The SILICON WAR

By Mark Hanson

The Silicon War is a fictional story depicting the theft and illegal export of sensitive U.S. electronic equipment and the federal government’s efforts to track down the perpetrators and bring them to justice.

The story begins with the discovery in the U.S. that equipment is being funneled to the Soviet Union and the near-simultaneou

• Language: English
• Publisher: TOPLINK PUBLISHING, LLC
• Release date: Jan 21, 2019
• ISBN: 9781950256266

Book preview

cover.jpg

The Silicon

War

Mark Hanson

Copyright © 2019 by Mark Hanson.

Paperback: 978-1-950256-25-9

eBook: 978-1-950256-26-6

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.

Ordering Information:

For orders and inquiries, please contact:

1-888-375-9818

www.toplinkpublishing.com

[e-mail]

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Prologue

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Chapter 10

Chapter 11

Chapter 12

Chapter 13

Chapter 14

Chapter 15

Chapter 16

Chapter 17

Chapter 18

Chapter 19

Chapter 20

Chapter 21

Chapter 22

Chapter 23

Chapter 24

Chapter 25

Endnote

Prologue

The Cold War was, in reality, several wars all going on at the same time. It started with the arms race at the end of World War II. Although the other Allied countries had been informed, if not actually involved, in the development of the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union was not. This, coupled with the more or less unilateral partitioning of Europe by the Soviet Union, created a breach in what was at best a tentative trust between the two nations that could not be reconciled. Thus, when the bombs exploded over Japan demonstrating just how far ahead of the Soviet Union the US’s nuclear capability was and just how unlikely it was that the US would share its technology with the Soviet Union, the Soviets were left with little choice; they deemed it a matter of self-defense to somehow steal US atomic secrets. They were very successful in doin g so.

With the launching of Sputnik in 1957, what had been only an arms race between the US and the Soviet Union became a space race as well. The term space race was used, although in reality it was another segment of the Cold War—the space war. The objective was to be the first nation to control space for military purposes and so race was an appropriate aphorism for the space war.

Uninformed Americans were deeply concerned as the Soviets launched larger and larger satellites, using larger and larger launch vehicles. What we didn’t understand was that the Soviets had no choice; they didn’t have the technology necessary to make their payloads small enough to be launched by smaller rockets. The reality was that our puny payloads had more capability and greater reliability than anything the Soviets could launch because of the new integrated circuit technology developed here, primarily in Silicon Valley.

The Russians realized they were losing the space race because they were not even in the more important race, the microchip technology race. And to their chagrin, they realized that given Moore’s law, they could never catch up by reinventing the technology on their own. That once again left them only one alternative: they would have to steal it. Their earlier experience and success with stealing atomic secrets would serve them well again. And so, what had been a space war became a third war— the silicon war.

But US supremacy in electronic technology not only benefitted the space program, it also changed the complexion of intelligence gathering. Aside from being able to launch more sophisticated satellites into orbit, many of which were devoted to intelligence gathering missions, microelectronics made earth-based intelligence gathering a whole new ball game as well. With smaller devices capable of operating with far less power, one could gather intelligence more surreptitiously than ever before. And since more and more information was being transmitted electronically, the field of electronic intelligence came of age. Yet another war was born under the auspices of the Cold War, the electronic intelligence war.

1.jpg

Silicon Valley, 1981. The collective knowledge about US electronic intelligence residing at various companies in Silicon Valley was arguably greater and more sensitive than anywhere outside of NSA headquarters at Ft. Meade, Maryland. The knowledge included not only the technologies by which electronic intelligence was gathered but also details about the sources of that intelligence and how it was being used within the US intelligence community.

It is no wonder then that companies in Silicon Valley had become the targets of espionage activities initiated by Eastern Bloc countries, all of whom funneled their results to the Soviet Union.

The events that follow, although fictional, are based on fact; it might have happened that way.

Chapter 1

Hof, Republic of West Germany. It was still early spring in Germany. The weather was cool and somewhat variable, rain one day, some sunshine the next. The sky was still gray most of the time, but one could sense more than actually feel an ever-increasing amount of sunlight. The trees were just beginning to bud out, giving a faint touch of green to the otherwise gray-brown branches. Farmers were not yet anxious to prepare their ground for planting—the chance of frost was still too g reat.

People were out and about in town during the middle hours of the day, but they were still wearing warm clothing to protect themselves from the wind and cool temperature. Later in the day or early in the morning, you could still see your breath when you ventured outside.

