In short, we decided to go with a hybrid of the non-contextual sea story within the framework provided by the by-month chronologically produced battalion-level and above-command chronologies. Now when reading the story of the warrior’s fight, the reader will be able to better understand, when provided the context of where, when, and which supported infantry unit(s) the fight describes from his perspective what actually took place. So these volumes are hundreds of personal sea stories placed in the framework of military history.

In addition, Foundation-conducted interviews of dozens of Marine veterans, other than members of the tracked vehicle community, provide an even broader picture of the significant role tracks played in the success of hundreds of offensive operations they supported. The Foundation maintains a library of approximately three hundred books from which are drawn quotations and which provide background information about the many-facetted Vietnam War. The citing and attribution of sources convention is provided with the bibliography.

In addition to these primary sources, the Foundation’s staff has researched the official records of the U.S. Marine Corps; records of other military and civilian organizations—both U.S. and allied—when appropriate; the Marine Corps’ Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division; Texas Tech archives; Veterans’ History Project of the Library of Congress; comment files of the Marine’s History and Museum Division; and pertinent published primary and secondary works featured, among other publications, in the Leatherneck, Marine Corps Gazette, and Vietnam magazines. Although none of the information in this history is classified, some of the documentation on which it is based still may have a classified designation. Comment drafts of the manuscript were reviewed by several persons, most of whom were directly associated with the events they describe, and many of their remarks have been incorporated into the narrative. Lists of all those interviewed, another providing names of the authors of personal stories, and interviewees are included in the appendices.

I have used the actual names of the Marines who have been cited in this book. Those authors who have had the latitude and propensity to choose disguises for their characters by using fictional names and, possibly, backgrounds have exercised an option not available to those who write history. In those areas where quotes are used, except for excerpts taken directly from printed documents, there is an attempt at capturing what the character may have said or thought under the circumstances detailed. For example, as a lieutenant strained his vision through the rain and blowing salty ocean mist, made more difficult by the pitching ship responding to the lifts and drops of 5-foot waves, to identify the intended landing beach, he reviewed his planned deployment of his Marines and the several possible variables he may have missed. He thought out loud, Have I covered everything? Have I trained my men well enough? How will I react in the face of possible injury or dying? While the lieutenant may not have actually said this, those thoughts crossed every small-unit leader’s mind in similar situations. It is considered as creative nonfiction, which adds depth, realism, and humanness to otherwise often rather dry situations without altering the situation.

The production of this volume has been a cooperative effort of the present and past members of the History Foundation. The manuscript was prepared under the editorial direction of Raymond A. Stewart, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret) and president and founder of the Marine Corps Vietnam Tankers Historical Foundation. The authors, of course, assume sole responsibility for the content of the text, including opinions expressed and any errors in fact.

Foundation Editorial Staff

Acknowledgements

Dr. Fred Allison, Major USMC (Ret), Marine Corps History Division, Chief, Oral History Section has supported the research and writing of the history of Marine tank and antitank participation in the Vietnam War. He has obtained for us from the archives every recorded interview that appears in this historical series. He has also been no farther away from offering sound advice and guidance than a phone call or email.

Colonel Walt Ford, USMC (Ret) Former Leatherneck magazine editor who provided me support and encouragement with this effort and published other associated articles.

Aryn Wilhite, who volunteered to organize our library, retype, and format more than one hundred stories and wrote a number of oral history summaries and verbatim transcripts of interviews provided by Marines several of which were given as the Marine was fresh from the fight.

Dick Carey, who founded the USMC Vietnam Tankers Association (VTA) and its newsletter - the Sponson Box and then joined the Foundation to establish our monthly e-letter, the Breech Block. Though his active participation and day-to-day involvement in the work of the Foundation slowed as his health issues necessarily limited his activity, his support never flagged.

Lloyd Pappy Reynolds, who created and maintained the Foundation’s award-winning website, edited the Breech Block, conceived, developed, and maintained the one-of-a-kind map history and was the rock upon which the Foundation remained anchored over the years not enough attaboys are adequate to convey my appreciation for his can-do support.

Colonel Dick Camp, USMC (Ret) generously granted the Foundation use of his many articles and books many of which cite the action of Marine tanks and Ontos.

Eric Hammel mentored and the encouraged me to undertake this project and provided a model to emulate. Years ago, when I first contacted Eric in mid-January of 2002 with my thoughts of writing the history of Marine armor in Vietnam, he asked, Ray, sounds good. When do you plan to have this effort completed and on the street. I said, I’d guess some time in November. Ah, says he, November is a good month to get a book out. And what year do you have in mind?"

Oscar Ed Gilbert has written about Marine tanks in a number of books and articles and I have quoted and paraphrased him heavily from his book Marine Corps Tank Battles in Vietnam. He gives life to his tank stories that provides them depth and credibility with the actual words of the interviewed Tanker Warrior. He is second to none in the art of the interview.

Tom Snyder found me in 1999, which was the first step in putting this history-writing project in motion. Tom has a noteworthy memory and has shared his many stories, memorabilia, and recollections for the book. Tom’s health has limited his active participation of late but never his loyalty and dedication to the effort.

And Julie Stewart, my wife for nearly sixty years, who balanced our family budget to include thousands of dollars to run the Foundation and to produce the Marine Corps Tanks and Ontos in Vietnam. She can recognize me primarily from the back of my head because that’s what she’s seen the most of me nearly every day for more than fifteen years- glued to my computer screen and plucking away on the keyboard. She has copyrighted the phrase Just get it done, Ray!.

