Electoral Essays and Discourses

By Carl W. Dundas

This book contains five electoral essays and five discourses which explore issues impacting on free, fair and credible election organisation and conduct, with special attention on best practices in the Commonwealth and the African Union. The essays constitute part 1 and the discourses part 2 of the book. It describes and analyses the slow and cautious restart of the process of democratic elections in Nigeria, examining the missteps along the way from the first to the fourth electoral cycle which ended in 2011, which constitute essay I. Essay II deals with the development of election observation, together with mechanisms to strengthen the effectiveness thereof in the African Union and promote the technical capabilities of African Union electoral management bodies. Essay III seeks to compare aspects of election observation by the Commonwealth and the African Union. Essay IV examines best electoral practices in the Commonwealth and the African Union and essay V with the potential use of alternative dispute resolution in elections in the Commonwealth and the African Union.
The discourses vigorously explore current electoral issues that slant towards further development in the near future. Discourse A is about youth and elections. It discusses how youth can participate more effectively in elections. Discourse B looks at the dimensions of political finance with particular attention to campaign financing. Discourse C is about incumbency and elections and discusses the nature and impact of incumbency on elections. Discourse D is about the culture of impunity which affects many electoral management bodies and in particular as it pertains to election violence. Discourse E deals with the impact of social media on election preparation and conduct.

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse UK
• Release date: Mar 5, 2014
• ISBN: 9781491896594

Carl W. Dundas

Carl W. Dundas, LLB, LLM (Lon.), barrister-at-law (Gray’s Inn), is an election expert. Mr. Dundas has offered technical assistance in electoral matters in many countries, including Aceh (Indonesia), Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Cayman Islands, Guyana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. He has been a part of the commonwealth support team to Commonwealth Observer Groups to Bangladesh, Guyana, Kenya, Malaysia, Malawi, Pakistan, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. Mr. Dundas advised on election organization and management in Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sierra Leone. Mr. Dundas led commonwealth secretariat’s electoral technical assistance missions to Guyana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. He carried assignments in areas, such as designing electoral frameworks for a neutral and impartial electoral management body, drafting of instruments for transition from military regimes to multiparty democracy, and he organized capacity-building seminars and workshops. He coordinated a post-election audit exercise in Botswana (2004) and advised on the implementation of post-election review recommendations in Nigeria (2003–04). Mr. Dundas advised on constitutional reform relating to fundamental provisions, dealing with electoral legislative schemes in many countries, including Guyana, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania and advised on electoral legislation in Antigua and Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Mr. Dundas led the support team to the commonwealth observer missions to elections in Malaysia (1990), Zambia (1991), Kenya (1992), Guyana (1992 and ’97), Malawi (1994), Mozambique (1994), Tanzania (1995), Zanzibar (Tanzania), and Trinidad and Tobago (2000). He also served as the technical adviser to the commonwealth preelection observation mission to Namibia in 1989 and to the Commonwealth Observer Group to South Africa in 1994. Mr. Dundas was chairman of the Electoral Boundary Delimitation Commission of the Cayman Islands in 2003 and 2010. As an independent electoral consultant from 2001 to 2006, Mr. Dundas advised many election management bodies (EMBs) on reform and modernization, including Aceh (Indonesia), Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Cayman Islands, Guyana, Lesotho, Liberia, Nigeria, and Tanzania. In 2006, Mr. Dundas became chief of party of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) Africa Union Support Program Union Support Program (funded by USAID) to advise the African Union on the establishment of a Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU). The DEAU was established in May 2008, and he remained as its adviser at the Africa Union in Addis Ababa until 2010.

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© 2014 Carl W. Dundas. All rights reserved.

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Published by AuthorHouse 03/04/2014

ISBN: 978-1-4918-9657-0 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4918-9658-7 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-4918-9659-4 (e)

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Contents

Preface

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Note about the Author

Other Works by the Author

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part 1

Electoral Essays

Electoral Cycle I—1998-1999

Electoral Cycle 1999-2003

Electoral Cycle 2003-2007

Electoral Cycle 2007-2011

Essay II: The Democracy And Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU)

Essay III: Observation In Commwonwealth And African Union Compared

Essay IV: Electoral Best Practices In The Commonwealth And The African Union Member States

Essay V: Electoral Alternative Dispute Resolution Potential In The Commonwealth And The AU

Part 2

Electoral Discourses

Discourses A:Youth and Elections

Discourses B:Dimensions of Political Finance

Discourse C:Incumbency and Elections

Discourse D:Impunity and Electoral Violence

Discourse E:Social Media and Elections

Preface

This work consists of electoral essays and discourses. The aim is to stimulate discussion among electoral stakeholders in the development of democratic elections generally. Both the essays and discourses are designed to articulate some of the less well-known issues attendant to the planning, preparation and conduct of credible democratic elections. The simple fact that population census apart, national general elections planning and conduct are the largest processes to be undertaken nationally by many States. These processes are not only voluminous, but in most cases they encompass considerable implementation of detail procedures.

