Mobility, Support, Endurance

By Edwin Bickford Hooper

Official history focusing on the unheralded logistical support provided by the U.S. Navy to bases, construction, salvage, ammunition, and more.

Admiral Hooper wrote most of this book during evenings and weekends in 1968 while he served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics). He later became Director of Naval History.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Barakaldo Books
• Release date: Nov 19, 2020
• ISBN: 9781839746765

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We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

MOBILITY, SUPPORT, ENDURANCE

A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War 1965-1968

By

VICE-ADMIRAL EDWIN BICKFORD HOOPER, USN (Retired)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

Dedication 7

Foreword 9

Preface 10

Illustrations 15

CHAPTER I — The Vietnam Conflict 18

CHAPTER II — The Earlier Stages of the Conflict 24

CHAPTER III — Logistics and Command Relationships 31

CHAPTER IV — The Service Force 36

CHAPTER V — The Critical Situation in 1965 46

CHAPTER VI — The Seventh Fleet in Action 51

CHAPTER VII — Country-Wide Support 67

CHAPTER VIII — I Corps Tactical Zone 74

CHAPTER IX — Southern I Corps 104

CHAPTER X — The Crucial Fight for the Northern Provinces 110

CHAPTER XI — Inshore and Inland Waterways 126

CHAPTER XII — Bases for the Support of Naval Craft in Vietnam 146

CHAPTER XIII — Construction 168

CHAPTER XIV — Salvage 178

FRANK KNOX 180

GUARDFISH 197

CHAPTER XV — Surveillance and Special Operations 198

CHAPTER XVI — Western Pacific Bases 208

CHAPTER XVII — Ammunition 215

CHAPTER XVIII — The Lifeline By Sea 226

CHAPTER XIX — Epilogue 231

APPENDIX I — Types of Ships and Craft in the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 233

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 237

Dedication

Dedicated to the logisticians of all Services and in all wars, and in particular, to the dedicated, and often heroic, officers and men of the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Foreword

In narrating the naval history of a war, one approach open to a historian is to record the general story of naval operations, then complement the main history with works dealing with specialized fields. The Naval History Division plans to follow this approach in the case of the Vietnam War, focusing the Division’s efforts primarily on an account of naval operations but accompanying the major history with publications in limited fields deserving of treatment beyond that to be given in the main work.

This was the practice, as it finally evolved, in World War II. One of the volumes that complemented Samuel Eliot Morison’s magnificent multi-volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II was Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil. Valuable insights on the logistic aspects of the war at sea were provided by the author, Rear-Admiral W. R. Carter. Not only had he served as Commander Naval Bases, South Pacific, during critical phases of the Solomons campaign of 1942 and 1943, but also later when the United States naval offensive across the Pacific was in full swing, he had organized and commanded Service Squadron Ten, the mobile base organization so essential to sustaining the massive operations of the Third and Fifth Fleets in the violent final phase of the war. Widely used as a reference work, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil did much to impart an understanding and appreciation of mobile logistic support throughout the Navy, and to keep the basic concepts alive in the post-war years. To Admiral Carter goes a considerable amount of the credit for the continuing emphasis which the Navy placed on the maintenance of its capabilities for mobile logistic support in the active and inactive fleets, on the continuance of a reasonable state of readiness in this important area, and on the refining of some of the techniques involved.

Although somewhat broader in scope, Mobility, Support, Endurance is a similar volume intended to complement the planned primary history of United States naval operations in the Vietnam War.

Preface

"The only good histories are those that have been written by the persons who commanded in the affairs whereof they write" — MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE (1533-1592)

Over the years a number of general officers and a few flag officers in positions of responsibility have written their own accounts of what went on during a major war. Quite understandably these have tended to focus mainly on the purely combat features of the war and on overall strategy. The result has often been an unbalanced picture of the total military effort.

To complete the picture, it is necessary to place in proper perspective the logistic support actions upon which the combatant forces and the effectiveness of these forces were totally dependent. It is the coupling of combat strength and logistic support that makes victory possible, whether it be action by a small unit, a major battle, a campaign, a war, or the wide variety of peacetime operations to support the national interest. Thus, along with knowledge of combat activities, one must gain an appreciation of logistics, of its relationship to operations, and the nature of operational logistic actions for a full understanding of a war. Hopefully, this recording of the activities of the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, will advance that appreciation, and contribute to a more complete picture of the Vietnam Conflict.

