Marine Corps Tanks and Ontos in Vietnam: Book Three – 1969 to 1970+

By LtCol Ray Stewart USMC

Book 3, the last of a three-book series, continues from 1968 in book 2 to cover the action of Marine Corps Tankers and Ontos crewmen fighting the locally grown Viet Cong; the better armed, trained, organized, and equipped Viet Cong main forces; and the North Vietnamese Army regulars from 1969 through 1970+ in I Corps, South Vietnam. As in books 1 and 2 and continuing in book 3, it features hundreds of personal stories and on-the-spot, real-time interviews of Marines just returning from their fight, all of which are framed within the official unit command chronologies and after-action reports, including documented “lessons learned.” The maps, personal pictures, organizational charts, and the citing of each Marine who gave his life are also linked to the Vietnam Wall and to the Foundation’s website, with volumes of additional information about the Marines and Ontos crewmen who left their sweat and blood in Vietnam, battling their Communist enemy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Feb 5, 2021
• ISBN: 9781664151307

LtCol Ray Stewart USMC

Lieutenant Colonel Ray Stewart, USMC (Ret.), enlisted in 1955. He graduated from University of Idaho. He was commissioned as second lieutenant in 1964 and served two tours in Vietnam as a Tanker (1st and 3d Tanks), a Grunt (2/4), and the OpsO (S-3) of the Da Nang Defense Battalion. He was the CO of H&S Company, 2d Radio Battalion with a tour in Morocco. He was an instructor at Amphibious Warfare School (AWS). He served with the Jordan Arab Army in M48A3 tanks and later the PlnsO (N-5) with Navy’s Middle East Force, Bahrain. He was the first us Defense Attaché in Oman, where he introduced the M-60 tank to its armored regiment. He is an Arabic linguist, retiring after thirty years as an Arabian Peninsula intelligence officer (J-2), usCENTCOM. He is the founder and president of the Marine Corps Vietnam Tankers Historical Foundation. This book is the third in a three-book series.

Book preview

Copyright © 2021 by LtCol Ray Stewart, USMC (Ret).

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

Any people depicted in stock imagery provided by Getty Images are models, and such images are being used for illustrative purposes only.

Certain stock imagery © Getty Images.

Rev. date: 02/05/2021

Xlibris

844-714-8691

www.Xlibris.com

783398

Books in the Marine Corps Tanks and Ontos in Vietnam Series

Book One: Volume One (1965) and Volume Two (1966)

Book Two: Volume Three (1967) and Volume Four (1968)

Contents

Dedication

Foreword

Preface

Introduction

90 Days a Grunt

Button It Up And Move Out

Ahh, the Memories

A Tanker Talks—Thirteen Months and a Wake-Up

Recalling the Events of 24 March 1969

3d Tanks Retriever Ambush of 24 March ’69

A Bravo Company, 3d Tanks Retriever Story

Mike Brandi’s Sweet Cream Lady

What Did They Think I Was Doing? Where Did They Think I Was?

Corporal Jan Turtle Wendling, USMC

Frank Remkiewicz’s 1969 Story

The Best War Story—Marine Ontos–Style

The Law West of the Song Thu Bon

Maps and Diagrams

I Corps Tactical Zone Map Grids (GB-69)

Major 1st Marine Division Operations, 1969 (GB-69)

Major 3d Marine Division Operations, 1969 (GB-69)

Special Landing Force (SLF) Operations, 1969 (GB-69)

III MAF Command Relations (GB-69)

Allied Commands I Corps (GB-69)

Enemy Order of Battle, Southern ITZ (GB-69)

Operation PIPESTONE CANYON

3d Marine Division Operations, July–September 1969 (GB-69)

7th Marines Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS

VTHF Archives

Dedication

To the Marine Corps Tankers, Ontos crewmen, and those support Marines who made it possible to meet, fight, and defeat the local Viet Cong guerilla and the well-trained, organized, and equipped North Vietnamese professional soldiers for more than five years from 1965 through 1970.

Foreword

This is book 3 which comprises volumes 5 (1969) and 6 (1970+), of the planned three books with six by-year volumes of the operational and chronological series covering the participation of the Marine Corps’ tanks and Ontos in the Vietnam War.