For all the contributors for the personal stories, phone and 1:1interviews, articles, material, funding, and sweat equity. You know who you are and you are too many to personally cite here. I hope the finished product meets with you approval and that I’ve done you and the Tanker and Ontos Community the service you deserve.

And I shall not forget those who said that I couldn’t do this. You took every measure to deny me access to our Brother Tankers and Ontos crewmen; actively thwarted our effort; and posited that we possessed neither the talent nor the funds. Your opposition provided no small amount of fuel to the fire of accomplishing our self-assigned mission. We’ve done this for our Brother Tankers and Ontos crewmen not because of but in spite of you: it’s called Loyalty. And you too know who you are and what you are not.

Introduction

The idea of a book to chronicle the Vietnam War exploits of Marine Tankers and our Ontos crewman brothers has been around for a long time and nearly twenty years now since the Foundation has undertaken that project. This is how the project came together.

Members of the Foundation’s board of directors and Foundation’s book committee agreed to take on specifically identified tasks and projects to address each part of the six-volume series. The series includes major/named operations, time lines, unit designations, and locations - for starters. Also provided is the chain of each battalion’s command and staff to include company commanders and key staff officers. And there is the Foundation’s ongoing effort to gather personal stories of Tankers and Ontos crewmen. This effort will not stop with the launching of each volume. Rather, we expect, at least initially, that there will be an increase in interest and the submission of personal stories.

Along the chronological format path are many personal stories told by Ontos crewmen and Tankers. Most of the personal recollections agree with the official version, but many do not. Occasionally, participants in the same fight have differing thoughts on many of the details of the who, what, where, when and often the why of an outcome. A Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations, and Acronyms; a composite list of Personal Awards for Valor; recognition, by name, of author-contributors; a list of financial supporters; a bibliography; a reading list of books and publications of interest; and links to websites, including the Foundation’s are also provided.

We began the decades-long journey of compiling material for writing this publication with the Foundation’s logo directed to the Tankers and Ontos crewmen: You made history. Your Foundation is making it known.

Important Note to Readers and Researchers

Because the historical series has been drawn from a multitude of sources, we have used a streamlined citing convention that will both facilitate the reading of the material and rapidly lead the reader to the source of the material in the most convenient way. Go to the Foundation’s website http://www.mcvthf.org and follow the prompts to annex G-1, the source-citing key, and annex G-2, which identifies the source. For example, a quote or a suggested reading may be (SF-EM). Should the reader desire additional details, it’s a matter of accessing annex G-2 and locating SF-EM, which is listed alphabetically. Adjacent to SF-EM, one will find Semper Fi: Vietnam: From Da Nang to the DMZ Marine Corps Campaigns, 1965–1975 by Edward F. Murphy. Murphy’s book is a supersized Reader’s Digest of the U.S. Marines in Vietnam by-year series that covers the entire Marines’ piece of the Vietnam War. For even more detailed information, simply email or call the VTHF, and we will answer your questions or address your comments. You will not have to acquire a copy of Semper Fi by purchase or from your local library. We have it in our Foundation library to assist in your research. Additionally, in some circumstances, we can lend a copy of a publication or possibly purchase a copy for you at a reduced rate.

Book 1 introduced the strategy for fighting and winning the Vietnam War expressed in phases. To review, read the following:

Strategy

Defense (April to December 1965) (Book 1, volume 1)

In March, the 173rd Airborne Brigade and 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade arrived. That same month, the U.S. Navy began to shut down the North Vietnamese coastal shipping operation that had been going on for some ten years. The South Vietnamese had done some damage to this Communist shipping, but with the larger U.S. naval resources, the Communist shipping was reduced to a trickle. In June, an Australian infantry battalion arrived, as did the first South Korean units. The U.S. Air Force began using B-52s for bombing targets in South Vietnam. Throughout the summer, more U.S. troops began to arrive, including the 1st Cavalry Division and its hundreds of helicopters. But there were only twenty-two U.S. infantry battalions in the country by the end of 1965, and the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were ready to fight it out. Two major campaigns were fought that year. In Operation STARLITE during August, the Marines killed over seven hundred Communist troops and rendered the 1st VC Regiment inoperative. Operation PIRANHA followed in a similar amphibious operation. The year ended with 185,000 American troops in Vietnam and the fighting increasing.

Counteroffensive (January to June 1966) (Book 1, volume 2)

In January, the 1st Marine Division arrived. More troops arrived throughout the year, many to fill out divisions that had begun arriving piecemeal in 1965. The ground fighting increased throughout the year as U.S. and South Vietnamese forces went after areas that had become Viet Cong strongholds. During this period, the largest operation was MASHER, where the 1st Cavalry Division, plus Korean and South Vietnamese units, spent forty-two days fighting Communist troops in Binh Dinh Province. Toward the end, there was a linkup with U.S. Marines nearby. The enemy suffered over six thousand casualties.

Counteroffensive Phase II (July 1966 to May 1967) (Book 1, volume 2 and Book 2, volume 3)

The tempo of American offensive operations picked up. Many American ground units were now often in constant action. The Communists were less and less willing to stand and fight. By avoiding contact, the Communist troops had to give up ground. It appeared (and claimed by COMUSMACV) that American tactics were winning. In September 1966, the United States began using defoliants (Agent Orange and the like). By the end of 1966, the United States had 385,000 troops in South Vietnam. The bombing of North Vietnam became more intense, and the Marines moved into the DMZ (demilitarized zone) between North and South Vietnam.