Within the military itself, many logisticians in the past have complained of ignorance of others as to the importance of logistics and the nature of logistic activities. I have never endorsed the more extreme complaints, but there are measures of truth in them. In their totality, logistics and related services in a major war are so varied, complex, and extensive that they are not always easy to comprehend. Those receiving the support normally only see the immediate interface with that support. When the support is good, it is natural to take that support for granted—with little concern over why it was good and little thought to do with the portion of the total effort involved other than at the interface with the operating forces. I have too often found even logisticians who, while experts in their own specialities or their own locality, were deficient in their knowledge of the scope of the total logistic effort, of the inter-relationships of its parts, of the extent to which systems must be tailored to the nature of the operations and special environments of the various types of combat forces, and of Service and unified command responsibilities to do with logistics. This book will not attempt to fill in all the gaps, but hopefully it may shed a bit more light on some of these matters.

It is with such goals in mind that I have set forth a recording of events and of views and experiences gained in thirty-one months as commander of the Navy’s foremost operational logistic command.

Although concentrating on the period from 20 July 1965 to 17 February 1968, when I commanded the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the stage will be set by a limited discussion of earlier events, and for completeness, some subsequent developments also will be mentioned. While the bulk of the treatment has to do with operational logistics I have not been able to avoid completely the temptation to make a few observations on broader matters.

The initial urge to write this book came from the difficulties encountered when, in the summer of 1965, I sought guidance from history as to the solution of the growing problem then being faced. Some useful information was obtained from Rear-Admiral Carter’s Beans, Bullets and Black Oil. However, that informative book concentrated almost exclusively on the mobile support forces in the Pacific in World War II. It did not extend to meaningful treatment of many other aspects of naval logistics in the Pacific, such as planning, organizing, preparing, establishing, and operating advanced bases. For the latter it was necessary to draw on the files of Rear-Admiral Eccles, USN (Retired), who had been in charge of the Advanced Base Section of the Service Force during the final stages of World War II. In the hope that more complete information would aid those faced with the problems of the future, it seemed desirable to provide a more comprehensive record of operational logistics in the case of the Vietnam Conflict. For the naval officer who would go deeper there are in the classified files not only the annual Command Histories, but also a weekly history started soon after I arrived and Operations of the. Service Force for Fiscal Year 1966 and subsequent years.

The preparation of this book was very nearly completed during evenings and weekends in 1968 while I served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics). At the time of setting down on paper the vast majority of what follows, there was no hint of the fact that a Joint Logistics Review Board would be convened to study logistic support in Vietnam, or that I would be a member of that board. Nor did I have the slightest suspicion that I would later become Director of Naval History. I set aside further work on this book until the Joint Logistics Review Board’s efforts had been completed.

Special attention has been given to those operations of the Service Force which differed most from those of more normal periods. Particular emphasis is placed on the extensive Navy logistic operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Support of the Fleet itself, which is the primary role of the Service Force, is given less detailed treatment. Since it is the practice of the United States Navy to operate in peace on the same basis as in war, to the extent this is reasonable and practicable, the changes required to meet the needs of the Fleet in the Vietnam Conflict were relatively straightforward.

One other purpose to which I hope this book contributes is imparting some feeling of the fact that operational logistics is far from being as dull as many assume it to be. During the period of this conflict, I found command of the Service Force to be extraordinarily challenging and exciting. Not only was the command a vast and diversified one but the responsibilities were heavy. There was never a let-up from the seemingly unsolvable problems that had to be solved in timely fashion in the face of the forbiddingly long lead times that are inherent in so much of logistics. The challenges and excitement of logistics in time of war are not confined to the commander. This is particularly true in the combat theater. It is true elsewhere as well. For, the effectiveness and responsiveness of the combat forces are strongly dependent on many decisions in the logistic chain of command and on the day-by-day staff actions to provide for the changing needs of support of dynamic warfare, actions which must in many cases anticipate needs well before they are even recognized in the field. I was supported by two able Chiefs of Staff, Captains Francis C. Rydeen and Dan T. Drain, and many other outstanding officers throughout the staff.