Organising democratic elections with multiple political parties with many contesting candidates opens up the electoral process to the political purpose it was created to serve. Inevitably, electoral process is under constant political scrutiny due to fierce competitive contestants that often emerge. Electoral management bodies must be equipped to deal with such environment and are expected to possess the temperament and skill to calm such situations smoothly.

While not all new and emerging democratic countries are able to acquire all the available electoral technologies that are available, many are making progress in that direction. Some have been able to implement electronic voting and counting of votes, thus elimination processes of collating, tallying and announcing results in a drip by drip manner. By these developments, it is believed by many electoral commentators that avenues for electoral fraud have been eliminated from the electoral process.

The advent of social media networking and the communication platforms that they have created have had considerable positive implications for citizens’ participation in election campaigns. The new media, as these social media platforms are sometimes called, have opened up new channels of communication between electoral stakeholders and electoral management bodies and between political parties and candidates. Citizens have more space to participate in election campaigns. These developments have added a welcoming dimension to transparency in election planning, preparation and conduct.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Note about the Author

Carl W. Dundas, LL.B, LL.M (Lon.), Barrister-at-law (Gray’s Inn) is an Election Expert and Maritime Delimitation Consultant. Mr. Dundas is also experienced in governance, democratic development, election organisation and Law of the Sea matters.

Before joining the Commonwealth Secretariat in November 1980, Mr. Dundas was a member of the Attorney-General’s Department in Jamaica. In 1973, he was appointed to the post of Legal Counsel and Director of the Legal Division of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to oversee the implementation of the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, of which he was a leading negotiator. As Principal Legal Advisor, he drafted legal instruments in respect of, inter alia, rules of origin, common external tariff, a harmonised scheme for fiscal incentive to industry, regional laboratory service, a regional shipping service, regional food corporation and regional agriculture research and development institute.

While in the service of Jamaica, Mr. Dundas, as the Technical Adviser to a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament, which dealt with constitutional and electoral reform, eventually became the first Director of Elections 1979-80. His extensive experience in constitution drafting, particularly the provisions relating to election management bodies and his wide experience in drafting legislative frameworks for petroleum and hard rock mineral exploration, gave rise to service in many countries of the Commonwealth, including Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, Kenya, Malawi, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Cook Islands.

He has given technical assistance in electoral matters in many countries, including Aceh, (Indonesia), Antigua & Barbuda, Botswana, Cayman Islands, Guyana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania/Zanzibar, and Zambia; and has been assigned to observe elections in many countries, including Bangladesh, Guyana, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia, Malawi, Pakistan, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania/Zanzibar, and Zambia. He has also advised on election organization and management in Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sierra Leone.

Mr. Dundas led Commonwealth Secretariat’s electoral technical assistance missions to Guyana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania/Zanzibar, and Zambia. He carried out assignments in areas such as designing electoral frameworks for a neutral and impartial electoral management body, the establishment of instruments for the transition from a military one-party to a multiparty system, and has organised capacity-building seminars and workshops.

Constitutional reform, particularly relating to the fundamental provisions dealing with election legislative schemes, is a focal area of his specialization. Consequently, he has undertaken assignments in this area in Guyana, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania (Zanzibar) and has advised on electoral legislation in Antigua & Barbuda, Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

Mr. Dundas has led the Support Team to the Commonwealth Observer Missions to elections in Malaysia (1990), Zambia (1991), Kenya (1992), Guyana (1992 & 97), Malawi (1994), Mozambique (1994), Tanzania (1995), Zanzibar (Tanzania), Trinidad & Tobago (2000). He also served as technical adviser to the Commonwealth pre-election Observation Group to Namibia in 1989 and to the Commonwealth Observer Group to South Africa in 1994.