At the US military base outside of town, things were bustling. The NATO exercises were about to begin, which meant that there were more than the usual number of people around and more than the usual air of activity. Everyone seemed to have a distinct purpose in mind as they hurried about the base. Although nominally an army post, right now one could see more than the typical number of members of all of the military forces along with people in the uniforms of other NATO countries.

Lt. Col. Crocker, USAF, had been up all night. The field demonstration of the new CIS-ISS system feasibility concept was scheduled to begin that day, and he had been up late with his men making sure everything was working. Preliminary testing of the system had been conducted stateside at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, but those tests had been very carefully orchestrated to determine if the system met its design specifications. The true test would begin that day in a less structured environment, the purpose of which was to determine if the system had real practical application in a wartime scenario.

The CIS-ISS system had been Crocker’s baby for nearly three years. Originally conceived by the people in the Hawkins Group think-tank outside of DC, it had been presented to the air force as a potential solution to a thorny problem. Once the powers that be in the air force had expressed interest in pursuing it, Hawkins Group had written formal specifications and the air force had gone out to defense electronics contractors for bids. It was at that point that Crocker became involved as the manager of the project.

The problem in search of a solution was that in the midst of a full-scale battle, how would a ground-to-air defense weapons system know which blips on its radar screen represented enemy aircraft that should be shot down? Consider the situation. Just prior to the battle, the radar operator saw an orderly array of blips entering from the friendly side of the sky and a similarly orderly array from the enemy side. Seconds later, however, as individual aircraft engaged each other over the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area), the orderly arrays disappeared, to be replaced by a confused mass of blips moving in all directions. And to the radar operator, all the blips looked the same. How did he know which ones to shoot down?

The army’s solution was simple. Since the objective was to protect the army’s ground forces, they would shoot down all the blips and sort them out on the ground. That way, they would be sure to get all of the enemy aircraft. Needless to say, the air force was not too keen on that solution. Friendly fire incidents were not only embarrassing, but also deadly in that scenario. The air force wanted a way to identify the blips individually, in real time, so that only the enemy aircraft would be shot down.

It had been possible for several years to identify static targets as being friend or foe and even moving targets as long as one of two conditions existed: either all the blips represented only one species of aircraft or else individual blips were spaced sufficiently far apart that existing systems could resolve them spatially. But those conditions were unlikely to exist in a real battlefield situation. The air force was hanging its hopes on the ability of the industry to identify blips based on monopulse technology—information collected from a single pulse of energy from onboard emitters—and to do so with sufficient spatial discrimination to know which of two aircraft in a dogfight should be shot down. Could it be done? No one knew for sure, but they thought it could and urged the issuance of a contract for a feasibility demonstration—a no-risk contract to determine the viability of the concept.

Six months later, the contract had been awarded to a team of Silicon Valley companies. Innovative Microwave Company, headquartered in Palo Alto, would be responsible for the electronic sensors. The high-speed computational aspect of the project, necessary to keep track of identifications on a blip-by-blip basis over space and time, would be handled by the emerging computer technologies of Dynamic Systems, Inc. in Sunnyvale, using the latest processors developed by CircuitTek.

The project had been an ambitious undertaking for the contractors involved. Not only did it require a technological leap of faith, but by its very nature, it was extremely sensitive, requiring the utmost secrecy. The civilian contractors’ project personnel were required to have security clearances well in excess of Top Secret. Those clearances were issued after special security briefings and enforced by periodic lie detector tests.

The security clearances were required to protect both the new technology involved as well as the emitter identification data loaded into the system. Determining what identification data to enter required, in turn, an understanding of the quality of the data. That could only be obtained by having detailed information about the data source. It was that latter requirement that drove the clearance level. As the overall project manager and as the official government representative for the project, Crocker was on the hook for project security. Although he never took security matters lightly, the implications of security for the project were much more significant than usual. He was glad that it was almost over and that the civilian personnel could be debriefed and their clearance levels reduced to those more normal for the industry.

After a year and a half of development, the system had been deployed to Eglin AFB for initial tests. In those tests, aircraft with known emitters flew predetermined routes. The system demonstrated its ability to tag a radar blip and track it in real time. Multiple aircraft with different emitters (still known) were also successfully identified and tracked. But those tests had been carefully orchestrated. The purpose was to show whether the system specifications had been met. The results were encouraging.

Then it was time for the most realistic battlefield test the air force could devise. The system had been shipped to Germany and deployed outside of Hof to participate in the current round of NATO exercises. During these exercises, aggressor forces would fly aircraft equipped with radars and other emitters typical of those expected to be on Soviet aircraft and would engage the friendly forces in simulated combat.