Finally, I wish to give some recognition to the imaginative, hard working and, at times, heroic efforts of those under my command. I deeply regret that space permits not much more than a sampling of these efforts of superlative performance of the many individuals involved.

One of the sources of satisfaction was the extent to which this performance was recognized by others. Typical of the reactions of those in the Fleet were the statements by one destroyer commander that

logistic readiness support rendered by the Pacific Navy was nothing short of magnificent. If you needed it, you got it with speed and a minimum of on board supply effort....

***

Repairs provided ashore at Subic and Yokosuka...were superb. The word ‘no’ simply does not exist in their vocabulary....

***

Mail delivery during WESTPAC deployment was the black oil that kept our morale going. In light of the tremendous distances involved, great bulk, sheer number of ships, and ever-changing schedules, SERVPAC mail officers work miracles.{1}

In the words of General Lewis K. Walt, USMC, after his return from duty as Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force and Senior Advisor to I Corps:

There is a tendency to think of Vietnam as a land and air war. All too often, the tremendous contribution which our Navy is making is overshadowed by the more dramatic ground clashes or bomb damage reports. We are prone to forget that without the support our Navy gives, those reports might not be so favorable....

We Marines are particularly aware of the Navy’s outstanding job. We’ve watched the Seabees, for example, transform sand and swamp into modern, well-developed bases at Chu Lai, Danang East, Phu Bai, Quang Tri, and Dong Ha. We’ve seen them work around the clock building hospitals, airfields, barracks, roads, and fuel storage farms. They’ve built Special Forces Camps and fortified combat outposts like Khe Sanh and Con Thien—and much of this work was done under enemy fire. In fact, as in past wars, they have fought shoulder to shoulder with Marines, and our long-standing respect for Seabees as builders and fighters has increased daily in Vietnam.

***

They’ve also distinguished themselves in combat. One of them won the Medal of Honor, and their other decorations include a Distinguished Service Medal, seven Silver Star Medals, 25 awards of the Legion of Merit, 59 Bronze Star Medals, and 231 Navy Commendation Medals.

The U.S. Naval Support Activity at Danang has done a truly remarkable job in providing extensive logistics to Free World Forces in I CTZ....Through the port city of Danang, over four million tons of supplies a year are moved in order to provide I Corps Marines with logistical support. Ammunition, soap, rations and fuel are only a small portion of the 11,000 supply items helping to keep the fighting Marine equipped with the tools of his trade. In addition, NSA Danang operations have included extensive logistic common item support to tens of thousands of other Free World Fighting Forces in the five Northern Provinces.

NSA Danang has also functioned in a most effective manner in ensuring the flow of supplies through enemy exposed forward areas, such as the Cua Viet River just below the DMZ. The NSA motto, ‘They shall not want,’ best describes its mission—keep the troops supplied.

To the Marine infantryman, though, undoubtedly the greatest guy going is the Navy corpsman attached to his platoon. He’s the man on the spot ready to apply a band-aid to a blister or a tourniquet to a severed artery; and he’s there no matter how grim or dangerous the situation gets. He’s backed up by some of the finest doctors in the world and by a medical system which evacuates a wounded Marine from the battlefield within minutes after he’s been hit and has him aboard the hospital ship Repose or Sanctuary or at one of our fine hospitals ashore for expert medical attention shortly thereafter. Thanks to this system, we have lost only 1.6 percent of those Marines who have been wounded. Of the remaining 98 percent plus, a majority have returned to duty in Vietnam.

***

The simple fact is that we couldn’t be in Vietnam today in the strength we are if it weren’t for our Navy and its undisputed use of the seas. In addition to the 68 ships and more than 82,000 Navy men in Vietnam Or in the waters offshore, roughly 98% of all materials and supplies used in Southeast Asia come to us by sea transport. This amounts to 800,000 measurement tons per month.