Mr. Dundas was Chairman of the Electoral Boundary Delimitation Commission of the Cayman Islands in 2003 and again in 2010. As an Election Legal Consultant from 2001 to 2006, Mr. Dundas advised many election management bodies (EMBs) on reform and modernisation, including Aceh (Indonesia), Antigua & Barbuda, Botswana, Cayman Islands, Guyana, Lesotho, Liberia, Nigeria, and Tanzania.

In 2006, Mr. Dundas took up an appointment as the Chief of Party of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ (IFES’) African Union Support Program (funded by USAID) to advise the African Union on the establishment of a Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU). The DEAU was established in May 2008 and I remained its adviser at the African Union in Addis Ababa until 2010.

Other Works by the Author

Practical Steps in Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements: A Guide to Small States, Commonwealth Secretariat (1991)

Organising Free and Fair Elections at Cost-Effective Levels, Commonwealth Secretariat (1993)

Dimensions of Free and Fair Elections: Frameworks, Integrity, Transparency, Attributes, and Monitoring, Commonwealth Secretariat (1994)

Let’s Talk about Elections—The Themes (ed.) Commonwealth Secretariat (1997)

Discussion of Election Issues in Commonwealth Africa (ed.) Commonwealth Secretariat (1998)

Compendium of Election Laws, Practices and Cases of Selected Commonwealth Countries—Volume I, Part I, Commonwealth Secretariat (1996)

Compendium of Election Laws, Practices and Cases of Selected Commonwealth Countries—Volume I, Part 2 Commonwealth Secretariat (1998)

Compendium of Election Laws, Practices and Cases of Selected Commonwealth Countries-Volume 2, Part 1, Commonwealth Secretariat (1999)

Compendium of Election Laws, Practices and Cases of Selected Commonwealth Countries—Volume 2, Part 2, Commonwealth Secretariat (1999)

Election Management Bodies: Constitutive Instruments—Commonwealth Secretariat (1999)

Improving the Organization of Elections: A 2006 Perspective Ian Randle Publishers (2006)

Observing Elections the Commonwealth’s Way: The Early Years, Ian Randle Publishers (2007)

The Lag of 21st Century Democratic Elections: In the African Union Member States, AuthorHouse, USA, 2011.

My Favourite Election Anecdotes and Snippets, AuthorHouse, USA, 2012

My Wonderful World of Elections, AuthorHouse, USA, 2011

Close Elections and Political Succession in the African Union, AuthorHouse, USA, 2012

Acknowledgements

I thank Jide Ojo for reading the manuscript and correcting my typos. Jide also drew on his not inconsiderable knowledge of and insight into the working of the Nigerian electoral process during the four cycles discussed in this work.

Introduction

These electoral essays and discourses deal with a variety of electoral events and developments that will have significant impact on the quality and scope of democratic elections far into the future for new and emerging democracies in particular. At the core of new and emerging democracies are the building blocks that constitute the pillars on which their democratic electoral principles and values are built. These essays and discourses have set out to identify the pillars of democratic elections and the principles and values swirling around them. By identifying the pillars of democratic elections, it will facilitate how best principles and values can be accommodated to enable electoral managers to deliver free, fair and credible elections to electorates and other stakeholders. There is little doubt that democratic elections have never been under greater scrutiny, internationally and regionally, now than ever before. It therefore behoves electoral management bodies to get the planning, preparation and conduct of national elections right.

This book is divided into two parts, part 1 deals with electoral essays and part 2 with shorter electoral discourses. There are five such essays and five discourses.

Part 1: Electoral Essays

Essay I

Nigerian four election cycles

This essay is divided into four sections, plus a shortened section describing the commencement of the activities that would shape the organisation of the fifth electoral cycle since the return to civilian administration in 1999. In general, this essay looks at what it takes to organise transitional democratic elections in a country with a relatively large electorate of over sixty million in 1998-99, starting with very little democratic electoral infrastructure. There was no proper constitutional or electoral framework in place for democratic elections when, in June 1998, the Head of the Military Government died suddenly and the incoming military Head of State immediately decided to return the country to civilian rule. An election timetable was drawn up which would have a series of four sets of elections encompassing local government, State Assemblies, gubernatorial elections, federal legislatures (House of Representatives and Senate) and finally presidential elections, in under eight months. During this shortened electoral cycle, a legal and constitutional framework had to be created for elections, an electoral management body had to be constituted, political parties had to be formed and registered, electoral staff had to be recruited and trained, qualified persons had to be registered as voters and candidates had to be selected and nominated to contest each set of elections. The challenges were immense and the tools and infrastructure were meagre.

