The Blood Tub: General Gough and the Battle of Bullecourt 1917

By Jonathan Walker

This controversial and stirring account of one of the bloodiest battles of the Great War recounts a heroic but disastrous engagement which left a lasting rift between the British and Australians. Drawing from a wealth of unpublished sources and eyewitness accounts, Jonathan Walker's study of the Battle of Bullecourt is vital to an understanding of the difficulties that faced Great War commanders. Central to The Blood Tub is a reassessment of Sir Hubert Gough, one of the Great War's most colourful generals.In the late spring of 1917, the Allies attacked at Arras, and a combined British and Australian force under General 'Thruster' Gough assaulted the fortress village of Bullecourt. Despite using the new wonder weapon, the tank, Gough's first attack ended in disaster and bitter recriminations. He then launched a second massive attack. For the next two weeks, the Battle of Bullecourt dominated British offensive action on the Western Front. It was the excessive brutality and ferocity of the hand-to-hand fighting that earned Bullecourt the name 'Blood Tub.'

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Mar 31, 2015
• ISBN: 9781473853782

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First published in Great Britain in 1998 by Spellmount

This edition published in 2014 by

Pen & Sword Military

an imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

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Copyright © Jonathan Walker 1998, 2000, 2014

Foreword copyright © Jonathan Nicholls 1998, 2000, 2014

ISBN: 978 1 47382 754 7

PDF ISBN: 978 1 47385 398 0

EPUB ISBN: 978 1 47385 378 2

PRC ISBN: 978 1 47385 388 1

The right of Jonathan Walker to be identified as the Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Contents

‘We all probably know of exceptions

but the broad fact remains that on the whole

it was the best and not the worst

who were killed.’

Rev. Ernest Crosse

Chaplain, 8th Devons

Bullecourt

For Gill,

Edward & Giles

List of Maps

1   Nivelle’s Plan: The Battle of Arras and Chemin des Dames, April 1917

2   Fifth Army’s approach to Bullecourt, 21 March 1917

3   First Battle of Bullecourt, 11 April 1917

4   German attack on Lagnicourt, 15 April 1917

5   Second Battle of Bullecourt, 3 May 1917

6   ‘The Red Patch’, 12 May 1917

List of Plates

  1.  General Sir Hubert Gough (centre), commander Fifth Army (‘Goughie’), with the King of the Belgians Imperial War Museum, Q2195

  2.  Crown Prince Rupprecht (left) with the Kaiser Imperial War Museum, Q23728

  3.  Major-General W.P. Braithwaite (commanding 62nd (West Riding) Division) with his son Valentine Imperial War Museum, Q13521

  4.  I ANZAC Corps Staff. Lieutenant-General Birdwood (seated centre), Major-General C.B. White (seated third left), Major Jack Churchill (Winston Churchill’s brother) ‘Winston’s eyes and ears’ (middle row, extreme right) Imperial War Museum, E(Aus)540

  5.  Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Leane. ‘Exercised initiative and expected it in others’ Australian War Memorial, E02401

  6.  Major-General W. Holmes (commanding 4th Australian Division). ‘The Citizen Soldier’ Australian War Memorial, 133441

  7.  Australian artillery observers registering hits on the Siegfried Line. ‘Some day their R.A. will let them down terribly’ Imperial War Museum, E(Aus)603

  8.  ‘Tankers’ at 1st Bullecourt. 2nd Lt. Bernstein, wounded (top left), 2nd Lt Richards, wounded (centre top), unidentified (top right), Lt. Money, killed (middle left), unidentified (middle right), Lt. Swears, killed (centre front) Anne Davison

  9.  ‘Pantomime Tanks’ Anne Davison

10.  Württembergers approach a crippled Mark II on the edge of Bullecourt Bundesarchiv, 104/7496

11.  ‘The Blood Tub’ after 1st Bullecourt (south east). Birkett’s tank tracks can be seen near Leane’s HQ on railway Imperial War Museum, Q57688

12.  AIF Battalion Commanders at 1st Bullecourt. From left: Lieutenant-Colonels Drake-Brockman, Durrant, McSharry, Peck Imperial War Museum, E(Aus)642

13.  Lt-General Sir William Birdwood presenting Captain Bert Jacka VC, MC, with a bar to his MC after 1st Bullecourt Imperial War Museum, E(Aus)450

