A New Drive-Relational-Neuroscience Synthesis for Psychoanalysis

By Leon van der Linde

This book critically examines the shift from instinctual drive theory to relational theory in psychoanalysis, based on the premise that drive formulations are incompatible with relational configurations.

It demonstrates that the original shift was misguided, based on misinterpretations and misconceptions of Freudian theory, informed by a problematic dualist social constructionist and relativist philosophical stance which sees mind as somehow disconnected from biological processes, therefore requiring a different epistemological approach. It illustrates how recent attempts at synthesis, and attempts to combine psychoanalysis and neuroscience, have inherited these earlier problems, leaving them equally unable to withstand critical scrutiny.

As a result, this book aims to make a positive contribution by presenting a new drive-relational-neuroscience synthesis that is both philosophically coherent and empirically compatible with recent developments in psychology and the neurosciences. Specifically, the new synthesis: (1) is based on a conceptually sound realist philosophy which posits mind as extended and embodied; (2) emerges from a re-examination of Freud's writings by demonstrating how instinctual drives and relational strivings constitute interlinked aspects of an overall motivational structure; (3) includes a much-needed clarification of the role of the central concepts of evolutionary theory and motivational conflict; (4) is strengthened and supported by appropriately interpreted current neuroscientific research; and (5) addresses implications for psychotherapeutic theory. In this way, the book is clearly located within the broader context of integrating psychoanalytic theory into mainstream developments in contemporary psychology, including neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, embodied/hot cognition, personality, and psychotherapy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Austin Macauley Publishers
• Release date: Sep 30, 2019
• ISBN: 9781528963411

Leon van der Linde

Leon van der Linde has a PhD in psychology from Western Sydney University and works as a psychologist in Armidale, NSW, specializing in brief or time-limited dynamic psychotherapy.

Book preview

About the Author

Leon has a PhD in psychology from Western Sydney University and works as a psychologist in Armidale, NSW, specializing in brief or time-limited dynamic psychotherapy.

Dedication

For Sigmund Freud and the Sydney Theory Group

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A new drive-relational-neuroscience synthesis for psychoanalysis

________________________________

Leon van der Linde

Copyright Information

Copyright © Leon van der Linde (2019)

The right of Leon van der Linde to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with section 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.

Any person who commits any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

A CIP catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.

ISBN 9781528921374 (Paperback)

ISBN 9781528963411 (ePub e-book)

www.austinmacauley.com

First Published (2019)

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Epigraphs

We may therefore well conclude that instincts and not external stimuli are the true motive forces behind the advances that have led the nervous system, with its unlimited capacities, to its present high level of development. There is naturally nothing to prevent our supposing that the instincts themselves are, at least in part, precipitates of the effects of external stimulation, which in the course of phylogenesis have brought about modifications in the living substance.

(Freud, 1915a/2001, p. 120)

In the individual’s mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, as an opponent; and so from the very first individual psychology, in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words, is at the same time social psychology as well.

(Freud, 1921/2001, p. 69)

…we must recollect that all our provisional ideas in psychology will presumably some day be based on an organic substructure.

(Freud, 1914a/2001, p. 78)

Preface

This book traces its origins back to a Masters class which I had attended at Edith Cowan University, where we, amongst other things, pondered the so-called unbridgeable gap between drive and relational theory in psychoanalysis.

It is my grappling with the problem that led to this work, which critically examines the shift from instinctual drive theory to relational theory in psychoanalysis, together with subsequent attempts at drive-relational synthesis, showing that the original shift was misguided and conceptually flawed, that the attempts at synthesis inherited the problems from the original shift, and that a new synthesis is warranted.

The essential tension between the two approaches is identified, namely, the contention that drive formulations are incompatible with relational configurations. This is followed by an exploration of reactions to the shift in the form of recent attempts at synthesis.