The shortened first electoral cycle (approximately August 1998 to February 1999) was characterized by a series of crisis management by a new and inexperienced electoral management body. However, with respect to institutional electoral memory, the ‘cupboard’ was not exactly bare as Nigeria had conducted some sort of elections before, the last effort of which had taken place in 1993, but which was annulled by the military. The 1993 elections were adjudged by independent observers as the fairest that Nigeria had experienced up until then. Some personnel who participated in the 1993 elections were still with the Electoral Office in 1998.

Towards the end of 1998, a newly constituted electoral management body (EMB), the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), with a chairman and twelve members was in place. There was an abundance of goodwill towards the new Commission. The electorate and Nigerian public at large welcomed the development which was aimed at ending military rule which had been in place since 1983. Nigeria’s regional and international friends and partners pledged good wishes and support. With the help of Commonwealth members, who offered technical and training expertise, channelled through the Commonwealth Secretariat, and backed by many other international partners, INEC’s registration officers were trained and deployed in more or less good time. Political parties were formed in accordance with stipulated rules and candidates to contest the different tiers of elections were selected and nominated.

Many aspects of the electoral timetable went according to plan, although not necessarily to expectation of all the stakeholders. The voters’ registration exercise, like others before it, was far from flawless; as there were multiple registrations, underage registration and with errors of misspelling and omission of names from the register. There were unverified rumours of the tampering with the register in some areas and dissatisfaction with the time allocated for the public inspection of the preliminary register. The newly created political parties and alliances, weak in structure, and with almost non-existent internal democratic record or culture, were ruled by the discretionary dictates of the leadership hierarchy rather than party constitutional rules. That background provided inevitable chaos and anarchy at the party primaries where the party candidates were selected to contest the elections.

The breakdown at the party primaries gave rise to lack of party discipline that pervaded the electoral environment then. The party indiscipline at primaries gave rise to two sets of electoral mischief, namely, violence and an accompanying culture of impunity for breaches of electoral rules, both of which live on throughout the four electoral cycles under review.

The transitional elections were generally marred by election violence and widespread election rigging, particularly at the presidential elections. ‘Money politics’ also quickly focused attention at the party primaries and followed through to the election campaigns during which candidates’ expenses limits were not observed.

Electoral cycle two followed closely on the trail of the transitional elections which suffered deficits understandably because of the significantly shortened electoral cycle triggered by the particular circumstances leading to the call for the return to civilian rule. Many of the challenges in credible democratic election planning and preparation were carried over from the transitional elections into the second electoral cycle after the restoration of civilian rule. The second cycle therefore witnessed significant strengthening of the electoral legal environment through the promulgation of a new Constitution and a new Electoral Law with electoral regulations there under. The new legal framework soon ran into difficulty as certain provisions of the Electoral Act and the Regulations dealing with the formation and registration of new political parties were challenged as being inconsistent with the new Constitution. The matter quickly reached the Nigerian Supreme Court which ruled in favour of the challengers. The upshot of the court ruling was that a new Electoral Law and amended Regulations had to be promulgated.

While the electoral legal environment was being addressed and improved, the voters’ registration exercised was not only delayed, reportedly through bureaucratic delays with disbursement of funds, but when the registration process finally got off the ground, it was so poorly managed that, in the view of observers of the process and stakeholders, it lacked credibility. The resultant voters’ register was flawed. It was a considerable setback for the INEC’s effort to remedy one of the deficits of the transitional elections of 1998-98.

The nomination (party primaries) processes showed little or no improvement over those of the transitional elections—they were marked by disorganisation, confusion, cheating and poor internal democratic rules and implementation thereof.

The polling at the election generally, and particularly the presidential elections, was beset by rigging and other breaches of the electoral rules. There was widespread intimidation and violence primarily against the supporters of rival political parties and occasionally against the electoral staffs and the property of INEC. The occurrences appeared to represent the worst aspects of the transitional elections of 1998-99. It was as though no lessons were learnt from the weaknesses of those elections. Again, the intimidation and violence which preceded interference with the electoral process took place under the umbrella of the culture of impunity for electoral breaches and the violence accompanying such breaches. Election observers, domestic and international, as well as stakeholders and local commentators gave thumbs down to the elections and labelled them of dubious credibility. Some critics of INEC’s blamed its inability to get the election organisation right on the Commission’s close relationship with the ruling party and the corrupting influencing of that relationship on the elections.