14.  Tank No. 799. The first tank the Germans had captured and retained Tank Museum, Bovington, 883/E2

15.  Riencourt 14 April 1917. ‘Still needs to be bombarded’ Bundesarchiv, 104/741a

16.  The Siegfried Line. Bullecourt was surrounded by wire up to four belts deep Imperial War Museum, Q5286

17.  ‘The Red Patch’ before bombardment. The dark lines to the front are belts of barbed wire Imperial War Museum, Q45150

18.  2/6 West Yorkshires. ‘Every officer who went into Bullecourt became a casualty’ E. C. Gregory

19.  The boys who ‘hopped the bags’ Imperial War Museum, E(Aus)454

20.  Brigadier-General John Gellibrand. ‘The finest operational commander in the AIF’ Jane d’Arcy

21.  Major-General Shoubridge. ‘The Dumas of the 7th Division’ Imperial War Museum, Q2701

22.  Private Roy Hankin. ‘Given a blood soaked Deutschmark note’ Melba Alexander

23.  Roy Hankin, 101 years old. He still carries a bullet in his back Central Coast Express Advocate

24.  ‘Lucky Combsy’, 23rd Battalion AIF. He enlisted at age 15 years Robert Comb Estate

25.  Robert Comb at age 95 years, holding the Bullecourt plaque. ‘He came through without a scratch’ Robert Comb Estate

26.  Australian gunners in Noreuil Valley. ‘Give the bastards hell’ Imperial War Museum, E(Aus)600

27.  ‘Possies’ in the Siegfried Line Imperial War Museum, E(Aus)439

28.  Riencourt Catacombs. ‘The damp and mildew of 400 years’ Bundesarchiv, 104/723

29.  ‘Low enough to see the Maltese Cross’ Imperial War Museum, E(Aus)458

30.  Rev. The Hon. Maurice Peel (Chaplain 1/RWF) kia 14/5/17. ‘Appeared like a guardian angel’ St Paul’s, Beckenham

31.  Rev. Eric Milner-White (Senior Chaplain, 7th Division). He read the Collect for the Day over Peel’s body King’s College, Cambridge

32.  The Diggers return, 1993 Author’s collection

Acknowledgements

A study of the combined operations at Bullecourt requires a thorough examination of archive material in both Britain and Australia. This can present logistical problems even in the age of the Internet. Without the help of Christine Gairey in Canberra, I could not have carried the project through and her work in searching out volumes of material, establishing contacts and interviewing veterans was most valuable.

While Bullecourt is a well established name in Australian military history, the battle is less well known in Britain. This applies to most of the actions and battles which made up the Arras Offensive in the Spring of 1917. In a field of study which has long been dominated by the battles of the Somme and Passchendaele, Jonathan Nicholls’ Cheerful Sacrifice has done much to remind us of the even heavier sacrifices of the Arras battles. I am indebted to him for his help and encouragement throughout.

I am most grateful to Peter Fanshawe for his hospitality and for allowing me to consult and quote from the private papers of his grandfather, Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe; my thanks also to Jane d’Arcy for allowing me to quote from the lively diaries of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand; Jean Letaille, Claud Durrand and many others in the Bullecourt locality offered me help and hospitality during my trips to the battlefield. Ross Bastiaan, the creator of numerous bronze plaques which highlight Australian battlefields all over the world, provided much initial inspiration and my thanks to Peter Sadler, the biographer of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand, for his support, knowledge and companionship.

I am grateful to the following for allowing me to examine or to quote from archive material within their collections: The Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London; Peter Liddle and the Trustees of the Liddle Collection, Leeds; the Trustees of the Australian War Memorial, Canberra; the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum, London; Lady Derham for allowing access to the papers of her father, Sir Cyril Brudenell White and Lord Birdwood for the papers of his grandfather, Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood; the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland; Earl Haig; the National Library of Australia; Stuart Allan and the Trustees of the Gordon Highlanders Museum; the Trustees of the Devonshire Regiment Museum, Exeter; the Trustees of the Tank Museum, Bovington. The use of Crown copyright material in the Public Record Office is by permission of The Stationery Office. Every effort has been made to trace and obtain permission from copyright holders of material quoted or illustrations reproduced.