Counteroffensive Phase III (June 1967 to January 1968) (Book 2, volumes 3 and 4)

By the end of 1967, there were nearly half a million U.S. troops in Vietnam. There were seventy-two infantry battalions, eleven armor battalions, and fifty-nine artillery battalions. The Viet Cong were steadily losing control of more and more of the population, while North Vietnamese combat units, under heavy pressure from American troops, were often forced to retreat into Laos or Cambodia to rebuild. By the end of 1967, Cambodia gave the United States permission to enter Cambodia and attack Communist bases there. In January 1968, the Communist siege of Khe Sanh began. Four months earlier, the base had been established as part of an effort to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. U.S. commanders saw this attack as a desperate Communist attempt to achieve a decisive victory. American government spokesmen proclaimed that the end was in sight and that the Communists were just about beaten.

Tet Counteroffensive (February to April 1968) (Book 2, volume 4)

The Communists read the situation differently. Although they were taking a beating out in the bush, all this fighting was sending hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing for the cities. It wasn’t safe out in the countryside with all those search and destroy operations and H&I fires. And the Americans provided free food in the cities. But the Viet Cong provided political cadres who preached armed resistance against the Americans and their South Vietnamese puppets. The Communists thought all this strife and preaching were having the desired effect and that a major attack on South Vietnam’s cities would enable the people to join the Viet Cong fighters and win the war in one dramatic uprising (a bit of Marxist popular uprising romanticism there). It didn’t work out that way. The Tet Offensive began at the end of January 1968 during a truce for the Lunar New Year. The Tet Offensive was a desperate attempt by the Communists to reverse their sinking fortunes, and it failed. For the next two years, the Communists lay low and rebuilt their combat capability.

Counteroffensive Phase IV (May to June 1968) (Book 2, volume 4)

After Tet, U.S. military forces rushed to take advantage of the enormous Communist losses.

Counteroffensive Phase V (July to November 1968) (Book 2, volume 4)

The Paris Peace Talks had begun but were off to a bad start. In October, President Johnson halted the bombing of North Vietnam in order to move the Paris Peace Talks along. It didn’t help much as the North Vietnamese saw this as a sign of American weakness. South Vietnam refused to get involved in the Paris Peace Talks. Richard Nixon was elected president on the issue of getting America out of Vietnam with his promise of a secret plan to end the war. 1968 ended with the start of the Counteroffensive.

Phase VI (December 1968 to February 1969) (Book 2, volume 4 and Book 3, volume 5)

followed by:)

Tet 69 Counteroffensive (March to June 1969) (Book 3, volume 5)

Summer–Fall 1969 (July to October 1969) (Book 3, volume 5)

Winter–Spring 1970 (November 1969 to April 1970) (Book 3, volumes 5 and 6)

Sanctuary Counteroffensive (May to June 1970). (Book 3, volume 6)

Counteroffensive Phase VII (July 1970 to June 1971). (Book 3, volume 6)

Consolidation I (July to November 1971). (Book 3, volume 6)

Consolidation II (December 1971 to March 1972). (Book 3, volume 6)

Cease-Fire (April 1972 to January 1973). (Book 3, volume 6)

image002.jpg

Five provinces of South Vietnam’s I Corps (GB-67)"

As 1966 ended, the Marines were fighting two different but interrelated sub wars: the 3d Marine Division was embroiled in developing and implementing a basically conventional war in the northern provinces of I Corps and specifically along the DMZ in a free fire zone environment with few local Vietnamese civilians to contend with. While the 1st Marine Division in the southern provinces of I Corps, Marine units were heavily involved in civic action operations and concerns with combinations of large-unit search-and-clear and counter guerrilla operations south of the Hai Van Pass. Tankers and Ontos crewmen of the 1st Tank and 1st Antitank Battalions tell a quite different story of the war that they fought than those Marines of the 3d Tank and 3d Antitank Battalions. The list of Purple Heart and personal valor medal recipients tells their stories.

Five provinces of South Vietnam’s I Corps (GB-67)

image003.jpg

Five provinces of I Corps Tactical Zones, map sheets (GB-67)

As the Marine forces were growing in I Corps, its numbers paled in comparison to those of the forces running the campaign at MACV headquarters in Saigon.

Here, from the U.S. Army in Vietnam, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967 by Graham A. Cosmas, CMH Pub 91-6, Cloth; CMH Pub 91-6-1, Paper 2006; and 524 pages, maps, illustrations, charts, bibliographical note, is a synopsis.

During the period between President Johnson’s troop commitment decisions of July 1965 and the end of 1967, the United States attempted to win the war in Vietnam by an escalating application of its military power on the ground in South Vietnam and in the skies over North Vietnam and Laos.

Also, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, directed much but not all this effort. In the process, MACV grew from an advisory and support organization into what amounted to the headquarters of a field army of American and allied troops actively battling a growing enemy main force. Yet at the same time, MACV continued to be responsible for equipping, training, and advising the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. It also took a major part in the American mission’s effort to promote a stable, constitutional, democratic Saigon government, and it became the central directing agency for an ambitious new American-sponsored try at pacifying the South Vietnamese countryside.