The third electoral cycle (2003-2007) began under the cloud of failure of the previous electoral cycle. The challenges were great as, since the reintroduction of civilian rule in 1999, the INEC record of organising credible elections was poor. The third electoral cycle was largely uneventful, except perhaps for the promulgation of a new electoral Act. The change of chairmanship of INEC during that cycle did not seem to usher in any new commitment to the delivery of free, fair and credible elections. Stakeholders and local electoral commentators did not discern any fundamental changes to the flawed preparations of the second cycle and so they not only feared the worst, but predicted that the 2007 general elections would fare no better than 2003 in quality. That turned out to be true. Perhaps, the 2007 elections, which marked the end of the third electoral cycle since the return to civilian rule in Nigeria, were the low point in electoral organisation. Everything that could possibly go wrong in electoral terms did so. Widespread election rigging and intimidation accompanied by violence and murderous crimes throughout the country before and during the series of elections, with the rigging reaching its peak during the presidential poll; international and domestic observers quickly pronounced the elections to be not credible. There was failure on the part of INEC to carry out meaningful reform of the electoral rules and procedures in the third electoral cycle to tackle the deficits identified by a review undertaken by experts provided by partners, including UN, Commonwealth and IFES. By 2007, the culture of impunity with respect to electoral breaches had taken hold firmly and youths in particular, backed by ruthless politicians, who recruited them to create political mischief and electoral mayhem throughout the campaign and during the elections, were in the middle of it. For the second time, the Nigerian general elections were generally perceived as at a level far below international democratic acceptable standards.

The fourth cycle began in an inauspicious electoral environment in Nigeria. Many stakeholders and partners of INEC lost hope in its ability to organise credible democratic elections in Nigeria. As if to add to the gloom on the preparation for the fourth electoral cycle, INEC’s attempt to review and delimit constituencies’ boundaries in Nigeria in 2008 ended in failure. Ever since the botched efforts to deliver credible elections in 2007, there were calls for the incumbent Chairman of INEC to step down from the post. By 2010, the calls for the Chairman of INEC to resign could no longer go unheeded and in the middle of 2010 Prof. Maurice Iwu’s time expired and was not renewed. Prof. Attahiru Jega, a University administrator, was appointed to replace him.

Prof. Jega brought new commitment to the delivery of free, fair and credible elections to the people of Nigeria. He wanted to take ownership of as many of the preparatory processes of the fourth cycle as was possible and so even against the advice of some partners, the new Chairman insisted that INEC should carry out a new voter registration exercise before the pending election of 2011. The registration of voters did not go smoothly, mainly due to the lack of adequate time, but nevertheless the exercise enlarged the voters’ register to about 73 million and was considered to be reasonably well conducted. With the support of partners, considerable emphasis was put on training of electoral officers, including the co-opting and training of members of the Nigerian Youth Service Corps to serve as poll workers. The constitutional provisions relating to elections and legal framework were upgraded with amendments to the Constitution and the Electoral Act. The Code of Conduct for Political Parties was strengthened and the 63 political parties subscribed to it. The political parties were dissatisfied because the Government had withdrawn public funding for political parties in 2010 Electoral Act. The political party primaries did not significantly improve. The attendant chaos, accompanied by intimidation and violence, which was shrouded by the culture of impunity as in previous primaries, was ever present and many complaints were filed with INEC and in the courts.

Notwithstanding the improved electoral management with much greater transparency and more engagement with NGOs and other stakeholders and the various changes made by the new Chairman, the series of elections in 2011 got off to a dreadful start; in fact the elections had to be postponed on the scheduled starting day and put back for about a week due to the short supply of vital polling materials as ballot papers and election results sheets.

After the initial setback, polling went relatively smoothly throughout the series of elections. However, the immediate aftermath of the presidential elections on 16 April was characterised by widespread post-election violence in a number of northern States where several hundreds of lives were lost. The violence was triggered by the disappointment of the supporters of the popular opposition candidate in the northern States that their candidate had not won the presidency. Notwithstanding the post-elections violence in the north of the country, the elections as a whole were hailed by independent election observers, domestic and international, as credible.

Partners of INEC were satisfied with the efforts and achievements of INEC in being able at last to deliver credible democratic elections, although stakeholders and commentators saw the positive developments as just the start of building confidence in the electoral process in Nigeria.