After a thorough review, President Richard M. President Nixon adopted a policy of seeking to end United States military involvement in Vietnam either through negotiations or, failing that, turning the combat role over to the South Vietnamese. It was this decision that began the Vietnamization of the war in the summer of 1969 and which would soon greatly reduce and then end the Marine Corps’ combat role in the war. (GB-69)

Volume 5 (1969) reflects how the strategic shift in the United States’ policy for continuing the Vietnam War had on the Marine Corps’ deployment of Marine armor in the war. It was the beginning of the process referred to as the Vietnamization of the war, which, in the summer of 1969, would soon greatly reduce and then finally end the Marine Corps’ armored combat and then ultimately the entire Marine Corps’ role in the war.

The Marines of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) continued the full range of military and pacification activities within I Corps Tactical Zone during this period of transition.

The 3d Marine Division, employing highly mobile tactics replacing the large multibattalion search-and-destroy tactics measuring their success by body count, successfully blunted the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) efforts to reintroduce troops and supplies into Quang Tri Province north of the Hai Van Pass.

Paralleling the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Marine Division concentrated in Quang Nam Province and continued both mobile offensive and pacification operations to protect the city of Da Nang and surrounding population centers.

The 1st and 3d Marine Division’s operations resulted in the reduced employment of their armored assets in one sense, i.e., supporting large named operations while increasing their use by scattering its tanks and the few remaining Ontos throughout their respective areas of operation (AOR) singly or in pairs in somewhat static defensive roles.

Preface

Book 3 of the 3-book series Marines Corps Tanks and Ontos in Vietnam reflects the major shift in the US strategy with the goal of achieving Vietnamization of the South Vietnam military through the increased operational mobility of the US forces, leading to their ultimate stand-down. As with its two predecessors, this book is largely based on the holdings of the Marine Corps Historical Division, including the official unit’s monthly command chronologies, combat after-action reports, oral histories, personal papers, and reference collections of the History Division and the Marine Corps Vietnam Tankers Historical Foundation archives, further supplemented with research of the records of other allied and US military-associated civilian services, as well as pertinent published primary and secondary sources. Although none of the information in this historical series is presently classified, some of the documentation on which it is based still carries a restricted, sensitive, or classified designation.

Introduction

The fifth year (1969) of US involvement in the civil war in South Vietnam would prove to be one of change and transition. Though the basic objective of the war—helping the South Vietnamese government retain control of its country and population against assaults by the insurgent Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army regulars—remained unchanged, the methods of achieving that goal were being reevaluated. Even though North Vietnam’s 1968 Tet Offensive had failed militarily, essentially eliminating the Viet Cong as a viable opponent, the political ramifications of the countrywide attacks had forced the US government to turn away from enhanced American participation in favor of Vietnamization, or military self sufficiency for the ARVN. Edward F. Murphy, Semper Fi: Vietnam: From Da Nang to the DMZ, Marine Corps Campaigns, 1965–1975 [SF-EM]

As the sun rose on South Vietnam, garden spot of Southeast Asia, the allied forces of the United States, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the Philippines were making plans to wrap it up and head for their respective homes.

Here is an edited piece from the journal MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal,1968-1973 that sets up the scenario for the Marine Corps. Thin is the veil that covers the years’ long systemic rancor between the Army and the Marine Corps.

By late 1967, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) had grown from a small temporary advisory and assistance organization into a large permanent headquarters that directed more than half a million American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in a wide range of combat and pacification operations.

The MACV journal, the second of two volumes, examines the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. It specifically traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from the Communist Tet Offensive of early 1968 through the disestablishment of MACV in March 1973.

The three central themes of this second volume of the MACV journal are (1) the timely withdrawal of Marine Corps tanks and the remnants of antitank (Ontos) US forces from combat operations, (2) how the American effort to prepare South Vietnam’s military establishment to take over the defense of the country was supported by the Marine Corps, and (3) the steps toward the implementation of the anticipated Paris Peace Agreement of 1973.