George McDonald, project manager for DSI, and Matt Bradford of IMC exchanged silent glances with Crocker. The three of them had become colleagues, if not friends over the past years, and all realized the importance of that day’s test. McDonald and Bradford were forced to trust Crocker’s judgment. After all, he was the customer. By the same token, Crocker had had to acknowledge the technological expertise of the others. They had learned to work together in a more or less harmonious manner, recognizing that it could not be a one-man show and therefore finding room in the project for each of their egos. It had not always been easy. Though none of them would readily admit it, each knew that the project could not have reached that point without the skill and expertise of the other two. All three men were bone-tired, but the anticipation of that day’s test was pumping adrenalin into their systems at an enormous rate. They would soon know whether their hard work really would inaugurate a new era in combat identification systems.

The system had been redeployed after being transported from Eglin, and everything had been checked out. No system of that complexity could possibly survive disassembly, transport, and reassembly without a single glitch. That was why the team had been up all night; finding and fixing redeployment-related problems had taken them literally until the last tick of the clock. But that moment they were ready.

A complex procedure had been established for determining if the system accurately tracked individual aircraft based on their emitter identifications and spatial coordinates. That involved the use of onboard flight recorders on every aircraft, specially configured to record aircraft position with respect to the ground with precision throughout their flight. Recorders had also been installed with the DSI computer system capable of recording the path of each radar blip, tying that path to earth coordinates. By comparing those two recordings together with identification information assigned to each blip, the ability of the system to accurately identify and track each radar blip could be determined.

At 0600 hours, the planes took off from their bases, following predetermined routes to the field exercise area that would bring the aggressor force into position as if they were attacking from the east and the defender forces as if they were defending from the west. That was the classic scenario for NATO exercises. All systems were powered up, and final self-tests were initiated to ensure that everything was functioning as expected. No problems were reported. The three project managers breathed a sigh of relief. The test could go as scheduled. A delay at that point would have been nerve-wracking as well as embarrassing.

Half an hour later as the planes began to approach the exercise zone, the system reported initial radar contact, and the ESM sensors were directed to begin collecting emitter data for purposes of electronic identification. The information thus collected was transmitted from the sensor site on a tower outside of Hof to the DSI computers, housed in a trailer on the nearby military base. One by one, the blips on the radar were identified, and each blip thus identified began to be tracked. The recorders began collecting their data for later analysis.

An hour later, as the planes broke off engagement and returned to their bases for refueling, the system was shut down. The tapes from the recorders were removed and prepared for transport to a specially prepared, secure site nearby where they would be compared with the aircraft onboard recorders. The process would take many days to complete, but an initial indication could be expected before the day was out. Crocker, McDonald, and Bradford left the site for their hotel rooms in Hof for much-needed rest. They would meet again around 1600 hours for an initial debriefing.

2.jpg

Col. Crocker called the briefing to order. Gentlemen, please. I’d like a summary of the field test results so far.

Sir, the ESM sensor is working as expected. We’ve been able to identify 90 percent of the aircraft in the air. The remaining 10 percent appear to have been in such close angular proximity to one another that we couldn’t identify the separate entities with a sufficient degree of accuracy, reported Matt Bradford.

At what proximity to each other did we lose the ability to accurately distinguish signals?

It depends a little on signal strength but at about 3 degrees angular separation.

George?

We were able to correlate the ESM sensor data with radar data and assign a definite identification to 85 percent of the radar blips.

Not 90 percent? What about that other 5 percent?

It’s like shooting at a moving target, if you’ll pardon the expression. Owing to rapidly changing vectors, we couldn’t always assign the ESM sensor data to a specific blip.

Anything we can do to improve the numbers?

Matt responded, With the current system, probably not. If tighter specifications for the antennas could be achieved, we should be able to do slightly better. But then the question becomes one of cost/benefit trade-off. I’m not sure better antennas can be made, but if they can, they won’t be cheap.

George added, And even if better spatial resolution could be achieved, we’re still faced with the problem of rapidly changing vectors. Better spatial resolution will not solve that problem. Faster processors might alleviate the problem to some extent, but it’s hard to say how much improvement might be possible.

Any indication of how much faster the processors might need to be to achieve a noticeable improvement?

No, at least not yet. We’ll have to analyze the data in gory detail to determine if we can even answer that question.

Anything we have learned that can result in improvement tweaks while we’re here at these exercises?

I don’t think so, said McDonald. The results appear to be slightly better than our expectations already.

Bradford agreed.

OK, let’s continue to participate in the exercise. It may be too early yet to determine if we can do better.