Beyond the boundaries of South Vietnam, MACV, in not always harmonious collaboration with American authorities in Vientiane [Cambodia] and Bangkok [Thailand], conducted a covert air and ground war in Laos. It also cooperated, and at times quarreled, with CINCPAC over the bombing campaign against North Vietnam. As MACV’s missions proliferated, its organization grew in size and complexity. The expansion was largely ad hoc and unplanned, with new agencies springing up or hiving off of old ones and command relationships being improvised under pressure of circumstances and service interests as allied strength mushroomed to over half a million American, Australian, South Korean, New Zealand, Filipino, and Thai.

Inevitably, each new mission and each policy or institutional conflict brought an organizational response, as did each fresh initiative from an administration in Washington increasingly desperate to achieve some measurable amount of progress in the war. Enlarging the headquarters, filled with office pinkies, noncombatants, and conscience objectors, light years away from the field was the toxic result.

In Allied Participation in Vietnam by Lieutenant General Stanley Robert Larsen and Brigadier General James Lawton Collins Jr., they write, More than forty nations provided assistance to the Republic of Vietnam in its struggle against North Vietnam. This aid ranged from economic and technical assistance to educational and humanitarian contributions. Hundreds of Free World civilians worked in Vietnam as doctors, teachers, and technical specialists. Eight nations also provided military assistance. The flags of these Free World countries—the United States, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of China, and Spain—flew alongside the colors of the Republic of Vietnam at the headquarters of the Free World Military Assistance Forces in Saigon. The military contributions of these nations included combat troops, army medical teams, and individual political warfare advisers. The degree of assistance and co-operation among the concerned Free World nations resulted from years of work and involvement.

As the Vietnam War entered its third year—1967—the Marine Corps’ III MAF occupied the bases it established throughout I Corps’ five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam with eighteen infantry battalions supported by two tank and two antitank battalions. The Marine Corps’ responsibility stretched nearly 230 miles from the southern border of Quang Ngai, shared with the northern border of II Corps, to the northern border of I Corps’ Quang Tri Province and the southern extremity of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating South Vietnam from North Vietnam following the general west-east flow of the Song Cua Viet. With the twenty-one fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft squadrons of the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW) and the massive logistic support facilities, III MAF totaled more than 71,000 Marines and sailors in I CTZ. In addition to this total, not counted with the II MAF’s total were the Navy’s 7th Fleet Amphibious Ready Groups’ (ARG) three or four ships with its Special Landing Force (SLF) comprising a Marine Battalion landing team (BLT) with attached tank and antitank units and supporting air and logistics support units embarked.

The early 1967 configuration of the Marine forces was a reflection and result of the enemy’s two major incursions across the DMZ in mid to late 1966. For starters, the emphasis to meet this new threat resulted in some 10,000 Marines being shifted north and forced the realignment of operational commands and organizational reconfiguration and responsibilities within III MAF. I Corps was parsed, with the 3d Marine Division committed to the two northern provinces.

image005.1.jpg

Two northern provinces comprising 3d Marine Divisions’ TAORs

Quang Tri and Thua Thien—under the command of Major General Wood B. Kyle and the main 3d Division’s command post—moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai. Seven of the Corps’ eighteen battalions were now committed to the northern area of I Corps, north of the Hai Van Pass.

The 1st Marine Division shifted north as well, with its headquarters moving from Chu Lai to Da Nang, leaving Task Force X-ray of four battalions at Chu Lai with the addition of three battalions of Korean Marines. Of interest was that the command relationship with the Korean Marines was one of cooperation and coordination (GB-67). The reality, however, was that the cooperation and coordination was checkered, and relations were often strained and tenuous as explained by the Tankers and Ontos crewmen who were there.

As confusing as the command situation was, with the decision in late 1966 to reestablish the intratheater unit rotation program between Marine battalions in Vietnam and Regimental Landing Team 26 (RLT-26) on Okinawa, the command and control was made even more difficult. Confusion notwithstanding, RLT-26 was a part of the newly activated 5th Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, in June of 1966. This decision facilitated the planned withdrawal of infantry battalions and occasionally their supporting units from South Vietnam to Okinawa for a one-to-two-month refitting and retraining cycle.

In northern I Corps, arrayed against the Marine forces was a well-organized, well-equipped, highly trained, professional, and dedicated enemy organized into a well-defined hierarchy ranging from local, part-time, village-based guerillas to Main Force Viet Cong (VC) units to North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions under Military Region control. And to the north of—and within—the DMZ were four NVA divisions. MACV, in response to this preponderance of enemy forces, shifted the just-added Army units north to reinforce III MAF’s Marines. Additionally, plans continued to build the McNamara Line. In response to the buildup by the NVA during the always-violated cease-fire truces, permission was eventually given the Marines to attack the safe haven military targets within and to the north of the DMZ (GB-67).

So one may ask, "Where was the Army of the Republic of [South] Vietnam [ARVN] in all the meeting of new threats and the moving north of Marine and Army units to confront the North Vietnamese Army [NVA] divisions massing along [and within] the DMZ. According to U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese—1967 (GB-67), the ARVN I Corps—shared its tactical zone of action with the III MAF. With South Vietnamese Army, Ranger, and Marine units, a total of thirty-four infantry battalions and with Regional (RF) and Popular (PF) forces included, brought the total of South Vietnamese troops to seventy seven thousand in the five provinces of I CTZ.