On 31 March 1968, the United States entered a prolonged period of transition in its conduct of the Vietnam War. The Johnson administration devoted its last months to negotiating with the North Vietnamese and ultimately also with its South Vietnamese ally about the terms under which substantive peace talks could begin. At the same time, the administration avoided new decisions on the conduct of the war in South Vietnam. The Military Assistance Command, under General Creighton W. Abrams, General Westmoreland’s successor, thus was left to reformulate its own operational concepts, guided only by the realization that no more American reinforcements were coming and that the administration wanted movement toward turning the war over to the South Vietnamese.

The concept of General Abrams (COMUSMACV), 10 June ’68 to 30 June ’72) for fighting the war in South Vietnam was based on his own experience and on the policies, forces, and situation he inherited. During his year as deputy COMUSMACV (i.e., General Westmoreland’s Number 2) he had immersed himself in the problem of improving the South Vietnamese forces and also had overseen portions of the main force war at Dak To and in northern I Corps. General Abrams inherited a MACV strategy that was evolving toward a broad-front, simultaneous attack on all elements of the enemy. He knew that no more American reinforcements were coming and that the administration wanted MACV to begin turning the war over to the South Vietnamese in preparation for imminent American disengagement from the conflict.

In northern I Corps, General Abrams modified General Westmoreland’s strongpoint obstacle system (a.k.a. McNamara’s Wall, about which the Marine Corps mounted early disagreement) in the direction of a more mobile, technology-based defense. He retained the bases and strongpoints already built in the eastern half of the barrier and arranged for troops of the South Vietnamese 1st Division to garrison most of them. General Abrams considered this revised system more effective.

Three fights were defined and implemented for the redeployment of American and allied forces to be successful—tactical, air, pacification—one war.

Vietnamization, in both its troop withdrawal and RVNAF improvement aspects, came to dominate the Military Assistance Command’s planning and operations.

Service interests and budgetary considerations influenced the composition of the redeployments, notably in the case of the Marines. From the start of redeployment in mid-1969, General Abrams wanted to clear the 81,000 Marines out of Vietnam as rapidly as possible. Redeployment of all the Marines would simplify command and control in I Corps, and it would allow General Abrams to substitute Marine aviation units for Army infantry battalions in the critical early phases of the American withdrawal. Accordingly, the 3d Marine Division left northern I Corps in the first two redeployment increments in 1969 and General Abrams planned to send out the rest of III Marine Amphibious Force—the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing—in Increment Three during the first half of 1970.

MACV repositioned a number of US Army units in I Corps. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division took up positions along the DMZ, and the 101st Airborne Division spread out through Thua Thien Province. These two units made up the US Army’s XXIV Corps, which remained under the operational control of III MAF. To the south in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, the Americal Division continued to hold the southern reaches of the corps’ zone. This us Army division operated under III MAF’s direct control. The tempo of the war had changed as well. With the continued emphasis on Vietnamization, the large multi-battalion operations that had been the norm as recently as eight months before were now a relic. Besides not having the manpower to conduct such campaigns, the Marines were no longer encountering the enemy in the large formations of the past. Indeed, as 1969 ended, contact with enemy units larger skirmishes, rocket and mortar attacks, and, worst of all, booby traps. These devious devices caused the majority of casualties in the final months of Marine operations in South Vietnam. (SF-EM)

MACV’s plan met opposition from the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Army complained that, under projected funding and draft calls, it could not sustain the units General Abrams wanted to keep instead of the Marines. Headquarters Marine Corps argued that too-rapid redeployments would create insurmountable logistical and personnel management problems for the Corps. Less openly stated, the Marine commandant and his staff feared that being the first service out of combat in Vietnam would leave the Marines at a disadvantage in political battles over the budget and roles and missions.

The Joint Chiefs, respecting the Marines’ concerns, ruled that, at the end of 1969, it was desirable to retain appropriate combat representation from all services in Vietnam until redeployments reached the transitional support force level. In response, General Abrams included only one Marine regiment in Increment Three and agreed to keep a 13,800-man Marine Amphibious Brigade in Vietnam until late in the withdrawals. Nevertheless, during the spring of 1970, his plans for the 150,000-man redeployment included removal of all Marines but the Marine Amphibious Brigade by the end of the year 1971.