A critical evaluation of the relational approach and the recent attempts at synthesis is then provided. It is demonstrated that the original shift was misguided, based on misinterpretations and misconceptions of Freudian theory, informed by a problematic dualist social constructionist and relativist philosophical stance which sees mind as somehow disconnected from biological processes, therefore requiring a different epistemological approach. It illustrates how recent attempts at synthesis, and attempts to combine psychoanalysis and neuroscience, have inherited these earlier problems, leaving them equally unable to withstand critical scrutiny.

As a result, this work aims to make a positive contribution by presenting a new drive-relational-neuroscience synthesis that is both philosophically coherent and empirically compatible with recent developments in psychology and the neurosciences. Specifically, the new synthesis: (1) is based on a conceptually sound realist philosophy which posits mind as extended and embodied; (2) emerges from a re-examination of Freud’s writings by demonstrating how instinctual drives and relational strivings constitute interlinked aspects of an overall motivational structure; (3) includes a much-needed clarification of the role of the central concepts of evolutionary theory and motivational conflict; (4) is strengthened and supported by appropriately interpreted current neuroscientific research; and (5) addresses implications for psychotherapeutic theory. In this way, the book is clearly located within the broader context of integrating psychoanalytic theory into mainstream developments in contemporary psychology, including neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, embodied/hot cognition, personality, and psychotherapy.

The explicit concern of this undertaking is the major contrast in the debate between classical and relational approaches to psychoanalysis, and it is simply beyond its scope to cover each and every development in the historical trajectory of the psychoanalytic field, such as, for example, the Adlerian school (emphasis on inferiority, superiority and compensation), Lacanian theory (discourse on philosophical anthropology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of ethics), Lichtenberg’s motivational systems theory (offered as an alternative to drive theory), etc.

Given the specific concern, it also goes beyond the scope of this book to offer a comprehensive exegesis regarding every facet of the psychotherapeutic spectrum. Even so, the focus on theory does not get us away from what this is ultimately all about, namely, treating patients and aiding human suffering. On the contrary, theoretical critique is seen as a necessary foundation, as clinical practice based on shaky theoretical grounds is unacceptable relative to the scientist-practitioner model endorsed by professional psychology. Still, it is considered that the therapeutic model and relevant information provided in the last chapter, will allow readers to further explore elements of the model which may be of particular interest to them.

As this examination principally centres on conceptual and logical analyses of the issues at hand, a range of direct quotations is provided in order to adequately substantiate the arguments advanced in the respective chapters. Given the contentious nature of the issues discussed, it is deemed important to allow the reader to see that the material is there, as argued.

Finally, I want to give special thanks to Agnes Petocz, Glenn Newbery, and Nigel Mackay for helpful discussions on material that formed an earlier version of this manuscript.

Table of Contents

About the Author

Dedication

Copyright Information

Epigraphs

Preface

Chapter 1: Introduction

PART ONE: BACKGROUND

Chapter 2: The Shift from Drive to Relational Theory

Origins of the shift and its historical trajectory.

Perceptions of and objections to Freud’s drive theory: thesis

Relational theory’s alternative: antithesis

Conclusion

Chapter 3: Reactions to the Shift from Drive to Relational Theory

Dissatisfaction with the shift

Recent attempts at integration: synthesis

Taub’s (2009) analysis of the shift

Conclusion

PART TWO: CRITIQUE

Chapter 4: Re-examination of Freud’s Drive Theory

Critique of objections involving accurate representations of Freud’s stance

Critique of objections involving misunderstandings/misrepresentations of Freud’s stance

Summary and conclusions

Chapter 5: Re-examination of Relational Theory’s Alternative

Relational theory’s grounding in pseudo-dichotomies

Relational theory’s alternative philosophical stance: social constructionism and relativism

Can relations be primary?