The INEC management immediately set about preparing the way to build on the widespread positive response to the 2011 elections organisation and conduct. A series of retreat seminars with stakeholders, including INEC staffs, were held in different parts of the country to get feedback on the preparation for and conduct of the elections and to extract the lessons to be learnt from the elections. The INEC then established a review committee to look into the conduct of registration of voters’ process, as well as the polling process, RERC, which reported in 2012 with a number of wide ranging recommendations to improve the conduct of voters’ registration and polling for the 2015 elections. At the time of writing, INEC was implementing the RERC recommendations and upgrading its management tools. It established a graphic design centre to produce voter education and other election materials in-house and was implementing a comprehensive election management system to improve its management tools. The prognosis for the fifth electoral cycle and for the 2015 general elections was positive for the holding of credible elections.

Essay II

This essay is about the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU) which stood up in 2008 and which aimed to strengthen the African Union’s role in observing elections in the Member States. The DEAU aimed also to work with electoral management bodies to enhance their capabilities to organise and conduct free, fair and credible democratic elections. There is a fund, the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Fund (DEAF) attached to the DEAU to fund electoral activities undertaken by the DEAU.

The concept of the DEAU, as formulated, appeared simple and straightforward when stated to strengthen the credibility of AU’s election observation and improve the ability of national EMBs to organise credible democratic elections, but in fact its impact is likely to be much deeper. The DEAU signified a measure of centralisation in the AU of electoral support which may in time lead not only to improved observation and election preparation, but also to incremental harmonization of electoral standards.

The DEAU also has the potential to encourage the AU-wide EMB networks to facilitate experience sharing, including problem-solving approaches. Through its fundraising arm, the DEAF, the DEAU can shop around for support from partners to fund its electoral assistance to national EMBs. The DEAU is well placed to undertake meaningful electoral research into weak spots in election organisation in the AU and make recommendations to the African Union Commission.

Essay III

Election observation in the Commonwealth and the African Union compared makes for fascinating research analysis, although some might think that the comparison is not meaningful since the Commonwealth has several mature democracies and the AU has few, if any at all. Also the Commonwealth started its election observation in 1967, while the AU’s predecessor organisation, the OAU, started election observation in early 1990s. It should be remembered however that there is a large convergence in membership between the Commonwealth and the AU—approximately a third of the membership of the two institutions overlap.

Commonwealth observer group (COG) reports, not unlike those of the AU, do come under strong criticisms from time to time for their findings and conclusions, for example, COG report on the Kenyan elections of 1992. However, Commonwealth election observer reports are believed to slot in at a higher level on the scale of credibility than those of the AU’s election observers. This essay looks at the efforts of the AU to improve the standard of its observation reports and the impact which the establishment of the DEAU is likely to have on the quality and credibility of AU observation reports.

The AU’s training programme for its election observation, conducted by the DEAU and supported by many partners, including IFES-USAID, UNDP, Carter Center, EISA and others, will make a difference to the quality and credibility of its observer reports over time.

Essay IV

This essay aims more to explore rather than capture best practices that may exist in electoral organisation and conduct in the Commonwealth and the AU. In this context, it is important to remember that approximately a third of the membership of the Commonwealth and the AU overlap. In the 1990s, the Commonwealth Secretariat started tracking best practices in the various preparatory processes of elections by EMBs in member countries of the Commonwealth association. That working document was circulated in the Commonwealth in 1997. From the point of view of AU, electoral best practices in the non-Commonwealth members of the AU will largely be developed by the national EMBs supported by the DEAU.

Best electoral practices in the Commonwealth and the AU have been enhanced through the recommendations contained in election observers’ reports, as well as post-election audits, evaluations and reviews where these have been adopted and implemented.

Many member states in the Commonwealth and in the AU are lagging behind in the application of best practices, but with increased training and advancement in electoral professionalism of EMBs’ personnel, the prognosis is positive.

Essay V

This essay deals with electoral alternative disputes resolution (EADR) potential in the Commonwealth and the AU. The EADR is a relatively unexplored aspect in electoral development in new and emerging democracies of the Commonwealth and the AU. Electoral commentators who support the EADR approach to resolving disputes associated with elections postulate that it is more expeditious, cost-effective and less acrimonious than the court system. Those who oppose the EADR approach contest the merits of EADR and contend that settlements reached through EADR are often less binding on the parties than are court decisions. Notwithstanding the differences of views with respect to the merits of alternative disputes resolution (ADR) mechanisms, there seems to be agreement that EADR is more appropriate to deal with certain electoral-related disputes than others. For example, disputes touching intra-political or inter-party differences are sometimes more appropriately dealt with by EADR mechanisms than the court system.