In August, the same Army budgetary and manpower deficiencies that forced acceleration of the 150,000-man withdrawal would also require General Abrams to retain more Marines longer so as to keep up his ground combat strength. Under hastily revised MACV schedules, only one Marine regiment with air and support units was redeployed during the remaining months of 1970. The rest of III Marine Amphibious Force would depart between 1 January and 30 April 1971 in the final increment of the 150,000-man pullout, leaving behind the Marine Amphibious Brigade.

Even as these redeployments went forward, General Westmoreland proposed keeping the Marine brigade in Vietnam through mid-1972 to ease the strain on Army resources. General Abrams was amenable to the proposal, but Admiral McCain and the Marine commandant objected that it would disrupt the reconstitution of Pacific Command’s strategic reserve. In Vietnam, the XXIV Corps commander argued that keeping the Marine Amphibious Brigade would complicate command relationships in his area. Agreeing with the objectors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with General Westmoreland dissenting, rejected the Army proposal. The Marine Amphibious Brigade was redeployed during May and June 1971, leaving in Vietnam only 542 Marines—members of an air and naval gunfire liaison company, advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, guards at the Saigon embassy, and officers of the MACV staff.

While the doctrinal dispute persisted, Air Force and Marine commanders in Vietnam developed practical, harmonious working relations, under which the Marines gradually regained in practice much of what they had lost in principle.

But of course, the average Marine Grunt fighting to survive his thirteen-month tour in the war zone knew little, if anything, about these political maneuvers. He knew only that his war continued unabated.

Image%202.jpg

I Corps Tactical Zone Map Grids (GB-69)

During the year, Marine Operations included TAYLOR COMMON, LINN RIVER, OKLAHOMA HILLS, MusKOGEE MEADOW, DURHAM PEAK, and PIPESTONE CANYON (the 1st Marine Division’s AOR).

Image%203.jpg

Major 1st Marine Division Operations, 1969 (GB-69)

In the 3d Marine Division’s AOR, Marine Operations included DEWEY CANYON, APACHE SNOW, CAMERON FALLS, IDAHO CANYON, KENTUCKY, SCOTLAND II, DAWSON RIVER, PURPLE MARTIN, MAINE CRAG, MONTANA MAULER, VIRGINIA RIDGE, HERKIMER MOUNTAIN, and UTAH MESA. In addition, the 3d Marine Division was selected by MACV to be part of the initial redeployment [named Operation KEYSTONE EAGLE] because it could return to Okinawa [its traditional home], it would be replaced by the well-disciplined 1st ARVN Division and, thanks to the heroic efforts of the officers and men of the division, Quang Tri Province was one of the most secure in the country (SF-EM).

Image%204.jpg

Major 3d Marine Division Operations, 1969 (GB-69)

In addition, the Special Landing Force (SLF) conducted ten operations: VALIANT HUNT, DEFIANT MEASURE, EAGER PURSUIT, DARING REBEL, GALLANT LEADER, BOLD PURSUIT, MIGHTY PLAY, DEFIANT STAND, BOLD MARINER, and BRAVE ARMADA.

Image%205.jpg

Special Landing Force (SLF) Operations, 1969 (GB-69)

Image%205A.jpg

III MAF Command Relations (GB-69)

Image%206.jpg

Allied Commands I Corps (GB-69)

Image%207.jpg

Enemy Order of Battle, Southern ITZ (GB-69)

Editor’s note: It is understood that between 1968 and 1969 in Vietnam, the 3d Marine Division Commanding Officer General Raymond B. Davis ordered any and all FNG-boot lieutenants arriving in-country that they would serve their first ninety days in-country as infantry platoon leaders.

90 Days a Grunt

by Pete Ritch

This past summer, I received an invitation from Terry Arndt, a USMC Basic School classmate of mine, inviting me to our class reunion in San Diego. Unfortunately, the TBS 2015 reunion was scheduled around the same time as our VTA reunion in Washington, DC. I advised Terry of the conflict in reunion scheduling and asked him if he was aware of the 3d Marine Division SOP that required all new 2d lieutenants arriving in Vietnam to spend their first ninety days in-country as infantry platoon commander, regardless of MOS. Terry sent an email blast to all our classmates asking them if they had encountered this rather unique procedure. The following are comments from some of us who spent ninety days as a Grunt and some others who had heard of the procedure.

