Jonathan Edwards and the Immediacy of God

By John Carrick

Jonathan Edwards is one of the outstanding figures in the history of the Christian church--he was, quite simply, a man of towering intellect and towering spirituality. But it has been noted, even by his friends and admirers, that his thought is also marked at times by certain idiosyncrasies which inevitably introduce certain complexities into his philosophical-theological system.
This study contends that the theme of divine immediacy is the controlling theme and the correlating principle within Edwards's thought. It analyzes the theme of divine immediacy in the thought of Jonathan Edwards under four major heads: creation, the will, ecclesiology, and spiritual experience. Indeed, Dr. Carrick claims that the theme of the immediacy of God is the Ariadne's thread, which runs with consistency through the multiple aspects of Edwards's philosophical, theological, ecclesiological, experiential, and homiletical interests.
But sometimes a man's strength is also his weakness, and it would appear that Edwards's profound commitment to the concept and the reality of the immediacy of God entails significant problems for his entire philosophical-theological system. Edwards's concept of divine immediacy finds its supreme expression, surely, in his doctrine of continuous creation; but is it not the case that this doctrine of continuous creation is in conflict with his determinism, that its tendency is to destroy the moral responsibility of man, and that it makes God both the author and the actor of sin? In short, is it not the case that Edwards's Ariadne's thread is, in fact, also his Achilles' heel?

• Language: English
• Publisher: Wipf and Stock
• Release date: Dec 9, 2020
• ISBN: 9781725252936

John Carrick

John Carrick is the author of the Ashley Fox novel [e-mail]

Book preview

INTRODUCTION

The years 1675 to 1711, observes Norman Fiering in Jonathan Edwards’s Moral Thought and Its British Context (1981), constitute, from the intellectual standpoint, a period of great fertility and interchange in ideas.¹ It was during this period of thirty-six years that some of the great seminal works of modern intellectual history were published: Nicolas Malebranche’s De la recherche de la vérité (1675); Isaac Newton’s Principia (1687); John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689); Archbishop Tillotson’s latitudinarian sermons, including Of the Eternity of Hell-Torments (1690); two separate, independent English translations of Malebranche’s work, entitled The Search after Truth (1694); John Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious (1696); Samuel Clarke’s famous Boyle lectures, published as Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1705); Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s Théodicée (1710); George Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); Pierre Bayle’s Dictionary, in English translation (1710); and the third Earl of Shaftesbury’s Characteristics (1711). Indeed, Fiering describes this era as the great watershed period in British and Continental thought.²

It was, moreover, during this period that some of the most significant movements in religious history developed. The last quarter of the seventeenth century witnessed the consolidation of Quakerism in the American Colonies, the emergence of Stoddardism³ within the Congregational churches of New England, and the rise of deism in Old England. Fascinatingly, these works and these movements set the stage for some of the most significant tensions, controversies, and debates of the early and mid-eighteenth century Enlightenment. Powerful winds of change were blowing across the Atlantic from Europe and also from within New England: it was the age of Malebranche, the age of Newton, the age of Locke, the age of Tillotson, the age of the Scientific Revolution, the age of deism, the age of Stoddardism, the age of Quakerism, the age of rising antipathy towards enthusiasm, and the age of Berkeley’s immaterialism. We should not fail to note that it was during this period and into such a world—a world of very significant intellectual and religious ferment—that Jonathan Edwards was born on October 5, 1703.

In 1700, contends Bertrand Russell, "the mental outlook of educated men was completely modern; in 1600, except among a very few, it was still largely medieval."⁴ The crucial factor in this remarkable transition was the Newtonian revolution, the pivotal event of which was the publication of Isaac Newton’s Principia (1687). At the outset of the seventeenth century, the Ptolemaic (geocentric) system, although shaken by the Copernican (heliocentric) system, still reigned supreme; by the commencement of the eighteenth century, the Ptolemaic monolith had been toppled. Edwards himself, in his youthful writings, refers to the now-superseded Ptolemaic system: Thus some men will yet say that they cannot conceive how the fixed stars can be so distant as that the earth’s annual revolution should cause no parallax among them, and so are almost ready to fall back into antiquated Ptolemy, his system, merely to ease their imagination.⁵ The astonishing absence of stellar parallax in a heliocentric system merely demonstrated the inconceivable vastness of the universe.