Mind as dyadic

Summary and conclusions

Chapter 6: Re-examination of Previous Attempts at Synthesis

Pine (1990)

Slavin and Kriegman (1992)

Kernberg (1976, 2001)

Ellman (2010)

Conclusion

Chapter 7: Bringing it all Together: Problems, Confusions, Misconceptions

Philosophical incoherence

The underlying moral agenda

Misconceptions of Freudian drive theory

Confusions about the primary/derivative distinction

Conclusion: Towards a new synthesis

PART THREE: TOWARDS A NEW SYNTHESIS

Chapter 8: Introduction - The Essential Tension Resolved

Chapter 9: Neuropsychoanalysis and Psychodynamic Neuroscience

Neuropsychoanalysis: A general collaboration

Psychodynamic neuroscience: At the neuroscience end of the continuum

Problems with neuropsychoanalysis and psychodynamic neuroscience

Towards resolution of the problems: Realism as an alternative framework

Conclusion

Chapter 10: A New Drive-Relational-Neuroscience Synthesis

A coherent philosophical framework

Two key explanatory tenets

Incorporating aspects of neuropsychoanalysis and psychodynamic neuroscience

Applying the drive-relational-neuroscience complex to the mind as relation

Summary and conclusions

Chapter 11: Implications for the theory and practice of psychotherapy

Corrects the notion of a theory-therapy dichotomy in classical psychoanalysis

Causal field approach recognises all factors explaining behaviour

A genuinely comprehensive approach to therapy

Grounds and explains the well-known common factors finding

Summary and conclusions

References

Chapter 1: Introduction

It is widely held both inside and outside the psychoanalytic field that Freud’s classical drive theory has not withstood the test of time, and that alternative theories are required. One major radical departure from classical drive theory has been the movement known as relational psychoanalysis, recently championed in the work of Stephen Mitchell (e.g., Mitchell, 1984, 1988, 1998).

According to the relational perspective, Freud’s classical drive theory rests on an outmoded framework that explains mind in nineteenth century terms of matter and energy, assigning mental experience to biological and constitutional processes. In contrast, the relational model is promoted as primarily making sense of mental experience within a social and cultural matrix of relatedness to others (Aron & Harris, 2005; Mitchell, 1988; Mitchell & Aron, 1999).

This shift from drive to relational psychoanalysis forms part of an overall post-empiricist, postmodernist momentum, still reverberating in almost every contemporary intellectual discipline, including the mind sciences (Mitchell & Aron, 1999). The philosophical stance of relational psychoanalysis is closely intertwined with the two cousins of the postmodernist movement, namely social constructionism and relativism (Hoffman, 1999; Lyons-Ruth, 2005):

…we … accept the proposition that experience can exist in an unformulated state … on purely phenomenological grounds. The theoretical view of thought from which the concept of unformulated experience is best understood might be called constructivism. The theories in this broad category, which includes most of present-day cognitive psychology, have in common an emphasis on experience as made or constructed, not merely received, as in the older associationist view … such as Freud’s… (Stern, 1999, p. 85)

This [relativist] view is simply that reality is not a pre-established given or absolute… (Hoffman, 1999, p. 58)

In a relational model of inquiry, discovery, and truth … are themselves viewed as problematic. (Spezzano, 1999, p. 454)

But, despite ever-expanding influence, there are a few voices of discontent with the so-called relational turn in psychoanalysis.

Mills (2005), for example, argues that the original shift from drives to relations was largely based on an unrelenting misinterpretation of Freudian theory (p. 27), characterized by absolutist overstatements and failure to recognise the implicitness of relational concepts in Freud’s psychological works.

Klein and Tribich (1981) agree by reminding us that, in developing his theory of human nature, Freud left hardly a stone unturned … [why would he miss] …fixing a definite place for object relations in his psychology of human nature (p.29)?

More recently, Taub (2009) takes a broad historical and philosophical perspective, contending that the drive-relational debate became unnecessarily entangled in a philosophical controversy over epistemology (p. 507). Instead of staying focused on the core debate issue, namely, whether object-relations are derivatives of drive discharge or whether they have a primary motivational function, the investigation started assuming a philosophical form. According to Taub, rather than examining the theoretical issues at hand, the relational school’s argument engaged in a philosophical discourse by tying the drive model to positivism and by querying the latter’s quest for objective knowledge. The relational movement aligned itself, in contrast, with a postmodern epistemology, by posing questions regarding the status of truth and knowledge in general. Taub concludes that the debate would be much better served by distancing itself from philosophical considerations and returning to the key theoretical questions initially informing the disagreement.