2.jpg

Dmitri Kosakov leaned back in his chair, put his hands together, and rested his chin on his fingers. He stared out the window of his Kremlin office. The sky was a nondescript gray, partly because of clouds and partly because of the Moscow smog. It was getting worse each year, he observed to himself. How bad will it be when I’m old enough to retire?

Dmitri was in his forties. He was a handsome man who looked ten years younger than his actual age. He took good care of himself and all things being equal, could expect to be quite vibrant when he was old enough to retire.

But perhaps thinking about retirement was premature. If the information he had just been handed turned out to be accurate, retirement may be the least of his worries.

He reached out and picked up a sheaf of papers from his desk. The reports indicated that perhaps the Americans were testing some new electronic intelligence equipment as part of their latest exercises. The information was sketchy at best, but one of the East German sites reported that some equipment was being installed near Hof. Exactly what the equipment was supposed to do was anybody’s guess, but from outward appearances, it didn’t look like anything the East Germans had seen before. And since Hof was a favorite site for the testing of new NATO electronic equipment, the conclusion seemed inescapable, something new was being tested.

NATO had just started the latest round of exercises in West Germany. Dmitri had ordered deployment of his most sophisticated ELINT systems to monitor NATO electronic emissions during the exercise with the intent of adding to the Soviet Union’s store of information about NATO emitters, codes, and procedures. Perhaps he should redirect some of those assets to specifically look in on what the Americans were doing at Hof.

Dmitri reached for his intercom and called his administrative assistant, Irena Petrovski.

Irena entered. She was a startlingly beautiful woman—tall enough to be a model but not nearly as thin as models were nowadays. Instead, she was well-proportioned. Her mid-length brown hair framed a slightly oval face highlighted by her eyes. They were light blue, large, and extremely bright. They shined with intelligence. She walked across the room to the front of Dmitri’s desk. Yes?

Dmitri and Irena had been lovers for three years, but they were careful to maintain a business-like decorum around the office. No one knew of their relationship. That was critical given Dmitri’s position. Although affairs were commonplace within the ranks of government service, his security clearances could have been jeopardized if it was known that he had a mistress. Both Dmitri and Irena took their jobs seriously. They never talked shop outside the office—not with each other and certainly not with anyone else. That was a very wise practice not only to protect state secrets but also to protect their own secret.

This report from the NATO exercises surveillance team bothers me. Can we verify this information independently?

Irena was, in fact, much more than an administrative assistant. Dmitri took her into his confidence completely and relied heavily on her advice. We could contact the East Germans directly, but their data is always questionable. How about the air force? They have a legitimate interest in the exercises, so asking them for data would probably not raise any questions.

Whom do we know over there?

Major Gramovich helped us a year ago on that West German issue. He might help us.

Ah yes, he was very competent. Let’s see if he knows anything. Can you get me his number?

Right away.

Dmitri watched as Irena turned and left the room. He couldn’t help it. She was beautiful. He still couldn’t get over the fact that she was his lover. She could have had her pick of virtually any man, and yet she had accepted his advances. Dmitri was married, and Irena had known that when he first approached her. Admittedly, his marriage was not to be taken lightly. She knew he could not simply ask for a divorce without raising questions that could affect his position unless his wife was involved in something scandalous. So far at least, there was no indication that such a scandal was likely. All Dmitri and Irena could do was hope.

Irena called with the phone number.

Dmitri thanked her and called Major Gramovich. Major, this is Dmitri Kosakov. How are things?

Same old same old. How about you?

Pretty much the same, but I keep hoping that every once in a while something of interest might pop up. Even routine surveillance jobs like the NATO war games may turn into something a little more fun. I have a team on it just in case. Are you guys doing anything about the games?

We’re doing flybys on our side of the border hoping to collect interesting information, but I haven’t heard of anything exciting so far.

Have you looked in the southern sector?

Not that I know of. Why?

My sources indicate there may be some field tests of new equipment going on down there. You may want to take a look.

Thanks for the heads up. If I find out anything, I’ll let you know.

I’d appreciate it.

Dmitri hung up and reread the report.

1.jpg

Major Gramovich appreciated the heads up from Kosakov. If he were to uncover something of interest based on this phone call, it could be a real feather in his cap. He would look into it. If he handled things discreetly, no one would know that he suspected something unusual. That way, if nothing came of it, he would have no explaining to do.

He called his colleague, Major Yuri Ustinov, who was handling the details of data collection from the NATO exercises for the Soviet Union. Yuri, this is Vlad. How are you?

Fine. Yourself?

"Fine. Listen, I’ve been looking at the data from the