Newton’s confirmation of the Copernican system was, however, construed by certain minds as a confirmation of a deistic distancing of God. Douglas J. Elwood notes the impact of the Newtonian revolution upon theology and faith: While this marked an advance in experimental science, it had disastrous consequences outside the domain of pure science. God was pushed to the periphery of the knowable universe and relegated to the beginning of the temporal process . . . Thus the deistic view of God arose.⁶ Edwards’s response to this deistic distancing of God was inter alia (amongst other things) that of highlighting, in a quite extraordinary manner, the concept of the immediacy of God. Indeed, Edwards’s consistent, pervasive, and multifaceted emphasis upon the concept of divine immediacy throughout the various aspects of his oeuvre constitutes, on his part, a lifelong counterblast to deism.

This concept of the immediacy of God is perhaps best understood in terms of the classic scholastic distinction between primary and secondary causation—a distinction that is adopted unreservedly by the Westminster Confession of Faith (1646):

Chapter 3: Of God’s Eternal Decree

God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

Chapter 5: Of Providence

God the great Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence.

Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the First Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.

God, in his ordinary providence, maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at his pleasure.

It should be noted that the Westminster Confession of Faith makes a decisive distinction here between the First Cause on the one hand and second causes or means on the other. According to this distinction, God is the First Cause or the immediate cause of x when God brings about x without the employment, intervention, or cooperation of any intermediate causes. Thus God is, clearly, the First Cause or the immediate Cause in the creation of the sun in the beginning; but it is generally accepted that, in the ongoing gravitational pull exerted by the sun throughout the solar system, God makes use of intermediate or second causes; namely, the force of gravity, or what Edwards himself refers to variously as solidity, matter acting upon matter, or natural necessity.⁷ It is important to note that there is a strong emphasis in the Confession upon the reality and the integrity of second causes: God, the First Cause, . . . by the same providence, . . . ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes; and God, in his ordinary providence, maketh use of means. It should be noted that, while creation is clearly attributed here to the First Cause, and while there is an emphasis upon the ever-potential immediacy of God (as in miracles, for instance)—God . . . is free to work without, above, and against them, at his pleasure—God’s works of providence are, in general, attributed to second causes. Interestingly, the main emphasis of the Confession falls not so much upon the First Cause as upon second causes; in other terms, it falls not so much upon immediacy as upon mediacy or means. The Confession’s clear distinction between the First Cause and second causes, a distinction also implicitly made by the Scriptures, certainly has no brief for an occasionalism in which second causes are effectively swallowed up by the First Cause.

The theme of the immediacy of God in Edwards’s thought has been explored by Douglas J. Elwood in The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards. This theme of divine immediacy, Elwood contends, constitutes the controlling idea⁸ and the principle of correlation⁹ in Edwards’s philosophical-theological system. His whole theology stands out against all forms of deism, abstract theism, or nonmystical orthodoxy, then and now; it rises in opposition to any view that tends to separate God from the world he has made.¹⁰ Indeed, Elwood is convinced that Edwards’s profound preoccupation with this theme lures him powerfully in the direction of panentheism: In Edwards we find a delicate balance of traditional theistic and classical pantheistic elements, which can only be called a variety of panentheism.¹¹ Elwood contends that Edwards, in seeking to steer a careful via media between traditional theism and classical pantheism, was searching for a theology of the ‘third way.’¹²

