FORTY YEARS AGO, ARGENTINA INVADED the Falkland Islands, a British archipelago 300 miles off the Patagonian coast. This followed an Argentine incursion onto South Georgia, another UK territory then occupied solely by British Antarctic Survey researchers, the previous month. After a short but fierce resistance, the islands’ governor, Rex Hunt, directed the small garrison of Royal Marines, Royal Navy sailors and local Falkland Islands Defence Force volunteers to lay down their arms.
The Argentine success was short-lived, however. The next day, Admiral Sir Henry Leach — then the First Sea Lord — convinced Margaret Thatcher that retaking the islands was feasible. Within three days, the major units of a UK military task force led by the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible sailed for the South Atlantic. On 14 June, Argentine forces surrendered; UK forces captured 11,400 POWs, all of whom were then released back to Argentina. Overall, 907 people died in the conflict: three Falkland Islanders, 255 UK military personnel, and 649 of Argentina’s own troops.
With the anniversary of the war’s outbreak and a major war of territorial revisionism now raging within Europe itself, this is an apposite time to review some crucial lessons from the earlier conflict. History may not repeat itself, but it can certainly echo. The focus here is on three recurring features of international violence: miscalculation beforehand; not getting what you expect during; and the interaction of power and ideas