However, this book takes the position that Taub (2009) is only partially correct. It is true that the drive versus relation debate became absorbed into the larger shift from positivism to postmodernism (as it is usually described). It is also true that this deflected attention away from the need to consider a number of theoretical questions, the most important of which is the question whether relations are drive-derivatives or motivationally independent of drives. But, contrary to Taub’s (2009) recommendation, the debate cannot simply distance itself from any philosophical considerations. Philosophical and metatheoretical issues cannot be avoided, because it is confusions in those areas that have contributed to the shift itself. Moreover, the confusions and misconceptions that arose from social constructionist and relativist views have continued to reverberate throughout the whole field of psychoanalysis; they have extended across the trajectory, not only in the rejection of drive theory and the offering of relational alternatives, but even in the various attempts at synthesis of the drive and relational models (Ellman, 2010; Kernberg, 1976, 2001; Slavin & Kriegman, 1992; Pine, 1990), and they have also extended to recent endeavours to combine psychoanalysis and neuroscience in the disciplines known as neuropsychoanalysis and psychodynamic neuroscience (Damasio, 1999; Fotopoulou, 2012b; Schore, 1999; Solms & Nersessian, 1999; Panksepp, 1999a).

These confusions and misconceptions centre on four major interconnected and mutually reinforcing problems.

The first problem relates to the philosophical incoherence that encompasses an underlying dualist philosophy of mind, promoting the notion that mental functions operate somehow independently from the body and its processes, as indicated in the idea of cognitive science that mind operates in a computational manner (Albus, 2010; Bob, 2011; Fodor, 1981, 1990; O’Reilly et al., 2002; Pylyshyn, 1984; Roskies, 1999; Sun, 2008), and culminating in the proposal by relational psychoanalysis that mind is essentially socially constructed (Mitchell, 1988; Stern, 1999). This dualism leads to the setting up of forced dichotomies: drives versus relations, meanings that are biologically given versus meanings that are socially constructed, and intrasubjectivity versus intersubjectivity (here the notion intrapsychic or intrasubjective refers to inner, individual subjective mental experience, and the notion interpsychic or intersubjective refers to mutual or shared interpersonal subjective mental experience)(Benjamin, 1999, p. 183; Mitchell, 1988, pp. 9-10; Slavin & Kriegman, 1992, p. 270; Stolorow & Atwood, 1984). The view that these contrasts involve mutually exclusive categories leads to the claim that drive and relational models are essentially alternative and conceptually incompatible (Mitchell, 1988, p. 54). Moreover, it is claimed by relational theorists that, as reality and meaning are intersubjectively constructed, knowledge is perpetually arbitrary or relative in nature (Hoffman, 1999; Spezzano, 1999).

The second problem is that the implicit moral agenda that underlies the preferred dualist philosophy fuels the aversion to Freud’s realism, determinism and materialism, and intrudes into questions that are ostensibly treated as theoretical and scientific.

The third problem is the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Freudian drive theory, over and above the rejection of that theory on the grounds of its accurately perceived but unpalatable theoretical commitments to the same realism, determinism and materialism.

The final problem centres on confusions about the distinction within Freudian drive theory between what is primary and what is derivative. This problem is partly the result of a neglect of evolutionary considerations, which is itself prompted by the combination of the implicit moral stance and the dualist conception of human nature.

Therefore, a much more thorough and detailed critique of the drive to relational shift and subsequent synthesis attempts is required. This book undertakes that critique, and, based on its conclusions from that critique, develops a new drive-relational-neuroscience synthesis that is argued to be free from the four main problems identified.