The South Vietnamese Joint General Staff and U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), promulgated the Combined Campaign Plan for 1967. The objectives were threefold:

• To counter rapidly any threat of invasion across the I Corps northern borders

• To destroy VC/North Vietnamese Army units attempting to disrupt the government’s expanding control over the populated areas

• To ensure the security of the base areas and lines of communication they were enabling the government to expand its control

This had been the basic plan in 1966, but the new strategy assigned to the South Vietnamese Army units was the responsibility for the pacification effort, freeing it from its tactical tasks by giving the U.S. forces the primary mission of carrying the bulk of the offensive effort against the VC and the North Vietnamese. The Marine leadership¹ did not see this shift in responsibility in any way to be at the expense of U.S. pacification efforts. And at the same time, III MAF’s mission still included the defense of the three large base areas which contained the five principal I CTZ airfields.

The enemy forces that the Marines of III MAF and I Corps ARVN faced was a hierarchy of enemy units ranging from local, part-time (GVN-supported) guerrillas to conventional North Vietnamese Army divisions controlled by a complex but fairly well-defined command and control system. Every organization took its orders directly (or indirectly) from Hanoi. They were clear, concise, and not open to local modification or to question.

Hanoi also parsed South Vietnam by regions similar to but functionally much different than that of Saigon’s, of specific interest to the Marines in I Corps, the North Vietnam-designated region, which included Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The region was commanded by an NVA general with two infantry divisions—the 2d NVA Division, also known as the 620th, composed of two NVA regiments, and the 1st VC Regiment, which operated in the Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces. The 1st VC Regiment faced off against the Marines earlier in Operation STARLITE and PIRANHA, coming up short in the body count score.

North of the DMZ were four more NVA divisions: the 304th, the 320th, the 324B, and the 325C. The 324B suffered heavy casualties in the fights with the 3d Marine Division during July and August of the previous year (1966) and had withdrawn back across the DMZ to lick their wounds and refit. These NVA units, operating along the DMZ, were protected from attack by the U.S. forces with the American-stated policy prohibiting such action. As one could guess, this policy was disagreed with by the Marines. However, in response to the enemy challenge in the DMZ area, MACV implemented two sets of contingency plans by the end of 1966. First, COMUSMACV would introduce Army units into I Corps to reinforce the Marines as it deemed necessary. The second was to build an elaborate anti-infiltration barrier system south of the DMZ to seal off NVA incursions. As the III MAF Marines struggled to fight both a counterinsurgency war against the VC and conventional war against the NVA, both actions would have dominant and profound effect upon its operations in 1967.

Edward E. Murphy writes in his Semper Fi, 3d Marine Division. As 1967 began, Operation Prairie was still in effect in Quang Tri Province. To protect the province against any invading NVA, Brig. Gen. Michael P. Ryan, commander, 3d Marine Division (Forward) and assistant division commander, had six infantry battalions, two recon companies, and a variety of supporting units. The major bases from which these units operated began on the east at Gio Linh, ten kilometers inland from the South China Sea and just below the DMZ. Fifteen kilometers southwest sat Con Thien. Twenty kilometers south of Gio Linh was Dong Ha, the province’s largest combat base and the command post for the 3d Marine Division (Forward). Cam Lo was located ten kilometers west of Dong Ha on Route 9. The 12th Marines’ artillery pieces, along with a battery of U.S. Army 175mm guns, occupied Camp Carroll, seven kilometers farther west on Route 9. An intermediate base was at the Rockpile, another ten kilometers west. The last, and most westerly, of the Marines’ combat bases in Quang Tri Province was Khe Sanh, just a few kilometers east of the Laotian border (SF-EM).

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Da Nang area: location of tank and antitank (Ontos) battalion HQs (VTHF by Lloyd Reynolds)

(Note to Researcher/Reader: The Foundation has distilled every available tank and antitank monthly command chronology that details tank and Ontos participation for the entire duration of the Vietnam War. To cut to the chase, many of the administrative and logistics issues faced from time-to-time by every organization—shortages of manning and staffing both in numbers and training for the job and difficulties in obtaining repair/replace equipment and parts—are not routinely addressed in this series. While no organization can go to the fight without this critical support, detailing it here would make the publication impossibly difficult.

Operation PRAIRIE 1/DECKHOUSE IV commenced on 3 August of last year (1966) and ended on 31 January. It lasted 182 days involving thirteen battalions in a 1st Marine Division operation in the Con Thien/Gio Linh areas of the DMZ.

VC/NVA KIA: 1,397

US KIA: 215

(See volume 2 for details)

Operation DESOTO commenced on 26 January and ended on 7 April. It lasted seventy-two days involving five battalions in a 1st Marine Division operation in Quang Ngai Province.

VC/NVA KIA: 383

US KIA: 76

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Da Nang area: location of 1st Tanks and H&S Company HQ (VTHF by Lloyd Reynolds)

January 1967

First Tanks

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Clayborne

Executive Officer: Major R. D. McKee

Operations Officer: Captain F. U. Salas

Logistics Officers: Captain G. E. Hooker and Major D. P. Crudup

Location and Operations Summary: Battalion CP Da Nang (AT 998722)

The month of January found the 1st Tank Battalion in basically the same position as last January. H&S Company, in addition to providing the logistical and maintenance support for two gun companies, spent considerable time and effort improving the Battalion cantonment area and defensive posture. The weather, paucity of building materials, and the manpower-intensiveness required of the effort were just a few of the obstacles to overcome.

Company B remained DS 9th Marines.

Company C remained DS 1st Marines.

During the month of January, elements of Company B participated in Operation CLEVELAND.