I also wish to acknowledge the help I have received from Paul Chandler of RMA Sandhurst Central Library. Similar help was forthcoming from Richard Bland and Derek Winterbottom who provided useful material from the Clifton College archives. My thanks to Michael Walker for locating regimental and battalion histories and Henry Thoennissen for translating German unit histories.

I am indebted to Major-General John Strawson and the late Major-General John Cubbon for their encouragement and advice; also to Brigadier ‘Birdie’ Smith and Colonels Dick Sidwell and Roy Maxwell for their guidance and support. David Fletcher, the Keeper of the Tank Museum, Bovington, was most kind in allowing me access to material on the tanks at Bullecourt and I am grateful for his help and the benefit of his vast knowledge. William Prout, Hugh and Bryan Davies, Michael Drakely, Garry Denison, Paul Jarvis, Beryl Metcalfe and Nick Yeomans all kindly provided details on the backgrounds of the early ‘tankers’, whilst veteran Edward Wakefield vividly recalled what it was like to actually drive and fight in the first tanks. In particular, Anne Davison was good enough to allow me to consult and quote from the letters of her uncle, Hugh Swears, which was invaluable. Further help in my research was forthcoming from BBC Radio and numerous newspapers who kindly published articles on the subject; likewise my thanks to Jasper Humphreys, John Terraine, Christian de Falbe, Ray Westlake, Terry Nixon and Mo Stokes, all of whom provided advice and encouragement.

For allowing permission for the reproduction of photographs, my thanks to Ian Carter and the Trustees of the Photograph Archive, Imperial War Museum; the Australian War Memorial; the Tank Museum, Bovington; the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz; Anne Davison; Jane d’Arcy; Melba Alexander; Robert Comb; King’s College, Cambridge; St Paul’s, Beckenham. I acknowledge permission to quote passages from the following; to Random House UK Ltd for A Frenchman in Khaki (William Heinemann) by Paul Maze, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (Jonathan Cape) by Norman Dixon, Storm of Steel (Chatto & Windus) by Ernst Jünger and The Girl at the Lion d’Or (Hutchinson) by Sebastian Faulks; to Eric Dobby Publishing Ltd for Allenby (George Harrap) by Sir Archibald Wavell.

My appreciation also to Professor Ian Beckett for constructive advice and similarly my publisher Jamie Wilson. My gratitude to my wife Gill and my family for patiently supporting me on the long journey back to 1917; and finally my grateful thanks to the AIF veterans who actually travelled that road from Bullecourt, Roy Hankin (together with Melba Alexander) and the late Robert Comb and Clive McKenzie – the boys who really ‘hopped the bags’.

Jonathan Walker

Sidmouth, Devon

1998

Foreword

Bullecourt. A sleepy village which lies in the midst of rich farm land in a country where farmers get richer. Most local people can tell you little or nothing of what happened here eighty years ago, even though there is a small museum. Few of them know. Few seem to care. To students of the Great War of 1914-18, the name Bullecourt is synonymous with Australia, yet Londoners and Yorkshiremen died here in their thousands. There are secrets under the corn. Here, hearts were broken and reputations destroyed in the space of a few weeks of intense fighting. Bullecourt saw the first breakthrough of the much vaunted Hindenburg Line. And it went horribly wrong.

Some years ago I was approached by Jonathan Walker, who was looking for information for a book he was planning to write on the Battles of Bullecourt, which come under the broad arm of the Battle of Arras 1917, a subject close to my own heart. Unfortunately, I was not able to offer him much help as I had only studied the operations at Bullecourt briefly. Back in the early 1980s, I made several journeys to this part of the old Western Front, searching for remains of the Hindenburg Line. I tramped round the pleasant fields and lanes but was disappointed at the lack of any immediate evidence of the savage fighting that had once taken place there. There is a dearth of British cemeteries on the actual battlefield and a study of the nearest cemetery registers revealed few graves of soldiers killed during April – May 1917. Most of the dead listed are those from the battles of 1918. What then, really happened at Bullecourt? Where are the graves of the men who fell in such vast numbers on that battlefield?