Elwood’s central thesis concerning divine immediacy can and should be developed further, both intensively and extensively. Thus the whole issue of Edwards’s concept of time and eternity, and the relationship between this concept and the issue of divine immediacy, should be explored. In the first chapter, we will note the relationship between the putative atemporality of God and the concept of the immediacy of God. We will explore Edwards’s precocious preoccupation, as a student at Yale, with what he terms the immediate exercise of divine power throughout the created realm.¹³ This notion inevitably raises the question as to whether the concept of mechanism in the government of the cosmos is a reality, or whether this concept, and the related concept of second causes, is, effectively, an illusion. We thus face, inevitably, the possibility of occasionalism in Edwards’s philosophical-theological system—a possibility that intensifies in the light of his doctrine of continuous creation. Indeed, it appears that Edwards’s concept of continuous creation yields, inevitably, a doctrine of temporal parts. At this point, we will note the influence of Nicolas Malebranche’s remarkable theocentrism upon Edwards’s system. We will then explore what might be termed the problem of infinity, Edwards’s apparent attraction to the concept of inclusive infinity, and also the question as to whether or not the strong Neoplatonic elements in his system yield a panentheism in which all things are contained in God.

In the second chapter, we will note the remarkable, indeed mysterious, absence of emphasis upon divine immediacy in Edwards’s great treatise, Freedom of the Will. We also explore the prima facie (at first glance) tension between the horizontal determinism that dominates this treatise and the vertical occasionalism with which his thought as a whole is suffused. Although, as the treatise unfolds, Edwards’s horizontal determinism fuses almost seamlessly, along compatibilist lines, with his vertical determinism, the apparent incompatibility between his horizontal determinism and his vertical occasionalism persists. Thus we will note the way in which Edwards’s creatio continua-cum-occasionalism doctrine appears to entail significant problems for Edwards’s metaphysics of sin, and most notably with regard to the question as to whether Edwards’s God is, on Edwards’s own premises, the author of sin. We will explore the possibility that the anomaly of Edwards’s determinism-cum-occasionalism position might possibly be resolved via the theory that Edwards is, in fact, writing at two different levels, each of which is legitimate in its own sphere. Such a two-tiered approach would explain Edwards’s ambivalence with regard to both mechanism and means. In this context, we will explore the fascinatingly cautious terms in which Edwards expresses his concept of causation in Freedom of the Will. We will also note that, if, as is the case, Edwards’s normal emphasis upon divine immediacy is significantly suppressed in this treatise, the anti-deistic strain is nevertheless powerfully present. One of Edwards’s great targets in this emphasis upon the immediacy of God is, unquestionably, what he clearly regarded as the pernicious gradualism of the Arminian scheme; one of Edwards’s great objectives in this emphasis upon the immediacy of God is that of safeguarding the divine, sovereign, and supernatural nature of the act of regeneration by the Spirit of God.

In the third chapter, we will explore a significant strand within the over-arching theme of divine immediacy which is not addressed by Elwood; namely, Edwards’s position in the communion controversy of 1749–50. To that end, it is necessary to trace the relatively rapid unraveling of the New England experiment of the 1630s and 40s and the emergence of the compromise systems of the Halfway Covenant in 1662 and of Stoddardism in 1677. This experiment in the churches of New England had been rooted in the ideal of ecclesiastical purity—a purity that expressed itself in exclusiveness. But both the Halfway Covenant and Stoddardism were clearly characterized by a conception of the church of Christ that was far more relaxed, inclusive, and comprehensive than that of the earlier New England ideal. Negatively, Edwards’s great concern in the communion controversy was that these compromise systems had simply fostered the externalization of religion and the externalization of God and had thus distanced God from the church; positively, Edwards’s great concern was that participants in the Lord’s Supper should be characterized by the consent of our hearts and the consent of our wills.¹⁴ Edwards’s entire position in this controversy reflects the Puritan preoccupation with immediacy in relation to God, and thus reflects his obvious concern to safeguard a certain type of piety; namely, the piety of the experimental Calvinistic tradition.