H&S CO: Captain J. C. Winther

Location: Same as Bn CP

CP security with patrols comprising primarily H&S Company personnel. The assignment to the reaction force was one sought after by most and one of the many additional duties that never lacked for volunteers.

Tiger Doctor

by Steve Patton

I arrived in-country in January of 1967 aboard the World War II troopship, the USS General Walker. When we landed at Da Nang, RVN, it was like an old movie. With all my gear, I joined 2,500 other Marines going over the side of the ship on rope ladders into a landing craft and making a beach landing, prepared to assault on a Da Nang schoolyard. With seabag, deuce (782) gear, flak jacket, helmet, and rifle with, of course, no ammo, we arrived on the beach.

My orders were to proceed to a palm tree with the number 12 on it. Now picture a large treed area with 2,499 Marines standing around the trees and me, by myself, watching everyone being loaded up on trucks and going off in all directions. Standing tall and proud, I waited. After an hour, I sat down and leaned back against my tree. I thought that after twenty-three days at sea and a beach landing, I occupied my tree in the Da Nang schoolyard, not knowing what type of unit I would be going to and not knowing that my time in Vietnam would be composed of mostly working by myself.

About that time, I was thinking of finding a chow hall when a rust-colored jeep came by and asked me where I was going. I pointed to the number on the tree, and in unison, they said, Tanks. So I got in this jeep with three young Marines who were wearing the same rust-colored uniforms. My Marine Corps green gear looked too good as we headed for the tank park on a hill called 55.

When the jeep arrived, two Marines in those funny rust-colored uniforms greeted me, and the big question was, What was my MOS? When I told them 2171 Optics, it was as though I was a visiting officer. And by the way, during our trip to Hill 55, my bright-green uniform had mysteriously changed to that rust color like the rest of the troops.

A larger-than-life corporal took me in tow. His name was Ollie Olson. He proceeded to explain the large shortage of MOS 2171 optics and 2151 mechanics in Vietnam. To care for the fifty-plus M48A3 tanks in a perfect world, a crew of twenty or so, plus staff NCOs and officers, was needed to do the job. In the 3d Tank Battalion, there were two peons and a mustang warrant officer named WO Herring. The two men comprised a short-timer who was leaving in two days and Ollie who had less than two weeks in-country … and now me.

Ollie grabbed some of my gear, and we headed in to camp. We stopped by his maintenance shack (office), and he grabbed a big manual. Then we dropped my gear in a hardback tent and had a late lunch at the mess hall. For the next couple of hours, I was introduced to the workings of the hydraulics and electronics of the M48A3 Patton tank. At this time, a new Tiger Doctor was born. Ollie named me the Little General.

One of the most important lessons I learned from an old salt was when you hear incoming rockets or mortars, they are already past you. He said, You will never hear the one that hits you. So why worry? You just needed to get as close to Mother Earth as you can, then ‘Carry on, Marine.’

My routine, of sorts, was to visit as many tank companies a week as possible, do an inspection of the systems, and record the condition of each tank I inspected. After I got to 3d Tank Battalion (forward) at the Dong Ha Combat Base, I made a 4/8 billboard that showed every tank, its location, and its status. After each day, I would update the board myself or call into the maintenance chief. Then I could order parts and many times go FSG and get them.

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Dong Ha tank park (Photo by Steve Patton)

In the thick of the action after the 1968 Tet Offensive, I took a trip by LST from Dong Ha to Da Nang to recycle a couple of tanks. I went to the Dong Ha boat ramp (which was not much of a harbor). The two tank retrievers had brought down the deadlined tanks, and the LST backed up to the muddy landing with his boarding ramp down. The LST revved its engines high to keep in position as the retriever crew, with their Confederate flag flying, pushed the first tank onboard. The operation went quite well. Then the number 2 tank started to get pushed on board the LST behind number 1. The boat crew had not had time to winch the first tank out of the way, and even though we all spoke English, the retriever crew did not understand the boat crew yelling for them to wait.

The retriever was at full power pushing number 2 tank against number 1 and sliding both on deck. All was going well when the LST lost power, and in a flash, the LST was pushed out in the channel. The retriever, unable to stop and still hooked to the number 2 tank, dropped unceremoniously into the river. Being still hooked by the push bar, it languished for a second and then dropped down into 10 feet of water. All that was showing above the waterline was the antenna and that Confederate flag.

One by one, the crew popped up from the muddy water, spitting and cussing. The LST crew ran to secure the tanks and to keep them on deck. Once all was OK, the comedy of it brought raucous laughter from all. The retriever crew climbed up on to the bank, and they were joined by a few rats that had made the retriever their home. My sides hurt from all that laughing. With the help of six-by-six trucks, tow trucks, and a bunch of cables, the retriever was pulled up the bank and onto the loading ramp area. Water poured out of every hole, and the engine was sending up a plume of steam. The retriever door handle was pulled, and a gush of water helped drain the crew compartment. Along with the water, several large carp-like fish that had been sucked in also shot out, and many of the local civilians dove in to the muddy mess trying to catch the fish.

I often wondered if someone of the forty or fifty people who had gathered to gawk at the spectacle had taken pictures. The LST returned to the beach, and a few other busted trucks and some supplies were loaded up. Then I got on board for the ride to Da Nang. I was standing on the port side as we headed down the river headed toward the ocean when a crewman called to me to come in and have lunch. He told me that snipers shot at the boats as they went up and down the river, so I should stay inside.