The best account I could find of the battle, at the time, was by Charles Bean in the Australian Official History. But there was no other definitive work on the subject. It was touched on lightly by Edward Spears in his excellent, Prelude to Victory and Hubert Gough, that much maligned instigator of the Bullecourt affair, makes a frugal comment in his autobiography, Soldiering On. He says, ‘eventually the Fifth Army became involved in some bitter fighting round Bullecourt, in an endeavour to assist Allenby’s right but there was insufficient cooperation between the two armies.’ That was about the only information I had on my bookshelf.

The memory of Bean’s harrowing description of the Australian infantry advancing across the snow-covered plain and their heroic efforts to struggle through the great belts of wire, which seemed to ‘swarm with fireflies as the bullets struck the strands’, has never left me. My vision was to be suitably widened over the following months by freshly written chapters sent to me by Jonathan Walker, in which he described, in accurate and chilling detail, the bloody events of the battle. This reinforced my belief that Bullecourt was, undoubtedly, the greatest horror story of the war. As one witness remembered – ‘At Mory, three miles to the rear, the awful stench of the dead came down on the wind from the front.’

Much venom has been directed over the years at British strategy and tactics at Bullecourt. Spears himself wrote, ‘a study of Bullecourt makes dismal reading to the professional soldier, trained to avoid the mistakes that were committed with such flagrant irresponsibility’. Yet many of those mistakes were made by Anzac Staff Officers, who had themselves devised a weak battle plan. Another cause of the disaster at Bullecourt was that seemingly unseen phenomenon that many British writers on the First World War choose to ignore – the presence of the enemy.

Not so in this account. The fine quality of the German infantry stationed at Bullecourt in 1917 reminds one of the battle-hardened SS Panzer Division which ‘just happened to be at Arnhem for a refit’, and led to another British defeat. It was bad luck that these excellent German soldiers were there in 1944. It was bad luck that their fathers admirably defended Bullecourt in 1917. This sturdy defence by the Württembergers was the cause of the worst Australian defeat during the Great War. It was easy for the Australian commanders to criticise the newly arrived British 62nd (West Riding) Division, ‘never left their trenches’, which incidentally lost a mere 191 officers and 4,042 men in this, their first real test in battle. But now the full story has been told. In this book, we can also follow the battle through the eyes of the young tank crewmen, as they lumbered forward into the unknown. They too were blamed by the Australians, but the sublime courage of the majority of those inexperienced boys in their primitive tanks in their hellish introduction to battle, has never been in doubt.

There was much in-fighting within the Australian Imperial Force and the thread of bickering and dissent wove its way far past 1918 and into the late 1930s. Australia’s finest fighting soldier, Albert Jacka VC, one of the heroes of 1st Bullecourt, was a case in point. His brigade commander, C. H. Brand, reported (Reveille 1929) that he had recommended Jacka for a Bar to his VC, for his bravery at Bullecourt but it was not to be, because ‘VCs are rarely awarded where enterprises fail’. The real reason however, was his outspoken criticism of Brand, which almost ended in blows at Polygon Wood later that year. Over dinner, at a farmhouse in Auchonvillers in the late summer of 1996, an Australian author, friend and historian of the 1914-18 War, proclaimed to a small audience, ‘a film with warts and all, can never be made about Bert Jacka, because it would air too much dirty washing and would have to include the shameful squabbling and petty jealousy that was rife among AIF commanders in 1917. It is something that has been swept under the carpet.’

Jonathan Walker does not let this dark backdrop to the Bullecourt battles detract from the real heroes, or the real truth. Through all the fumbling and incompetence, the magnificent courage of the Australian, British and German infantry shines through. The defence of Bullecourt was undoubtedly the finest achievement of the 27th Württemberg Reserve Division, which their historian describes as ‘more bitter than the Somme’. Indeed, they were the toughest opponents ever faced by the Australians. They stubbornly stood their ground and shot straight. Walker’s description of the determined Australian assaults on the wire is sufficient to make one shudder. These were brave men indeed.

There has been a recent shower of new books on the Somme, with the promise of more to come. In this, the 80th Anniversary year of the Battle of Arras (doubtless soon to be swamped by Passchendaele celebrations) The Blood Tub will take pride of place. Jonathan Walker’s first book will receive the acclaim it so deserves. It is a stunning read. It is also an unforgettable contribution to the literature of the Great War.