This book is divided into three parts:

Part One (Background) presents the historical and conceptual background, outlining the essential tension (the phrase adopted here refers to Kuhn’s (1978) identification of an essential tension between conservative and innovative approaches in the development of knowledge) between drive theory and relational theory, and traces the historical trajectory of the shift from drive to relational theory. It provides an exposition both of the standard perceptions of and objections to Freud’s drive thesis and of relational theory’s antithesis. It then explores reactions to the shift in the form of recent attempts at synthesis.

Part Two (Critique) provides a critical evaluation of these attempts. It revisits the essential tension, re-examines Freud’s drive theory via a critical exegesis of his own published writings, and then re-examines relational theory’s alternative stance. This is followed by a critique of the previous attempts at synthesis. The critique identifies a number of problems in these attempts, and argues that such attempts have not been successful.

Part Three (Towards a New Synthesis) develops a new drive-relational-neuroscience synthesis by presenting the final coherent picture, bringing together all the strands dealt with in Parts One and Two. Specifically, the new synthesis: is based on a conceptually sound realist philosophy which posits mind as extended and embodied (Damasio, 1994; Freud, 1940/2001; Mackay & Petocz, 2011a; Panksepp, 1998; Petocz & Mackay; 2013; Petocz, 2011a; Siegel, 2008); includes a much-needed clarification of the key explanatory tenets (i.e., evolutionary theory, motivational conflict); includes appropriately interpreted material from neuropsychoanalysis and psychodynamic neuroscience; posits mentality as a relation between subject and object terms; and addresses implications for theorizing about the psychotherapeutic process, the major implication being a holistic or comprehensive approach.

PART ONE: BACKGROUND

Part One of this book provides a descriptive account of the shift from drive to relational theory. It depicts the underlying nature of the essential tension as presented by relational psychoanalysis, which is the claim that a dichotomy exists between Freud’s notion of endopsychic structure based directly on the vicissitudes of instinctual drives and an alternative view which makes sense of mental experience within a social and cultural matrix. It then describes how this transition from drive to relational theory was far from a smooth process in that a number of scholars have recently become disenchanted with the debate between the two competing models. Chapter 2 presents the perceptions of and objections to Freud’s drive approach (thesis) by relational theorists, and the alternative model (antithesis) provided by them. Chapter 3 describes reactions to the shift, and how a number of scholars have illuminated the great deal of overlap between these two competing currents in offering their respective attempts at integration (synthesis).

Chapter 2: The Shift from Drive to Relational Theory

Rubens (1994) identifies two broad, competing theoretical perspectives which emerged in psychoanalytic history. The first perspective is the original Freudian structural theory and the drive model it embodied. The second is a model described as radically different (Rubens, 1994, p. 151) with ideas considered to have a more profound influence (p. 151) on the general spectrum of contemporary psychoanalytic thinking, proposing that mind is structured through interaction. This chapter will aim to describe how this shift came about, and the theoretical and philosophical factors informing the change in direction.

According to Greenberg and Mitchell (1983):

The most significant tension in the history of psychoanalytic ideas has been the dialectic between the original Freudian model, which takes as its starting point the instinctual drives, and a comprehensive model initiated in the works of Fairbairn and Sullivan, which evolves structure solely from the individual’s relations with other people. Accordingly, we designate the original model the drive/structure model and the alternative perspective the relational/structure model. (p. 20)

This tension has resulted in a marked shift in psychoanalytic theory, described by Mitchell (1988) as a revolution in the history of psychoanalytic ideas (p. 2). This shift is characterised by a divergence from Freud’s notion of endopsychic structure based directly on the vicissitudes of instinctual drives, to an alternative perspective which considers relations with others, not drives, as the basic stuff of mental life (Mitchell, 1988, p. 2). Freud is charged with according drive or id operations central organisational status in terms of psychic structuring. Instead, the relational model accords relational configurations central significance, claiming psychic structuring to be shaped through the nature of and experience in relationships. In the later re-examination of Freud’s drive theory (Chapter 4), the charge regarding the central focus of drive, and a number of associated charges flowing from that, will be assessed critically. In the present chapter, the origins of the shift, perceptions of and objections to Freud’s drive theory, and relational theory’s alternative, will be presented descriptively.