It’s true that most of the public attention and much of the credit for success goes to the man in the foxhole or in the cockpit, but one thing is certain—he is there only because he’s backed up 100% by the mightiest Navy the world has ever known.{2}

The title of this book, Mobility, Support, Endurance, is taken from the names given the three prongs of Neptune’s Trident on the seal of the Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

I would like to express appreciation to several members of the Naval History Division staff for their assistance in the final stages of the manuscript. Mrs. Sandra Doyle undertook a number of editorial tasks associated with the final preparation of the manuscript and its publication. DM2 Dennis A. Hodgin, USN, prepared the excellent charts that appear in the volume. Mrs. Agnes Hoover assisted in the selection of the book’s photographs.

The views and assertions expressed herein are the private ones of the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large.

EDWIN B. HOOPER

Vice-Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Chevy Chase, Md.

Illustrations

(All illustrations are from the historical collection in the U.S. Naval Photographic Center, Washington, D.C., except one illustration identified by a number preceded by 80-G which is in the official U.S. Naval photo collection in the National Archives.)

Western Pacific (chart)

Service Force seal

Global view of the Pacific (chart)

Southeast Asia (chart)

Tonkin, Annam, Cochin China (chart)

Bayfield off-loading refugees

Admiral Sharp, Rear-Admiral Veth, and Captain Wells

Admiral Johnson, Rear-Admiral Ward, and Commodore Chon

Service Force organization (chart)

Bridges severed at Haiphong

Recommissioned battleship New Jersey

Replenishment cycles, 1965 and early 1966 (chart)

Replenishment cycles after June 1967 (chart)

Oiler Hassayampa refueling carrier Ranger

Eight-inch powder casings highlined from Pyro

Aircraft fuel tanks delivered by vertical replenishment

Combat stores ship Mars

Entrance to Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon

I Corps Tactical Zone (chart)

Only Danang pier prior to port development

Small oiler Genesee

The White Elephant

Naval Base Hospital, Danang

Change of command of NAVSUPPACT Danang, February 1966

Tien Sha ramp

Site of the Bridge Cargo Complex

Bridge Cargo Complex

Observation Point, 1965

Observation Point after construction of piers

Tourane River Bridge

Danang area (chart)

Rosemary Point, January 1966

Rosemary Point, September 1967

Hospital ship Repose

Hue ramp

Cua Viet River mouth before dredging

New cargo lift craft

Saigon and the Delta areas (chart)

The author and Captain Herbert King

AKL Mark

Benewah acting as tender

Mobile Support Base

Future site of Naval Support Detachment, Cam Ranh Bay

Repair ship Tutuila

Naval Support Detachment, Cat Lo

Barracks craft and Krishna at An Thoi

Nha Be, 1965

Nha Be, 1968

Base under construction at My Tho

YRBM-16 after mining

New base at Binh Thuy

Liberty Bridge under construction

Salvage ship Deliver

Refloating destroyer Frank Knox

Light lift craft

Heavy lift craft

Salvage of Paul Bert

Lieutenant DeLanoy receiving the Bronze Star

Refloating Jamaica Bay

SS R.C. Stoner

Banner, first of the environmental research ships

Fleet ocean tug

Annapolis, first of the communications relay ships

Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay

Carrier catapult of A-7 Corsair

Pier at Naval Magazine, Subic Bay

USNS Core delivering aircraft

CHAPTER I — The Vietnam Conflict

United States participation in the conflict in Vietnam was one of gradual involvement, starting with a small advisory group and expanding into the employment of combat and support forces in a major war of long duration. The war differed in many respects from any previous one in our history and presented unique problems, both of a combat and a logistic nature.

The uniqueness stemmed in part from the fact that the localized combat actions were but one segment of a struggle of worldwide proportions. It stemmed in part from the strategy which evolved and from the self-imposed restraints. It stemmed also from the guerrilla nature of the actions and from the environment in which the war was fought.

The worldwide struggle was between the Communists and the Free World. The start of the U.S. military assistance and advisory program in 1950 had been preceded by the establishment of Communist control over several nations formerly independent, and by Cold War confrontations at scattered locations throughout the globe—including Poland, Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Trieste, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Rumania, East Germany, and China. As a natural outgrowth of the need to block Communist efforts toward their avowed goal of world domination, the involvement in Southeast Asia was in many respects an extension of the United States policy of containment.