Jonathan Nicholls

1998

Introduction

On Armistice Day, 1993 the body of an ‘unknown soldier’ was buried with full military honours at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. He was the first fallen member of the Australian Imperial Force to be repatriated since Major-General Bridges in 1915.¹

As the coffin was lowered into its tomb in the Hall of Memory within the AWM, a twelve-man firing party loosed off three volleys. A veteran ‘digger’ stepped forward and sprinkled earth, taken from the Western Front, onto the lid of the coffin. Ninety-three-year-old Robert Comb then rejoined the thirteen other AIF veterans as the ‘Last Post’ sounded. They bowed their heads and remembered.

‘Lucky Combsy’ had come through the Great War without a scratch. Too young to catch the first big ‘stunt’ at Gallipoli, he was pitched into the horrors of the Western Front at the age of sixteen. Pozières was gruelling in 1916, but the following year saw him in the middle of an even more desperate battle at Bullecourt.

Bullecourt has survived in the memory of Robert Comb and other Australians as one of the great ordeals of the AIF. It sucked in all four of its young divisions, and there were few diggers in France in the Spring of 1917 who avoided the blood bath. Even the designer of the Hall of Memory, Napier Waller, had lost an arm at Bullecourt.

The two battles were immortalised by Charles Bean in his Official History of Australia in the War. It is not hard to see why. The story contains all the swashbuckling heroes of AIF lore. ‘The Fighting Leanes’, the family who dominated the 48th Battalion; Bert Jacka, the most decorated soldier in the AIF; Percy Black, the heroic gold prospector; and dominating the Anzac story were two celebrated brigadiers, John Gellibrand, probably the finest operational officer in the Corps and that supreme ‘Antipodean Ajax’, Pompey Elliott.² Independent, brave and spirited to a man, they all embodied the Australian ideal.

The course of the battles provided dramatic ebb and flow. At 1st Bullecourt in April 1917, new tank tactics were attempted for the first time but ended in disaster. Australia also suffered her greatest number of soldiers taken prisoner in one action, a calamity only surpassed at Singapore in 1942.³ 2nd Bullecourt, fought for two weeks in May, saw not only Gellibrand’s extraordinary capture of part of the Siegfried Line but also the worst Australian rout of the war.

Bean wrote his account of this turmoil from the viewpoint of an Anzac Corps History and therefore concerned himself with the Australian fighting man. But Bullecourt was a combined operation. The British role, tarnished over the years, has often been portrayed as only producing ‘windy officers’ in the field and reckless planners to the rear. However, the huge losses of the British 2nd line territorials together with those of the Honourable Artillery Company, Queen’s Regiment and Royal Welsh Fusiliers tell another story, a story which Bean largely confined to private correspondence. Captain Cyril Falls, who wrote the British Official History for the first part of 1917, was fascinated by Bullecourt. But although he devoted over sixty pages to the operations in the History, they were inevitably overshadowed by Arras and Messines.⁴

The private papers of officers show both British and Australian Commands riven with factional strife while their field commanders wrestled with new technology that they were unable to handle. Letters and diaries confirm the terror felt by both officers and men, while eyewitness accounts tell of the vital supporting role of the medics and padres.

In a battlefield no bigger than Hyde Park, 1,000 casualties a day were being lost.

After 3 May, when the great Arras offensive petered out, Bullecourt surprisingly continued its bloody course for two further weeks. How did it maintain its momentum as the only major action on the Western Front during this crucial period?

One clue must lie with the Commander of the Operation, General Sir Hubert Gough.

NOTES

1 Bridges’ charger Sandy was similarly the only AIF horse to come back to Australia. It followed its master’s gun carriage at his funeral.

2 The role of these figures in Australian war literature is analysed in Robin Gerster’s Big-Noting: The Heroic Theme in Australian War Writing, p. 68-72.

3 Australian PoWs captured at 1st Bullecourt accounted for 30% of her total PoWs for the Great War.

4 Cyril Falls to Charles Bean, 25 May 1937, Australian War Memorial, Canberra (hereafter AWM) 38 3DRL/7953 Item 30.

CHAPTER I

The Wicked Baron

The young German was totally unaware of his fate. He sat alone in the basement of the headquarters of the British 2nd Cavalry Division, situated on the corner of a wide pavé square dotted with poplar trees, in the village of Messines. The previous day, he had discarded his uniform as he crept across the lines and was caught by a British cavalry patrol in civilian clothes. It was Autumn 1914 and stories of German espionage were rife among the British troops near the Belgian border. Orders had come through from Cavalry Corps HQ that he should be shot as a spy. The execution was to be carried out immediately.