USMC VTA Members Bob Skeels, John Heffernan, and I were assigned to 3d Marine Division upon arriving in Vietnam and served as infantry platoon commanders. Hef was so good at it that he spent an additional thirty days or so, as a Grunt.

Jack Higgins and Kent Best said that Colonel Ray Davis, CO of 3d Marine Division, in the late 1960s, created the policy. They said that Davis was an engineering grad from Georgia Tech.

Dan Legear: I recall there were some lawyers who were assigned to an infantry platoon for 90 days.

Mike Levin, a JAG officer, arrived in Vietnam in 1968 and spent his first ninety days as a Grunt. He remembered that Wilbur Bill Fly, Dave Mad Dog Moore, and Tommy Allison, all JAG officers, were assigned to infantry units. Can you imagine a lawyer Grunt? Mike, Bill, Dave, and Tommy spent the last six months of their tour working for Colonel Joe Motelenski, staff judge advocate.

John Everhart (MOS 2501, basic communication officer), spent 120 days as an infantry platoon gommander with India Company, 3/3.

Kent Hughes (MOS 1801, basic tracked yehicle officer) was assigned to 1st Marine Division (down south) and went straight to a tank company upon arriving in Vietnam.

Pete Ritch continues, After the shock of being assigned to an infantry unit for 90 days wore off and I was transferred to B Company, 3d Tanks, I realized that I had just spent 90 days with the Heart and Soul of the Marine Corps.

And in response to the ad in a past issue of the Sponson Box (VTA magazine) asking for input to this story:

Jim Coan wrote, "There were 18 of us 2d Lieutenant tank officers [1801s] from TBS 4-67 who came over to Nam together on 5 August 1967. Nine stayed in Da Nang to be assigned to 1st Tank Bn., and nine went north to be in 3rd Tank Bn. I was later told that for some time thereafter, all tank officers went to infantry units initially, then transferred to tanks as openings occurred in a tank battalion. Also, fewer Basic School graduates were being assigned to tank school; they were all getting an infantry or artillery MOS. And, by the way, the most hazardous MOS in Nam, besides infantry officer, was as an Arty FO.

"Because of the shortage of new [replacement] tank officers, I was out in the bush for 11 months before moving up to be XO of Alpha Company, 3d Tanks. I was so happy on my birthday, July 15, 1968, when a shiny new 2d Lieutenant named Frank Blakemore arrived by chopper out in Leatherneck Square to replace me. I was going back to Dong Ha to be Alpha’s XO. We had a new CO named Captain Sullivan who liked me.

The previous May, the XO of Alpha and I butted heads. We were both 1st Lieutenants and I was not about to take any crap from him. A week later, I was told to pack my gear and say goodbye to 1st Platoon, that I was being reassigned to amtracs on the Qua Viet. When I got to Quang Tri, the personnel officer told me to go back home to Dong Ha. Seems there was some griping by several senior NCOs in Alpha Company that I was being screwed over. The 3d Tank Bn Sergeant Major heard about it and told the colonel who intervened on my behalf.

John Heffernan wrote, Good Morning, John. Pete is giving you the straight scoop. Gen. Ray Davis was the 3rd Marine Division Commander when we arrived in country and due to the shortage of 03 brown bars, if you were not infantry or artillery you were diverted at Division to an infantry battalion for ’90 days.’ One of the unintended consequences was that apparently no one at Third Tanks knew where we were, so if your Infantry Bn. didn’t voluntarily cough you up, they could keep you. If you did a bad job with the grunts, you got a job counting jockstraps in the rear for the rest of your tour, so there was significant pressure to perform well, not to mention the fact that you were expected to save your own life and by extension the lives of your platoon. I was the platoon commander for 3rd Platoon, Charlie Company, First Battalion, 3rd Marines from the time we arrived in country until March 13, 1969, when I was medevaced out of country to Guam. When I returned from the hospital in May, General Davis was gone, policies changed, and I was reassigned as S-3 actual, 3rd Tanks, where I served until I took over as the Company XO when Dave Ralston took over Alpha Company after Mike Wunsch was killed. Pete and I went to RVN on the same plane and came home on the same plane, but that’s a story Pete has already told.