I love the Marine Corps, don’t get me wrong. But when I entered the boat’s galley, I was weak in the knees. Baskets of fresh fruit were lying on the tables, and everything was spotless. Such quality I hadn’t seen since my grocery store produce management days back in the US of A. As I sat down, I was asked if l wanted a steak. And what a steak it was: with all the trimmings!

After months of C-rations and maybe a trip to the mess hall once a week, I was wondering if I had joined the right branch of the service. After lunch, I crawled into a small bunk along the passageway and laid my head on my pack. I was out like a light. I stayed asleep until we arrived in Da Nang Harbor. I disembarked the boat and turned in my paperwork when I found out that my new tanks would be loaded the next afternoon.

For the overnight, I went to the in-country R&R Center at China Beach and spent the evening in the outdoor theater, drinking warm San Miguel beer in a tropical downpour. The movie was Cool Hand Luke. The next afternoon, I boarded the LST with two brand-new tanks and spent a beautiful night sailing back to Dong Ha.

This was just a couple of my days as a Tiger Doctor in Vietnam.

Steve Patton

CO Company A: Captain C. R. Brabec

Location: Chu Lai (BT 515040)

Company A (Rein), 1st Tank Battalion, is within the Chu Lai tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). This company has a strength of five Marine officers, 121 Marine enlisted, and two Navy enlisted. The 1st Tank Battalion retains AdCon of Company A.

CO Company B: Captain L. E. Cherico

Location and Operations Summary: Da Nang (AT 945763)

At 071800H, the 3d Platoon, Company B, moving to Hill 22 (AT 953667) with an infantry L/3/7, received approximately fifty rounds of SA fire from vicinity (AT 950667), resulting in four infantry personnel WIA. Tanks fired eleven rounds HE, one round WP, and two hundred rounds .30-caliber MG. One VC was observed hit by fire.

At 171145H, the 1st Platoon, Company B, on Hill 41 (AT 934664) observed three VC, armed with rifles, moving in an easterly direction in vicinity (AT 949653). Tanks fired several rounds HE. No search was conducted due to lack of infantry in the area.

At 171145H, the 1st Platoon, Company B, on Hill 41 (AT 934664) observed two VC armed with rifles moving westward in vicinity (AT 925656). Tanks fired one round HE, resulting in two VC KIA (C).

The 3d Platoon, Company B, participated in Operation CLEVELAND during the period 24–25 January supporting elements of 2/4 and 2/26, in grid squares (AT 8870, 8970, 9070, and 9271).

(Foundation note: Operation CLEVELAND is not cited in the Green Books, i.e., GBs, and no further details are provided in the 1st Tanks January command chronology.)

CO Company C: Captain P. S. Weigand

Location and Operations Summary: Da Nang (BT 066715) and (BT 075678)

At 101755H, a tank of the 2d Platoon, Company C, detonated a mine at (BT 109647), resulting in moderate damage to the tank and one tank crewman WIA (non-medevaced). The mine was buried in a sandy area and was estimated to weigh 100 pounds. The crater was 5 feet deep and 12 feet wide. Immediately after, the tank and infantry received fire from vicinity (BT 111651). Tank returned fire, resulting in five VC KIA (C) and three VC KIA (P). The damaged tank was retrieved to the Company CP.

At 121215H, the 2d Platoon, Company C, supporting 3/1, as a blocking force in position at (BT 091671), observed three VC running across a rice paddy in vicinity (BT 085674). Tanks fired five rounds HE. One VC was KIA (C), and one VC was WIA and was detained by the infantry.

In the early morning of 15 January 1967, the heavy section of the 2d Platoon, Company C, led by Sergeant John Bartusevics, was instrumental in repelling a VC attack of approximately one hundred VC against the perimeter (BT 054687) of the 2/K/3/1. Tanks moved into the overrun position by the VC and destroyed them with machine-gun fire. The tanks were credited with twenty VC.

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Silver Star

Silver Star

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Sergeant John Bartusevics (MCSN: 1897519), United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while serving as a Section Leader with the Second Platoon, Company C, First Tank Battalion, First Marine Division (Rein), FMF, in connection with combat operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. Early in the morning on 15 January 1967, Sergeant Bartusevics was directed to move his tank section to a position in support of elements of the Third Battalion, First Marines which were under attack by an estimated battalion of North Vietnamese troops augmented by local Viet Cong guerrillas. After arriving at the besieged area, he assessed the situation and quickly located the enemy within the defensive perimeter. Skillfully and aggressively, Sergeant Bartusevics directed the movement of his three tanks against the enemy. Realizing that the proximity of friendly troops eliminated the use of 90-mm. tank fire, he cautioned his tank commanders to attack the enemy forces using only their machine guns. Blinding the enemy with searchlights and directing extremely accurate fire, he aggressively led two of his tanks into the midst of the enemy forces. With complete disregard for his own safety, Sergeant Bartusevics boldly maneuvered his tank through the enemy positions until they fled in panic and confusion. Unhesitatingly, he directed one of his tanks to rescue four Marines, two of whom were wounded outside of the compound area. Continuing his attack, Sergeant Bartusevics led his tanks in pursuit of the fleeing enemy, inflicting heavy casualties and preventing them from reorganizing. Subsequently, he returned to the defensive position where he provided security for the evacuation of the wounded. Throughout, Sergeant Bartusevics’ tank section, under his skillful and resolute leadership, accounted for at least one third of the sixty-one confirmed enemy dead and sixty probably dead. By his exceptional professional skill and daring, he inspired all who observed him and contributed immeasurably to the successful accomplishment of an extremely hazardous mission. Sergeant Bartusevics’ extraordinary courage, bold leadership, and unswerving devotion to duty in the face of grave personal danger upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.