In the fourth chapter, Spiritual Experience, we will explore the phenomenon of enthusiasm and its relationship to the concept of immediacy. We will note that the issue of enthusiasm lies at the very center of Quakerism, with its notion of the light within, and also that certain Quaker-like traits and tendencies were manifested by many involved in the Great Awakening of the 1740s. Moreover, Edwards’s inveterate opposition to Quakerism demonstrates the very important fact that his commitment to the concept of immediacy was not boundless. We note, therefore, that Edwards was throughout his life fighting a battle on two fronts; namely, against the anti-immediacy position of the deists on the one hand, and the ultra-immediacy position of the enthusiasts on the other. If the Quakers represent the latter position, Charles Chauncy represents the former position—one that Edwards pointedly describes as that of standing aloof or standing at a distance from the phenomenon of revival. Pivotal to Edwards’s views on spiritual experience in general, and to his doctrine of regeneration in particular, is his concept of the sense of the heart. Thus we note again Edwards’s persistent emphasis upon the heart and the crucial connection between the heart and the concept of immediacy. Indeed, there is a striking parallel between the concept of the sense of the heart in the realm of spiritual experience and the concept of the consent of the heart in the realm of the Lord’s Supper and ecclesiology.

There is, unquestionably, a powerful individualism about Edwards’s entire position on spiritual experience, and this individualism coheres with the theme of the immediacy of God and with the related theme of immediacy in relation to God. It should be noted, however, that Edwards’s emphasis upon the theme of the immediacy of God lies within the orbit of the Word-and-Spirit approach of conservative Puritanism. There is, throughout his oeuvre, a very powerful, yet measured, emphasis upon the Spirit of God, and it is fascinating to note that his emphasis upon divine immediacy in this sphere is, in fact, marked by somewhat less exuberance and somewhat greater restraint than his emphasis upon divine immediacy in the sphere of God and the creation. It is important to note that, in the sphere of spiritual experience, Edwards does not allow his penchant for the concept of divine immediacy to run riot—he does not fall foul of what John Locke aptly describes as the ungrounded fancies of a man’s own brain.¹⁵

1

. Fiering, Jonathan Edwards’s Moral Thought,

15

.

2

. Fiering, Jonathan Edwards’s Moral Thought,

14

.

3

. Stoddardism is the term given to the ecclesiastical innovation of open communion which was introduced into the Northampton church in

1677

by Edwards’s maternal grandfather and ministerial predecessor, Solomon Stoddard.

4

. Russell, Western Philosophy,

536

.

5

. Edwards, Scientific and Philosophical Writings,

197

.

6

. Elwood, Philosophical Theology, 49

–

50

.

7

. Edwards, Freedom of the Will,

157

.

8

. Elwood, Philosophical Theology,

90

.

9

. Elwood, Philosophical Theology,

3

.

10

. Elwood, Philosophical Theology,

9

.

11

. Elwood, Philosophical Theology,

57

.

12

. Elwood, Philosophical Theology,

7

.

13. Edwards, Scientific and Philosophical Writings,

215–16

.

14. Edwards, Ecclesiastical Writings,

205

.

15

. Locke, Human Understanding, 451

.

GOD AND THE CREATION

Eternity and Time

It is perhaps appropriate to commence an analysis of Jonathan Edwards’s view of God’s relationship to the creation by considering his concept of eternity, and thus his concept of God’s relation to time. In this context, Paul Helm notes that there have been two broad traditions of thought about God’s relation to time; some have argued that God exists at all times and, since he exists necessarily, he is backwardly and forwardly everlasting.¹⁶ This was the position held, it appears, by William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) in the medieval period and is the position held by Richard Swinburne and many other modern scholars.¹⁷ Thus God is viewed here as without beginning, without end, but not without succession. According to this view, God is characterized by succession—he has a past, a present, and a future. Herman Bavinck explains that this view was the position of the deists:

Deism . . . defines eternity as time extended infinitely in both directions; according to it, the difference between eternity and time is quantitative, not qualitative; gradual, not essential; the distinction is not that eternity excludes a succession of moments, but merely that it excludes a beginning and an end; past, present, and future are terms that should be applied to God as well as to man. The Socinians held this view, and so did many after them.¹⁸

This concept of eternity as everlastingness necessarily implies that, at a certain point along the infinitely extended line of time, God created the cosmos. Thus the cosmos was, according to this position, created in tempore (in time).

Others, such as Boethius, and of course Augustine, notes Helm, "argue that God exists in a timeless eternity. He cannot have a past or future, for