The worldwide nature of the struggle was to have many direct and subtle effects on the use of military forces and on the way in which the localized war was fought. It strongly influenced strategic decisions. Fighting the war in Southeast Asia was but one of the military tasks in the global struggle. Many other requirements were placed on the Navy and other services, and new trouble-spots were forever erupting. It was necessary to maintain continuous deterrence against nuclear attack. It was necessary to establish control of the sea wherever and whenever the situation demanded and to counter threats to that control, such as those posed by submarines. Keeping the peace functions were required in widely scattered areas. Thus, the Fleet was committed to many operations in addition to those off Vietnam, and had to be instantly ready for redeployments in response to new challenges. The result was the placing of extensive demands on naval logistics, including demands well beyond those of a localized nature.

From their early beginnings, the Indochinese Communists considered their efforts a part of the worldwide struggle between two social systems. Gaining control over the nationalist movement was but a step along the way. Thus, as the other side saw it, the victory over the French in 1954 was considered to be one of the great historic events in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and it was declared that Vietnam has now become one of the outposts of the socialist world. The goal clearly set forth was to win complete victory for socialism and communism in our country as well as in the world.{3}

In the continuation of their struggle against the Republic of Vietnam after Ngo Dinh Diem had taken over from the French, the Communist offensive included armed propaganda, a combination of political activities, propaganda, and military activities. The strategy closely followed the previous concepts of General Vo Nguyen Giap whereby initial priority was placed on the political struggle, with the armed struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare growing in intensity. After gaining a co-equal status with the political struggle, the armed struggle was to become the key role in the form of mobile war. The deployment of North Vietnamese combat forces south in 1964 and 1965 indicated a Communist decision to enter that stage in which the armed part of the conflict would include regular warfare actions in addition to guerrilla activities.

It was under these circumstances that United States assistance to the Republic was expanded to include the deployment of organized military forces as an aid to safeguarding the freedom of the people of the Republic and to ensuring the containment of Communist expansion.

From the start ours was a limited, a tightly controlled, and a restrained effort. The deliberate strategy of the war on our part was closely aligned with the measured response concept which had grown so popular in the writings of some political scientists since the Korean War, a concept stemming at least in part from concerns over the dangers of a nuclear exchange and general war.

The fact that a strategy of graduated military actions required implementation of many individual decisions from time to time as the assessment of the future changed inevitably complicated the problems of providing timely and adequate logistic support. The support of the war and the way it was fought was influenced as well by the fact that there was no national mobilization or call-up of Reserves, until the Pueblo crisis. Annual budgeting tended to be done on an optimistic basis including, for a time, the budgetary assumption that the war would cease at the end of the fiscal year. All these factors greatly complicated the problems of providing timely and adequate logistic support.

In contrast with the United States, the strategy of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong remained almost purely offensive, except in North Vietnam itself—a strategy combining politics, propaganda, invasion, guerrilla action and subversion, all with a political objective. The enemy military effort was clearly so shaped as to produce political and psychological effects, and propaganda was consistently and persistently aimed at influencing those in Vietnam and those in the non-Communist world, including those susceptible in the United States itself.

All this was reminiscent of the war against the French during 1946-1954. In the Viet Minh War many claimed the overthrow of the French control stemmed more from the defeatist attitude in Paris than from the military actions in Southeast Asia.{4}

Extensive assistance was provided to the North Vietnamese by other Communist nations. Weapons, aircraft, munitions, equipment, and supplies were provided by the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Red China. Russian technicians trained and aided the missile force, the air force, and its ground control in North Vietnam. China provided logistic and construction help near their common border. North Korea provided aviators.

A LOGISTIC WAR

Early in 1966 Lieutenant-General Victor H. (Brute) Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, expressed to me the view that this was a logistic war. He said this in such a fashion as not to downgrade the forces in contact with the enemy on the ground, in the air, and on the water. Rather, his statement revealed a keen awareness of the importance and difficulties of the logistic problems faced by the enemy in this strange war, and those faced by ourselves.

In the case of the enemy, the Communists had their own logistic problems, as the Vietnam military effort depended heavily on the receipt of weapons, vehicles, and other equipment and materials from abroad. Some came from China by rail lines to Hanoi from the north and northwest. For part of the Vietnam Conflict, this flow was subject