Bob Keels wrote, "I think there was an 85% chance of a Marine infantry officer being killed in 1968 in Vietnam. So, Pete & ‘Hef’ are right, we were indeed thrown a curve ball when we arrived in country on September 28, 1968. My sphincter muscle still fires off when I even thing of that moment that we were lined up and assigned as rifle platoon commanders in different infantry units. The expressions ‘War is Hell’ and ‘Hazardous Combat Environment’ are not even close to what we experienced in that DMZ Jungle War. Someday, they’ll really honor those ‘Marine grunts’ that served 24-7-365 days in that jungle before we could rotate them. War is not all combat, and there were a lot of non-battlefield casualties caused by leeches/rat bites/ jungle rot, and heat stroke!

"I was assigned to Third Platoon, Echo Company, 2/4, 3d Marine Division, and served 90 days until I rotated to B Company, 3d Tank Bn. at Vinh Dai on January 3, 1969. The greatest honor of my life was when I was asked to stay on with 3d Platoon and continue as a ‘Grunt Lieutenant’ by Captain Al Hill on Dec 29, 1968. My replacement, Lieutenant William Hunt, was KIA two months later at FSB Russell on Feb 25, 1969.

As a side note, Karl Marlantes, the author of the 2010 blockbuster novel ‘Matterhorn’ arrived in-country at exactly the same time as we did and was assigned to Charlie Company, 1/4. So, Pete & I, for sure, went on some battalion chopper assaults with him . . . and, for sure, the multi-battalion assault on Mutter’s Ridge on 12/7/68. I’ve had three emails from him, and his book was spot-on as to conditions in that DMZ jungle war, and I salute & honor his outstanding service. Most of his enemy contact was in March 1969; that was surely one of those bad months in the ’Nam. We, in 1st platoon, B Co., 3d Tanks, had our share of activity during that time!

Rick Lewis wrote, Pete, read your request for anybody who got to play Grunt. At C Co., 1st Tanks, it was well known that if your mine-damaged tank was going to be down, while waiting on parts, two or the crew were sent to the grunts until parts came in. Sometimes we would get stuck out there for weeks, because our company could not find us and/or the grunts were in no hurry to give us up. To make it fair, the Plt. Sergeant would have us flip a coin with two out of three times to see who got to go. TC’s did not have to go, just crewmen. There were times that they would have us pull the 30’s with tri-pods and put us at a patrol base with us covering a possible enemy avenue of approach, which was better than humping every day on foot. I do not remember any Tanker becoming WIA or KIA but we all came back and kissed our tanks. I will check with a couple of buddies who I think also got stuck being Grunts for a while.

The tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion conducted a sweep of Liberty Road, the main thorough-fare between Da Nang and An Hoa, in preparation for the buildup at the combat base.

(MarCorpHistDiv)

Image%208.jpgImage%209.jpg

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37422 4

Preceded by tanks, riflemen of Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines push toward an enemy-infested treeline during the battalion’s sweep and block of Southwestern Arizona.

Image%2010.jpg

Elements of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, supported by a tank from Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, take up positions in preparation for the assault on an enemy-held treeline. (MarCorpHistDiv Department of Defense Photo [USMC] A37422 411)

Following the withdrawal of the 9th Marine Regiment from South Vietnam in Operation KEYSTONE EAGLE, planning began for the withdrawal of the remaining units of 3d Marine Division in line with the plans prepared by MACV.

Operation KEYSTONE CARDINAL was the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division from South Vietnam, taking place from 30 September to 27 November 1969.

The MACV List: Composition of Operation KEYSTONE CARDINAL

Note: All CONUS destinations refer to Camp Pendleton, California.

Image%2011.jpg

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A193363 6

Marine engineers using heavy bulldozers level and then bury accumulated debris at Vandegrift Combat Base during the stand-down and withdrawal of the 4th Marines.

Image%2012.jpg

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, supported by tanks, sweeps and countersweeps scrub-covered Dodge City in preparation for the attack on Go Noi Island to the south.