For most EMBs in the Commonwealth and AU members, EADR is a new approach and is at the experimental stage. A few countries like Nigeria and Zambia do have EADR mechanisms to apply procedures that are outside the court system to settle electoral-related disputes. In New Zealand, ADR is widely available, by choice, alongside the court system to deal with disputes settlement generally, including electoral-related disputes. In the United States of America, EADR is available at the federal level in respect of campaign finance cases.

The essay explores the nature, scope and procedures of EADR mechanisms and how they may be applied. It discusses an ADR survey in New Zealand among ADR practitioners, disputants and lawyers who do general law practice, as well as ADR. The prognosis for EADR in the Commonwealth and AU is positive.

Part II

Electoral Discourses

Discourse A—Youth and Elections

This discourse explores the potential for youths and youth-led organisations to make effective contributions to democratic elections. In many countries youths are allied to a political party and seek to make their contribution to elections through such political party. Often youths are perceived as political activists associated with intimidation of opponents from other political parties. In some cases, the youths are associated with electoral intimidation and violence often instigated by ruthless political elders and shielded by the culture of impunity that typifies the electoral environment of many emerging democracies.

This discourse is interested in exploring the positive side of youths’ involvement in the electoral process and how it can be opened up to youths and offer them entry points where they can make effective contributions. Youths are sometimes defined as, young persons between the ages of 15 years and 24 years old, or between the ages of 18 and 35 years old, depending on the context of the discourse. This discourse examines the role that a youth-friendly electoral legislative scheme can play in creating entry points for youths into the electoral process. It may begin with the age at which a person qualifies to register as a voter and is able to vote at elections. The discourse notes that a number of countries currently allow voting at age 16. It is noted that in many jurisdictions the age at which a young person can hold elective office to the parliament or national assembly is higher than the minimum voting age. The discourse argued that such a situation should be reviewed.

In a similar vein, the view is put forward that political party legislation with respect to party formation and registration should be youth friendly and create space for youths to make effective contributions to party decision-making and hold political party offices.

Youths have been taken on board and trained as electoral officers to work in voter registration and polling at elections, for example, in Nigeria at the 2011 general elections and subsequently at several gubernatorial elections. The Commonwealth Secretariat has a programme for training youths in election observation to enable them to form judgments on whether an election was credible or not.

The discourse opined that currently too few regional and international partners have programmes of support, through financing or otherwise, to young candidates campaigning for elective offices. In this regard national legislation and EMBs could also assist youth candidates with waiver of, or discounted fees, such as fees with respect nominations to contest elections.

Discourse B

Dimensions of Political Finance

Political finance certainly has many dimensions, including election campaign financing. This discourse identifies some of these dimensions and examines the issues involved. These issues include public financing of political parties and election campaigns; limits of expenditure by parties and candidates, or limits on expenditure by candidate, but not by his/her party. Then there is disclosure of campaign contributions by party and by candidate. In some jurisdictions, the commencement and conclusion of election campaign period is an issue.

There are reporting requirements with respect to election campaigns by political parties and candidates. Several issues are tied up here; transparency with respect to funding and contributors, accountability to public and stakeholders; and compliance with applicable regulations. Other considerations that may come into play here are the need for a level playing field among contestants and the avoidance of excessive expenditure on campaigns by wealthy individuals. Where it is allowed constitutionally, an independent candidate’s position may constitute an issue with respect to the size of nomination fees and candidate’s limit on expenditure.

This discourse looks at the positive as well as the negative side of ‘money in politics’. It notes that normally, that is without excesses, money is good for politics. It enables parties and candidates to put across their manifestos or message to constituents and the public, and to hire campaign staffs. The discourse recognises and discusses the various ways in which election campaigns attract ill-gotten monies to an electoral campaign ranging from drug money to money obtained by fraudulent means.

The discourse explores the potential of social media platforms to be used for election campaign fundraising purposes, particularly in new and emerging democracies.

Discourse C

Incumbency and Elections

Incumbency generally refers to governing parties, their members and their sponsored election candidates. However, this definition does not apply to sitting members of the United States of America’s Congress where sitting members of governing and opposition parties have incumbency advantages flowing from the fact of being an elected member of Congress.