Origins of the shift and its historical trajectory.

There appear to be divergent views amongst psychoanalytic writers as to when and by whom the shift to relational theory was initiated. Whilst Mitchell (1988) regards Fairbairn and Sullivan to be the main protagonists in terms of promoting a social psychoanalytic theory of mind, Salter Ainsworth (1969) traces the emergence of an object-relations theme beyond Fairbairn, back to the early formative years of psychoanalysis. She credits the work of the Hungarian school of psychoanalysis led by Ferenczi with recognizing that true object- relations are present right from the very beginning of the infant’s life. Aron (1996) agrees with the latter contention, but also includes Rank as one of the forerunners to contemporary relational psychoanalysis. Schafer (1983) sees it differently, by suggesting that the two different psychoanalytic theoretical traditions, i.e., the drive and relational models, rest on the same fundamental assumptions, but that the differences between these traditions lie in their using two different languages when pursuing similar questions regarding mind development.

Hall (2007) observes two different relational traditions which emerged in post-classical psychoanalysis. The first is what he refers to as a broad group of relational theories, representing object-relations perspectives, but continuing to identify itself with psychoanalysis. The second comes from John Bowlby’s attachment theory that separated itself from psychoanalysis.

Consistent with Hall’s observation, Mitchell identifies three historical psychoanalytic traditions, the first being the classical Freudian, the second the object-relations theorists who continued to identify themselves with Freud, and the third those who completely rejected all drive model premises (1988).

According to Mitchell, Freudian or classical psychoanalysis always claimed that the relational matrix is tautological with respect to drive theory (1988, pp. 53, 281). In terms of this perspective, the notion of drive is narrowly intertwined with that of a relational field within which it seeks expression. It posits that transactional patterns involving any form of object-relations or self-organization, cannot be adequately explained without drive references.

The second group follows a strategy which Mitchell terms, model mixing (pp. 56, 284) in the sense that they have developed a theoretical view quite distinctive from, but still regarded as compatible with, that of Freud. The most prominent figures in this group comprise Anna Freud, Hartmann, Mahler, Spitz, Klein, Winnicott, Kohut, and Kernberg.

Anna Freud (Freud, 1946, 1965) and Hartmann (1939/1958) are considered to be the founders of ego psychology (Ellman, 2010; Mitchell & Black, 1995). But, whereas Hartmann’s (1939/1958) work was mainly focused on the conflict-free and adaptive sphere of ego functioning, Anna Freud mostly concerned herself with psychoanalytic child psychology and various types of defense mechanisms which may be employed by patients during analysis (Freud, 1946, 1965).

The object relational ego psychology traditions, which sprung out of the work of Anna Freud, are most prominently represented by the work of Spitz (1965) and Mahler (1968). Whilst Spitz (1965) maintained the drive concept of libido as pleasure-seeking, he traced how the biologically adaptive infant-mother connection evolved into a set of complex object-relations capacities, parallel to libidinal pursuits. Mahler (1968) investigated the early phases of child development, defining it as a process of separation-individuation. Although she regarded genetic and constitutional factors as playing a key role in symbiotic dysfunctions, she ultimately related problematic psychological functioning of the child to disturbances of critical merger experiences with its mother during early developmental years.

In addition to Anna Freud and her followers, the other two factions in the British Psychoanalytic Society (Mitchell & Black, 1995) comprised of the middle group, who held a neutral position, and Melanie Klein and her followers. Klein (1932; 1945; 1957/1997) primarily focused on understanding the processes of innate phantasy and aggression, extending Freud’s theories in this regard to developmental processes occurring earlier than the Oedipal phase (Klein, 1932, 1945). However, her elaboration of these earlier conflicts became significantly different to those conceptualised by Freud (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Klein regarded psychic conflict as developing from struggles centred on experiencing the terror of annihilation and abandonment, rather than emanating from instinctual wishes, and fears of sanctioning and guilt (Klein, 1957/1997).