Image%2013.jpg

(GB-69)

January 1969

First Tanks

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel M. C. Ashley Jr.

Executive Officer: Major R. H. Graham

Operations Officer: Major J. B. Terpak

Logistics Officer: Major D. R. Sparks

Location and Operations Summary: CP (AT 997723)

During the month of January, tanks and Ontos of the 1st Tank Battalion continued to support the infantry regiments of the 1st Marine Division and the 2nd Brigade, ROK Marine Corps. Tanks participated in three major operations and numerous small-unit operations; provided convoy and road sweep security, bridge security, and counter-rocket and mortar fire; and strengthened the defensive positions of infantry units throughout the division drea of responsibility (DAOR). The increased employment of mines and surprise firing devices by the enemy to interdict lines of communication took a heavy toll on tanks and caused several casualties among tank crewmen. Despite this increase in enemy mining incidents, tanks continued to provide infantry units in the field with highly accurate direct fire support, which accounted for more than forty NVA/VC KIA and the destruction of numerous living areas, storage facilities, enemy medical treatment centers, and fortified positions.

The task organization of the 1st Tank Battalion as of 31 January was as follows:

Southern Sector Defense Command (SSDC) activities continued to be initiated, coordinated, and controlled by the commanding officer, 1st Tank Battalion. During January, activities conducted by SSDC tenant units included patrols, ambushes, LPs, Ops, and COPs. On 1 January 1969, H/2/7 relieved K/3/1 and I Corps Quick Reaction Mobile Task Force, Task Force Kilo. With elements of Company A, 1st Antitank Battalion, H/2/7 continued to carry out nightly patrols in the Hoa Vang District as well as company-sized sweeps in the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines’ area of responsibility. During the month, Company A, 1st Antitank Battalion assumed operational control of OP Thumb (Hill 70) (AT 952728) from the 3d Military Police Battalion. Extensive effort was put forth in strengthening the defensive fortifications of OP Thumb by the construction of new bunkers and fighting holes, the installation of German barbed concertina, aircraft flares, and the E-8, CS dispensers. In the early morning hours of 2 and 22 January, counter-rocket and mortar sites, OPs Panther and Hawk again proved their value by providing direct fire against suspected enemy rocket sites.

Employing the assets of Company A, 1st Antitank Battalion and the provisional SSDC infantry platoons as a potential delaying force, the SSDC continued to be capable of delaying or denying an enemy penetration from the west, which may arise during the Tet Holidays, into the vital installations within the Southern Sector as well as within the Da Nang vital area.

H&S Company CO: Major F. P. Briseno

Location and Operations Summary: CP (AT 997723)

Provided HQ CP defense by manning nightly perimeter bunkers, providing forward LPs, and active patrolling outside the wire.

Company A (-) (Rein) CO: Captain B. R. Montgomery

Location and Operations Summary: CP (AT 936782)

Company A (-) (Rein) remained DS 26th Marines with the company CP and colocated with that of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. Elements of the 2d and 3d Platoons as well as the Headquarters Platoon continued to be employed on Hill 190 and the Namo Bridge, where they provided counter-rocket and mortar fire and bridge security, respectively. Tanks from the 2d Platoon participated in several small-unit operations in the area to the northwest of Namo Bridge frequently used by the enemy as an infiltration route. On 28 January, 1st Tank Battalion assumed OpCon of the 1st Platoon, Company A, 5th Tank Battalion and the 2d Platoon, Company A, 5th Antitank Battalion and passed OpCon to Company A, which, in turn, placed them DS 26th Marines.

Company B (Rein) CO: Captain M. P. Sams

Location and Operations Summary: CP (AT 962621)

Company B (Rein) remained DS 5th and 7th Marines with three platoons in support of the 5th Marines and two in support of the 7th Marines. The company CP remained colocated with that of the 7th Marines with a forward CP colocated with that of the 5th Marines. The 1st and 3d Platoons were extensively employed on Hills 10, 41, 65, 37, and 55 to bring direct fire to bear on sighted enemy movement as well as known enemy infiltration routes. On 27 January 1969, tanks from the 1st Platoon and Headquarters Platoon moved out in support of 1/7 and 2/26 on Operation LINN RIVER. Operating in an area that was once believed to be inaccessible to tracked vehicles, tanks displayed their versatility and capabilities by being able to move with the infantry as the operation progressed in the classic tank-infantry attack. In the An Hoa Basin, tanks from Company B continued to support Operation TAYLOR COMMON by providing road sweep and convoy security between Phu Loc (6) and the An Hoa airfield, as well as participating in numerous search-and-clear and search-and-destroy operations.

