The Hindenburg Line

By Peter Oldham

A deep dive into the genesis, development, and occupation of the Hindenburg Line, as well as detailed guides to the actions and battles in each sector.

When the Hindenburg Line, Germany’s legendary defence system, was pierced at Cambrai in November 1917, the British were so pleased and delighted that church bells were rung. But that initial elation was followed by disappointment when the Germans used “defence-in-depth” and “elastic-defence” to retake the Hindenburg defences.

This book examines the reasons for the German’s decision to fall back to a strong defence line while their Navy starved Britain into submission, and the “burnt earth” policy of devastation in the area evacuated. The design and layout of the Hindenburg Line, and the Battles for its possession in 1917 and 1918, are given: with numerous maps covering different sectors and the struggles for each village and farm, together with the part played by many British Regiments. The maps contain information on how to find all remaining vestiges of both German and British defences in the region, most of which are rarely visited and many of which have not been seen by British eyes for many years.

No book since the Great War has examined this area in such detail, nor has any single account contained so much for the battlefield visitor to see. The sites of individual acts of bravery, including the winning of many Victoria Crosses are featured, and existing locations of battle lines, headquarters, artillery observation and machine gun posts are also included, together with an absorbing narrative which also guides the armchair reader.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Jan 28, 1997
• ISBN: 9781473819399

Book preview

CHAPTER ONE

The situation in the winter of 1916/17 and German plans for withdrawal to a new defence line

The Battle of the Somme ground to a halt in the middle of November, 1916; the winter weather set in with a vengeance and both sides, weakened and with horrendous manpower losses, set up front line defences which were thinly held. The French Armies were exhausted and depleted after their fights at Verdun and needed time to re-equip and re-man. The Germans, who apart from material and troop losses, had major problems of morale at both troop and staff levels after their hitherto military superiority had taken a beating. The British, counting the dead after four months of battle, discussed whether the Somme campaign had been a success or failure. This debate is yet unfinished – the German army had been worn down and was shaken by the experience, and the battle was ‘one of the foundation stones on which the advance to victory in 1918 was built’³. However the original carefree fighting spirit of the British soldier had been broken: he had lost his idealism and was from now on not an enthusiastic volunteer.

For eight weeks after the end of the battle the conditions in the trenches were appalling – continuous rain, sleet and snow meant that mud – which had been a deciding factor in breaking off the active offensive operations – caused almost all movement to become impossible. Moving parts of guns and rifles ceased to function, trench collapses meant that communication trenches were impassable and men were frequently buried by mud slides. Most troops were withdrawn to rear areas for rest and re-fitting, whilst troops holding the front line suffered much sickness and trench foot became a major type of complaint. Although the front lines were only thinly held some activity did not cease – patrols went out on most nights into No Man’s Land, often capturing prisoners, sniping remained an ever present danger and artillery shelling continued.

The British maintained their policy of being aggressive and did not allow any Christmas goodwill to interfere: at mid-day on 25 December all guns on the Somme front fired a salvo at likely German gathering points. This ‘Christian’ act – intended both to maintain pressure on the Germans and to inhibit any fraternisation – was repugnant to many British soldiers. It was repeated on the stroke of the New Year on December 31.

Infantry trench raids and patrols continued in earnest over the first few days of January 1917; many prisoners were taken by British battalions, although many of these turned out to be willing deserters. Some German attacks were carried out, such as where the 7th Division’s Hope Post, near Beaumont Hamel, was taken from the 9th Devons, the loss being discovered by two Devons officers approaching the post with rum rations for the garrison. The initiative generally lay with the British who maintained the offensive. For the first full attack of 1917, against Muck Trench and the Triangle, a trench system near Serre, the attackers had to carry duck boards to enable them to cross the mud. In the middle of January 1917 the weather changed; sub-zero temperatures and heavy frosts set in and the ground froze hard and solid. Sickness rates became even higher than before, special arrangements were made for the supply of clean, warm and dry clothing and R.A.M.C. centres were kept busy.

The freezing of the ground changed some operational methods, with more movement after dark over the open ground as water-filled shell holes and deep mud ceased to be traps. Trench walls, now the ground was solid, did not collapse, and heavy falls of snow necessitated the issue of white overalls for night patrols. The snow on the ground also enabled artillery observers on both sides to determine which trenches, tracks, dugouts and posts were used and manned, and to direct their fire accordingly: ‘harassing fire on both sides became noticeably more precise’.⁴

Over the course of the winter months the planners on both sides of the front had been busy. Generals Haig and Robertson had met with the the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre at Chantilly in mid November 1916; they agreed to resume hostilities with the Germans as soon as the weather improved, hopefully in February. The British were to attack on a front from the north of the Somme battlefield, the French were to tackle the Germans south of Peronne.

While plans were being made some changes were made at the top which meant that such arrangements would need to be halted and restarted. Lloyd George replaced Asquith as British Prime Minister, which had a big effect upon General Haig’s ability to direct the British effort, and General Joffre was promoted out of battle planning in favour of General Nivelle who had what was thought to be the answer to the deadlock on French soil. This answer involved new methods of attack and the subordination of the British Army to the French.