Winnicott (1953; 1960; 1965/1990) is seen as the only member of the middle group who continued to employ drive terminology, whilst developing an object-relationship theory in terms of the quality of the infant’s experience during the earliest months of development (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Although being initially a close collaborator of Klein, he eventually formulated a different perspective, firstly regarding the infant-mother relationship, and then the patient-analyst relationship (Ellman, 2010; Mitchell & Black, 1988). He viewed the role of the good enough (Winnicott, 1960, p. 591) mother in the earliest months of the infant’s life to be that of creating a facilitating or holding environment (p. 590) shaped around the child’s physiological and psychological wishes. As the child develops, the role of the care-giver increasingly incorporates reflecting back to the child their own sense of being.

Kohut (1971; 1984), in a similar manner to Winnicott (1965/1990), also saw development as involving an emerging sense of self. Initially, his formulations were sourced from Freudian ego psychology, but later progressed to transforming Freud’s conceptualisations of narcissism (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Although he abandoned the concept of drive from his formulations, Kohut largely maintains an intrapsychic view of mind, regarding self as generally operating independently in relational transactions (Mitchell, 1988). He proposes that a healthy, cohesive and stable sense of self (normal narcissism) develops not only through providing for the child’s needs and desires, but also by performing mirroring, idealising and alter ego (to feel alike) functions (Kohut, 1984).

Like Kohut, Kernberg (1976; 2001) traces his ideas mainly to the ego psychology tradition, but he also acknowledges his debt to Klein’s model of early mental life (Mitchell, 1988). He differentiates between two major developmental tasks, firstly a separation of self from object images, and secondly the overcoming of this splitting process. The latter is achieved by the holding together of good self and object images through positive, libidinally derived affects, this unison being kept separate from negative self and bad object images (Kernberg, 1976). In contrast to Freud, Kernberg (1976, pp. 86, 104; 2001, p. 611) postulates that drives are not endogenously present, but that they emerge from the powerful affective states associated with early object relational transactions.

Mitchell’s third broad historical group is comprised of theorists who radically departed from the drive model, claiming that drive and relational concepts are fundamentally alternative (1988, p. 54) and conceptually incompatible (p. 289). The most significant early figures in this group are Fairbairn, Sullivan and Bowlby.

Fairbairn (1930/1995, 1952a) departed from Freud’s libido premise by proposing that the fundamental motivational aspect in the human experience is not a push for tension reduction by means of pleasure and gratification, but to establish connections with others:

…whilst ‘impulses’ necessarily involve object-relationships, they cannot be considered apart from ego-structures, since it is only ego-structures that can seek relationships with objects. ‘Impulses’ must accordingly be regarded as representing simply the dynamic aspect of ego-structures; and there consequently arises a necessity for the replacement of the old impulse-psychology by a new psychology of dynamic structure… (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 167, emphasis in original)

Deriving his conclusion from his work with children, Fairbairn (1952a) claimed that the particular manner in which children attach to their caregivers serves as a template for subsequent emotional interactions with others. Healthy development entails a parenting style which encourages the child to experience adaptive, real interactions. Pathology, on the other hand, occurs when the interactional process is thwarted, and the painful and sabotaging patterns associated with that become futile vehicles for attempting to maintain connections with significant others.

Sullivan (1950, 1953) also remained unconvinced about the importance ascribed to instinctual impulses and wishes in terms of determining behaviour. Instead, he preferred to focus on the interpersonal field, and the way in which past relationships contributed to the dynamics of the present field (Mitchell & Black, 1995). He therefore regards personality formation as the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterise a human life (Sullivan, 1953, pp. 110-11). Although he agrees that consistent patterns of behaviour evolve, these patterns are not considered to be reflective of biological mechanisms inside the individual, but rather responses to and shaped by social situations themselves.

