War In The Falklands: Perspectives On British Strategy And Use Of Air Power

By Lt.-Col. John E. Marr USAF

Examines the political atmosphere and events leading to the Falklands war and concludes that the war was caused by critical misperceptions on both sides. Analyzes British response with emphasis on force selection, strategy, “Jointness,” and the role of airpower. Suggests that British victory hinged on a well-coordinated, joint warfighting effort, and highlights the key role played by airpower. Concludes with a caution concerning the potential for worldwide perceptions of reduced US power projection capabilities in light of budget-induced force reductions. Warns that these perceptions could lead, as they did in the Falklands, to military conflict.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781782899815

Lt.-Col. John E. Marr USAF

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Text originally published in 1988 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

War in the Falklands; Perspectives on British Strategy and Use of Air Power

by

John E. Marr, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 6

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 6

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 7

CHAPTER II — WAR AS AN EXTENSION OF POLITICS 9

Britain's Decline as a Global Power 9

Argentina's Long-Standing Grievance 10

Ups and Downs in Negotiations 12

A Time For Assessment 13

Bargaining Table to Bomb Alley 15

CHAPTER III — THE BRITISH REPLY 18

Task Force Sails 18

Battle Lines Are Drawn 19

Know Your Enemy, Know Yourself 19

CHAPTER IV — A STRATEGY FOR VICTORY 21

Strategy of Phased Operations 21

The Role of Airpower 22

Effectiveness of Airpower 23

CHAPTER V — CONCLUSIONS 27

Lessons For the US 27

APPENDIX A — CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS 29

APRIL 29

MAY 29

JUNE 30

APPENDIX B — British Air Order of Battle in the South Atlantic 31

APPENDIX C — British Aircraft Losses 32

APPENDIX D — Argentine Air Order of Battle 33

APPENDIX E — Argentine Aircraft Losses 34

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 35

BIBLIOGRAPHY 36

GLOSSARY 39

ABSTRACT

Examines the political atmosphere and events leading to the Falklands war and concludes that the war was caused by critical misperceptions on both sides. Analyzes British response with emphasis on force selection, strategy, Jointness, and the role of airpower. Suggests that British victory hinged on a well-coordinated, joint warfighting effort, and highlights the key role played by airpower. Concludes with a caution concerning the potential for worldwide perceptions of reduced US power projection capabilities in light of budget-induced force reductions. Warns that these perceptions could lead, as they did in the Falklands, to military conflict.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel John E. Marr (B.A., St. Michael's College; M.A., University of Northern Colorado), is a command pilot with extensive experience in operations, including duty as an F-111 squadron commander. He has accumulated over 4,300 hours of flying while assigned in the CONUS and in Europe. He held staff positions as a briefing officer at HQ United States Air Forces Europe and as an operational planner at both HQ Tactical Air Command and HQ United States Central Command. Colonel Marr is a 1988 graduate of the Air War College.

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

A case can be made that the United States caused the Falklands War not by its actions in 1982, but rather in 1831! (20:5) In that year the Falklands were under the jurisdiction of Argentina, and had been since 1820, Argentina having laid claim to the Islands in that year. An Argentianian governor had been overseeing the islands, albeit with limited effect, since 1823. But in 1831, the Governor arrested the crew of a US ship for hunting seals on a scale that exceeded the limits he had imposed to protect the declining seal population. The American's property was confiscated and held on the islands, and the crew taken