The Germans also had some major changes of personnel which resulted in changes in strategy and tactics from those which had been used during the earlier parts of the 1916 summer fighting. General von Falkenhayn, who had directed the German effort, was sent off to Rumania, and Field Marshal Hindenburg, with Ludendorff at his side, was put in charge of the O.H.L. (German High Command). Hindenburg and Ludendorff immediately changed German tactics: the fighting at Verdun was scaled down to allow a much greater concentration of resources in the one area and front line trenches were now not to be held necessarily at all costs but could be given up when considered appropriate. The German First Army chief of staff, Colonel von Lossberg, was also able to form a body of reserve divisions in the back areas to be brought forward to relieve front divisions when necessary. Lossberg was also able to organise defences of a less rigid type than hitherto, fighting would now take place in a deep zone which gave the best advantage to the defenders, rather than a front line trench which could be destroyed by enemy artillery. Thus the Battle of the Somme ground to a halt with the early trial use of defence in depth.

The experiences and information gained during these later actions were considered by Lossberg. His conclusions were then used by General von Below to produce a record of the changes during the battle: Erfahrungen der I Armee in der Sommeschlacht (Experiences of the First Army in the Somme Battle). This document, printed on 30 January 1917, explained the concept of a mobile defence in depth and was to become very important in future German defence strategies for the rest of the war.

During the winter of 1916/17 the overall situation on the Western Front convinced Hindenburg and Ludendorff that a period of stable defence was required in order to allow conditions to improve. The eastern front was still active – Russia was still not yet defeated and Rumania had now joined the Allies, which meant that almost half (122 out of a total of 255 divisions) of the German forces were in the east. German industry was by now running flat out on the war effort but there was a shortage of many essential materials, the potato harvest had failed and the German people were beginning to suffer hunger.

The decision was therefore made to try and bring the war to an end by starving Britain of food and essential supplies, bringing Britain to its knees and cutting the channel link with France. This would be brought about by unrestricted submarine warfare which was was ordered on 9 January and announced on 31 January: the U-boat campaign was to begin in full force on 1 February and from then on no vessel – naval or civilian, Allied or neutral, would be safe.

Meanwhile German defence tactics had been re-assessed, and plans which had been hatched earlier were now put into operation. This included the perfection of an idealised defensive zone, with artillery observation from the rear, and carefully sited trench lines on reverse slopes to prevent British artillery observation. The order for the construction of such a position had been given soon after Hindenburg and Ludendorff took command, on 5 September 1916. The area behind the German army on the Somme was to be the first of five such major defences and was the first to be sited and traced out as it would give the most benefit in terms of release of man power, as the battle had created a large bulge in the German lines.

The defence zone or Stellung was given the name Siegfried after one of the heroes of the Teutonic sagas. Siegfried was originally a descendant of the god Odin in the Scandinavian Volsunga Saga but was adopted into German folklore in the Nibelungenlied, a medieval poem written about 1200.

The construction and maintenance of roads and railway lines to feed the front with troops, guns and ammunition required much manpower. When the Hindenburg Line was planned the reduction in the length of front was expected to reduce the demand for men and munitions. These troops are repairing a line at Rethel, well behind the front, for the supply of construction materials for the new defence lines.

The godly associations were timely, the Siegfried cycle by Wagner was in its fortieth year, having been first produced at Bayreuth in 1876. The Siegfriedstellung was sited to run from Arras to St. Quentin and then continue down past Laon to the Aisne, cutting off a large salient which was to be abandoned. Other sectors of the Western Front were to follow and most of these new defence systems were also to be named after German gods. The Wotan Line (Wotan-stellung) ran northwards from the Siegfried line at Quèant up to Drocourt and Lille from where it continued to the coast at Ostend as the Flandernstellung or Flanders Line.

The Hundingstellung or Hunding Line ran from the Siegfriedstellung at la Fère and then behind the Champagne battlefields; east of that Michelstellung was to cut out the Saint Mihiel salient.

When the British followed the Germans as they retired to the new line all accommodation and billeting had been destroyed and rapid building was required. This was also the case when the British pushed the Germans back from their defences in 1917. The troops above are constructing shelters on the edge of Havrincourt Wood in the winter of 1917/18. The road is the D15 from Trescault.

The defence lines or positions Wotan, Siegfried and Handing. The area to be evacuated, shown shaded, was systematically destroyed during the withdrawal to ensure that nothing remained which might be of use to British troops.

The Siegfriedstellung – which would later be named the Hindenburg Line by the British – was a hundred and forty four kilometers (ninety miles) long and would cut out forty kilometers (twenty five miles) of German front. The idea of shortening the front had been instigated by General-leutnant Fuchs at Cambrai. By 19 September its general course had been agreed and traced out. On 27 September the order for construction work to begin was given by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the Army Group. The siting of the Wotanstellung, which was to join at Quéant, was agreed on 4 November but work was not to start until the Siegfriedstellung was almost complete, to enable the best use of