Bowlby’s (1969, 1973) approach, akin to Freud’s, was narrowly informed by evolutionary theory, though he favours a different, primary motivational factor. Bowlby (1969) conceives of the infant’s need to establish and maintain a tie with its mother to be an evolutionarily wired-in mechanism. He terms this survival mechanism attachment, defining it as a lasting psychological connectedness between human beings (p.194). He establishes the attachment concept as the centrepiece of his theoretical model by using it to describe healthy development and the emotional security that flows from the consistent availability of attachment figures, as well as the anxiety associated with prolonged separation (Bowlby, 1969; Mitchell & Black, 1995; Salter Ainsworth, 1969). A major contribution of Bowlby (1969) is seen to be the manner in which he linked and overlapped psychoanalytic ideas with similar interests held by other disciplines, particularly, ethology, biology and developmental research (Mitchell & Black, 1995).

Whilst Mitchell (1988) cautiously explains how Bowlby’s theory is best understood not as wholly externally derived, but as grounded in the genetics and physiology of human experience (p. 20), he seemingly favours Fairbairn and Sullivan as the purest representatives (p. 18) of a social theory of mind. Mitchell and his colleagues primarily used Fairbairn and Sullivan’s theoretical formulations to launch what is now known as relational psychoanalysis (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Harris, 1992; Mitchell, 1988; Mitchell & Aron, 1999). As the work of relational psychoanalysis is of primary interest to this book, a descriptive account of objections to Freud’s drive theory will mainly focus on their articulations.

Perceptions of and objections to Freud’s drive theory: thesis

Relational theorists believe that the discontent with drive theory was formally initiated by Fairbairn (1930/1995), who queries the psychological validity of Freud’s drive thesis:

The whole development of Freud’s theory of instinct, indeed, goes to show that it is not a psychological theory at all. It is a biological theory of instinct, and this fact alone leads us to expect to find it weak on the psychological side. (p. 122)

Such discontent gained a unified momentum, when later further crystallized by writers such as Aron (1990), Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) and Harris (1992). Although there is a degree of heterogeneity in terms of the ideas of these writers, they tend to jointly coalesce or arrive at the same negative perceptions of, or objections to, Freud’s drive model (Mitchell, 1988).

In their objections, relational theorists offer distinctive themes of philosophical, theoretical and clinical critiques of drive theory, focusing in particular on its notion of psychic energy. In brief, it is claimed that Freud, in a Darwinian manner, portrays humans as being only incompletely evolved, and that his overemphasis on what is innate equates to biological reductionism. Freud is also accused of subscribing to psychic determinism and propagating an intrapsychic or monadic view of mind. Furthermore, drive functioning as described by Freud must be a non-cognitive activity. In addition, Freud is blamed for sketching a too gloomy and pessimistic view of human nature and for having a disproportionate focus on human alienation and self-deception. His model is seen as being overly mechanistic and too far removed from the analysand’s experience. Lastly, it is claimed that classical psychoanalysis has a distant and authoritarian therapeutic approach. Each of these claims will now be examined in turn.

Darwinian portrayal of humans. Mitchell maintains that Freud arrived at his depth psychology framework by drawing from dramatic discoveries by nineteenth century evolutionary biology:

...Freud’s clinical theory of sexuality, and the drive theory metapsychology which encases it, [is an] ...analogue of the structure of Darwin’s theory of the evolution of the human species. Just as lower organisms evolve into higher forms of life, bestial sexual and aggressive impulses are transformed into the entire array of civilized human activities. (1988, p. 73)

A general discomfort is expressed regarding the manner in which Freud, as a principal scientific heir of Charles Darwin (Sulloway, 1979, p. 5), links his postulations regarding repression and civilizing social controls to those drawn from evolutionary biology, specifically his supposed ideas regarding how aspects of human sexuality may