In oral history CD-332/577, Second Lieutenant Pasieka, platoon commander of 2d Platoon, K/3/1, described the fight: On the night of 14-15 January 67, an all-out V.C. sustained attack by a well-organized, meticulously rehearsed force of approximately one hundred well trained, armed, equipped enemy force. Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Pasieka, describes in great detail the location and layout of his defensive position and weapons type and placement located three thousand meters east of Rt 1, two thousand meters west of Marble Mtn. Also, the daily/nightly routine of patrols and sweeps. The 14 Jan night patrol triggered a pre-mature prepared attack on the defensive position. Subsequent follow-up patrol made additional contact with attacking enemy. Dozens of VC in waves, wearing helmets and flak jackets, supported by mortar fire, penetrated perimeter in some cases by VC throwing each other over the top of the defensive barbed wire and occupied positions within the perimeter e.g., mess tent. Two tigers (tanks) joined the fight cutting down fleeing VC dragging their casualties. Friendly casualties were collected and medevac’s called and completed. Defensive positions re-manned. Each of the defending Marines described in detail their individual efforts to defeat the VC attacking force – too many enemy to be accurately counted.

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(CC1TK/Jan ’67) (Permission from MarHistDiv)

In the early morning of 15 January 1967, the heavy section of the 2d Platoon, Company C, was instrumental in repelling a Viet Cong attack of a battalion of elite NVA sappers reinforced by local VC against a tiny patrol base manned by two Grunt platoons.

Here was how Sergeant Bartusevics briefly explained the battle to Oscar Ed Gilbert (TB-OG).

It was pitch dark in the middle of a moonless night when Bartusevics was awoken to man is three tanks and proceed to the rescue a Grunt outfit that was being overrun. Without any help from the SNCOIC (staff non-commissioned officer in charge), he went to work placing the some of the K/3/1 Grunts on his three tanks and the others in accompanying amtracs. He understood the urgency of his mission and chose a route to the fight scene that would be least apt to be ambushed by the enemy avoiding the MSR on a parallel track through rice paddies and thick vegetation. They arrived at a ‘mad house’: enemy sappers running every which was carrying armloads of explosives, dressed in only in shorts. Enemy RPG rounds were crisscrossing the compound. Marine bodies were strewn across the area so Bartusevics ordered his tanks to NOT button up in order to spot downed Grunts and use only their machine guns. The tanks fired and maneuvered against targets of opportunity, knocking out enemy machine guns and running over those enemy who had breached the perimeter dared challenge them. After several minutes, the intruders began to break. Now was the time to load the tanks’ 90mm canister rounds and decimate the fleeing survivors. After the battle more than sixty enemy bodies were counted, though the total was probably much more. The Marines suffered seventeen killed and thirty three wounded: none of them Tankers. The Grunt survivors blessed their Tanker Brothers for saving them from probable complete annihilation.

At 161300H, a light section of the 2d Platoon, Company C, supporting a K/3/1 reconnaissance group at (BT 072608) observed a group of VC fleeing into a rice paddy in vicinity (BT 072609). Tanks fired eight rounds HE, resulting in five VC KIA (C).

At 201410H the 2d Platoon, Company C, supporting K/3/1 conducting a sweep at (BT 111627), observed six VC running across a rice paddy in vicinity (BT 106629). Tanks fired HE and .50-caliber MG, resulting in two VC KIA (P). Rounds were observed to strike VC.

At 211230H, a section of tanks of the 2d Platoon, Company C, en route from Company C CP (BT 066715) to K/3/1 positions at (BT 0566) observed one VC running across sand flat at (BT 058650). Tanks fired two rounds HE. One VC KIA (C).

At 271300H a heavy section of the 2d Platoon, Company C, at (BT 074600), supporting elements of 3/1, received enemy fire from the tree line vicinity (BT 078678). Tanks fired eight rounds HE and two rounds canister. Infantry conducted a search of the area and found indications where four bodies had been pulled away. Four VC KIA (P).

(End of January 1st TKs)

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HQ 1st Antitank (Ontos) Battalion map by Lloyd Reynolds (VTHF Archives)

January 1967

First Antitanks

Commanding Officer: Major J. J. Keefe

Executive Officer: Major J. L. Saul

Operations Officer: Major J. J. Burke Jr.

Logistics Officer: Captain C. R. Van Horn

Location and Operations Summary: Da Nang (AT 991675)

Throughout the reporting period, subordinate units of this command were assigned missions as follows:

Company A, DS 1st Marines.

Company B (-), 2d Platoon, OpCon 2/5

3d Platoon 1–7 January DS 3/9

      8–14 January DS 3/7

      15–31 January GS First MarDiv

Company C (Rein) DS 7th Marines

H&S Company CO: Captain M. H. Collier

Location and Operations Summary: Da Nang (AT 991675)

CO Company A: Captain G. J. Forbes

Location and Operations Summary: Da Nang (AT 9913)

During the current reporting period, Company A has had OpCon and AdCon of its three organic gun platoons. The mission of the company continue to be DS 1st Marines.

Throughout the reporting period, the 1st Platoon has been DS 3/1, and the 2d Platoon has been in DS 2/1, the 3d Platoon DS 1/1.

Due to Company A’s CP being with the 1st Marine’s CP,