In new and emerging democracies, incumbency is associated with the improper uses and abuses of public property, services and public servants by ruling political parties, particularly during election campaigns. The almost monopolistic use of publicly owned media, print and electronic, by ruling parties in many countries has distorted the right of free press and the concept of level playing field with respect to elections’ campaigns. The issue of incumbency with respect to elections is taken serious in countries like India where rules dealing with the matter are issued by the Election Commission regulating the conduct of ruling parties, their executives and their candidates are usually followed. Pakistan and Bangladesh have tried to tackle the problem of incumbency through constitutional amendments which provided for caretaker government to run general elections when the term of office of the incumbent government comes to an end. This discourse explores the merits or otherwise of this drastic approach to create a level playing field for democratic elections.

When incumbency is allowed to flourish in unbridled forms, it could render democratic elections uncompetitive and may even adversely affect voter turnout at elections. The discourse analyses the situation in the USA Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, from the point of view of uncompetitive democratic elections.

Discourse D

Culture of Impunity and Electoral Violence

Electoral breaches occur in almost all democratic elections in mature, as well as in new and emerging democracies. Prosecution and punishment for such breaches are less swift in forthcoming in new and emerging democracies than in mature ones. Lack of punishment for electoral breaches and crimes associated with such breaches is due to a variety of reasons, such as lack proper legal structure, lack of personnel and often lack of political will. This discourse deals with the perceived culture of impunity which attends many jurisdictions in emerging democracies. This extraordinary phenomenon is found in many jurisdictions in the Commonwealth and African Union.

This discourse looks at the development of the culture of impunity with respect to Nigeria since the restoration of civilian rule in 1999 and Kenya since the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1992. It discusses the reasons why the culture of impunity with respect to crimes associated with elections are allowed to take root and flourish, possible solutions and what is being done about it in these countries.

The consequences of the culture of impunity cannot be overlooked, as in some of these cases, for example, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, the cost of many hundreds of lives and millions of dollars to the countries concerned is significant.

It should be noted that the ‘culture of impunity’ is not a legal status, but rather it is the history and prognosis that the instigators and perpetrators of electoral breaches and associated crimes will not be punished.

Discourse E

Social Media and Elections

Social media platforms have brought new dimensions to participation by citizens in elections and in time will broaden the window of transparency in election preparation and conduct. The new media, as social media are sometimes called, have cleared the gateway blockage posed by traditional media to citizen’s direct participation in election campaign discussions. The social media platforms have provided citizens with avenues to communicate with candidates contesting elections and open up possibilities of inter-active communication between the two sides.

There is a negative side to the growth of social platforms. It has become easy for rumours and false statements to be put across to the public about political opponents. ‘Hate’ messages and threats against political party opponents in volatile areas often serve as the trigger point for local conflicts. The operation in real time created by social media, however, renders rumours and mischief to be arrested quickly and so prevents these events from becoming unmanageable.

Social media platforms can be used for electoral campaign fundraising purposes, as the Obama Campaign teams in presidential elections of 2008 and 2012 in the USA amply demonstrated. It is not as yet clear whether or not the fundraising capabilities of social media will extend to new and emerging democracies in the near future as has happened in the USA. This discourse examines these and other issues surrounding social media and elections generally.

Part 1

ELECTORAL ESSAYS

NIGERIA

ELECTORAL CYCLE I—1998-1999

Introduction

The untimely death of Nigeria’s military Head of State on June 8 1998 set the stage for moves to usher in a period of civilian administration in that country. Up to that time the military had been in power for 29 of the 39 years since Nigeria’s independence. Hence the landscape for democratic elections was denuded, but fragments of the infrastructure were kept in place. The in-coming military administration in June 1998 opted to return the governance of the country to civilian rule and set a very short time table¹ to accomplish that goal. The challenge was immense, but was generally welcomed and considered ‘doable’. Notwithstanding the shortened election timetable set out herein, for the purposes of this essay the preparatory and polling periods constitute an electoral cycle.

Overview

The electoral environment was bare, perhaps barren and certainly undeveloped. The national electoral process which lay dormant for many, many years was to be dusted off and activated with the goal of delivering credible multiparty democratic elections. The electoral legal environment was underdeveloped and needed prompt restoration. The principal stakeholders in multiparty democratic elections, political parties, were non-existent and had to be created for the purposes of the transitional elections to civilian rule. Civil society groups from all parts of Nigeria were active and stood ready to support the transition from military to civilian rule in many areas, including voter education, monitoring registration of voters, polling and counting of votes.

There were goodwill and well wishers nationally