Image%2014A.jpg

A tank of the 1st Tank Battalion conducts a sweep of Liberty Road, the main thoroughfare between Da Nang and An Hoa, in preparation for the buildup at the combat base.

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Image%2014B.jpg

Marine Corps Historical Collection

The photograph provides an overhead view of An Hoa logistics operations center and the passenger and cargo pad beyond. The center coordinated the helicopter movement of personnel and supplies in support of combat operations in Base Area 112 and the Arizona.

Supported by three 105mm artillery batteries, 5-inch guns of the heavy cruiser Newport News (CA148), and two platoons of tanks from the 5th Tank Battalion, the 7th and 26th Marines successively cordoned and then searched the objective area. Engagements during the remainder of the 12-day operation were light, consisting of Marines intercepting enemy troops attempting to flee the cordon. These small groups of enemy troops were sighted and then engaged by air, tanks, and artillery; however, the majority of casualties resulted from mortar and sniper fire. Although 53 enemy troops were killed, the destruction of fortifications and tunnel complexes carried out by the two battalions and accompanying tanks and engineer detachments overshadowed the loss of enemy personnel. (GB-69)

Company C (Rein) CO: First Lieutenant T. G. Roberts

Location and Operations Summary: CP (AT 997723)

Company C (Rein) continued to be tasked with the support of the 1st Marines and the 2nd, ROK Marine Corps. The company CP remained colocated with that of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Tanks from the 2d Platoon and Headquarters Platoon confronted with the task of supporting both the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines were continuously operating in support of battalion and company-sized operations in the vicinity of Phong Ho (1), Man Quan, and Cam Sa (1). With the increased number of mining incidents involving tanks in these areas, the 1st Platoon, Company C, which had been placed under the OpCon of Company B for support of the 5th Marines on Operation TAYLOR COMMON, was withdrawn and on 31 January was returned to the command and control of Company C to bolster the tank assets of the 1st Marines. The 3d Platoon continued to support the 2nd ROK Marine Corps, providing valuable direct fire support for Operation VICTORY DRAGON 7 and numerous operations in the vicinity of Dien Ban.

Company A (Rein) 1st Antitank Battalion CO: First Lieutenant J. J. Banning

Location and Operations Summary: CP (AT 997723)

Company A (Rein), 1st Antitank Battalion remained within the (SSDC) command providing security for the Song Cau Do and Cobb Bridges together with elements of the 1st and 7th Marines, respectively. One heavy section of Ontos remained in support of the 1st Marines at the Song Cau Do Bridge and a light section of Ontos supported elements of the 7th Marines on the Cobb Bridge. In addition to command responsibility for the OPs Panther, Bear, and the Three Fingers Combat Outpost, Company A, 1st Antitank Battalion was assigned command of OP Thumb (Hill 70). One platoon of Ontos remained in support of the I Corps Quick Reaction Mobile Task Force, Task Force Kilo.

Image%2015A.jpgImage%2015B.jpg

The new year found Lieutenant Colonel James J. McMonagle’s 2d Battalion, 3d Marines conducting pacification operations in the Mai Loc area south of Route 9, securing friendly positions along the Con Thien-Cam Lo corridor, and assisting Regional Forces around Cam Lo. Lieutenant Colonel George E. Hayward’s 3d Tank Battalion continued armored combat, security patrols, and road sweeps between Quang Tri and Dong Ha Combat Bases, and in the vicinity of Con Thien. (GB-69)

In US Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown 1969, Marine tanks and Ontos are cited in the chapter Artillery and Surveillance p.250-51. The article summarizes the increase of Marine artillery fire that rose in 1969 from the previous year and cites tank and Ontos fire