Paul Maze, a French interpreter with the Division, was given the task of informing the prisoner of his sentence. Maze knew the German was a deserter and had pleaded to that effect with his commanding officer, Major-General Hubert Gough, who refused to countermand the Corps order.

Maze stood face to face with the German, who silently handed over his personal possessions, as souvenirs for the guards, together with his last letters to his mother and girlfriend. Outside, the General’s car was starting up for the morning’s brigade visit, as the shooting party arrived to carry out the execution. Maze dashed out to confront a startled Gough and, putting his head through the car window, pleaded one more time for the German’s life. Gough retorted, ‘Well, do what you like with him.’¹

Maze’s account of this small incident in the early months of the war conveys much about the impulsive nature of Hubert Gough. As one of the most controversial generals of the Great War, it has always been this side of Gough’s character that has been most easily recognised and most commonly damned. The problem in command was that his qualities of drive and verve were often unchecked. It is true that his chief, Sir Douglas Haig, did at times attempt to curb his excessive zeal, but Gough was a difficult man to restrain. In the plan to capture the Gheluvelt Plateau during Passchendaele in 1917, Haig attempted to restrain him, advising, ‘you must have patience and not put in your infantry attack until two or three days of fine weather’, but Gough did not accede.² Assigned tasks for siege warfare instead of the pursuit for which he was eminently suited, he was nevertheless often left to his own devices.³ To be fair to Gough, this vacuum between GHQ and its Army Commanders sometimes meant that he could never be sure whether his brief was to ‘bite and hold’ enemy lines or to break through. Fast changing events, such as those of the Spring of 1917, further complicated that brief and posed many ‘command and control’ problems for him.⁴ Control of his Army operations was not helped by his appointment as his Chief of Staff, of Neill Malcolm, who often failed to temper his excesses but, more importantly, cut him off from subordinate opinion.⁵

Gough was essentially a highly charged and spirited commander, a single-minded man and one who had little time for the more leisured and cautious attitudes of his contemporaries. Unfortunately, his earlier successes in the war were later eclipsed by the disasters of 1917 at Bullecourt and Passchendaele and ironically, when he exercised great generalship in the face of the 1918 German Spring Offensive, he fell foul of political intrigue.

Because he stamped his mark on every battle he directed, the story of Bullecourt is incomplete without a study of his character and career. His rise within the British Army was nothing short of meteoric, and this speed of promotion inevitably cut across many of his fellow officers. On his own admission, he was too quick to sack subordinates and this built up a cluster of disgruntled brigadiers and major-generals. It was wretched that at Bullecourt they should once more come together.

Hubert Gough was born in 1870, into an Irish family renowned for its military tradition. His ancestor, Lord Gough, had conquered the Punjab and no fewer than four members of his family won the Victoria Cross. It was a heady precedent and one which Hubert Gough took up with relish. After service in the Boer War, in 1904, he took up an appointment as lecturer at Staff College, Camberley, under Brigadier-General Henry Rawlinson. During the three years that Gough taught there, most of the future Great War commanders passed through its doors as instructors or students. Others on the directing staff included Richard Haking, Thompson Capper, Launcelot Kiggell and John Ducane, all of whom went on to make their mark, for better or worse, on the fortunes of the British Army.

The prevailing attitudes at Staff College were important, as they shaped the opinions of a generation of young officers whose conduct in battle would be critical. Many of the junior commanders who fought at Bullecourt had attended the College, while three senior Bullecourt commanders, Gough, Malcolm and Braithwaite had actually been on the lecturing staff.⁶ The philosophy of the College was deeply instilled in many of these officers, who treated it as a creed, never to be broken. But when war broke out, some were tragically ill-equipped to grasp that tactics had to change with conditions: that new lessons had to be learnt quickly and that the new technology, which frightened many, would not go away. Few realised that this technology would accelerate so rapidly and produce a host of terrifying new weapons, which could spew out shells at an unbelievable rate. This new ordnance, however, created as many problems as it solved, and most officers were slow to realise that it had to be harmonised to be effective. To win battles, commanders would now not only have to employ superior tactics